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ELECTORAL MYTH AND REALITY: THE 1964 ELECTION

Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller
University of Michigan

On Election Day, 1964, the aspirations of Senator Barry Goldwater and the conservative wing of the Republican Party were buried under an avalanche of votes cast for incumbent President Lyndon Johnson. The margin of victory, approaching 16 million votes, was unprecedented. Historical comparisons with other presidential landslides are left somewhat indeterminate by the intrusion of third parties. However, it is safe to observe that Johnson's 61.3 percent of the two-party popular vote put him in the same general range as the striking victories of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936, Harding in 1920, and Theodore Roosevelt in 1904.

Before the fact, the election was also expected to be the most intensely ideological campaign since 1936, in no small measure because of Goldwater's reputation as a "pure" conservative. After the fact, doubts existed as to whether this expectation had been fulfilled. Goldwater supporters, in particular, expressed disappointment that President Johnson had refused to join battle on any of the fundamental ideological alternatives that were motivating the Goldwater camp. However, as we shall see, the mass public had some sense that "important differences" between the two major parties were heightened in 1964 compared with parallel data from either 1960 or, as is more impressive, the relatively tense election of 1952.[1] And certainly no one questioned the importance of ideological differences in the factional dispute that split the Republican Party along liberal-conservative lines with an enduring bitterness unmatched in decades.

Indeed, these three prime elements of the 1964 election—faction, ideology and the contest for votes—became intertwined after the manner of a classic script. That is, the "outer" ideological wing of a party captures its nomination, leaving a vacuum toward the center of gravity of national opinion. This vacuum is gleefully filled by the opposing party without any loss of votes from its own side of the spectrum. The outcome, logically and inexorably, is a landslide at the polls.[2]

With a script so clearly written in advance, the outsider would naturally ask why any party controlled by rational strategists should choose a course likely to lead to such massive repudiation in its name. The answers to this question in the 1964 case are not particularly obscure, although they can be made at numerous levels. One answer, of course, is that Republican Party strategists were themselves in deep disagreement as to just what script was relevant: many recognized the classic script and predicted the eventual outcome, with all of its attendant losses for other Republican candidates, in deadly accuracy.

For the factional dispute within Republican ranks involved not only an ideological clash, but also major differences in the perception of that political reality which becomes important in winning votes and elections. The Goldwater faction was told by its Republican adversaries, as the conservative wing had been told for years, that a Goldwater could not conceivably defeat a Democratic President, and would instead greatly damage the party ticket at all levels. The Goldwater group countered that a victory for their man was entirely plausible despite the danger signals of the spring polls and the normal difficulties of challenging an incumbent. It is not clear how sincere or widespread this confidence was: some statements sounded as though the Goldwater candidacy had little chance of winning but would at least provide a forum for the conservative philosophy, along with control of the Republican Party. But even in their more pessimistic moments, the Goldwater people would argue that while victory might be difficult, they certainly saw no reason to believe that Goldwater would do worse than any other Republican challenger, or encounter the electoral disaster the liberals were predicting.

---

[1] The collection of data from a national sample of the electorate around the 1964 election was made possible by a grant to the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which had also supported the 1952 election study.

[2] The most fertile elaboration of this classic script is of course contained in Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957).

Similarly, at the San Francisco nominating convention, his opponents vehemently charged that Goldwater was a "minority candidate," even among Republicans in this country. In another direct clash of perceptions, Senator Goldwater is said to have remarked to a group of Midwestern delegates, "What the minority [the convention liberals] can't get through their heads is that this is a true representation of the Republican Party."[3]

In this article we wish to examine the relationship between such conflicting perceptions and what is known of the relevant reality in the context of the 1964 election. Our information comes primarily from sample survey studies of the mass public that formed the electorate in 1964, and whose reactions represent one level of political reality about which so many conflicting opinions and predictions were made. While the most important aspect of that reality was unveiled by the election outcome, there remained some of the customary latitude of interpretation as to its full significance. And with respect to the interplay between the stratagems of party elites on one hand and the grass-roots American voters on the other, the chronology of the 1964 election does indeed provide a fascinating composite of sheer myth, genuine but discrepant reality worlds, and self-fulfilling prophecies.

I. THE MYTH OF THE STAY-AT-HOME REPUBLICANS

The first theory of electoral reality on our agenda may be rapidly disposed of, for it lies more simply and unequivocally in the realm of myth than any of the others we shall treat. It should not be overlooked, however, both because of its historical persistence and because of its enshrinement in the battle cry of 1964 Goldwater supporters: "A choice, not an echo!"

In the quadrennial competition between liberal and conservative wings of the Republican Party for the presidential nomination throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the conservatives were consistently bested. One of the prime contentions of the liberals was that all of the entries of the conservative wing were so distant from the "middle-of-the-road" that they had no hope of attracting the independent votes necessary for victory over the Democrats. At an ideological level, the conservative wing coined the epithet "me-tooism" to ridicule the liberals for their refusal to reject Democratic innovations of the New and Fair Deal eras root and branch. The liberals, it was charged, were slowly selling out the fundamental principles on which earlier days of G.O.P. ascendancy had been based.

This accusation of ideological "flabbiness" was not, however, compelling of itself without some further comment on the problem of winning votes. As a consequence, a theory became widely current among conservative Republicans that G.O.P. difficulties in maintaining much contact with the White House were in fact directly tied to the "me-tooist" flavor of its presidential candidates. Republicans running for that office tended to lose not because there was any lack of potential Republican votes (as the superficial observer might have thought), but because many of the "real" Republicans were sufficiently offended by "me-tooism" that they simply didn't bother to vote at all. Nominate a true Republican rather than a Tweedledee, the theory went, and enough of these stay-at-homes would return to the polls to put him into the White House.

As such theories go, this contention was remarkably verifiable. That is, the critic need not argue that few Republicans were disappointed by the nominees of their party, for disappointment in itself is irrelevant for argument. The question is simply whether or not Republicans, however disappointed, did continue to turn out and vote even for "me-tooist" candidates through this period—a matter much easier to ascertain. Nor is there any point in arguing that there were *never* any stray Republicans who in the last analysis vented their frustrations by refusing to go to the polls. Undoubtedly there were. But the theory hinges less on the question as to whether such people existed, than on the contention that they existed in significant numbers: not merely several hundred or several thousand or even a few hundred thousand, but in the millions needed to overcome the persistent Democratic majorities.

Such a pool of potential voters would be large enough to be discriminated reliably in most sample surveys. And we know of no reputable sample surveys at any time in this period that gave any shred of reason to believe that this significant pool of stay-at-home Republicans existed. Indeed, such findings as were relevant pointed massively in the opposite direction. From 1944 on, for example, one can contrast turnout rates between Democrats and Republicans of comparable strengths of identification. And over election after election featuring "me-tooist" Republican nominees, one finds that turnout rates are consistently higher —and often much higher—on the Republican side. Indeed, each time we isolate that polar minority who not only have an intense commitment to the Republican Party, but whose commitment is of a highly sensitive ideological sort, turnout typically reaches proportions staggering for the American system: 96 percent, 98 percent—levels almost implausible in view of registration difficulties, travel, sickness and other accidents which can keep the most devoted American from the polls upon occasion. More impressive still, we find that in 1952 those Republicans who reported during the campaign that they would have preferred the "conservative" Taft over the "liberal" Eisenhower—exactly those Republicans to whom the theory refers—actually turned out at much *higher* rates to vote for Eisenhower in the November election (94 percent) than did the set of Republicans who indicated satisfaction with Eisenhower's nomination (84 percent).[4]

---

[3] *The New York Times*, July 19, 1964.

These brief observations do not begin to exhaust the evidence, none of which lends any support whatever to the theory of a silent pool of frustrated conservative Republicans. Hence it is scarcely surprising that the Goldwater cause in 1964 was not buoyed up by some sudden surge of new support at the polls which other strategists had overlooked; for the hitherto silent people expected to provide such a surge existed principally in the imaginations of conservative strategists who in time of adversity needed desperately to believe that they were there. It is less of a wonder that this theory was generated, particularly before sample survey data took on much scope or stature in the 1940s, than that it persisted with greater or lesser vigor into the 1960s in the face of repetitive contradictory evidence readily available to any proponents with an edge of interest as to what the facts actually were.

II. THE MINORITY CANDIDATE OF A MINORITY PARTY

On the eve of the Republican nominating convention, an irate Goldwater supporter wrote to the Paris edition of the *Herald Tribune*, upbraiding it for the doubts it had expressed as to the extent of Goldwater sentiment beyond the convention delegates themselves, and pointing out that a massive groundswell of support had built up for Goldwater throughout the country "west of Madison Avenue."

The charge of the liberal wing of the G.O.P. that Goldwater not only was unattractive to Democrats and Independents but was not even the majority preference of Republicans was a particularly severe allegation in view of the constraints under which the Republican Party has been obliged to operate in recent years. It has been the consensus of observers for quite some time that the Republican Party is a minority party in the affections of the American public. Our relevant data collections at frequent intervals since 1952 have left little question in our minds both as to the minority status of the Republicans, and as to the stability of that status during this epoch. For most of this time, our estimates would suggest that in terms of underlying loyalties, the Democrats could expect to receive, all other things equal, something in the neighborhood of 54 percent of the national popular vote; and if any change has been occurring in this figure in the past 15 years, it is that this Democratic majority is slowly increasing.[5] In practical terms, this means that a Democratic candidate need not have much attraction for grass-roots Republicans: he can win easily if he can but carry the votes of a reasonable share of independents, and has general appeal for Democrats. A Republican candidate, on the other hand, can only win at the national level by drawing nearly monolithic support from Republicans, attracting the votes of a lion's share of independents, and inducing unusual defection among the less committed Democratic identifiers as well. The latter was the Eisenhower formula, and one which Nixon had nearly succeeded in following in 1960. More generally, the liberal wing of the Republican Party had sought candidates with this kind of broad appeal throughout this period. In this light, the question of Goldwater's popularity was serious: for if a minority party nominates a figure enjoying only minority support within his own party, it is an obvious invitation to disaster.

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[4] This datum is not as absurd as it might appear if the reader has failed to grasp the import of the preceding text. That is, in 1952 it was the most intense and ideologically "pure" Republicans who tended to prefer Taft to Eisenhower, much as 12 years later their counterparts chose Goldwater over the other Republican alternatives. It was the less ideologically committed (either by persuasion or by lack of ideological sensitivity) who were more satisfied with the Eisenhower candidature. The erstwhile Taft supporters did not perversely turn out at higher rates because they were disappointed in the convention choice, but because their striking commitment to Republicanism compelled them to more ardent support of its candidate whatever his ideological position.

[5] See "The Concept of a 'Normal Vote,' " ch. 1 in A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York, 1965.)

In the spring and early summer of 1964, the opinion polls lent much weight to the contention that Goldwater enjoyed no broad support even among Republicans. The Goldwater supporters tended to counter this kind of evidence either (1) by ignoring the polls; or (2) by questioning the validity of the polls (some Goldwater placards were to read "Gallup didn't count us!"); or (3) by questioning the immutability of the early poll readings. Of these reactions, certainly the last-mentioned was entirely appropriate. That is, in the very early stages of a push toward the presidency, even a person who has been something of a "national" figure as Senator or major Governor for a considerable period may not be recognized by very large portions of the public. Until he has received much more intense national exposure in the limelight of presidential primaries and the nominating convention, "straw polls" as to his popularity can be highly misleading and unstable, particularly if the polling pits such a candidate against other figures with more long-standing national prominence and "household" names.[6]

However, survey data gathered over the course of 1964 can be put together with "hard" data from the presidential primaries to provide an illuminating picture of Goldwater's general popularity and, in particular, the reactions of grass-roots Republicans to him. In January, 1964, before the beginning of the spring primaries, we asked a national sample of the electorate:

> Many people are wondering who will run for President on the Republican side this fall. . . . If you had to make a choice, which Republican leader do you think would be best for our country in 1964?
>
> Who would be your second choice?
>
> Are there any of the leading Republicans that you think would make very bad candidates?

Table I summarizes the responses to this sequence of questions. The open-ended nature of the questions meant that individuals only rated those Republicans whom they were aware of at the time, and thought of as plausible candidates. The table excludes a thin scattering of other mentions. Since the scoring used reflects both the breadth and the intensity of support, a Republican receiving relatively few mentions could not achieve any very high score. Thus, for example, another possible scoring could have shown Henry Cabot Lodge vastly outdistancing all other aspirants, as his references were almost unanimously positive, whereas the other Republicans suffered numerous descriptions as "very bad candidates." However, at this time he was not commonly regarded as an aspirant for the nomination, and the scoring deliberately puts this warm but limited positive feeling toward him in perspective.[7]

The table speaks for itself as to Goldwater's attractiveness as a candidate. Clearly Goldwater's problem was not that he was still too little known: he received mentions from a wider proportion of the electorate than any of his competitors. But for much of the electorate he was an object of antagonism even in January, 1964. And among grass-roots Republicans, where his strength was concentrated, he remained fourth in a field of six.

The sequence of Republican primary elections in the succeeding months tended, with some local variation, to fit the lines suggested by these January reactions. The table presages the startling Lodge write-in victory over both Goldwater and Rockefeller among New Hampshire Republicans in March, as well as his numerous subsequent strong showings. It contains ample warning as well of the amazingly poor Goldwater record in the primaries throughout the spring, including the scattered victories in such seemingly congenial states as conservative Nebraska, where by standing alone on the ticket he managed to win about half of the votes cast over a flood of Nixon and Lodge write-ins. It even renders intelligible the crucial Goldwater victory in California, where write-ins were not permitted, where the sole opponent was Rockefeller, and where Democrats had a hotly fought primary of their own. Indeed, there is room to wonder whether any presidential aspirant has ever contested so many primaries with as disastrous a showing, and still captured the nomination of his party's convention.

---

[6] In our estimation, some challengers of this description have been prematurely discouraged from competition by poll results which might well have changed radically with greater exposure.

[7] Lodge's strong grass-roots popularity was one of the untold stories of the 1960 election, when he ran for vice-president. Well-known for his televised confrontations with the Russian delegation in the United Nations, he was far and away the most widely recognized and warmly regarded first-time vice-presidential candidate in the elections we have studied. Given the tarnish which seems to accompany second efforts at the presidency in American elections and which would undoubtedly have hurt Nixon, it may well be that Lodge, had he been acceptable to the Republican Party leadership, could have pushed Lyndon Johnson to a closer race than any other of the Republican hopefuls.

No evidence from polls of the period, moreover, suggests that Goldwater's popularity showed any sudden increase, even among Republicans, in the short interval between the final primary and the San Francisco convention. In interviewing our sample of the national electorate in September and October, we asked respondents to recall their reactions to the decisions of the Republican convention, including the identity of the candidates they had preferred at the time the convention began, as well as their gratification, indifference or disappointment at the outcome. While these responses suffer the inevitable frailties of any retrospective accounts that go back over an evolving situation, the social and political lines of support and antagonism for the various major contestants in July as reported during the campaign bear so close a resemblance to the lines of support visible in the January, 1964 data, as to make it unlikely that they are badly distorted by selective recollection, *post hoc* rationalization, and the like.

It is most instructive, perhaps, to set these popular reactions to the 1964 Republican convention against a fairly comparable set of data collected in 1952 after the conservative wing had lost its bid to nominate Senator Taft for the presidency against the liberal wing's offering of General Eisenhower, for the bitterness engendered in the 1952 struggle came closer to matching that of 1964 than either of the intervening conventions. Our question in 1952 asked respondents irrespective of partisan allegiance whether they would have preferred to have seen any other candidate nominated in either of the major-party conventions held in Chicago. Thus Republican identifiers could focus their remarks on the Democratic convention in a way that the 1964 question did not permit. However, partisans tended to comment primarily on the outcomes of their own party's nominating conventions.

Among Republican identifiers in the fall of 1952, about one in five recalled having felt a preference for Taft at the time of the convention. Another eight percent had preferred some third candidate. The vast majority of the remaining 72 percent indicated that they had been indifferent to the choices at either convention, or expressed gratification in the selection of Eisenhower as the Republican candidate. Some other Republicans responded that they would have preferred a candidate other than Stevenson from the Democratic convention. Presumably, however, these citizens were satisfied with the Republican convention, and it seems reasonable to conclude that a maximum of some 30 percent of all Republicans in 1952 had ground to recall any disappointment over their party's nomination.

TABLE I. PREFERENCES FOR THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AMONG SELECTED SEGMENTS OF THE ELECTORATE, JANUARY, 1964

		Segments of the Electorate		
	Per cent mentions[a]	Score across total electorate[b]	Score within "Minimal Majority": all Independents and Republicans[b]	Score among all Republicans[b]
	(%)			
Nixon	42	+25	+32	+37
Lodge	10	+11	+13	+13
Romney	11	+ 9	+11	+10
Rockefeller	49	+19	+10	+ 1
Scranton	11	+ 7	+ 6	+ 5
Goldwater	54	− 8	− 5	+ 9

[a] The percentage entered represents the proportion of individuals in the total sample mentioning the Republican leader indicated, either as one of two best or one of two very bad candidates.

[b] Each mention of a leader as the "best" candidate received a score of +2. Each mention as second best received a score of +1. The first-mentioned "bad" candidate received a score of −2. Any negative second mentions were scored −1. The entries in the table represent the net balance of positive or negative scores for the leader, expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible positive score an individual would have received had he been awarded all of the "best" choices given by the indicated segment of the electorate.

The picture from 1964 is remarkably similar in one respect, and drastically different in another. Among Republican identifiers in this latter year, slightly less than 20 percent of all Republicans recalled having preferred Goldwater at the time of the convention. This figure is only one percent less than the proportion of Taft supporters among Republicans in 1952. What was different, of course, was that in 1952 Taft lost the nomination on the first ballot, whereas in 1964 Goldwater won it handily on the first ballot. Although in our 1964 data a large segment (30 percent) of Republican identifiers indicated that they had held no preference for a specific candidate at convention time, very nearly half of all of our Republicans did recall some preference other than Goldwater. Thus these grass-roots Republicans with non-Goldwater choices outnumbered the Goldwater supporters within Republican ranks by a margin of better than two and one-half to one. A clear majority (60 percent) of those with other preferences, when asked "Were you particularly unhappy that Goldwater got the nomination, or did you think that he was nearly as good as your man?," expressed their lingering unhappiness about the outcome.

In sum, then, it is hard to turn up any bit of evidence to challenge the conclusion that Goldwater was, in rather startling degree, a minority candidate within a minority party. If his camp actually believed that the San Francisco delegates represented a true cross-section of grass-roots Republican sentiment, then they had grossly misunderstood the situation. There was, however, at least one extenuating circumstance: the support among Republican citizens for other candidates than Goldwater was split badly among the four or five other leading candidates. Thus while any of several pairs of other candidates had grass-roots party support at convention time which would have outnumbered the Goldwater faction quite readily, the fact remains that the 20 percent Goldwater support represented a plurality for any single candidate.

However this may be, disappointment at the convention outcome in 1964 had radically different consequences in November than the comparable disappointments among Republicans in 1952. As we have seen above, the former Taft supporters in that year turned out at the polls in near-perfect proportions and cast a very faithful Republican vote for Eisenhower. In 1964, however, the widespread defections among Republicans necessary to account for the Johnson landslide tended to follow rather closely the lines of lingering discontent with the nomination.

These recollections of San Francisco varied according to the different camps in which rank-and-file Republicans had located themselves at the time. So, for example, about three Lodge supporters in four reported they were unhappy with the Goldwater nomination; for Rockefeller supporters, the figure was closer to two in three. Slightly over half of the Nixon supporters, however, indicated that they thought Goldwater was "nearly as good" as their man, Nixon. With minor departures, similar patterns marked the ultimate defections to Johnson among these varying Republicans. Since Nixon supporters were, like Goldwater's, more frequently "strong" Republicans than the adherents of some of the other camps, lower defection rates here were only to be expected. However, defections to Johnson among Republicans who had preferred Nixon at convention time remained about double what could be expected from past norms for Republicans of this particular mixture of strengths of identification. Over three times as many Republicans for Lodge and Scranton defected to Johnson as parallel "normal" expectations would suggest, and—perhaps surprisingly—defections among Republicans who expressed no pre-convention favorite at all were in this range as well. Most extreme were the Rockefeller and Romney supporters, with defection rates at the polls exceeding expectation by a factor of greater than four.[8]

These differences across the several non-Goldwater camps are intriguing, in part because they appear related to reactions of the various G.O.P. leaders to the Goldwater candidacy. That is, of the set of major Republicans under discussion, Nixon took greatest pains to maintain relations with the Goldwater group before the convention, and undertook to help unify the party behind him after the nomination. Therefore it seems fitting that dismay at the nomination was least in his camp, and defections relatively limited. Neither Rockefeller nor Romney made any major show of reconciliation after the nomination, and subsequently went to some lengths to dissociate themselves from the Goldwater aspects of the Republican campaign.

Yet if it were true that nothing more than a "follow-the-leader" response is needed to account for these variations in defection rates among Republicans, the data would cast a somewhat different light on the question of conflicting perceptions between liberal and conservative wings of Goldwater's voting strength. For in such a case the Senator's problem would have been less one of gross overestimates of his strength, than of self-fulfilling prophecy on the part of the disgruntled liberal leaders. In other words, they first refused to support Goldwater on grounds that he could not win enough votes, and then proceeded to withhold in large quantities the votes of their "followers" to assure exactly this outcome.

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[8] While these rates may sound mountainous, it should be remembered that the expected defection rates for most of these groups are rather low—in the vicinity of 10 percent. Nonetheless, 40 percent of the Rockefeller Republicans in our sample voted for Johnson.

No airtight way is available to determine whether or not Republican defections at the presidential level might have been reduced significantly had Rockefeller or some of the other liberals effected a more genuine reconciliation with Goldwater to unite the party for the campaign. Nevertheless, if we were to compare the issue positions and ideological persuasions of 1964 Nixon Republicans with those of Rockefeller or Romney Republicans and find no substantial differences, we might be tempted to judge that differences in leader behavior did play some independent role in minimizing or maximizing Republican defections in November. Preliminary analyses suggest rather clearly, however, that substantial ideological differences did exist across the range of Republican factions. Republicans enthusiastic about Goldwater showed a rather unique (or "extreme") pattern of ideological positions. Nixon supporters, while unmistakably different, looked more nearly like the Goldwater people than the adherents of any of the other camps. Next in order moving away from the Goldwater position were the Scranton and Lodge followers, and the Rockefeller and Romney adherents show slightly more liberal positions still. Ideological differences, therefore, plainly existed between grass-roots supporters of the various factions, and these differences were indeed correlated with defections from a Goldwater vote. This does not exclude the possibility that the defections might have been lessened by a genuine "unity" move on the part of more liberal Republican leaders. It indicates nevertheless that the desertions were rooted not only in leader-follower behavior, but in a more personal sense of ideological distance between many rank-and-file Republicans and the Goldwater faction—a distance that would have produced increased defections quite apart from examples set by the leadership.

However this may be, it was a significant feature of the election that the customary post-convention reconciliation between party factions was in the 1964 Republican case lack-lustre at best, and at many levels simply non-existent. Many of the liberals wished to avoid the Goldwater platform. At the same time, Goldwater seemed to do less than most candidates in making it easy for the dissident brethren to return to the fold. Among several possible reasons, one may have been that in the blueprint laid out by Goldwater strategists for a November victory, the support of most of these leaders did not appear to be critical.

III. CAMPAIGN STRATEGY: THE SOUTH AS REPUBLICAN TARGET

The strategy of the Goldwater camp for a November victory was both simple and relatively selective. Goldwater felt, to begin with, that he could hold on to essentially the same states that Nixon had won in 1960. This meant a clean sweep of the populous states of the Pacific Coast, most of the Mountain and Plains states, and a scattering east of the Mississippi. To reap the additional electoral votes for victory, Goldwater believed that the way lay open, under proper circumstances, for the Republican Party to make further major inroads in the once solidly Democratic South. The plan implied that Goldwater could largely afford to write off the populous industrial states of the Northeast and some, if not all, of the Midwest —a matter which greatly reduced the importance of the dissident liberal Republican bloc. And it represented a dramatic departure from any past Republican strategy in making of the South a fulcrum for victory.

Such a strategy was not only unusual but, against the long sweep of American electoral history, it might even be thought of as implausible. Yet it was no hastily devised scheme. For years Goldwater had participated in the Congressional coalition between conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats. The same drive for ideological neatness that led him to call for the reorganization of American politics into "Conservative" and "Liberal" parties impressed upon him the grotesque incongruity of a Democratic South. The South had no reason to be a Democratic bastion; by all of its affinities and traditions, it should long since have become Republican. Part of the problem lay with the national Republican Party, which, in the control of the Northeastern bloc, had failed to present national-level candidates making clear that Republicanism was the natural home of the Southern voter. This had been a frustrating fact since Goldwater's entry into national politics—a period during which political observers had frequently predicted an imminent partisan realignment of the South; but gains in the region, while very obvious, had remained rather modest. In discussions of Republican difficulty in recapturing majority status in the land, Goldwater had opined that the Party had to learn to "go hunting in the pond where the ducks are"—the South. As bitterness began to mount in that region toward the civil rights pressures of the Kennedy Administration, the time seemed more ripe than ever for the presentation of a purely conservative Republican candidate who could appeal to the Southern ethos in a most direct way, thereby breaking the Democratic hold on the region in one dramatic and decisive stroke.

This long-planned strategy had suffered two temporary but alarming setbacks. The assassination of President Kennedy suddenly placed a Southerner in the White House, and removed from power the most feared personal symbols of federal intrusion. The continuation of the Kennedy beginnings by the Johnson Administration, however—particularly in the 1964 Civil Rights bill—helped to reset the stage. So did the increased signs of Negro unrest, and the new element of "white backlash" in the North as well as the South that seemed apparent in the spring primaries. The capping touch was Goldwater's vote against the Civil Rights bill. This vote, to be sure, represented no condoning of segregationism *per se,* but rather a blow for states' rights against the encroachment of the federal government. Nevertheless, white supremacists in the South had so long paraded under the states' rights banner as to leave little room for fear lest the Goldwater gesture go unappreciated. The liberal wing of the Republican Party, having worked for years to prevent the Democrats from "gaining position" on the civil rights issue, was further horrified as it envisioned the G.O.P. suddenly transformed into "the party of the white man" at just the moment when the Negro vote was becoming effectively mobilized.

The second setback threatened when Governor Wallace of Alabama decided to enter the presidential race as a states' rights candidate. This was especially alarming, for Wallace would have competed for exactly the same votes that Goldwater had been wooing toward the Republican column. However, Wallace's subsequent withdrawal left the field open again for the original victory blueprint, and the implementation began in force. Mid-campaign accounts of the Goldwater organizational efforts spoke of a high-powered, modernistic campaign apparatus in the South stocked with volunteer labor in numbers that would have been unbelievable for the earlier Eisenhower and Nixon campaigns. While this machine had been humming efficiently from the start, the Goldwater organization in the West was described as effective but less advanced; in the Midwest it was chaotic, and in the Northeast next to non-existent. At few if any points in recent political history have so many campaign resources—in both issue positions taken and organizational efforts made—been devoted to the cultivation of a single region. The first discordant note came when, during the campaign and apparently as the result of new poll data, Goldwater remarked to reporters that he was not as strong in the South as everybody seemed to think.

After the votes were counted, what was the success of this strategy? The verdict must come in two halves. From one point of view, the strategy was a brilliant success, and it left its imprint on the geographical voting returns with greater strength than any other of what we have called "short-term forces" in the 1964 election. One crude way of separating these immediate or new effects from those better attributable to long-term standing loyalties is to create a different kind of electoral map, entering state by state or region by region the departure of a particular presidential vote in a more Republican or more Democratic direction than the normal voting of the area involved. A map so constructed for 1964, with pro-Goldwater deviations regarded as "high ground" and pro-Johnson deviations as "low," would show one primary "tilt" or gradient across the nation. The very lowest ground would appear in the northern reaches of New England, and the gradient would move upward with fair regularity all the way west to the Pacific Coast. The same gradient would appear, but much more sharply tilted still, as one moved southward to the Gulf of Mexico. In other words, Goldwater's regional emphases were indeed profoundly reflected in the vote.

As soon as one leaves the relative question of the regional and the geographic, however, the strategy was a dismal failure. For while the whole continent tilted in the expected direction, the strong Democratic tide nationally left virtually all of the country submerged under what from a Goldwater point of view was "sea level"—the 50-50 mark in popular votes. In terms of electoral votes, Goldwater was stranded on a few islands which remained above the tide on the outer Southern and Southwestern fringe of the continent. These islands represented stunning "firsts" or dramatic historic reversals in states like Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina. But their historic interest did not bring Goldwater any closer to the presidency.

Indeed, while Goldwater scored sharp Republican gains through the "Black Belt" of the deepest South, his assault on the South as a whole produced rather pathetic results. All observers agree, for example, that the South has been drifting away from its old status as a one-party Democratic bastion for at least two decades, if not for five or more. Hence Goldwater could have hoped to profit from four years more of this drift than Nixon, and a decade more than Eisenhower. Secondly, all observers are equally agreed that not only in the Black Belt but well north into the Border States of the South, civil rights was the prime political issue, and there is no doubt where the mass white population stood on the matter. Our data from the late 1950s and the early 1960s have consistently made clear that the potential of this issue for dramatic partisan realignment in the South had been muffled because of lack of clarity in the eyes of the mass population, prior to 1964, that either of the two major national parties offered much hope to the Southern white. It was exactly this ambiguity that Goldwater set out to remove by providing a clear party differentiation on civil rights at the national level. Putting these two ingredients together, the actual 1964 election results from the South as a whole might seem astonishing. For Goldwater actually did less well in the region than either Nixon in 1960 or Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. One has to return at least to 1948 to find a comparably poor showing for a Republican presidential candidate; and there are reasonable treatments of the 1948 Thurmond vote which would send one back to 1944 for a parallel. Given the fact that Goldwater wooed the South so straightforwardly, and injected the new and potent ingredient of clear party differentiation on civil rights into the 1964 picture, this retrogression of Republican popular voting strength for a presidential candidate back to levels of the 1940s may seem quite incomprehensible.

A possible explanation, although one that we can summarily reject, would be that the clear party differentiation on civil (or "states' ") rights which Goldwater tried to communicate failed to come across to the mass voters.[9] Perhaps to the dismay of the liberal wing of the Republicans, however, the communication was near-perfect. In our 1960 election study, a measure of association between the two parties and the policy extremes of the civil rights controversy showed values of .02 and .05 (the Democrats only very slightly associated with a pro-civil rights position) on two different civil rights policy items.[10] In 1964, the perceived association in the same terms on the same two items had risen to values of .54 and .50. The change in *volunteered* identifications of the two parties with the issue, among the much smaller subset of people so concerned that they brought the matter up themselves, showed even more dramatic change. In 1960 these civil rights-concerned people had tended to associate Kennedy somewhat with a pro-civil rights position, and Nixon with more of a "go-slow" approach (an association of .30). For Johnson and Goldwater in 1964, the association had mounted to .84, approaching consensus. The same volunteered materials include images of the parties, as well as of the candidates, and it is a matter of some interest to know in what measure Goldwater's 1964 position "rubbed off" on the Republican Party as a whole. In 1960, the civil rights association appeared to lie more clearly with the Kennedy-Nixon pairing (.30) than with any differences between the two parties, for these volunteered references to the parties showed only an association of .08. The comparable figure for the two parties in 1964 was .86. In short, we cannot explain why Goldwater produced a retrogression of Republican presidential voting strength in the South by suggesting that his key civil rights position failed to get across.

The Southern vote for Goldwater becomes intelligible if we add three elements to the consideration. First, while civil rights lent an important new pro-Goldwater force to the situation, various strong short-term forces which had pushed the Southern electorate in a pro-Republican direction in 1952, 1956 and 1960 were no longer present. We have argued elsewhere that the popular vote for Eisenhower and Nixon in the South was a very misleading index of the degree of solid Republican advance there.[11] While our data do show the Republican

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[9] We have examined this possibility in some seriousness simply because often in the past we have found public perceptions of party differences on major issues totally confused and muddy. Even on issues where the politically sophisticated see marked party differences, general public inattention and the ambiguities which politicians exploit to blur the edges of their positions combine to produce either lack of recognition of differences, or very conflicting impressions of what those differences are at any given point. See Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 179ff.

[10] The statistic is such that if all citizens in the sample agreed that the Democrats represented one side of the issue and the Republicans the other, the figure would be 1.00 (perfect association). A figure of .00 represents the case of no aggregate association whatever.

[11] Philip E. Converse, "A Major Political Realignment in the South?" in Allan P. Sindler,

Party inching forward in the affections of mass Southern voters, the pace has been slow; the South remains a preponderantly Democratic region. In 1952 and 1956, the Southern presidential vote swung far to the Republican side of normal for the region, just as it did in all other parts of the United States. In 1960, with the Eisenhower appeal gone, most other regions moved back toward the Democrats as we expected. This return toward normal was almost invisible in the South, since a new and offsetting short-term force—Kennedy's Catholicism—had arisen which was peculiarly repugnant to the Southern population with its concentration (Louisiana excepted) of devout and fundamentalist Protestants.[12] Thus if any other of the Republican aspirants had run in 1964, we might have expected a delayed return toward a much more normally Democratic vote in the South. From this point of view, the injection of a new civil rights differentiation by Goldwater did not occur in a void, but was something of a replacement for other forces which had kept the Southern vote extended in a remarkably pro-Republican direction for three consecutive presidential elections.

Once we take this into account, the Republican retrogression is less perplexing, although intuitively we would expect civil rights to have an impact on the Southern voter more potent than either Eisenhower's appeal or fear of a Catholic president. It is here that the second and third considerations enter. While Goldwater's civil rights position drew Southern whites toward the Republicans, Negroes both South and North moved monolithically toward the Democrats. Although Southern Negro voting was still limited by registration difficulties, it increased over 1960 and was almost unanimously Democratic for the first time.[13] If this sudden new increment of Negro votes could be removed from the Southern totals, the Goldwater vote proportion would undoubtedly appear to be a slight progression, rather than a retrogression, over the Eisenhower and Nixon votes.

Finally, it must be recognized that civil rights, while the primary issue in the South, was not the only one. Beyond civil rights, Southerners reacted negatively to the Goldwater positions much as their fellow citizens elsewhere. Many Southern white respondents said in effect: "Goldwater is right on the black man, and that is very important. But he is so wrong on everything else I can't bring myself to vote for him." From this point of view, the civil rights issue did indeed have a powerful impact in the South: without it, the 1964 Goldwater vote probably would not only have slipped to normal Republican levels, but would have veered as elsewhere to the pro-Democratic side. The more general ideological appeal to what Goldwater saw as Southern "conservatism" aside from the Negro question, did not have major impact.

Much the same comments hold for the failure of "white backlash" to develop in the way many expected outside the South. Our data show that civil rights feeling did not lack impact elsewhere. But for many non-Southern whites who resented the advance of the Negro cause and the summer of discontent, the election involved other important issues as well; and Goldwater's positions on them struck such voters very negatively. Thus "white backlash" feelings were translated into Goldwater votes by Democrats only where fear of the Negro was so intense as to blot out virtually all other considerations. Voters fitting this description existed in fair number and geographic concentration in the deepest latitudes of the South. Elsewhere, they were thinly scattered.

IV. THE ELECTION "POST-MORTEM"

Up to this point we have referred only vaguely to the many negative reactions Goldwater occasioned in all sectors of the country, which tended to dim out isolated attractions he did present. The Goldwater "image" was indeed phenomenally unfavorable. We have measured such images in the past, among other ways, by tallying the simple number of favorable and unfavorable references made by respondents to broad questions inviting them to say what they like and dislike about each of the candidates. Typically, American voters have tended on balance to speak favorably, even about candidates they were about to send down to defeat. The least favorable image we have seen—in Adlai Stevenson's second try in 1956—involved only about 52 percent of all responses that were favorable. Less than 35 per-

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ed., *Change in the Contemporary South* (Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1963).

[12] These religious effects were described in Converse *et al.*, "Stability and Change in 1960: a Reinstating Election," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 269–80.

[13] In our data, expressions of party loyalty from the South which had been slowly losing Democratic strength throughout the 1950s show a sudden rebound in 1964. However, all of the rebound can be traced to Southern Negroes; the downward trend among Southern whites continued and at about the same pace.

cent of the Goldwater references were favorable.

Just after the election, Goldwater observed that "more than 25 million people" voted "not necessarily for me, but for a philosophy that I represent. . . ." At another time, in assessing the magnitude of his defeat, he chastised himself for having been a personally ineffective spokesman for that philosophy. This seemed particularly odd against the descriptions of Goldwater before his nomination, in which even opponents concurred that at long last the right wing had found an articulate spokesman with a magnetic personality.

The candidate references we collect are a mixture of observations concerning the personality and leadership qualities of the individuals themselves as well as reactions to policy positions they represent in the public eye. Ideally, we could take this image material and split it cleanly into references to personal attributes as opposed to policy positions, in order to judge the accuracy of the proposition that what the public repudiated was the spokesman, and not the philosophy. Practically speaking, such divisions present many difficult coding decisions.[14]

Nevertheless, we have sifted Johnson and Goldwater references into categories more or less purely reflecting "policy" as opposed to "personality" significance. Among the most pure policy references, Johnson's were favorable by an 80–20 margin, visibly ahead of the 69–31 balance of his total image. Mentions of Goldwater policies ran less than 30–70 favorable, thereby trailing the rest of his image slightly. In general, the farther one moves from pure policy to pure personality, Johnson's advantage declines. His "wheeler-dealer" style and the aura of conflicts-of-interest which dogged him during the campaign came through to dilute his attractiveness. Against this backdrop, Goldwater's personal "integrity" and "sincerity" drew praise. Throughout, the data suggest that Johnson was carried along to an image nearly as positive as Eisenhower's best, less by his personal characteristics than by the policies with which he was associated (many of them identified by respondents as continuations from the Kennedy Administration). For Goldwater, if anything, the reverse was true.

Aside from civil rights and a faint flutter of approval brought by Goldwater's latter-day stand against immorality, none of his major positions was attractive to voters outside the most hard-core Republican ranks. In general, the mass of public opinion has been quite unsympathetic to traditional Republican thinking in areas of social welfare and other domestic problems for several decades. A major Goldwater theme involved attacks against the increasingly heavy hand of "big government," yet this struck little in the way of a responsive chord. Most Americans in the more numerous occupational strata do not appear to feel the governmental presence (save for local civil rights situations) in any oppressive or day-to-day manner, and as a consequence simply have no reactions to the area which have any motivational significance. Among those more aware of the practices and potentials of federal government, a slight majority feels that if anything, governmental services and protections are inadequate rather than overdone. Thus for better or for worse, such contentions on Goldwater's part had little popular resonance.

Goldwater's failure to make much capital of domestic policy was not uncharacteristic of a Republican presidential candidate. What was new for a Republican, however, was his performance in the area of foreign policy. In a degree often overlooked, the 1950s were a period during which, from the point of view of many Americans inattentive to the finer lines of politics and reacting to the parties in terms of gross associations and moods, something of an uneasy equilibrium prevailed between the two major parties. Much more often than not, for these Americans the Democratic Party was the party of prosperity and good times, but also the party more likely to blunder into war. The Republican Party, conversely, was more skilled in maintaining peace, but brought with it depression and hard times.

The foreign policies proposed by Goldwater and refracted through the press and other commentators, shifted this image more dramatically than one might have thought possible (Table II). Setting aside the large mass of voters who throughout the period did not see any particular differences between the parties

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[14] Take, for example, the charge hung on Goldwater by Democrats and some Republicans that he was "impulsive." This allegation reverberated in the public and came to make up one of our largest single categories of negative references to Goldwater. "Impulsiveness" is a personality trait that on one hand might have been less plausible for some other right-wing leader. Yet the charge took roots and began to flourish with respect to a cluster of policies that Goldwater shared with other Republican leaders of similar persuasions. It seems quite arbitrary to decide that it is exclusively either the person or the policy which is "impulsive."

TABLE II. PERCEPTIONS AS TO THE PARTY MOST LIKELY TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT OF WAR IN THE ENSUING FOUR YEARS

	1956	1960	1964
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Democrats would handle better	7	15	38
No party difference	45	46	46
Republicans would handle better	40	29	12
Don't know, not ascertained	8	10	4
	100	100	100

in foreign policy capability, the balance of expectations in the area favored the Republicans by better than a 5-1 margin in 1956. This margin deteriorated somewhat in the late stages of the Eisenhower Administration, but remained at an imposing 2-1 edge. During the Goldwater campaign it reversed itself to a 3-1 margin favoring the Democrats.

Thus to the many ways of describing the public's repudiation of the Goldwater candidacy, another may be added: between a party of prosperity and peace, as against a party of depression and war, there is little room for hesitation.

V. LEVELS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE BASES FOR MISPERCEPTION

From at least one point of view, it is less interesting that Goldwater lost the 1964 election than that he thought he had a chance to win. What most of our descriptions of the election year have had in common is a sort of chronic miscalculation of electoral reality: miscalculations of standing strength, of new strength that might be won, and of what appeals were necessary to win that new strength. Since "electoral reality" is at many points a nest of uncertainties, and since we are told that in the face of uncertainty personal needs are likely to color perceptions the more strongly, there is little surprising in the fact that Goldwater overestimated his strength and drawing power. But as these misperceptions of Goldwater and his aides went grossly beyond what many observers felt were the margins of uncertainty, they deserve closer comment.

Rather than write off these perceptions as figments of imagination, let us suppose that to persist in the way many electoral misperceptions of the right wing have persisted, there must be some sustaining reality bases; and let us ask instead what such bases might be. For "public opinion" is a protean thing, and we shall discover that there are perfectly sound ways of measuring public opinion during the 1964 campaign which, instead of illustrating Johnson's towering lead in the opinion polls, would actually have shown Goldwater enjoying a slight margin.

As is well known, public opinion was spoken of and roughly gauged long before the operations of public opinion polling were developed. What was gauged was opinion from a variety of kinds of sources: informal reactions to events among ancillary elites around the centers of government; the writings of intellectuals and newspaper editors; representations from leaders of interest groups, and the like. While it was apparent that this conglomerate of opinion came disproportionately from relatively elite and informed sources and hence need not have coincided with what the "real public" thought, beyond mass elections themselves there were (and *are*, for those who totally distrust the polls) few further ways of understanding what the public below an elite level was thinking. One of those few ways of "digging down" into the real population was letters of opinion: letters sent from unassuming constituents to public officials, "letters to the editor" composed by non-professional writers reacting to daily events and even, in no few cases, to the opinions of the editor himself. This was one level of public opinion that seemed to be generated below the elite level and that, for the observer interested in opinion beyond the localisms of municipal government, could be monitored regularly on a wide geographic base.[15]

In our 1964 interview schedule we spent some time investigating the behavior of our respondents with respect to the writing of politically relevant letters. We ascertained first whether or not they had ever written such a letter either to any kind of public official, or to the editor of a newspaper or magazine. Then, among the minority who could recall ever writing such a letter, we went on to ask about the frequency of such activity—whether any of the letters had been written in the past four years, and if so, roughly how many such letters the respondent would estimate he had written to each of the two types of targets over that recent period.

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[15] Undoubtedly, for such an observer, letters were not weighted equally in his impressions as to how opinion stood: some were more cogent than others, some were more distressed, and so on. But as a rough first approximation, one can imagine that what registered as "public opinion" on a particular issue in the mind of such an observer was closely related to the simple frequency of letters pro and con.

Many aspects of these data remain intriguing despite their general predictability. Thus, for example, the materials demonstrate handsomely that the large bulk of letters to public officials or the printed media come from a tiny fraction of the population, which tends to write very repetitively. Thus, in the data summarized in Figure 1, we find that only about 15 percent of the adult population reports ever having written a letter to a public official, and of the total stream of such letters from the grassroots, two-thirds are composed by about 3 percent of the population. Where letters to newspapers or magazines are concerned, the constituency is even more restrictive still: only about 3 percent of the population recalls ever having written such a letter, and two-thirds of such letters are turned out by not more than half of one percent of the population.[16] Needless to say, there is fair overlap between those who write to the printed media and those writing to public officials, so that the observer monitoring both lines of communication would tend to count the same people twice.

Furthermore, as these few people write more and more letters over time, they are counted again and again, and this of course is the phenomenon that interests us. What we have done is to reconstruct our data on various preferences relevant to the 1964 election *not* by a raw head-count, which is what a mass election measures, but rather with each individual's preference on an item weighted by the number of letters that he has reported writing to either target in the four preceding years. This provides a basis, within reasonable limits, for a fair replication of the different kind of "public opinion" as it might be assessed by a hypothetical observer.[17]



FIG. 1. Letters to public officials and letter-writers within the electorate.

Figure 2 contrasts "public opinion" in the head-count sense, with that form of public opinion as measured by letter-writing. We suggest that this figure may usher us into the reality world on which many of Goldwater's assessments and stratagems were based. This is not to say that Goldwater had no other bases from which to calculate public opinion. He had, among other things, public opinion as measured by the polls, and he did not entirely discredit this information. Yet as we have noted there was evidence that poll data perplexed him, not simply because they customarily brought bad news, but also because they failed to square with all of his other intuitive impressions as to what the public was thinking. In the measure that these impressions came from a variety of sources not very different from the letter-writers among the public (*i.e.*, from party activists, from campaign personnel and from informal associations), it is not hard to believe that they may have been displaced from the head-count of public opinion in much the same ways.

If we accept letter-writing for the moment then as a relevant indicator of public opinion, we see a rather marvelous change in the state of

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[16] Data on letters to the news media are not presented graphically, in part because the inequality is so complete that there is little one can discriminate in the figure. The Gini index of concentration for the newspaper and magazine letters is .99. See H. Alker and B. Russett, "On Measuring Inequality," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July, 1964), pp. 207–18.

[17] We wish to stress that it remains a crude approximation, in part because we do not know, letter by letter, what political opinions the respondent was expressing. Conceivably in many cases they lay outside the range of any of our items. But the exercise is worth completing in part because it is likely that our hypothetical observer generalizes beyond the specific content of letters ("if ultra-conservative opinion on issue x is running about 30 percent, then it is likely that ultra-conservative opinion on issue y would run about the same level if something made that issue salient"); and in part because the systematic lines of displacement of "letter opinion" from "public opinion" in the mass electoral sense are undoubtedly valid in their general direction, whatever the details.



(a.) EARLY VOTE INTENTION



(b.) REPUBLICAN CONVENTION PREFERENCE (Among Independents and Republicans Only)



(c.) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GETTING TOO STRONG ?

FIG. 2. Public opinion as measured by people or political letters.



(d.) NEGOTIATION WITH COMMUNISTS



(e.) IDEOLOGY

FIG. 2 (cont.) Public opinion as measured by people or political letters.

political affairs. In Figure 2(a), instead of trailing Johnson sadly in the anonymous crowd in mid-campaign, Goldwater holds a visible lead. Moving back to the time of the San Francisco convention (b), Goldwater is no longer the candidate of a small minority among Republicans and Independents, but rather is the toast of an absolute majority, even counting "no preferences" against him. In (c), we discover that not only is a vast majority of the public interested in the problem of the growing strength of the federal government,[18] but those upset by this growing strength outnumber their opponents by a ratio approaching 3 to 1! In Figure 2(d), the displacement of "letter opinion" from public opinion is much less, in part because the item wording brought a relatively consensual response. However, it is clear that Goldwater's "hard" inclinations in foreign policy are somewhat overrepresented as well in the letter-writing public.

In some ways, Figure 2(e) contains more grist than any of the others, however. First, the very form of the distributions of ideological preference differs rather dramatically. Where

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[18] The wordings of the issue items involved in Figure 2(c) and (d) were as follows:

(For 2c) "Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington has not gotten too strong for the good of the country. . . . What is your feeling?"

(For 2d) "Some people think our government should sit down and talk to the leaders of the Communist countries and try to settle our differences, while others think we should refuse to have anything to do with them. . . . What do you think?"

Figure 2(e) is based on a set of questions that asked people to indicate their affective reactions toward a variety of groups, including "conservatives" and "liberals." The scores for the figure are based on the difference in reaction to the two stimuli.

"public opinion" is concerned, nearly half the population falls in the "zero" category, making no affective distinction whatever between conservatives and liberals.[19] In addition, the clustering around this zero-point is very tight: over three-quarters of the population is located within one category of the zero-point. The distribution of "letter opinion," however, is quite different. The central mode of indifference or ignorance shrinks dramatically, and voices from more extreme positions on the continuum gain in strength. Other analyses show that virtually all letter-writers rank very high on measures we have used of ideological sensitivity. Hence those who remain toward the middle of the continuum in the right half of Figure 2(e) are not there through indifference or ignorance: they understand the ideological alternatives and place themselves toward the middle of the road with forethought. And, as the bimodal shape of the distribution suggests, political discourse becomes most notably a dialogue between very mild liberals and ultra-conservatives.

It is to the world of letter opinion or one like it that the Goldwater campaign, in its original design, was addressed. At least until its late stages, it assumed an electorate with near-total ideological comprehension and sensitivity. The appeal to the Southern conservative tradition in any abstract vein was indeed joyfully received in the South, and created great ferment among a part of the Southern population. Except as this theme became concretized in day-to-day problems with Negroes, however, the part of the population affected was tiny, even though in the letter-writing and related senses it was so visible as to appear to be "most of the South," politically speaking.

Similarly, the distribution of the population in this world of letter opinion helped maintain persistent overestimations of strength. Empirically speaking, the center of Goldwater support lay roughly in the third bar of the figure on the conservative side. It weakened rapidly with any further steps toward the center, and was relatively solid in the outer two bars of the graph. If one looks at "letter opinion" with this zone in mind, it would appear that the base of standing Goldwater support was very substantial. Goldwater hoped to firm up the support on his side of the center sufficiently to create a majority, and in this figure it would have taken only a modest extension of influence to achieve this. In the world of public opinion relevant for mass elections, however, the distribution of actual and potential support was radically different. Rather than starting from a solid base of support on the conservative wing, the initial springboard was scarcely populated at all. To win a majority, a much deeper penetration into the center would have been required.

In the measure that we have delineated in Figure 2(e), the kind of political environment familiar to many practicing politicians, we can also better understand the first of our puzzles, the myth of the stay-at-home Republicans. For ultra-conservatives who found a wide measure of social support and resonance for their views in the world of public opinion which they understood, it must indeed have been perplexing that uniquely at election time, and uniquely in vote totals, this vigorous support had a habit of evaporating. How could one interpret this gross discrepancy between what one heard and read about public sentiments and what happened at the polls? The easiest explanation was that strong conservatives in large numbers simply refused to go to the polls, however vigorously they would express themselves otherwise. And as soon as a useful reason was worked out as to why this willful nonvoting should occur, a theory was born. It persisted in part because it was a handy tactical weapon; but it persisted in some part as well because the discrepant realities which helped to catalyze the theory also persisted. For its proponents, the election of 1964 was a sobering reality test.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

It should be apparent that the phenomena we have examined in this paper have a significance that stretches considerably beyond the 1964 election, or questions of the credibility of public opinion polls, or the playing of games with the epistemologies of practicing politicians, fascinating though each of these subjects may be.

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[19] It is likely that this contingent is roughly coterminous with that 40–50 percent of the American electorate which we have described elsewhere as having no impression as to what such terms as "conservative" and "liberal" mean. See Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, 1964), pp. 206–61. The data presented there were gathered in 1960. In the 1964 study we collected the same data on recognition of ideological terms, thinking that perhaps the nature of the Goldwater campaign might render these terms and meanings more salient to a wider public The data show that it did not.

But the more important implications flow from the reflection that while these opinion worlds may be discrepant from one another in many regards, and it behooves us not to confuse them, it is not a simple matter of fact *vs.* fantasy: both worlds are real, and have real effects on the political process. Save for the obvious fact that the reality of "one man, one vote," governs the mass election with greater or lesser modification, while other public-opinion realities like the letter-writing world tend to hold sway otherwise, we know all too little empirically about the counterpoint between the two in actual political systems, and the normative significance of motivation-weighted votes is largely unexamined.

However this may be, if the reality of one of these worlds was manifest on Election Day, 1964, then the reality of the other was equally apparent in the San Francisco convention. For it is obvious that the intense levels of political motivation which underlie the letter-writing of the ultra-conservative wing are part and parcel of the ingredients which led to a Republican convention delegation so markedly discrepant from either the rank-and-file of the Party or its customary leadership. What had been lacking around the country in bodies was made up for in dedication; but the outcome of the convention was in no sense the less real for it. And from this juxtaposition of two worlds, the oddities of the 1964 election grew.

SAFE SEATS, SENIORITY, AND POWER IN CONGRESS*

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The president's difficulties in inducing Congress to pass his legislative program are usually ascribed to the different constituencies of the two institutions. This difference would make for disharmony under any circumstances, but it is said to be particularly important because the seniority system bestows the most power on congressmen whose constituencies are most unlike the president's. His policy commitments are responses to the needs of a heterogeneous, industrialized, urban society. The occupants of the most influential congressional positions come from districts that re-elect them regardless of national political trends. The representative from such a district "views with alarm the great issues that sweep the nation and threaten to disrupt the familiar and comfortable politics of his district,"[1] which is usually characterized as a rural backwater.

Both political parties are described this way. Because the Democrats have controlled Congress for all but four of the past 36 years, most illustrations of this thesis are drawn from conflicts between Democratic presidents and Democratic congresses. More specifically, the focus of attention is usually on the refusal of southern Democratic congressional leaders to support presidential legislative requests. In this article we will be concerned with this phenomenon in the House of Representatives. The thesis we examine may be restated as follows: lack of responsibility in the Democratic party is due to control of Congress by Southerners. Their influence is due to their seniority, which is a result of the lack of party competition in the South. Most academic descriptions of American politics include this thesis.[2] It is particularly common in textbooks. We will call it the "textbook theory."

Another interpretation of congressional behavior, that might be called the "insiders' theory," has a good deal of currency in Washington circles close to Congress.[3] The insiders concede both the one-party South and southern congressional power, but they say that the former is not a sufficient cause of the latter, and introduce other considerations to explain it. Southern influence in Congress, according to the insiders, is not due just to the lack of party competition in the South, since there are many safe Democratic seats in the North. The men in these northern seats allegedly do not, however, make use of their "potential seniority." They are less interested in congressional careers and tend to "committee hop," thus losing the benefit of whatever seniority they have accrued. Many of these congressmen come from machine-dominated big cities where command of local patronage and contracts is the real sign of status and power. When an opportunity for such a position opens up back home, they desert the House for state or local government.

In the insiders' view, Southerners value a career in the House of Representatives more highly than do Northerners. One presumed reason is that the South, less developed industrially than the rest of the country, offers fewer alternate careers to ambitious young men. A second explanation is that the plantation owners' traditional *noblesse oblige* has made politics a more highly valued activity in the South, attracting some of the most able men from all walks of life. In the North politics has been not so much a gentleman's calling as a channel of social mobility for underprivileged ethnic groups.

The central proposition of the insiders' theory is that the level of southern influence in Congress is due to more than the "natural"

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* We were aided in gathering data by Milton Cummings and Richard Scammon. Many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article were made by Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Fred I. Greenstein, Duncan MacRae, Jr., Donald Matthews, Nelson W. Polsby, Randall Ripley, Alan Rosenthal, Stephen Smith, Leo M. Snowiss, Aaron B. Wildavsky, and Barbara Kaye Wolfinger. We are grateful for financial support from the Edgar Stern Family Fund, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council, and to the Brookings Institution for use of its facilities.

[1] James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy,* rev. Spectrum ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), p. 244.

[2] Burns is probably the best-known contemporary advocate of this point of view.

[3] While the insiders' theory is probably the prevailing one among Washington *cognoscenti,* it has not been given the literary circulation of the textbook theory. Hints and scraps of it may be found in the writings of William S. White; see particularly *Citadel* (New York, 1956).

consequences of the lack of party competition in the South. More generally, the insiders' theory raises a number of questions about the relationship between types of party systems and effective legislative representation, and between career alternatives and types of legislative behavior. It suggests that the constituent environment may influence not only the direction of congressional behavior (for example, votes pro or con), but also the roles played by legislators from different types of party systems.[4]

Most of the empirical propositions and assumptions in the two theories are readily verifiable. Yet published evidence on them is surprisingly scarce. Their evaluation involves answering the following questions:

1. Do congressmen in southern safe seats have more congressional seniority than those in northern safe seats?
2. Do the career patterns of the Northerners indicate any greater willingness to leave the House?
3. Do congressmen from southern safe districts have more committee seniority than safe Northerners?
4. Do the Southerners have more chairmanships than they are "entitled to" by their seniority?
5. Do members of the House have more prestige in the South than in the North?

If these questions can be answered affirmatively, the insiders' explanation is a crucial modification of the textbook theory. If not, the insiders' theory is superfluous. If the insiders are right, then the growing northern Democratic representation in Congress will be partly vitiated by members who do not take full advantage of their opportunities to accrue seniority. Our purpose in this article is twofold: to examine the available data in an attempt to answer these five questions; and to explore the implications of recent shifts in the distribution of safe House seats.

I. THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS IN THE HOUSE

As a prelude to examination of the relevant evidence, it is useful to review the familiar topic of alleged southern and rural dominance in the House of Representatives. There were 255 Democratic Representatives on January 7, 1964.[5] Of these, 38 per cent were from southern districts.[6] Table I shows the representation of congressmen from different types of district (urban-rural, North-South) in influential positions. Contrary to some impressions, the Southerners did not have a disproportionate share of appointments to the Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees, generally considered the top three committees

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[4] For an extensive treatment of this subject at the state level see John Wahlke *et al.*, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962). See also James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4 (November, 1960), pp. 346–69.

[5] Since minor changes in the composition of the House occur frequently, it is necessary to choose a date for any analysis of House membership. We chose January 7, 1964 because a House roster for that date was published in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 10, 1964.

[6] Throughout this article the South is defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

We have included the five border states (Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) in the North. Some observers of Congress classify some or all of these states as southern, or put them in a separate category. We saw no reason to do this, since the voting record of the 28 Democratic representatives from these states is similar to that of northern congressmen, and very different from the Southerners'. In 1963, for instance, the border congressmen had a Presidential Support score of 80, compared to 59 for the Southerners and 82 for congressmen from the northeastern states. The Presidential Opposition scores of the three groups were 9, 27, and 5, respectively. (These scores are based on individual voting records for 71 House roll calls during 1963 on proposals on which President Kennedy took a position. The support score is the percentage of the 71 roll calls on which the member supported the president. Since failure to vote lowers a member's support score, we also present the opposition scores. The individual scores are in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 13, 1964.)

Congressional Quarterly defines as "urban" any central city with at least 50,000 population and any suburban city with 100,000 or more people. "Suburban" areas are those "closely settled areas contiguous to central cities," with the exception of cities over 100,000 in population. All other areas are classified as rural. See *CQ Census Analysis: Congressional Districts of the United States* (Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1964), pp. 1786, 1792. We have combined *CQ*'s "urban" and "suburban" classifications for the purpose of testing the propositions stated in the text. We have classified districts as "rural" if they are 50% or more rural according to *CQ*, and "urban" if they are less than 50% rural.

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN INFLUENTIAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS, BY REGION—JANUARY, 1964

	North		South		Total	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	No.	Per cent
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
All Democratic congressmen	42	21	9	29	255	101[a]
Membership on top three committees	40	24	5	31	55	100
Major committee chairmanships	29	18	0	53	17	100
Subcommittee chairmanships	29	17	6	47	109	99[a]
Holding first three positions	37	14	4	45	51	100

[a] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

in the House.[7] But they are significantly overrepresented in other powerful posts. They account for 53 per cent of the chairmanships of the 17 major standing committees;[8] 53 per cent of the chairmen of all these 17 committees' subcommittees; and 49 per cent of all the representatives who hold the first three positions (chairman and first and second ranking majority members) on each of the 17 committees. For a variety of reasons this last measure may be the best index of committee seniority. The number of chairmanships is so small that the death or retirement of a single chairman produces a sizeable percentage change, and subcommittee chairmen are not appointed solely on the basis of seniority. The top-ranking majority members are next in line for the chairmanship. Together with the chairman and the two ranking minority members, they are usually appointed to conference committees on bills the committee has handled.[9] Among their various other advantages is first preference in questioning witnesses at hearings.

II. THE DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRATIC SAFE SEATS

For the purposes of our study we defined safe Democratic seats as those which met all three of the following criteria:

(1) Won by a Democrat in every special[10] and general election since 1940.
(2) Won by an average of 60 per cent or more of the two-party vote since 1944.
(3) Won by not less than 55 per cent of the two-party vote in every election since 1946.

Changes in district boundaries proved not much of a problem in our efforts to identify safe districts. We were usually able to "follow" the incumbent. Where a change in incumbent

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[7] The absence of southern overrepresentation on the top three committees is due partly to the recent appointment of four Northerners to the Appropriations Committee. During most of the period from 1947 to 1963 every southern state had a representative on that committee. (We are indebted to Richard F. Fenno, Jr. for this information.) If one splits the Appropriations Committee's 30 Democratic members on the basis of seniority, the former southern advantage becomes apparent. Eight of the top-ranking 15 members are Southerners, compared to only one of the 15 most recent appointees.

Appointments to the Ways and Means Committee are made on the basis of regional zones, but it should not be thought that this guarantees equitable representation on the committee to all parts of the country. The zones are not redrawn after every election to take account of changes in state delegations, and, perhaps for this reason, there is considerable variation in the number of representatives assigned to each zone. The range was from 14 to 24 in the 86th Congress. See Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), p. 347.

[8] There are 20 standing committees. Members generally consider three of them unimportant: the District of Columbia, House Administration, and Un-American Activities Committees. The first of these—important to permanent residents of the District—is in effect Washington's city council, the second is occupied with housekeeping, and the third reports virtually no legislation. Membership on one of these three committees does not preclude assignment to another standing committee.

[9] This practice is not required by the rules, but is usually followed.

[10] Two seats, one each in the North and South, were omitted because they were won by Republicans at the special election following the death of the incumbents.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC SAFE SEATS BY REGION AND TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY

	North		South		Totals	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	No.	Per cent
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Safe Seats	30	7	11	52	122	100
All Democratic Seats	42	21	9	29	255	101[a]

[a] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

coincided with redistricting, we used maps to trace the district's lineage. Our definition of safety turned out to be rather stringent. It excluded the seats held by three major committee chairmen: Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, Interior and Insular Affairs; George P. Miller of California, Science and Astronautics; and Clarence Cannon of Missouri, Appropriations. Cannon's winning percentage dipped below 55 per cent on two occasions, while the first two seats were held by Republicans in the 1940s. Also excluded were a number of seats which, because of redistricting or population movement, now seem to be completely safe. But the inclusion of such newly safe seats would not contribute much to our analysis of members' responses to the opportunity to accrue seniority. Implicit in our definition is the assumption that the key aspect of safety is the incumbent's belief that he can stay in his seat as long as he wants.

By our definition we counted a total of 122 safe Democratic seats in the 88th Congress, 45 in the North and 77 in the South. Table II shows how these were distributed between urban and rural constituencies: 72 are rural and a bare majority of them are both southern and rural. More than a third of the safe seats are northern. There are four urban safe seats for every rural one in the North; in the South this ratio is reversed. Seven of the nine northern

TABLE III. A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF NORTHERN SAFE AND NON-SAFE DEMOCRATIC DISTRICTS—1964

	Northern Safe Democratic	Northern Non-Safe Democratic
	(%)	(%)
1959 median family income:[a]		
Per cent of districts in:		
first quartile[b]	18	31
second quartile	36	35
third quartile	31	24
fourth quartile[c]	16	10
	101[e]	100
N	*(45)*	*(115)*
Per cent Negro:		
0–4.9%	31	64
5–9.9%	27	13
10–19.9%	13	12
20–29.9%	9	4
30% and over	20	6
	100	99[e]
N	*(45)*	*(115)*
Per cent first- and second-generation:[d]		
0–9.9%	20	17
10–19.9%	9	25
20–39.9%	36	44
40% and over	36	13
	101[e]	99[e]
N	*(45)*	*(115)*
Type of constituency:		
urban	80	61
rural	20	39
	100	100
N	*(45)*	*(115)*

[a] The average median family income for the safe seats was $5506, compared to $5921 for the non-safe districts. If rural districts from the border states are eliminated from both groups, the figures are $5811 and $6099, respectively.

[b] Quartiles are based on nationwide ranking.

[c] All but one of the northern safe seats in the 4th quartile are from rural border districts.

[d] Includes all persons born abroad (except of American parents) or with at least one foreign-born parent.

[e] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Sources: 1960 Census data reported in U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Congressional District Data Book* (*Districts of the 88th Congress*) (Washington, 1963); and *CQ Census Analysis*.

rural safe seats are from the border states of Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. The urban seats include five from Chicago, three from Detroit, eleven from New York, and three from the Los Angeles area. The boundaries of most of these Democratic city districts were drawn by Republican legislatures.

Compared to northern non-safe seats held by Democrats in 1964, the safe districts included a somewhat higher proportion of low-income families, of Negroes, and of first- and second-generation Americans, as Table III shows. These differences are not large, however, and the safe seats are no less diverse in their socio-economic characteristics than the others. The higher level of ethnicity in the safe seats is the greatest difference. Half of the safe districts in the first income quartile and 43 per cent of those in the second quartile had 40 per cent or more first- and second-generation residents. Twenty-seven of the 45 safe constituencies had 40 per cent or more foreign-stock residents or 20 per cent Negroes, or both.

TABLE IV. PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT SCORES OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE AND NON-SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1963

	North		South	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Safe Seats	76	77	75	55
Non-Safe Seats	83	82	61	55

We explored the textbook theory proposition that congressmen in safe seats are less likely to support their president, presumably because they are subject to different constituency pressures.[11] Tables IV and V show the Presidential Support and Opposition scores for congressmen in safe and non-safe seats with region and type of constituency controlled. Table IV suggests that Northerners in safe seats gave slightly less support than those from non-safe districts. Since failure to vote lowers a member's support score and many New York City congressmen are notorious absentees, Table V may be a better indicator of presidential support.[12] It shows no differences between safe and non-safe northern congressmen. The extremely spotty attendance records of two members from rural safe districts account for most of the difference in the support scores of rural Northerners. The lower support by non-safe Southerners may result from Republican competition forcing these incumbents to adopt a more conservative position. In short, the level of party competition does not appear to be a useful general explanation of voting patterns among Democratic congressmen.[13]

TABLE V. PRESIDENTIAL OPPOSITION SCORES OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE AND NON-SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1963

	North		South	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Safe Seats	5	8	14	28
Non-Safe Seats	4	8	31	36

III. CAREER PATTERNS OF SAFE SEAT HOLDERS

We come now to our major concern: the different levels of interest in a congressional career by members from different sides of the Mason-Dixon line. Years of consecutive service is one index of this interest. If northern congressmen in safe seats were less interested in House service, then, taken as a group, they should have less congressional seniority. But as Table VI indicates, this does not appear to be the case. There were no important differences in length of consecutive service between northern and southern Representatives.

According to the insiders' theory, many congressmen from urban machines are only serving

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[11] See, *e.g.*, Burns, pp. 242–4. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., discusses several other propositions about relationships between competition and party loyalty at both state and national levels. See his *Congressmen and their Constituencies* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), ch. 9; and the works cited there.

[12] Of course, failure to vote also lowers the Presidential Opposition score, but the rate of opposition in all northern cells is so low that 100% voting participation would not change the opposition scores significantly.

[13] After examining voting records for the 87th Congress, Froman came to the same conclusion (*ibid.*, p. 114). Other recent findings indicate that when region is controlled, length of service is not strongly related to the support that congressmen of either party give to their president. See Judson Mitchell and George Spink, "Presidential Support and Length of Service in the House of Representatives" (unpublished paper, Stanford University).

TABLE VI. YEARS OF CONSECUTIVE SERVICE BY DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1964

Years of Consecutive Service	Northerners	Southerners
	(%)	(%)
0–9	38	32
10–19	33	38
20–29	25	23
30 and over	4	6
	100	99[a]
N	*(45)*	*(77)*

[a] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

time in the House until they can get a more highly prized post. The principal example offered is a tendency for New York City congressmen to quit the House abruptly when a judgeship becomes available. (These are usually elective offices, but access to them has been effectively controlled by the regular Democratic organization in New York.) By extension other northern big-city congressmen are alleged to have the same preference for careers in state and local government. In contrast, a seat in Congress is said to be the high ambition of almost any southern politician. Those fortunate few who attain this goal are content to stay in the House (unless an opportunity for the Senate presents itself), patiently going along and working their way up the ladder of seniority to a position of real influence in national affairs.

We tested this proposition by examining the circumstances under which safe-seat incumbents left their seats from January, 1947 to the beginning of 1964. In all but a few cases the reasons for leaving were either stated by the incumbent or were obvious enough, *e.g.*, death in office, defeat in a primary, retirement. In a few instances we inferred the reason from the man's subsequent occupation. These data, classified by region, are presented in Table VII.

The insiders' theory is confirmed on one point: 21 per cent of the Northerners who left the House did so to run for a state or local office, in contrast to only one Southerner. Almost all of these Northerners were from New York City and most of the offices sought were state or county judgeships. Quitting one's seat to go into business also is an indication of lack of interest in a House career, and here the regional ratio is reversed. Twenty-two per cent of the Southerners who left Congress went into private business or law practice, compared to just one Northerner. Since preferences for local public office or for private business to continuing congressional service are both examples of voluntary departure, the two categories can be combined to provide an overall measure of low interest in a House career. When so combined, these categories account for an identical proportion of northern and southern quitters: twenty-four per cent.

Fear of losing a primary may cause a member to quit in favor of another job. Rumors have it that several congressmen, from both North and South, have done this in the past decade. There is no reason to believe, however, that this fear is any more prevalent among Northerners than Southerners, or *vice versa*. One could argue that, everything considered, primary defeat may be less of a hazard for Northerners because of the strong political organizations in many cities. The data in Table VII support this proposition; more than twice as many Southerners were defeated in primaries.

The data presented thus far do not support the insiders' claim that Northerners evince less interest in Congress. Table VII indicates that, in fact, Northerners who leave Congress are

TABLE VII. SAFE SEAT HOLDERS' REASONS FOR LEAVING CONGRESS, BY REGION—1947–1964

Reasons for Leaving	Northerners	Southerners
	(%)	(%)
Death in office[a]	37	22
Retirement due to health or age	5	12
Defeat in primary	11	26
Run for Senate	16	12
Run for state or local office	21	2
Go into business or law	3	22
Appointed to government position	8	5
	101[b]	101[b]
N	*(38)*	*(59)*

[a] See below, p. 346, for a discussion of this regional difference.

[b] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Sources: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961* (Washington, G.P.O., 1961); and various issues of *Congressional Directory* (Washington, G.P.O.).

more likely to remain in public service than Southerners. This may reflect fewer opportunities for rewarding government posts in the largely rural South. It may also be a result of the unstructured southern political parties. There appears to be much less articulation between congressional politics and state and local politics in the South.[14]

We have seen that incumbents in northern safe seats have as much seniority as their opposite numbers from the South. Seniority in Congress is useful chiefly to secure desirable committee assignments. Since committee rank is a result of consecutive service on the committee, the northern safe seat holders conceivably could dissipate their congressional seniority by "committee hopping."

The data do not support this speculation. Twenty-nine per cent of the southern safe seat holders and 31 per cent of the Northerners were in one of the top three positions on the 17 major standing committees. Of the 14 major chairmanships held by members from safe districts, Southerners held nine and Northerners five; 12 per cent of the Southerners were major committee chairmen, and 11 per cent of the Northerners.[15] The southern advantage in total chairmanships appears to be a result of their great number of safe seats, and nothing else.

Finally, we examined the proportions of the two groups of safe seat holders who were chairmen of subcommittees. Here there is a southern advantage; 36 per cent of the Northerners were subcommittee chairmen, compared to 45 per cent of the Southerners. Subcommittee chairmen are chosen by the committee chairman, who need not make their selections solely on the basis of seniority. Favoritism by the predominantly southern committee chairmen might account for the disparity in subcommittee chairmanships. We tested this proposition by counting, on each of the 17 major committees, those committee members who were not subcommittee chairmen themselves but who had more seniority than the lowest ranking subcommittee chairman. A total of 28 congressmen were in this position, 18 Northerners and 10 Southerners.[16] On committees chaired by Southerners, nine Northerners and three Southerners were by-passed. With northern chairmen, the proportion was more even: nine Northerners and seven Southerners.

Favoritism may not be the only reason for setting aside seniority in appointing subcommittee chairmen. Someone with special expertise may receive such an appointment out of turn. An uninterested or hopelessly incompetent member may be passed over. Some members may be reluctant to accept the chairmanship of an undesirable subcommittee in hopes of being chosen eventually to head a more powerful one. There is no reason to believe, however, that any of these considerations would apply disproportionately more to southern than northern members. Thus while the data in the preceding paragraph cannot be considered conclusive evidence of southern favoritism, they provide at least some basis for an explanation of the disproportionate number of subcommittee chairmanships held by Southerners.

The data presented up to this point indicate that the insiders' theory is wrong on every count:

(1) Congressmen in southern safe seats do not have more congressional seniority than those in northern safe seats.
(2) The post-congressional career patterns of the two groups do not indicate any greater northern inclination to leave the House for another career.
(3) The safe Southerners do not have more committee seniority than safe Northerners.
(4) Safe Southerners have more chairmanships than they are "entitled to" only at the subcommittee level, where considerations other than seniority affect the selection process.

The final element in the insiders' theory, concerning differences in the prestige of congressmen, will be discussed in the following section.

IV. OTHER REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

The finding that northern safe seat holders do not quit congress any more readily than their southern counterparts does not by itself dispose of the proposition that Southerners are more effective legislators. Is it possible to examine the proposition that while the Northerners are no less likely to leave Congress, they do not use their House positions as effectively as the Southerners? Are the Northerners, as a group, less able men? Some fragments of data can be considered.

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[14] See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949), ch. 18 and *passim.*

[15] The figure for the Southerners would be 13% if we took account of George Mahon's accession to the chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee on the death of Clarence Cannon in May, 1964.

[16] It might be thought that the larger number of by-passed Northerners results from the fact that there are more of them in the House. But Southerners comprise 44% of the membership of the highest-ranking half of the 17 major committees, and it is from this group that subcommittee chairmen are chosen.

In the first place, the role of United States Representative does not appear to be any more prestigious among the mass of southern citizens than among those in the North. In a survey conducted in 1947 the National Opinion Research Center studied a national sample's assessment of the "general standing" of 90 occupations, one of which was "United States Representative in Congress."[17] Each of the 2920 respondents was asked to rate each occupation's "general standing" on the following scale: "excellent," "good," "average," "somewhat below average," and "poor." When tabulated by region, with southern Negro respondents removed, the results do not indicate any significant regional differences in congressional prestige. Eighty-eight per cent of the white southern respondents gave "excellent" or "good" ratings to the job of congressman, compared to 92 per cent in the Midwest and 94 per cent in Northeast and West. When all occupations were ranked, congressmen were sixth in the West and Midwest and seventh in the South and Northeast.[18]

The office of representative may be accorded as much respect by the mass electorate in the North, as in every section, and yet not be as highly regarded in the specialized political milieu in which politicians are socialized. Urban political organizations control Democratic congressional nominations in many northern one-party areas. Since these machines typically are based on the tangible rewards that can be drawn from control of local government, status in them generally goes to those who distribute jobs and contracts. Positions that have a share in this distribution process are the most desirable that the machine can bestow. In such cities many people see politics as a way to make money through the exercise of discretion.

Congressmen have hardly any patronage of their own[19] and, when there is a party organization of any consequence back home, federal appointments are cleared with its leader. In any event, federal patronage is negligible compared to the jobs and contracts that any machine-influenced local government can dispense. For most politicians who have worked their way up in an urban machine, being a congressman has little appeal. Some local bosses have also been congressmen, *e.g.*, the late William Green of Philadelphia or Charles Buckley of the Bronx, but their political power was not a result of their congressional seats. In his study of the Chicago congressional delegation, Leo M. Snowiss found that in that city's powerful Democratic organization the job of congressman was not as highly prized as any of a number of party and local governmental positions.[20] Consequently, at least some congressional nominations go to less highly regarded organization figures, tired mediocrities in late middle age. Most regular machine politicians in New York City seem to have a similarly low evaluation of congressmen. Richard H. Rovere's description of Peter J. McGuinness, an old-time boss in Brooklyn, includes an interesting example of this point of view:

> Like most politicians of his school, McGuinness considers congressmen members of an inferior class. To him, the local party bosses, who pick the legislators and tell them what to do, are the elite of politics and congressmen are men who, unable to make the grade themselves, must serve as legislative secretaries to men who have made the grade. He cannot understand the tendency, comparatively recent in this city, of political bosses to take congressional nominations for themselves. "I've sent plenty of them to Albany and Washington," he says, "but I'd never be such a damn fool as to send meself. Believe me, I'm glad I was never in a fix where anyone else could send me. If a man's a leader in New York, what the hell business has he got in Washington?"[21]

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[17] For a full description of this study see Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Occupations and Social Status* (New York, 1961.)

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 19, 200, 220 Data on white Southerners were obtained from the National Opinion Research Center through the Inter-University, Consortium for Political Research. We are grateful to Ralph L. Bisco of the Consortium and Patrick Bova of NORC for their kind help.

[19] In addition to nominations to the service academies (which usually are heavily dependent on objective examination scores), the average congressman is lucky if he can name a Capitol policeman, elevator operator, or page. It takes a number of terms to acquire enough seniority to have much more appointment power.

[20] Leo M. Snowiss, "Chicago and Congress: A Study of Metropolitan Representation" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1965), ch. 2.

[21] Richard H. Rovere, "The Big Hello," in *The American Establishment*, Harvest edition (New York, 1962), pp. 45–6.

One of the authors of this article, engaged in research that provided many opportunities to observe status relations in a very cohesive traditional northeastern urban organization, noted that the local congressional candidate seemed to get very little deference from most members of the organization.

This is not to say that all big-city congressmen are incompetent. The candidate just mentioned, for instance, has become a congressman with a considerable reputation for ability and effectiveness. Many other able representatives have come to Washington from the machines. In fact, given the low value generally placed on House seats in such political *milieux*, some ambitious men probably realize that the competition for such positions is less than for more lucrative posts at home. Nevertheless, politicians, like everyone else, are partly products of their environment, and there are indications that machine-controlled districts in the North produce more than their share of ineffective congressmen.

The New York City delegation is a case in point. Its members make up the core of the "Tuesday-to-Thursday club": congressmen who are in Washington only from Tuesday morning through Thursday afternoon and spend the rest of their time back home in more congenial and profitable pursuits. This habit is so prevalent that the decision of a second-term Democratic congressman from Queens to live in Washington evoked quasi-anthropological awe from *The New York Times:* "Mr. Rosenthal is the first New York City Democrat to take this step, as far as anyone in the state delegation can recall."[22]

The best available measure of attendance is *CQ*'s voting participation score, which gives the percentage of roll calls (119 in 1963) at which each member was present.[23] A serious disadvantage of this score as a measure of interest in legislation is that the leadership, aware of the members' habits, tries to schedule roll calls when most congressmen are in Washington. Since the House has been in Democratic hands for the past ten years, votes are seldom held when many Democrats are absent. As a practical matter, this means that there is little voting except on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. If a member's score is low, his attendance must be very spotty indeed. Table VIII contains voting participation scores for safe and non-safe congressmen, with region controlled. Although a safe congressman should not have to spend as much time mending fences at home, the northern safe group scored somewhat lower than the non-safe Northerners. The New York City delegation accounts for most of this difference. When they are excluded, the northern safe group's score rises from 79 to 82, virtually the same as the southern safe score.

TABLE VIII. VOTING PARTICIPATION BY DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE AND NON-SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1963

Type of District	Voting Participation Score
Northern Safe	79
Northern Non-Safe	86
Southern Safe	83
Southern Non-Safe	87

Since a number of Southerners also have unimpressive attendance records (although no southern delegation can match the New Yorkers), it is difficult to derive marked regional differences from these data. The complaints about the New York and Chicago delegations come chiefly from people who would usually like to be able to count on their votes. Possibly conservative spokesmen are equally bitter about southern absenteeism, but do not exhibit their disappointments in print.

Another bit of evidence may be useful in determining whether there are regional differences in legislative effectiveness. Despite the intentions of the spirit, the flesh may be weak. Some congressmen might not be physically capable of working as hard as they want. Representatives in northern safe seats are more likely than their southern counterparts to begin their congressional careers at fairly advanced ages. As Table IX shows, a quarter of

TABLE IX. AGE DISTRIBUTION AT BEGINNING OF CURRENT TERM OF SERVICE OF INCUMBENTS IN SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1964

Age at Entry	Northerners	Southerners
	(%)	(%)
25–34	13	17
35–39	33	32
40–44	18	29
45–49	11	10
50–54	16	10
55 and over	8	1
	99[a]	99[a]
N	(45)	(77)

[a] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

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[22] *The New York Times,* March 16, 1964, p. 37.

[23] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* January 31, 1964.

the present northern safe seat holders entered the House when they were fifty or older, compared to 11 per cent of the Southerners. This explains the finding in Table VII that more Northerners than Southerners die in office. The machine-dominated recruitment patterns discussed earlier may account for the regional age difference. Like other rewards for faithful service, congressional nominations are not given to neophytes. The leaders of urban machines typically are older men who have put in decades of work for the party. Upstarts are not highly regarded. On the other hand, nominations for available seats in most southern districts are more often fought over by a number of ambitious young men.[24] Since this prize is seldom one that can be bestowed by a cohesive organization, precedence has less to do with who gets it.

On the basis of these scattered data, it appears that Northerners in safe seats may be somewhat less vigorous than Southerners. This difference cannot be established as either large or conclusive.

V. TRENDS IN THE COMPETITIVENESS OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

Our definition of safe seats is static and does not take account of districts that have become non-competitive since 1946. What trends have there been since then? As Charles O. Jones has shown, the number of competitive seats has decreased since 1952.[25] What effect is this trend likely to have on the distribution of political power in the House Democratic party? Do these trends modify the picture of safe districts painted by Burns and other spokesmen of the textbook theory?

To explore these questions we traced the number of non-competitive Democratic districts in every congressional election from 1946 through 1964. 1946 is a good starting point for two reasons: it was the first postwar election and it marks the low point of Democratic congressional votes in the past 36 years. For purposes of this discussion we will define a non-competitive election as one in which the Democratic candidate received 65 per cent or more of the major party vote. This is an arbitrary criterion, designed only to put often uncontested southern seats in some sort of comparative framework with northern non-competitive districts.

Table X shows the distribution of non-competitive districts in every election since the war. The number of southern districts in this category remained almost constant through 1958, with the exception of 1956, and has declined since then. The number of northern non-competitive districts has increased consistently and now exceeds the South's. The 1964 election has exaggerated these trends,[26] but the probably aberrant character of this election should not minimize the significance of the steady increase in the North's share of non-competitive districts. Since 1956 Northern districts have never comprised less than 44 per cent of all seats won by 65 per cent or more. A similar proportion of non-competitive districts has been urban since 1956. It is no longer so true that non-competitive districts "have a heavily rural bias," as Burns said in 1963.[27]

The increase in Democratic strength in the North is due in part to population growth and movement. Better-off urban residents have been moving to the suburbs. The remaining city dwellers include higher proportions of Negroes, ethnic groups, and the poor. Reapportionment after the 1950 and 1960 Censuses may also have contributed to the growth of non-competitive districts.[28] Republican state legislatures often follow a strategy of concentrating Democratic voting strength in a few districts.[29]

The increase in northern numbers has been accompanied by a decline in the southern position. In 1947 there were 103 Democratic representatives from the South and only two

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[24] The classic description of the unstructured politics of most southern states is Key's book. See also Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (May, 1953), pp. 197–210.

[25] Charles O. Jones, "Inter-party Competition for Congressional Seats," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (September, 1964), pp. 461–76.

[26] There probably would be fewer southern non-competitive seats (not to mention fewer Democratic congressmen) if there had been Republican candidates in every southern district in the 1964 election. In several southern states Republican candidates either won or held their opponents to less than 65% of the vote in every district that they contested.

[27] Burns, p. 242.

[28] The wholesale reapportionment resulting from recent Supreme Court decisions is also likely to increase urban and suburban representation in both North and South.

[29] This is an example of how a rational strategy for Republican parties at the state level—conceding a minimum number of seats to the Democrats—is harmful to the party's interests on the national level because it enables these Democrats to build up seniority in Congress.

TABLE X. CONGRESSIONAL SEATS WON BY DEMOCRATS BY AT LEAST 65 PER CENT OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEAR AND REGION—1946 THROUGH 1964

Year	North				South				Total Seats Won By 65%		Total Democratic Seats Won
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural				
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	
		%		%		%		%		%	
1946	16	15	7	6	11	10	76	69	110	100	188
1948	31	23	14	10	12	9	78	58	135	100	263
1950	25	19	13	10	12	9	79	61	129	99[a]	235
1952	24	20	4	3	12	10	78	66	118	99[a]	213
1954	40	28	14	10	9	6	79	56	142	100	232
1956	32	26	8	7	13	11	68	56	121	100	234
1958	61	35	20	11	20	11	75	43	176	100	283
1960	57	36	12	8	19	12	70	44	158	100	260
1962	53	39	10	7	10	7	64	47	137	100	259
1964	81	49	25	15	12	7	48	29	166	100	294

[a] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Sources: for election returns, various editions of Richard Scammon, ed., *America Votes* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press); several editions of the *Congressional Directory;* various editions of Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives, *Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Elections* (Washington, G.P.O.); and *Complete Returns of the 1964 Elections by Congressional District* (Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965). The task of classifying Congressional districts as urban or rural proved to be rather complicated. For the 1962 and 1964 elections we used *CQ Census Analysis*, and for 1956 through 1960 similar data in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 2, 1962. In an earlier classification published in 1956, CQ used a completely different four-point classification scheme, *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1956* (Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1956), pp. 788–792. We adapted this scheme to the urban-rural one on the basis of apparent similarities in the two taxonomies. For the elections from 1946 through 1950 we used the 1956 data, modified by examination of Congressional district maps.

Republicans. By 1963 there were eleven southern Republican seats; and in 1965 there are 17 such,[30] and 89 Democratic. Some of the Republican seats gained in 1964, notably five in Alabama and one in Mississippi, *may* presently revert to the Democrats. On the other hand, Goldwater did not do as well as Eisenhower and Nixon in the peripheral southern states. Possibly, therefore, the Democrats will recover their seats in the Deep South only to lose seats in Florida, Texas, or Virginia. The 1964 election cost the South two of its subcommittee chairmanships.[31] These are not the only seniority losses the region has suffered. Primary losses and redistricting have also eroded its power in the House. Since 1947 eight southern congressmen have lost their seats through redistricting and 15 more have been deposed in primaries. The redistricted seats have been gained by other southern states, but the new incumbents in these 23 seats could not inherit the seniority of the supplanted congressmen.

These trends mark an important shift in the distribution of power in the Democratic party. The northern wing of the congressional party is just now recovering the ground lost in the Republican sweep of 1946. The enormous Democratic losses in that election were confined almost entirely to the North. One of the long-term consequences of the Republican landslide then was the creation of a "seniority generation" dominated by Southerners. Unless the trend depicted in Table X is reversed, northern Democrats with useful amounts of seniority will soon be as numerous as the weakened southern contingent. Within a few years the North should begin to realize in its turn the fruits of the seniority system.

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[30] This includes Representative Albert W. Watson of South Carolina, a Democrat who backed Senator Goldwater in 1964, was stripped of his seniority for this defection by the Democratic Caucus, and then switched parties.

[31] Representatives Grant and Roberts of Alabama and Winstead of Mississippi, all defeated by Republican candidates, headed a total of four subcommittees. A fifth subcommittee was chaired by John Bell Williams of Mississippi, who shared Watson's fate (but did not switch parties). Northerners took over Williams' subcommittee and one of the two chaired by Grant.

The familiar debate over "party responsibility" often leads to rejoinders that fragmentation is inevitable in American political parties. Some fragmentation is unavoidable, but it is one thing to say that we cannot (or should not) have cohesive parties on the English model, and quite another to claim that any particular existing level of fragmentation is immutable. As the changes in House rules at the beginning of the 1965 session demonstrate,[32] arrangements to make the process more or less responsive to majorities can occur within the basic framework of fragmentation. A "bargaining system" can be any of a variety of political orders, from just short of anarchy to something like what happens in Great Britain when one party does not have a decisive majority. All systems characterized by bargaining do not assign similar resources to the principal actors. If the effective power of the president and the majority leadership were enhanced by any of half a dozen procedural changes, *e.g.*, an item veto, it would still be necessary for the actors to bargain with each other. The change would be in the cards, not the game. This is a simple point, but it seems to be overlooked by some of the most enthusiastic academic apologists for anti-majoritarian aspects of our political system.

Dissension in the Democratic party is due largely to Southerners.[33] As the relative strength of the South decreases, the cohesive potential of the party as a whole will increase, for there is little reason to expect that the northern wing of the party will become proportionately more divided as it grows in strength.[34] To put it another way, the decline of the Southerners will be accompanied by a Democratic president's greater ability to get his way with Congress. It appears, then, that present trends are in the direction of greater cohesion and "responsibility" in the Democratic party.

VI. SUMMARY

We have presented data to test two theories about southern influence in the Democratic party in the House of Representatives. The central question is whether southern power can be explained solely by the lack of party competition in the South, or whether it is due also to regional differences which result in more dedication to legislative careers on the part of Southerners. We approached this problem by comparing northern and southern occupants of safe Democratic seats. There were no regional differences in congressional or committee seniority, or in forsaking Congress for other careers. Lack of party competition, aided perhaps by southern favoritism in appointment of subcommittee chairmen—and in the wake of the northern Republican sweep in 1946—seems to be an adequate explanation for the disproportionate number of Southerners in influential positions in the House. The textbook theory, accordingly, appears to be correct on this point.

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[32] Procedures were changed to reduce the Rules Committee's power to prevent floor consideration of legislation and avoid appointing conference committees. Most Southerners resisted these actions.

[33] There are, of course, many Southerners, including powerful committee chairmen like Carl Vinson, who are (or were) loyal to Democratic presidents all or most of the time. One cannot validly label all southern congressmen as invariably dissident. Nevertheless, there is also no doubt that the southern wing of the party is the major source of deviance.

[34] Some political scientists have argued that large legislative majorities are less responsive to the president, because they lead to factionalism. It is unclear whether this proposition refers simply to a majority for the president's party, or an effective majority for his policies. Even if it refers to the latter, there are some difficulties. Most important, it would seem that the smaller the majority, the easier it is for a potential defector to impede the president's program, since he needs to win fewer other dissidents to destroy the majority. As the majority grows, so does the size of the splinter group necessary to make an impact, and hence so does the magnitude of the defector's task. For discussions of this "law of economy" see E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 85–96. William H. Riker, who is cited on this point, actually discusses the weakness of big majorities only when they are so big that they become "a coalition of the whole." See his *A Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962), p. 56.

Statements of this proposition are usually accompanied by reminders that President Roosevelt, having won enormous congressional majorities in 1936, found his legislative program bogged down soon thereafter. This appears to be the major item of evidence to support the proposition. It does *not* appear that presidents have restrained their efforts to elect friendly congresses for fear of suffering Roosevelt's fate. A systematic examination of the historical record found that, if anything, big majorities are better than little ones. See Jay Goodman, "Legislative Majorities and Presidential Success" (unpublished paper, Brown University.)

The southerners may be more vigorous in the use they make of the positions they have. If age is any indication, Northerners, while they remain in the House, may be less able and energetic than Southerners. We could find no evidence of regional differences in the prestige of congressmen among electorates. The Northerners did tend to include more absentees and more members who first entered Congress at age 50 or older. These differences are not great, however, and must be interpreted with caution.

The number and share of non-competitive seats held by the North have increased markedly in the past fifteen years. The textbook theory is becoming increasingly less valid in its description of the characteristics of non-competitive districts. Unless this trend is reversed, northern Democrats will become much more influential in the House within a few years, since the other findings of this article do not indicate that they are any less likely to accrue seniority. The effect of these trends will be a decrease in the power of the deviant wing of the Democratic party and therefore an increase in party cohesion.

CHARACTER AND MISSION OF A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE, UNDER CONDITIONS OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

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A principal element of the United States Government's conception of general and complete disarmament pertains to establishment and development of a force not identified with any national governing entity, subject to control by an all-embracing international collectivity, and charged with missions of global scope in connection with peace-keeping.

The purpose of this essay is to examine what might be entailed, as conditions and as consequences, in establishing such a force. The discussion focuses quite explicitly on terms in the United States' proposal before the eighteen-nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1962—a document hereinafter referred to by the short title *Outline*.[1] Other sources, including proposals and discussions of forces of kindred type, are referred to for details concerning conceivable forms and conditions for the undertaking.

I. THE PROJECT IN BROAD COMPASS

As set forth in the *Outline*, such a force would be brought into existence over a span of years. The process of realizing it would be linked, stage by stage, with a progressive diminution of all forces under national control. At a transforming juncture, national forces would have been scaled down to a level rendering impossible their projection of any threat beyond the borders of their respective domains. Concomitantly, the global force would be increased to a level such as to place it beyond effective challenge by any other force existing. The course would not be one of simply doing away with forces capable of deployment over a wide range. It would involve an amalgam of such forces into an all-encompassing monopoly—a coercive institution of scope and relative, if not absolute, power heretofore never achieved.

The lines of development would be essentially interdependent. The final step in reducing nationally controlled forces to a level commensurate with internal security requirements would be contingent upon a solid and immediate prospect of achievement of an efficacious global force. Fulfillment of the design for the global force, moreover, would be dependent upon diminution of nationally controlled forces.

An initial question, necessarily hypothetical, is in order concerning the appropriateness for their respective missions of the world peace force and of forces to be permitted under national control. The criteria in the *Outline* are limited to quantitative and technical considerations expressed in highly general terms. With respect to the world peace force, the key words in the *Outline* are: "sufficient armed forces and armaments that no state could challenge it." This prescription is amplified by the following phrases: "fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed world" and "equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter any threat or use of arms."[2] The counterpart terms in the *Outline* regarding forces permissible for states to retain under their own direction are: "agreed requirements for nonnuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens." States would be required to disband "organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment."[3]

Relevant qualities in each instance are simply postulated. Their feasibility and ascertainability are assumed. The terms necessary for fulfillment are left to be worked out by international accord. For the moment, questions of the adequacy of a purely quantifying and technical expression of attributes may be passed over, along with questions regarding the practicability, probability, or even desirability of the relevant contemplated developments. The focus here is on the broad missions of the force and its presumable character in the light of its missions and on the requirements and consequences inferable from its missions and character.

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[1] United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Blueprint for the Peace Race: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962). This article is from a study prepared for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University. The judgments in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

[2] *Outline*, Stage III, H, 3; A. Objectives, 4.

[3] *Outline*, Stage III, B, 1.

A mission assigned to the projected peace force with respect to maintenance of order and security *among* states, as explicitly expressed in the *Outline,* would be enormously inclusive and complex. In addition, however, the force would have duties to perform with respect to security *within* component states. Because this aspect of the matter is only implicitly indicated in the project, and because it is fundamental to comprehension of the idea of the peace force, elucidation is called for. For that purpose, it is necessary to make clear the transformation of the character of states envisaged in the project.

II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATES

A decision to move into and past the transforming stage would involve both resolution of will and ascertainment of fact on the part of concerned governments acting in their single discretion but also as a group. A number of antecedent choices would have to have been made, and relevant actions effected, to take the course to that decisive stage.

The purpose here, rather than speculating upon procedure, is to examine the sorts of questions likely to require answer at the seat of judgment. As a precondition to the final step, or, more accurately, as a constituent part of it, the governments would have to register themselves as satisfied on two interrelated propositions: first, a solid and immediate prospect of the scaling of forces retained under individual state control, case by case, down to a level providing no surplus over requirements for domestic security; second, a concomitant conveyance of overwhelming superiority to the world peace force. Clearly—a point requiring no argument—the determination would be both subjective and objective: the governments' wills would be resolved in response to their appraisal of relevant realities, but the relevant realities would in major part flow from their combined wills.

For the moment, the focus is on the first of the two propositions. The forces permitted to retain national identity and to be at the disposition of individual governments would be limited to *agreed* requirements and would be of *agreed* types, with the referent *à propos* of requirements and types to be the function of maintaining internal order and protecting the security of citizens. Capability for sustaining the internal security of states would have been removed from their autonomous jurisdiction.

One might speculate on a possibility of *pro forma* ascertainment, with each government's estimate of its own requirements and its related inventory of equipment and related manpower to be accepted as conclusive by the others. The supposition does not withstand analysis. Fulfillment of the paramountcy accorded the central forces would be measurable only in relation to capabilities to be retained by states individually or cumulatively.

As an auxiliary postulate, however, one might premise the irresistibility of the universal force by assuming it to have been vested with a monopoly of prodigious instruments such as nuclear weapons, thereby rendering uncritical the amounts of weapons of less destructive efficacy and the related trained manpower to be retained by individual states. This line of argument requires overlooking the references to *agreed* requirements and to provisions in the project calling for states to disband "organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment." It requires one to hypothesize huge improvidence on the part of the participating governments in creating a world security force capable of effective action only at the highest levels of destruction—a characteristic far more likely to inhibit authorized use of the force than to intimidate potential challengers.

One might speculate also on a possibility of limiting the term of general concern in retained security capabilities to the moment of decision, whereafter the matter would revert to the autonomous jurisdiction of the respective states. This notion of lifting internal security requirements of states only for a moment to the center of world concern and then permitting them to subside immediately into being a concern for each state to settle in its own way also fails of credibility. Factors simply do not shift so arbitrarily from importance to indifference.

The inference is clear. Limitation upon internal security capabilities to an agreed level of requirements would be a continuing and integral part of the pattern of general obligation in the disarmament undertaking. Establishment of that level, case by case, would be a matter for international authority not just initially and once but thenceforth and continuously. The limitation would be part of a contract underlying a global governing apparatus. Confinement within those limits would be an essential aspect of adherence to the whole scheme and subject, therefore, to the processes of verification and enforcement underlying the disarmament program as a whole. Any question of upward revision of restrictions settled on at the outset would be international business on a par with the question of setting limits in the first instance.

The constituent states would have yielded their autonomy with respect to allocation of resources as between the uses of civil enjoyment and provision for coercion. The autonomy thus surrendered would relate not only to power to decide, within limits of resources available, on provision of forces for launching or repelling attack as counters in relations with other states but would extend as well to the discretion of any government as to requirements for maintaining the regime within.

The point is basic and highly important—one deserving to be acknowledged for what it is rather than minimized euphemistically. The implications are made clearer by taking into account the nature of internal security requirements, which are implicitly predicated as fixed and predictable in the United States disarmament project but which are in reality elastic and unpredictable.

III. PREDICTABILITY AND INTERNAL ORDER

How far ahead could the internal security requirements of any particular political society be divined? The question is not disposed of by postulating the efficacy of international arrangements for interdicting all factors playing upon such a society from beyond its borders. That sweeping assumption is scarcely demonstrable at best, but in order to forward the argument here, relevant doubts may be discounted. An array of imponderables would still remain.

To place the matter in perspective, it is in point to take account of the meanings of the key term *internal order* used in connection with standards and limits predicated for forces to be permitted to be retained under the control of particular states. The phrase implies reliable conditions in human relations over the land concerned—a sense conveyed in an auxiliary phrase about "the personal security of citizens." Beyond that sense, the term embraces the idea of continuity of regime. Order may be said to obtain within a civil society when succession to places of authority is reliably controlled by rules rather than subject to determination by forcible means. In an ordered society, those holding title to power would be enabled, as well as constrained, to convey it to successors determined under the same basic licit arrangements by which the holders in their turn had received it.

Those holding high magisterial positions under any orderly system of governance, moreover, must take heed of questions of continuity and descent. Faculties for deciding on the allocation of means to ensure continuity of the system itself are an integral element in any governing system, a necessary constituent of power to lay down the law. Divested of power to assure the means of survival, a system of government would lose a main prop of authority—an element of internal sovereignty, to use an overworked abstraction.

These observations do not imply a possibility of an absolute guarantee of survival for a system of government. Perhaps no regime could ever foreclose all possibilities, at least logical possibilities, of being overthrown by revolt or revolution. Nevertheless, the concept of order—and this is the main point—entails a licit and reliable descent of authority as distinguished from violent disjunctions and overturns in the system of rulership.

Whether with respect to order in the sense of assurance of the personal security of persons or in the sense of assured continuity of the system of government, internal security requirements, stated in amounts or types, vary in relation to the mores prevailing within a society. They vary in relation to factors of urban concentration and rural dispersion. They vary in relation, moreover, to factors of identity and confidence operative between a regime and its populace. They are affected by degrees of confidence assumed by regimes, or accorded by their populaces, with respect to their legitimacy. They vary as between circumstances of political tension and oppression and those of free consensus. They vary in relation to stress or contentment with respect to conditions of production and distribution, social unrest or placidity, and to factors of ethnic and cultural homogeneity or diversity and circumstances of disturbance or adjustment among ethnic groups. They are affected by factors of morale and competence within the security forces themselves. All these considerations—and many others of indisputable relevance—may be summed up as inherent and persistent variables in any political society. The point requires no labored argument. One needs only to ask himself as to the validity of a ten-year projection of internal security requirements for the United States drawn up, say, in the year 1855.

Variability of internal security requirements leads logically to a consideration of the role of military establishments in regard to internal security, to implications of abolishing such establishments under national control, and to the bearing of the topic on the mission of the projected United Nations peace force.

IV. DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS REGARDING INTERNAL ORDER

This facet of the subject entails a recital of some elementary, even obvious, points concerning organization of coercion in relation to maintenance of order and statehood. The delineation necessarily is highly generalized, focusing on essences rather than details and eliding empirical distinctions as between unitary and federal systems and as among states of varying degrees of civic development in the contemporary world.

A basic division of functions with respect to the apparatus of coercion is generally characteristic of advanced states. The origins trace back to a stage of development when groups first settled down in permanent identification with delimited portions of the earth's surface and used them as sites for accumulating goods and established fixed habitations and passed them along from one generation to another. The concept of *state*—as suggested by its *static* implication—is rooted in the idea of fixed position. It represents established order pervasive within an area, with diversity beyond the perimeter.

Basically, the relevant division of function lies between establishment of a span of jurisdiction and control on the one hand and the exercise of control or jurisdiction within the established span on the other: external security and internal security. These are distinguishable but not absolutely separable functions.

Military functions pertain to the establishment of spans of control. They are concerned with securing, in the first instance, dominion over land or water, as the case may be—and in modern circumstances, over air space as well; with holding perimeters against other forces competing for access to or mastery over all or part of the range concerned, and with expanding perimeters as opportune or necessary under the spur of ambition, advantage, or survival.

In our nomenclature, the generic term in respect of enforcing order within an established span of jurisdiction is *police*—derived, obviously, from the Greek term for *city*, reflecting the institution known as the Greek city state, and cognate with such terms as *polish*, *politics*, *polity*, and the like, associated with the handling of general affairs among a people living in proximity, interdependent, highly involved in each other's existence, and needing a pervasive and constantly operative scheme of order to minister conditions of their common life.

Military and police institutions share many characteristics, some of them superficial only. Each type is customarily called a force—a term denoting coercion, directed energy, and a body of men prepared for action. Their specialty centers on weapons and their use. Uniform dress and distinguishing emblems to differentiate members from the general run of people are a normal requirement on duty. Each such institution—certainly, at least, in a constitutional order—is under rigorous restrictions regarding the occasions and purposes for bringing its specialty to bear in action. Their structures are tightly hierarchic. Each is more highly organized than other institutions of society in general.

Yet contrasting characteristics are also relevant. The rigor of organization and authority is generally more pervasive within a military establishment. Systems of tutelage and surveillance within are more highly developed. Autonomous standards of privilege and courtesy are particular traits. Military organizations have separate codes of rules enforceable through an autonomous system of adjudication and punishment effected by magisterial systems of their own. Prerogative to deploy elements in what has been called systematic nomadism is part of the scheme of authority in the usual case. The obligation of service between a member and the military establishment is dissolvable only at the state's consent: that is, a member cannot quit at his option but must be absolved from duty. Such are the characteristics distinguishing a military establishment as a sort of state within a state.[4]

A police establishment is committed to its mission continuously. At all times it is deployed and operating within its assigned area. It acts on a basis of delegated discretion. Its activities on behalf of internal order therefore may be said to be of an administrative character. A military establishment represents, in contrast, a latent power under normal circumstances. Its mission is reserved. A military establishment exists in some degree of readiness, but it is not in action with respect to its mission except under extraordinary circumstances. Then it takes the field not on a basis of delegated discretion but properly in response to specific command or authorization representing an exercise of prerogative basic and central to the existence and maintenance of a state.

The prerogative to call military forces into action has to do not only with levying war against external enemies but also with maintenance of a state's span of jurisdiction against internal challenge as well. Military forces are a part, even if normally an abeyant part, of the internal security arrangements of a state. Police forces are calculated to cope with predictable challenges to internal security. Military forces are a reserve capability for use when a challenge exceeds the capabilities of police establishments, whether because of some extraordinarily formidable character in the challenge or because of some factor of disaffection within the police apparatus. The concept here invoked is not one of mere theorizing. In an instance still fresh in American national experience, a thousand score of troops were called out to enforce the right of one individual to attend a university.

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[4] S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York, Praeger, 1962), pp. 6–13.

Thus one of the potentials for maintaining order within a state is military power. Disorder within a state's span of jurisdiction may take on proportions challenging the integrity and continuity of the state's existence. In such an extremity, the relevance of military power to the maintenance of internal order becomes patent. Even in normal times, when military power is only an abeyant factor, its very existence and the prospect of its availability in exigency are a presumable, if incalculable, factor in support of internal security.

Discussion on the point here has been directed to the role of military power within political systems characterized by a high level of institutional development. In contrasting cases military establishments are often dominant factors rather than subordinated elements in patterns of rulership. In some extreme instances—illustrations from recent events in various African states come readily to mind—unbridled military establishments may even be an aggravating factor in discontinuity and disorder. In others, a degree of corporateness and effectiveness within the military apparatus may supply a principal and virtually sole basis for holding a so-called nation together. Such phenomena do not offset the main argument here concerning the basic role of military power within autonomous states.

The project for abolishing military capabilities of states thus has deep implications for their existence and for the character of authority within them. The prerogative to interpose forces in exigency beyond those forces provided in the police establishment for coping with challenges to internal security would pass from the hands of state authority and be vested in an organ external to each state.

Limitation to internal security requirements of forces under control of any state might be so construed as to permit each government to maintain armed bodies in some modest excess of constant requirements as a means for coping with extremities. Some such thought is reflected in the *Outline*. This approach would raise a question of how to foreclose use of such forces to threaten the security of neighboring areas. Neighboring areas, too, might have, as counters to such threats, forces of their own in excess of calculable internal security needs. This line of thought would tend to perpetuate in some degree the relationship which the *Outline* would seek to transform. Such a problem and a related necessity of dealing with it appear to have been anticipated in the *Outline*, which apparently envisages a system of continuous surveillance and reporting on the stationing and operations of internal security forces.[5] The point supports a conclusion con-

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[5] This conclusion is warranted by a careful reading. Indeed, no alternative interpretation seems adducible. After completion of disarmament, "The Parties . . . would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II." *Outline*, Stage III, F, 2. Moreover, the International Disarmament Organization "would be strengthened . . . to ensure its capacity . . . to verify. . . . " This would be accomplished through extension of arrangements referred to. *Outline*, Stage III, G. Relevant provisions for Stage II simply refer to "extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I. . . . " *Outline*, Stage II, E. Hence it is necessary here to refer only to Stage I. The measures are expressed as follows:

> Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed. [Moreover], Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation

cerning the subordination of internal security to international jurisdiction.

The basic intention would be to eliminate national forces in excess of requirements for internal order assumed to be predictable and passed upon by international authority. In the event of exigencies requiring forces in excess of allowed levels to cope with internal violence and threats to public order, each state would be left in the position of a petitioner for assistance from a source beyond its own control. Those having a determinative voice in withholding or making available such assistance from outside would be cast as ultimate arbiters of order within each state. The forces from outside, if made available, would operate under a chain of command external to the state concerned. The doctrine under which the force would operate would presumably be beyond determination by the state affected. The same would be true of personnel constituting the outside force.

It is fitting now to take account of some of the considerations relevant to establishing and maintaining such a force as envisaged.

V. MATERIAL BASES OF THE PROJECTED PEACE FORCE

Constituent governments acting to create a new framework of force would presumably have to be convinced of its prospective reliability in high degree before divesting themselves of control of military forces of their own and subordinating themselves to the new arrangement. A condition of the reliability of the new arrangement would be the good faith of all significant parties in subordinating themselves. The problems posed by interdependency between these two considerations are not logically more difficult than those involved in any proposition of forming a new frame of government by contract. The essential thing here is to recognize the process as that of forming a world state of sorts.

The matter of reliability of the new arrangement would include, beyond assurance against likelihood of misuse of the peace force, assurance of the force's capability and disposition to meet its responsibilities. By a proviso "that no state could challenge it," the *Outline* predicates an overwhelmingly effective force, but the only index to its efficacy—a phrase regarding "sufficient forces and armaments"—is a quantitative and technical description reflecting what has been aptly characterized as a typical civilian fallacy in measuring military strength.[6] In all probability, the technical and quantitative aspects of putting such a force together would be the simplest part of the process—though its simplicity would only be relative to the difficulties of others.

The force would require mobility and technical proficiency of the highest order and would have to be immediately available when summoned to action to meet manifold and ranging responsibilities. It would necessarily be a fighting force capable of exerting coercive power with overwhelming effect—that is, to a degree calculated to prevail—at any level of armed activity against whatever adversaries it might be called upon to meet in any environment whatever.[7] It would have to be, in sum, a sophisticated, versatile, multifarious force. Besides requiring at operating levels great subtleties of doctrine and an extraordinary degree of corporate identity and morale, it would need at staff levels a mastery of higher logistics and huge proficiency in military and industrial mobilization. The matter of industrial and technical underpinnings for such a force is especially important. In this respect, the *Out-*

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of posts would be agreed. (*Outline*, Stage I, F, 1 and 2.)

The *Outline* says further, in relation to Stage I:

> Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations (*Outline*, Stage I, G, 2, C.) . . .

[6] Frederick Martin Stern, *The Citizen Army* (New York, St. Martin Press, 1957), p. 4.

[7] This point seems adequately clear, notwithstanding a tendency among some to meet questions of how to fit United Nations contingents for unmeasured responsibilities by imagining the problem of force to have been obviated and the way thus opened for immaculate order. For example, one such writer predicates such a moral authority for the United Nations as to enable a force under its aegis to prevail by symbols—its efficacy in its arm bands rather than its arms. See William P. Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York, Oceana, 1957), p. 91. The context shows this idea to have been a generalization overdrawn from the single case of the United Nations Emergency Force interposed between Israel and Egypt.

line affords small illumination, presenting not so much a formula as an invitation to governments to attempt a formula. Implicitly, however, it points to an intricate question of how to begin.

The requirements indicated, in connection with reduction of force levels to internal security requirements, include action by participating governments "to cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing," dismantlement or conversion to peaceful uses of bases and facilities beyond those permitted to be retained for internal security purposes, and closure of all military research, development, production, and testing except as permitted by international agreement for purposes of maintaining internal security.[8]

Obviously, however, lore and technology relevant to military matters are in the hands of national governments. The international collectivity could scarcely start from scratch in fashioning a military mechanism of the limitless scope and supreme proficiency intended. It would fall to participants to contribute to aggrandizement of the force. Presumably, though this is not explicit in the *Outline*, the process would have to be that of conveyance, by participants to the world collectivity, of ownership, control, and operation of considerable portions of their domains, their concentrations of relevant professional talents, and their scientific and industrial complexes. At least, this would be incumbent upon participants having such endowments. The new military collectivity would have to have something to draw upon. It is scarcely plausible for nations at once to extirpate military resources and to proliferate military strength in combination.[9]

Something equivalent to a global defense ministry would have to be founded, since retention of such agencies by individual states would be forbidden. Implicitly, the establishment would include a multifarious staff system of its own, research and development systems, access to and control of patents and manufacturing systems, as well as contractive powers, procurement processes, systems for settling accounts, and the like, along with cantonments, training ranges, aviation complexes, depot systems, transport arteries and port facilities and vessels of its own or enforceable accesses to them, and many other such properties of a cogent military capability. All of these would necessarily be operative within and located within territory of presently independent states.[10] They would have to be exempt from interference by such states. Otherwise, obviously, the apparatus would be subject to impediment and interruption. Its efficacy would not then be a calculable surety. The force would lack the measure of absolute reliability postulated as a central characteristic.[11]

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[8] *Outline*, Stage III, B, 1 and 2.

[9] A quite different set of hypotheses is employed, however, in one relevant work. The portion of nationals permissible from any one state would be limited to 3 per cent of the force. Nationals of the twelve most populous states—namely China, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, Indonesia, Pakistan, Germany, Brazil, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy—would be wholly barred from service in the top command. Basing of any portion of the force in the aforementioned countries would be forbidden. Implicitly, these provisions would amount to a wholesale realignment of military capability. Militarily significant and resourceful areas would be ordained to become militarily insignificant, and *vice versa*. No empirical evidence to support the practicability of the proposal is adduced, however. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2d ed., 1960), pp. xxix–xxxii.

[10] Again, note should be taken of a proposal, *ibid.*, p. xxx, for locating "main bases . . . on easily defensible islands or peninsulas." The proposal has been elaborated with a suggestion of Trinidad, Madeira, Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, Zanzibar, and Ceylon as locations. Sohn, in Arthur B. Larson, ed., *A Warless World* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 5. Reasons for such anxiety about security in locating a force supposed to be inherently paramount do not need to be speculated upon here. The main point of doubt concerns something else. A world peace force, if realized, would be a central reality, not a marginal and abeyant one. Of far greater apparent practicality—if such a quality may be invoked in respect of so hypothetical an exercise—is the idea of deliberately positioning such a peace force within the larger industrial countries. See Thomas C. Schelling in Lincoln P. Bloomfield, ed., *International Military Forces* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 227.

[11] Some readers of this part of the manuscript have suggested an alternative possibility. States participating in the disarmament arrangement might be permitted to retain control of facilities, contracting authority, patents, and so on, relevant to capacity for making war, and at the same

Tracing out ramifications, one sees clearly in general conformation if not explicitly in detail the outlines of a world government. The point may be elaborated by considering, in addition to quantitative and technical aspects of the projected peace force, the more subtle requirements for men to compose the force.

VI. MANPOWER AND COMMAND IN A GLOBAL PEACE FORCE

Planning for a global peace force adequate for its manifold duties while amenable to control by some collective authority must entail appreciation of the nature of command and its interrelation with the character of the force commanded.

Not a great deal on the subject is available in general literature on the idea of a world peace force. Mostly the writing is characterized by expansiveness of imagination amounting to romance, as anyone with appreciable military experience and some grasp of factors of diversity in the world would note. A sort of omnicompetence for governments and their negotiators is predicated. Cultural factors would become completely malleable on a premise of an absolutely new day in world affairs, and statesmanship would be enabled to perform prodigies of combination heretofore unachievable. Heterogeneity would fall into ranks, and a homogeneous force would thereupon be ready to march. Ethnic antipathies and factors of diversity respecting language, nutritional habits, religious practices, and innumerable taboos would fade into inconsequentiality. Deficiencies in talent would somehow be redressed. Thus men from primitive societies would be fitted to constitute and to operate a complex, versatile, modernized force fit to serve in any clime and amid populations of whatever cultural level. Maximum admixture of ethnic and lingual groups in ranks and even alienism between officers and men would be cultivated as positive bases for morale rather than as conditions for chaos. Men would sign their years to rotation among remote garrisons.

Such suppositions and propositions, drawn from the literature of disarmament, reflect what has been already described as a typical civilian fallacy of regarding military organizations in technical terms only.[12] This outlook, preoccupied with categories rather than functional realities and noting structural parallels between one national force and another, construes military life as a genus of culture and imagines unlimited possibilities of combination. Components are treated as fungible like mechanical parts. By this line of thought, a peace force would be susceptible of assemblage from components of national forces according to whatever design statesmen might determine. A force could be made multinational in such degree as matched the authors' desires.

Such exercises in imagination have small bearing on practical problems. Planners for a world peace force could surely count on no exemption from requirements relevant to the human equation inherent in setting up a cogent military body. To assume such exemption would be equivalent to planning a ship in disregard of factors of seaworthiness.

Some guidance for such planners is provided by the *Outline*. The document calls for examination anew of the feasibility of giving effect to article 43 of the UN Charter. A stipulation

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time be subjected to restrictions which would permit making use of them only as agents of the world collectivity and providing material underpinnings for the global peace force. The idea underlying this alternative possibility is that states would be spared thereby from impingements upon their autonomy. The idea involves a distinction without a real difference. Agency is not the same as autonomy. To fulfill the characteristics stipulated for the peace force, that force would have to be placed beyond possibility of challenge by any state. That would require placing it beyond possibility of being hamstrung by any state's withholding use of facilities or other material requirements.

[12] It seems pointless to churn at length through ideas contained in the largely fantastical literature on the subject. Essays of Schelling and Henry V. Dicks, respectively, *loc. cit.*, pp. 212–256, are of some considerable value, however, as endeavors to come to terms with problems inherent in such an undertaking. They avoid the fallacy of assuming that the world and all factors relevant to creating such a force can be made over to suit statesmen's designs. In contrast, little of relevant value appears in Clark and Sohn, *op. cit.*, which is interesting chiefly as an illustration of what has been called the civilian fallacy. This sort of fallacy has been aptly described by an authority in *gestalt* psychology. From structural similarities between one heart and another, it construes a community among hearts and overlooks the ties functionally binding a heart to a pair of lungs in a relationship infinitely closer than any conceivable between one heart and another. Wolfgang Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology* (New York, Liveright, 1929), p. 351, cited by Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 12.

for the new force to "be supplied agreed manpower by states" might be construed as a scheme both to prorate participation and to authorize conscription for the purpose envisaged.[13] The language might accommodate preservation of symbolic national identities of troops, but it would be consistent also with conglomerate forces. The point is relatively inconsequential. The peace force is clearly anticipated as one inclusive apparatus. National command structures would be things of the past. Organization, support, and tempering of the force would be international business.

As a point for emphasis, the endeavor to create a force on such a mould of admixture, should it ever materialize, would be a departure from experience. No certain precedent indicating feasibility is adducible. Forces operating under the United Nations or, in earlier times, the League of Nations, have not been in such a pattern but have consisted rather of temporarily and contingently assigned units of national military establishments. The French Foreign Legion is sometimes cited as a model, but the instance proves inapposite when examined in detail.[14]

The problem is put in better proportion by including among criteria of reliability such considerations as identity, common doctrine and motivation, and amenability to command and control, in addition to the relatively easy factors of magnitude and technical adequacy. One must see a way through these aspects before being justified in any appreciable degree of confidence in the practicability of the whole idea of a global peace force. Without a plausible formula for bringing governments into concord on such sensitive and basic considerations, one could scarcely be said to have even the beginning of a plan.

Faculties of command respecting a military apparatus concern both the chain of authority within and the system of guidance and control exterior to and above it. The interlaced functions of command are broadly four: first, determination of doctrine underlying and motivating the force, its character as a social entity, and traits to be cultivated through control of members' careers; second—and closely related—the magisterial function of judging and punishing derelictions; third, choice of weapon systems and inculcation of proficiency in them, conceived in relation to putative missions; fourth, competence to decide upon and to effect deployments in actual operations. The first two aspects—characteristically taken for granted or summarily dealt with in projects for universal forces—are foundations of accomplishment with respect to the other two.

A fundamental aspect concerns the moral basis of the faculty of command. In a superficial view, obedience flows from establishment of a command framework: create authority, and compliance will follow in consequence. This approach involves a simplification amounting to distortion. Command authority is in essence a grant from those subject to it. Command conceived as a product of obedience comes closer to basic truth than a statement putting the relationship *vice versa*.[15]

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[13] This last interpretation is consistent with a ban on conscription expressed elsewhere in the *Outline:* "The parties . . . would halt all military conscription . . . inconsistent with the foregoing measures" which include the provision regarding supply of agreed manpower for the peace force. *Outline*, Stage III, B, 3.

[14] The French Foreign Legion as an example might have seemed more persuasive before the French government's decision in 1961 to disband its paratrooper battalions because of their recalcitrance and potential for mutiny. In any event, the Foreign Legion is a *French* Foreign Legion. The members are subject to French indoctrination and authority, serve on missions ordained by the French government, and use French as their operational language. Company officers are largely French and senior officers entirely so. Some Frenchmen serve in ranks. The rest are drawn mainly from European cultures somewhat assimilated to the French. Alien members usually serve in expectation of receiving French nationality upon completion of service. All are judged and rewarded or punished according to standards authorized by the French government. Discipline, however, emphasizes rigorous punishment for strictly military infractions but is indulgent with respect to social offenses, as would be usual in a service based on a mercenary principle—that is, without high identity between the outfit and the frame of authority. Withal, desertions have been a perennial problem, as gang tendencies also have been. The Legion's suitability is limited to duties in marginal areas with high incidence of combat rather than to routine duties in metropolitan areas. See Adrian Liddell Hart, *Strange Company* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), *passim.*

[15] Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 163–164. Also James G. Harbord, *The American Army in France* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1936), p. 259. Military annals are replete with instances of units rendered actively mutinous

A second key aspect concerns the cultural base of a military organization's responses.[16] This base is linked integrally to the concept of reliability. Reliability standing alone conveys little. The term requires a referent: reliability with respect to what? To be reliable, a force must have unity of character—a unity reflecting a common doctrine, reflecting agreement about values. The range of possibilities concerning moral and cultural bases for creating an effective force are wide, but no universal base —no generally accepted ethic of authority, responsibility, and the like—exists to be invoked as a basis for a world peace force. Such an ethic would have to be agreed upon and given reality as a motivating body of ideas, as a condition to creating a structure of command and control. Because of its importance, this simple point deserves elaboration.

VII. AN UNDERLYING ETHIC FOR A GLOBAL FORCE

It is accurate but inadequate to conceive of a force as a body of men organized and equipped to bring energy to bear destructively against designated adversaries on proper command. A force is not a collection of depersonalized entities. A force, moreover, should be thought of as spending the larger part of its existence under peaceable conditions rather than in hostile operations. The problem of relation to environment mostly concerns pacific environment. The members represent some pattern of identities and associations. In the usual case, a member has affective ties with some place inhabited by his own kind—a place in whose security against enemies he is personally involved.

Peaceable associations, sense of identity, and affective connections are basic to the assumptions, responses, and motivations underlying the character and effectiveness of a force. These characteristics vary in detail and strength from one member to another. In the degree of their existence and likeness, however, as between one member and another, they afford some basis for essential community. They do not account for all constituent traits of a force. Many other intertwined factors enter into determining a force's character, meaning the sum of what it can be relied upon to do or not to do: such matters as indoctrination, development of common habits and general proficiency by training, cumulative common experience as a group, systems of preferment and promotion, qualities of administered justice, standards of leadership, and the moral basis of authority. The sum total of determinants of a force's character is great and complex, and the sum differs from one culture to another, so that respective armed forces, however much alike considered from a technical standpoint, are widely variant as social entities. Such moral aspects are basic, and their paramountcy over material factors is recognized in a well known Napoleonic maxim.

Persons from alien cultures may indeed be assimilated to a force associated with some particular culture. This circumstance does not gainsay the main point: a force cannot be adequately considered apart from a cultural base and an underlying ethic. Outsiders must be assimilated. A force must reflect a character—not a patchwork. Forces may have roots in variant schemes of identity and value. A *force* must have, and be limited to, one basis. Otherwise it would constitute not a force, but a congeries of forces—not susceptible of being equated against putative missions.

The considerable variations possible may be illustrated by a force, on the one hand, with preponderant attitudes and associations scarcely distinguishable from those characterizing the civil community to which the force relates and, in contrast, a force dissociated from its surroundings, centered on its own existence, and characterized by inward affective connections so that the outfit itself becomes a moral equivalent of a homeland, and barracks life becomes the engrossing focus of loyalties. The Swiss army or a force based on the ethic delineated by Frederick Martin Stern in *The Citizen Army* would typify the

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or passively unresponsive, whereupon power of command was vitiated even though the structure of command was left intact.

[16] "Military institutions are intimately bound up with the state of culture which the nation has obtained," in the words of Rudiger von der Goltz, quoted by Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde* (New York, Putnam, 1939), p. 3. Literature constituting what might be called a sociology of military organization is not abundant. Stern, *op. cit.*, Nickerson, *op. cit.*, and Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, Macmillan, 1959) are useful, however. Two relevant points emerge from a perusal of such works: the basic and complex social character of military organization in contrast to the relatively simple technical aspect; the fallacy of thinking of military culture as a culture *per se* rather than as an aspect of culture normally related to a national base. Niccolò Machiavelli's insights into the national basis of military morale, though brief, are incisive. See his *Discourses* (New York, Random House, 1940), Bk. I, ch. xlii.

first. Any force in the Janissary or Praetorian-Guard model could typify the latter.[17]

What the *Outline* contemplates is a *force*. It would be synthesized from pre-existing forces associated with particular cultures—an assemblage of fragments taken over from disbanded national components. Three, and only three, elements of its binding ethic are made apparent: first, an affirmation of the unconditional heinousness of unauthorized violence; second, as a corollary, the countering rightness of authorized violence; and third, the repose of relevant authority—meaning the faculty determinative of the difference between violence authorized and violence unauthorized—in some prescribed consensus, as yet undefined, of local representatives in an international collectivity.

For a moment, at whatever cost in effort to suspend disbelief, it is appropriate to hypothesize achievement of a force on the basis of the ethic stipulated and to ponder its possible effectiveness, whether active or deterrent. The two aspects would be linked. The deterrent effects would be a product of estimates of the force's probable efficacy on being called into action.

A decision is made by a requisite majority in the establishment vested with control of the global peace force. It deems some act, whether in connection with an international quarrel or a contest for power within a national domain, to be a malefaction deserving or requiring interposition of the peace force; designates the malefactors; and summons the force to bring to bear its irresistible capabilities. The decision is conveyed to the apex of authority within the confines of the force establishment proper—presumably some global equivalent of a ministry of defense. Appropriate orders thence are relayed to the military command apparatus. The immediate results conceivable fall into two general categories: an effective strike against the designated malefactors, or a default. The implications of these two broad possibilities deserve further consideration.

An effective response might reflect either an identification on the part of a determining number within the force with the requisite majority's view on the merits of the matter at issue or an unreflecting acceptance of the directive as conclusive *ipso facto*. The first would not necessarily constitute a precedent for subsequent compliance under different circumstances. The second, unreflecting compliance, would apparently—with emphasis on that qualifier—tend to sustain the frame of authority unequivocally.

The possible forms of failure of compliance, signaling collapse of the ethic and derogation of the authority, would be various, for the ways of mutiny are multiple: dissent and cleavage within the command structure, resulting in a withholding of orders or even a commitment of force to the opposite side; divided identities within the force as a whole, rendering it inert in the particular instance or even sundering it, dividing its irresistibility into two or more parts, and bringing on an internal struggle for ascendancy. A potential for such developments would remain in any force with national identities and a sense for the merits of issues lingering in the command structure or the cadres,[18] and calculations of that potential and of ways for affecting it would become a central consideration in world politics.

It would be presumptuous to dismiss possibilities, as distinguished from probabilities, of achieving a force to suit the prescription and to sustain authority by bringing its overwhelming capabilities unquestioningly to bear. Some may uphold the possibility on a premise of recruiting members with a zeal for universal peace.[19] This is an improbable hope. A force's capability must depend on a fighting *élan*—not a zeal against fighting. Theoretically, however, such a force might be realized in either or both of two ways: by recruitment of individuals free of antecedent loyalties, moved by an urge to identify with paramount power, or desirous of opportunity to fight on the overwhelming side without fear of formidable retribution, or by a rigorous method of indoctrination such as to expunge members' antecedent loyalties and identities, to inculcate purely reflex responses to mandate, and so to transform personalities as to render members willing to operate even against their erstwhile homelands because a vote taken has determined for them to do so in the name of enforcing peace.

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[17] A reader has asked whether an army of occupation would not be in the same category. That would depend on its inherent character as a force, not on its relation to a particular scene of duty. An army of occupation, though at least formally alienated from its surroundings, is not *ipso facto* in the mood of feeling detached from any homeland whatever or being disposed to think of home as being the barracks. This is no less the case with troops on occupation duty accompanied by their kindred.

[18] Paul Kecskmeti, "Nuclear Absolutism," *Commentary* (July, 1963), pp. 43, 47.

[19] See for example Dicks, *loc. cit.*, p. 252. The author envisions a force imbued with, and motivated by, zeal for peace. He suggests the Ghurkas and the French Foreign Legion as possible prototypes. The inappositeness of these two traditional groups, with high reputations as fighting men, needs no laboring.

In reason and prudence, a word must be added. One should rule out an assumption of achieving a complete departure from lessons and limits of experience through international concord on the ethic of a global force. A force of such overwhelming corporate spirit, imbued with absolute obedience, dissociated from considerations which move or stay others, divorced from cultural ties, and committed to so peculiar an ethic, would in great probability be characterized by a high Janissary or Praetorian potential—a potential for developing its own momentum, a potential for passing almost momentarily from subordination to usurpation of authority or from absolute obedience to absolute mutiny.[20]

VIII. DOUBTS AND QUERIES

With his mind's eye, one can visualize the component parts of the new ordering of force predicated in the United States project: first, the basic force itself; above, yet part of it, a command and staff structure; higher still in the chain of formal authority, an equivalent of a world defense ministry; and in supreme or political charge a collectivity of representatives of erstwhile independent governments.

The peace force itself would be a body of fighting men chosen in accordance with some criteria, supposed to be moulded to a set of habits and responses in common, equipped and trained not for some abstractly conceived mission of peace but prepared or preparing to interpose and to wage havoc in particular theaters under specific assumed operational conditions. Necessarily, it would be garrisoned somewhere, maybe in a diversity of locations. It must come to some social relationship within itself and with environing populations. The members might conceivably be cut off from women and familial ties. They might be permitted fuller lives in enclaves set apart from the surrounding societies, or they might even enjoy that combination of aloofness and prerogative associated with a conqueror's status. Their way of life might be that of blending into surrounding cultures as full sharers. The basis chosen would, of course, have a bearing on the degree of feasible admixture into a conglomerate homogeneity or of assortment into diverse components attempted in the force, and that factor in turn would have much to do with how the force could be used.

The higher command and staff structure—itself presumably drawn from diverse cultural sources and struggling with language barriers as well as internal divergencies of outlook—would be concerned with trying to realize a cogent, unified, operationally reliable instrument out of culturally varied men. The men must be either admixed into a uniformity of diversities or separated into a diversity of uniformities. With small inherent unity within itself, the structure would be trying to cope with unexampled complexities of human relations. What notional missions should be prepared for—inasmuch as military doctrine and training cannot be formulated against abstractions?[21] Staff work and command would be unremittingly involved in that most prickly of questions.

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[20] This danger is dealt with, and a solution offered, by one highly reputed writer in this field: "The danger of Caesar worship may be avoided if the command of the force is entrusted, not to a single person, but to a committee of five or seven persons, all of whom preferably ought to be nationals of small nations. At the same time, to ensure the impartiality of decisions, the majority of the command group should come from the noncommitted nations rather than the two major blocs." Sohn, in Larson, *op. cit.*, p. 5. No showing is made on the relevance of such concepts as "major blocs" and "noncommitted nations" under conditions of complete national disarmament. No links between "impartiality" and "noncommitted nations" are demonstrated. No showing is made for the assumed likelihood of finding small nations to be resourceful in affording talents and experience for the intricate and subtle problems of command under the contemplated conditions. No experiential data on the efficacy of command by committee are offered. Nothing is adduced to support an assumption in favor of the appropriateness of plural command as a means of averting the perils. The passage quoted is an interesting example of how to project the future in disregard of experience.

[21] Schelling, *loc. cit.*, p. 233, puts the matter succinctly: unless conceived as a purely ceremonial or symbolic entity, such a force would have to have a strategy. A set of purposes and assumed missions would have to be built into the organization and reflected in its doctrine. Determining that strategy would be a central concern in world politics, because in turn that strategy

The ministerial agency, itself internally diverse, would be trying to perform prodigies of superintendency in integrating force over a world scope. It would be seeking and trying to apply formulas for qualification, selection, promotion, brigading, compensation, retirement, and conditions for a common life covering throngs of persons of divergent background, different senses of reality, highly varied frames of value, and discrepant expectations and taboos. It would face baffling problems in the formulation and administration of justice resulting from interspersion of cultures in an intensively organized body. It would be charged with measuring operational requirements, and procuring accordingly, against unforeseeable missions.

The supreme authority, the political collectivity itself, would be engrossed in parallel issues in trying to translate the rhetoric of unity and world order into measurable realities. Basically, the collectivity must determine the distribution of authority. The participants would be in an ambiguous position. The entities for which they would speak would be putative targets of, as well as participants in, the amalgam of force. This duality would affect a wide range of questions requiring decision. One such question would be that of selecting a site for the force's headquarters. Others would arise in connection with locating the force's main bases and main normal concentrations of personnel and determining its main supply sources. Obviously, except under incalculably distraught conditions, the force would never be ordered to proceed against its own establishment or sources. Hence a host area, or a significant contributary, might presumably be exempt from ever becoming an operational target. On the other hand, the continuing presence of large numbers of global troops would probably be an important political conditioning factor in any land. The issues would be deep and enduring.

Further, such questions would arise in determining who should command from one stage to another, what should be the extent of his or their prerogative to determine subordinates in the chain of authority, and who should have the determining voice in displacing commanders. The questions, obviously, would bear upon what the force might be relied upon to do or not to do. The participating entities would have to be vitally alert because vitally concerned.

A basic matter would be that of settling who should lay down the binding doctrine for the force and how the inculcation of that doctrine should be supervised. These would not be theoretic questions. Academies, staff and command schools, and the like would have to be instituted in view of the abolition of national establishments of such character. Who should be in charge? What precepts and methods should be imposed in them? The pattern of fidelity and reliability for a globally irresistible force might well turn on such questions, and every significant unit of government would feel vitally concerned.

How and by whom would specific questions of equipment and specific objects of training exercises be determined? In a related way, how, and at whose say-so, should operational intelligence be gathered? The implications do not need to be labored. Forces must be prepared to operate on one kind of mission or another, in one sort of terrain or another, and amid one populace or another—against specific rather than abstract operational targets. For example, the force may run maneuvers under simulated Alpine conditions. Or, it concentrates on desert training. The staff studies Baltic or Red Sea oceanography. Some officers are assigned to study Arabic. Data on land approaches to Kashmir are gathered. One can readily imagine the sort of reverberating issues bound to arise as plans, exercises and the gathering of operational information were directed to correspond to particular countries. One may predicate the vesting of control of nuclear weapons in the projected apparatus and ponder the question—and its implications—as to what particular capitals or industrial complexes should be targeted.

Such questions, by no means exhaustive, are illustrative of what would be involved in creating links to ensure control and response with respect to such a force. The aspects are myriad, and all delicate. Authority of a central collectivity over such a peace force may sound engagingly simple when confined to considerations of authorizing a pre-established and ready force to blast away at some hypothetical miscreant. In practice the elements of control would be integral to the character of the force itself and would have to be built into the force from its origin and to be continuously superintended.

If the whole idea were to work at all, the

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would have a determinative influence on world politics.

collectivity, however organized, with the force under its charge as an instrument of presumed reliability, would have to exercise effective power in suppression of attempts to undermine the arrangement. The irresistible force would need to be brought to bear at once and rigorously against any effort to offset its irresistibility. Any move by a formerly independent state to resume military autonomy would need to be regarded and dealt with as an act of rebellion and secession. In consenting to become a participant in, and putative beneficiary of, a world monopoly of military force, a state would *ipso facto* consent to becoming a target in event of a later attempt to renounce the contract. Under other conditions—and without an effective will to maintain paramountcy in the central arrangement—the force would fail of irresistibility, and states could not afford to commit their security to its care unconditionally. Yet the paramountcy premised for the force must rest on such commitments made in an engrossing pattern. With respect to the whole undertaking, the peace force's irresistibility is thus premised both as a condition precedent and as a consequence. In any event, and in practical terms, it is at least subject to doubt that the constituent elements of the stipulated quality are accessible.

The collective authority, with its irresistible coercive instrument, would become arbiter of questions of legitimacy touching the system of regime in every land. To its jurisdiction would come questions of enlarging quotas of force permitted to particular governments for internal security. It would have to develop a basis for approving and rejecting such petitions. It would presumably inquire into the necessities in view of the methods and purposes of an applicant government and in relation to the purposes and interests confronting it. It would be in position to grant effectiveness, to license oppression, or to deny a beset regime requirements for maintaining itself against internal challenge.

In extremity, involving a regime's inability to counter domestic challenge with its permitted quota of internal security forces, it would fall to the world collectivity to lend or not to lend a hand with a fraction of its irresistible components—a political question of sweeping import. A factor in the life and stability of regimes would be their standing, in the measure of political favor, with whatever consensus might prevail in the apparatus of control over the central force and the apparent probability, again calculated in political terms, of their being able to obtain its assistance in exigency. In an instance of rival claims to a local seat of authority, the advantage falling to a claimant enjoying favor with the determining voices in the central apparatus might well prove conclusive.

In like fashion, the suffrage of the central apparatus would be dominant in issues of secession arising within any constituent area.

These considerations have a basic importance to every scheme for integrating and centralizing the organization of force over a great expanse. Characteristically—and, one should add, essentially—such projects in the past have faced the attendant problems squarely. They have started from postulates of the legitimacy of every regime engrossed and of the propriety of its span of jurisdiction. In predicating a central authority in possession and control over paramount forces, they have complementarily undertaken to guarantee each participating regime in perpetuity.

Thus it was, for example, with the Duke of Sully's Grand Design in the sixteenth century and with the Abbé de St. Pierre's *Projet* in the eighteenth. Thus it was, and remains, with the Constitution of the United States. A provision, in section 10 of Article I, that "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . keep troops, or ships of war" goes hand in hand with provisions, in sections 3 and 4 of Article IV, that "no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress" and that the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them . . . against domestic violence." The integrity of every span of domain and the continuity of legitimacy for every participating regime are clearly stipulated. Every state is secured against disruption of its domain. Every state is promised a duly elected and representative regime and guaranteed constitutional continuity.

The *Outline* omits equivalent provisions for guaranteed peaceful continuity. To the contrary, it bespeaks peaceful change. Yet assurance of what can be counted on to last—not what can be counted on to give way—forms the foundation of order. It is difficult to see how any significant regime could afford to sign away command over factors of force without some such set of guarantees as those cited from the Constitution of the United States. Yet the idea of agreeing *ab initio* on a universal frame for legitimacy, undertaking to guarantee licit continuity of authority in every land, and predicating the fixity of all territorial dispositions only underlines the remoteness from actuality of preconditions for a world monopoly of force.

To assume such preconditions as fulfilled is to construe the underlying problems of world order and security as solved. To attribute to governments individually and collectively such plenitude of power—such omnificent capacities—as to enable them to achieve these conditions as an exercise in policy involves disregarding the actual limitations bearing upon their actions. As an element in the United States disarmament plan, the project for a world peace force may promote an aura of abstract good intention for United States policy. Its usefulness with respect to the credibility of United States policy is another matter.

THE 1914 CASE*

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This paper will employ techniques of content analysis to examine some features of top-level communications between national policy makers during a momentous period of stress. It is concerned with the effects of stress upon: (1) the manner in which decision-makers perceive time as a factor in their formulation of policy; (2) the contrasting ways in which they view policy alternatives for their own nations, for their allies, and for their adversaries; and (3) the flow of communications among them.

I. HYPOTHESES AND DATA

Specifically, the following hypotheses will be tested with data from the 1914 crisis leading up to the Great War in Europe:

Hypothesis 1. As stress increases in a crisis situation:

(a) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making.
(b) decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Hypothesis 2. In a crisis situation, decision-makers will perceive:

(a) their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.
(b) their allies' range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

Hypothesis 3. As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive:

(a) the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.
(b) the range of alternatives open to adversaries to expand.

Hypothesis 4. The higher the stress in a crisis situation:

(a) the heavier the overload upon the channels of communication.
(b) the more stereotyped will be the information content of messages.
(c) the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.
(d) the higher the proportion of intra-coalition—as compared with inter-coalition—communication.

These hypotheses have been developed in large part from recent decision-making literature and from the voluminous experimental literature of psychology. The advantages of precise measurement, easy replication, and tight control over the experimental variables have permitted psychologists to probe into many aspects of human performance under varying situational conditions. Results obtained primarily from observations of undergraduate students may at first blush be suspect when generalized to foreign policy leaders. The strong support for these hypotheses in the experimental literature, however, at least suggests that they warrant testing in historical crisis situations.[1]

The 1914 crisis provides a particularly suitable case for a test of the hypotheses. The available documentation relating to the outbreak of the Great War surpasses that of any crisis of similar magnitude. Among the nations directly involved, only the Serbian archives have remained relatively inaccessible to the investigator. A generation of careful scholarship produced document collections of unquestioned authenticity, including those of Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia.[2] Finally, the crisis is a classic ex-

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[1] This literature is reviewed in my "Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making," as the earlier version of this paper, noted above, was entitled. See also F. E. Horvath, "Psychological Stress: A Review of Definitions and Experimental Research," in L. von Bertalanffy and Anatol Rapoport, eds., *General Systems Yearbook*, IV (Ann Arbor, Society for General Systems Research, 1959).

[2] Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Ministerium des k. and k. Hauses und des Äusseren, *Österreich-*

ample of war through escalation. The minor war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which crisis-hardened European diplomats expected to remain localized,[3] engulfed nearly the entire continent within ten days. The existing international system—still commonly referred to as the archetype of a functioning "balance of power" system—was unable to cope with the situation as it had previously in the recurring Balkan crises. While extensive war plans had been drawn up by the various general staffs, there is little evidence that any European decision-maker wanted or expected a general war—at least in 1914.

The data for this paper were derived in whole from documents signed and sent by designated British, French, Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian decision-makers; that is, those persons filling the roles of: head of state; head of government; foreign minister; under-secretary of foreign affairs; minister of war; chief of the general staff. The data in the present paper are derived from the *complete verbatim text* of published documents meeting the criteria of authorship and date (June 27–August 4). While these documents do not record all messages initiated by the designated leaders—notably lacking are face-to-face or telephone conversations—they do embody a substantial portion of all their communications.

The initial step in the content analysis of these documents was to develop a coding unit—*the perception*—defined in terms of the following elements: the *perceiver;* the perceived, or *agent;* the *action* or *attitude;* and the *target.* For example, the assertion by a Russian decision-maker that "The Austrian, as well as German, hope is the ultimate annihilation of Serbia," was coded as two separate perceptions, in each case the *perceiver* being the author of the document.[4] The 1914 documents yielded 4883 such perceptions.

Perceiver	*Agent*	*Action or Attitude*	*Target*
Sazonov	Austrian	hope is the ultimate annihilation of	Serbia
Sazonov	German	hope is the ultimate annihilation of	Serbia

The independent variable in each hypothesis—the level of *stress*—can be defined as resulting from a perceived threat to high priority values. Eight of the ten hypotheses postulate changes deriving from *increased stress.* The outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will be used as the dividing point between the period of *lower* (June 27–July 28) and *higher* (July 29–August 4) stress. Intuitively one would expect that European decision-makers—except perhaps the Serbs and Austrians, by then already committed—were under greater stress during the latter period.

Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914; Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreich-ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern, Ludwig Bittner and Alfred Pribram, Heinrich Srbik and Hans Uebersberger, eds., vol. VIII (Vienna and Leipzig, 1930.)

France, Commission for the Publication of Documents Relative to the War of 1914, *Documents Diplomatiques Francais (1871–1914),* 3d series, vols. X and XI (Paris, 1936).

Great Britain, Foreign Office, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914,* vol. XI, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. (London, 1926).

Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., *Outbreak of the World War, German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1924).

Russia, Komissiia po izdaiiu dokumentov spokhi imperializma: *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v ipokhu imperializma;* dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarkogi i vremennogo pravitel 'stv 1878–1915 gg., seriia III, toma IV and V (Moskva-Leningrad, 1931 and 1934).

In this paper references to these collections are made by *document number,* rather than page number.

[3] The reaction of Sir Arthur Nicholson, British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was typical: "I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take any action of a serious character and I expect the storm will blow over" (Great Britain, *op. cit.,* #40). At about the same time Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote, "I went to bed with a feeling things might blow over . . . we were still a long way, as it seemed, from any danger of war". Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911–1914* (New York, 1928), p. 208. As late as July 28 the Kaiser wrote of the crisis in the Balkans, "A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away" (Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.,* #271).

[4] For a full description of the coding operations, see Robert C. North *et al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963). Some problems of sampling in the use of historical documents are discussed in Holsti, *op. cit.,* pp. 21–22.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF PERCEPTIONS OF TIME AS A FACTOR IN DECISION-MAKING: COMBINED TOTALS FOR AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMANY, FRANCE, RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN

Period	Total Perceptions	Time Perceptions					Total
		A	B	C	D	E	
June 27–July 2	306	3	0	0	0	0	3
July 3–16	349	11	1	0	1	3	16
July 12–20	211	1	0	0	1	1	3
July 21–25	634	11	17	9	0	1	38
July 26	300	0	3	0	0	0	3
July 27	287	0	7	1	2	2	12
July 28	407	0	1	0	0	0	1
July 29	456	0	5	1	1	0	7
July 30	342	1	1	5	2	0	9
July 31	529	0	0	10	5	2	17
August 1–2	583	0	2	11	8	7	28
August 3–4	479	0	0	2	18	3	23
Total	4883	27	37	39	38	19	160

Code of relevance of time:

A—Factor in Austro-Hungarian action toward Serbia.
B—Factor in localizing conflict.
C—Factor in mobilization.
D—Factor in political commitments.
E—Others.

This premise is supported by measures of both attitude and action. The documents yielded 882 *perceptions of hostility* directed against the perceivers' nations, which were scaled by the Q-Sort method. The results indicate significantly higher intensity during the July 29–August 4 period for each alliance ($Z = 10.81$ and 3.88; both are significant at the .0001 level). A scaling of the *actions* taken by members of each alliance also reveals a significantly higher level of *violence* or *potential violence* during the last week prior to the outbreak of general war ($Z = 2.24$ and 5.58, significant at the .025 and .0001 levels respectively).[4a] Thus the two periods meet the requirements necessary to test the hypotheses.

II. PERCEPTIONS OF TIME

To test the first two hypotheses, the entire set of nearly five thousand perceptions derived from the decision-makers' documents was recoded; every statement making reference to time as a factor in decision-making was extracted. The 160 time perceptions were initially classified according to date[5] and stated reason for the relevance of time (Table I).

Time perceptions in these data fall into four major categories which correspond to the development of events within the crisis. During the earliest period—through July 20—some 68.1 per cent of the references to time focus on the prospects of early Austro-Hungarian actions against Serbia. Count Alexander Hoyos, for example, wrote on July 7 that "From a military standpoint . . . it would be much more favorable to start the war now than later since the balance of power would weigh against us in the future."[6] Hoyos's fear that "through a policy of delay and weakness, we at a later moment, endanger this unflinching support of the German Empire,"[7] was not wholly without foundation. Germany was exerting considerable pressure on its ally not to postpone a showdown until a less clearly defined future. Gottlieb von Jagow, German Foreign Minister, wrote on July 15: "We are concerned at present with the preeminent political question, perhaps the last opportunity of giving the Greater-Serbia menace its death blow under comparatively favorable circumstances."[8]

[4a] For a more detailed discussion of the data and scaling methods see, *ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

[5] In earlier studies of the 1914 crisis using content analysis data, the data were divided into twelve periods of approximately equal volume of documentation as in Table I; thus time periods early in the crisis are longer than those in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war. See Ole R. Holsti and Robert C. North, "History as a 'Laboratory' of Conflict," in Elton B. McNeil, ed., *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, 1965); Holsti and North, "Perceptions of Hostility and Economic Variables," in Richard Merritt, ed., *Comparing Nations* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965); North *et al.*, "Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer, ed., *The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research: Empirical Studies in International Relations* (1965, in press); Holsti *et al.*, "Violence and Hostility: The Path to World War," paper read at American Psychiatric Association meeting, Los Angeles, Calif. (May, 1964.)

The statistical tests of hypotheses 1a, 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b are based on these twelve periods.

Once the content of the Austrian ultimatum became known, the 48-hour deadline given the Serbian government to reply became an immediate subject of concern. The time perceptions from July 21 through 29 focus predominantly (54.0 per cent) on the necessity of delaying the course of events in the Balkans in the hope of averting war, or at least containing it within a local area.

By July 30 it was apparent that war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia could not be prevented. At the same time, it was increasingly evident that such a war was likely to spread. As late as August 1 many European decision-makers asserted that if time permitted a reconvening of the concert powers, general war might be avoided. The British Foreign Minister wrote: "I still believe that if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war it might be possible to secure peace."[9] By this time, however, the pressure of time had taken a different meaning for many of them. A major concern (48.1 per cent of all time perceptions from July 30 to August 2) was that one's nation not be caught militarily unprepared in case of war.

The dilemma was obvious. Time was required to avert a general European war; above all, a moratorium on military operations was necessary. So on August 1 King George V wrote of his efforts "to find some solution which permits in any case the adjournment of active military operations and the granting of time to the powers to discuss among themselves calmly."[10] But increasingly this consideration was overshadowed by the fear that a potential adversary might gain a head start in mobilizing its military power. Although no *official* mobilization orders except those of Austria-Hungary and Serbia were issued until July 29, there were increasing rumors and suspicions of secret preparations—some of them well founded, as it turned out.[11]

In the early hours of the morning of July 30, the Kaiser wrote on the margin of a message from the Czar,

> . . . the Czar—as is openly admitted by him here—instituted "mil. measures which have *now come into force*" against Austria and us and as a matter of fact five days ago. Thus it is almost *a week ahead* of us. And these measures are for a *defense* against *Austria*, which is *in no way* attacking him!!! I can not agree to any more mediation, since the Czar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back. It is only a maneuver, in order to hold us back and to increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end![12]

Later the Kaiser added, "In view of the colossal war preparations of Russia now discovered, this is all too late, I fear. Begin! Now!"[13]

The previous day Russia had ordered—and then cancelled—a general mobilization. Later it was decided in St. Petersburg that the mobilization of the four southern military districts would deter an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia without alarming Berlin. But technical difficulties caused the Russians to reverse their decision once again on July 30 in favor of general mobilization—German warnings notwithstanding.

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[6] Hoyos's assessment that time was working against the Dual Monarchy was supported by General Conrad, Austro-Hungarian Chief-of-Staff: "In the years 1908–1909 it would have been a game with open cards," he said. "In 1912–1913 the chances were in our favour. Now it is a sheer gamble [*ein va-banque spiel*]." Quoted in Edmund Taylor, *The Fall of the Dynasties* (Garden City, 1963), p. 206.

[7] Austria-Hungary, *op. cit.*, #10118.

[8] Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #48.

[9] Great Britain, *op. cit.*, #411.

[10] France, *op. cit.*, #550.

[11] Winston Churchill mobilized the British Navy contrary to a decision of the Cabinet. "At the Cabinet [meeting of August 1] I demanded the immediate calling out of the Fleet Reserves and the completion of our naval preparations. . . . However, I did not succeed in procuring their assent. . . . I went back to the Admiralty and gave forthwith the order to mobilise. We had no legal authority for calling up the Naval Reserves, as no proclamation had been submitted to his Majesty in view of the Cabinet decision, but we were quite sure that the Fleet men would unquestioningly obey the summons." Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–231.

[12] Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #390.

[13] *Ibid.*, #433.

In response to what was perceived as a mounting threat against its eastern frontiers, the German Empire proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war" on July 31 and dispatched a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding a cessation of military preparations. Berlin then ordered mobilization on August 1. A general mobilization was simultaneously ordered in Paris. Although official British mobilization was delayed until August 2, many had advocated such action considerably earlier. On July 31 Arthur Nicolson had urged immediate military preparations: "It seems to me most essential, whatever our future course may be in regard to intervention, that we should at once give orders for mobilization of the army."[14]

So, ten days after the small scale mobilizations by Serbia and Austria-Hungary on July 25, each of the major European nations had ordered a general mobilization; the armies totalling less than 400,000 men called to fight a limited war had grown to nearly twelve million men. As each mobilization was ordered it was described as a necessary defensive reaction—made more urgent by the pressure of time—to a previous decision within the other alliance, although such an act was commonly regarded in 1914 as tantamount to a declaration of war. Thus, each mobilization acted as a stimulus that elicited an almost reflex-like response.[15]

In the final hours of the crisis leaders in both coalitions became increasingly concerned (78.2 per cent of all time perceptions August 3–4) that other nations make their intentions known immediately. Allied states, members of the opposing coalition, and even neutral states were subjected to demands for immediate commitment to one side or the other.

The first hypothesis (1a, above) relating the stress of crisis to perceptions of time states that:

> As stress increases in a crisis situation, time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making.

In order to perform a valid test of the hypothesis, the frequency of time references for each of the twelve periods (Table I) was adjusted as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Time Perceptions} \times 100}{\text{Total Perceptions}}$$

The resulting scores were then divided into two periods, June 27-July 28, and July 29-August 4.

A Mann-Whitney U-Test of the direction and magnitude of differences between the two periods was applied to the data for each coalition.[16] The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data for the Triple Entente (France, Russia and England), whose leaders perceived time as a factor in decision-making significantly more frequently during the culminating stages (July 29–August 4) of the crisis than during the earlier period (June 27–July 28) ($U = 3, p = .009$). The data for the Dual Alliance (Germany,

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[14] Great Britain, *op. cit.*, #368.

[15] In some cases, the escalation of measures and counter-measures was sustained almost by accident, or by the failure to perceive the effects of one's actions. The mobilization of the Russian Baltic fleet is a good example: "On 25 July, when the Tsar looked over the minutes and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the 24th, he not only approved them by adding 'agreed,' but, where it was the question of mobilizing the districts of Kiev, Moscow, Odessa and Kazan and the Black Sea fleet, he inserted in his own hand 'and Baltic' without any of his ministers drawing his attention to the fact that the mobilization of the Baltic fleet constituted an act of hostility toward Germany." Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 3 vols. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), II, p. 558.

Although the Russian Baltic Fleet was no match for the German Navy, the Kaiser apparently felt genuinely threatened. In response to Bethmann-Hollweg's plea that the German Fleet be left in Norway, he wrote, "there is a Russian Fleet! In the Baltic there are now five Russian torpedo boat flotillas engaged in practice cruises, which as a whole or in part can be at the Belts within sixteen hours and close them. Port Arthur should be a lesson! My Fleet has orders to sail for Kiel, and to Kiel it is going to sail!" Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #221.

[16] This test is used to determine if there is a systematic difference between scores in two samples or populations. Each item is given a rank order score; in the case of hypothesis 1a, each time period receives a rank score based on the adjusted frequency with which time is perceived as a salient factor in decision-making. The value of U (the statistic in this test) is given by the number of times that a score in one group (July 29–August 4) precedes a score in the other group (June 27–July 28). Thus, the lower the value of U, the more significant is the difference. Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1956), pp. 116–127.

Austria-Hungary) reveal that differences between the early and later periods of the crisis are in the predicted direction, but that the difference is not statistically significant ($U = 11.5, p = .19$).

According to the second hypothesis (1b) concerning perceptions of time:

> As stress increases in a crisis situation, decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Of the total of 160 statements in which time is perceived to be a factor in decision-making, only eight reveal a concern for the more distant future. When the data are divided into the early and later periods of the crisis, all perceptions of the distant future occur during the June 27–July 28 period, and none are found in the last week of the crisis, a distribution which is statistically significant (Fisher exact $p = .002$).

These data confirm again the relevance of the "Thomas Theorem": "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." An analysis of European military technology and doctrines reveals that "objectively" time was of incalculably less importance than in the 1960s. Estimates of the time required for Austria-Hungary to field a full army ranged from three to four weeks. The necessities of harvesting the summer's crops were an important factor in military timetables. Russia's inability to mount a rapid offensive against Germany could be discounted; this assumption in fact was the basis of the Schlieffen plan.

Yet in the situation of high stress the decision-makers *perceived* that time was crucial—and they *acted* on that assumption. In the culminating phases of the crisis, leaders in the various capitals of Europe increasingly perceived potential enemies as able to deliver a sudden punishing blow. As a result, the penalties for delaying immediate military action were perceived to be increasingly high. Or, to use the language of modern deterrence theory, the nations of each coalition perceived those of the other alliance as able and willing to launch a massive, crippling first-strike, and thus hastened their own preparations.[17] Hence the entire European concert system—which was assumed to act as an equilibrating mechanism—became instead a "runaway system."

III. PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES

The entire original set of 4883 perceptions was recoded to test the hypotheses relating to perceived alternatives. This process yielded 508 statements classified as perceptions of "choice," "necessity," or "closed alternatives."[18]

The "choice" category includes all statements in which more than one course of action is perceived.

The "necessity" category includes all statements indicating that the author sees only one possible course of action.

The "closed" classification includes all statements indicating that some course of action is not possible.

The initial hypothesis (2a) to be tested with these data is that:

> In a crisis situation, decision-makers will tend to perceive their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries; that is, they will perceive their own decision-making to be characterized by *necessity* and *closed* options, whereas those of the adversary are characterized by *open* choices.

Table II reveals that British, French, Russian and German decision-makers perceived significantly fewer options open to themselves than to their adversaries.[19] In one respect the data for Austria-Hungary are similar to those of the

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[17] A question of possible interest to deterrence theorists is: Would the "capacity to delay response" have materially altered the outcome in 1914? Although we can only speculate, one point does seem clear. The ability of the weapons system to delay response successfully may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient, factor. None of the states in 1914 had the ability to unleash a rapid destructive blow, crippling the retaliatory capabilities of the adversary. But during the final week prior to the outbreak of general war, decision-makers in the capitals of Europe increasingly attributed this ability and intent to potential enemies. Thus the capacity to delay response is not likely to be effective unless decision-makers: (a) perceive the net rewards of delay to be higher than those of immediate action; and (b) are willing to attribute the same preferences to the adversary's decision-makers.

[18] The inter-coder reliability was 0.87.

[19] There may, of course, be political and strategic reasons for such assertions, quite aside from the way in which the situation is actually perceived. This is particularly likely in documents which are intended for wide public circulation. On the other hand, the most "private" documents—intended only for circulation within the various decision groups—do not differ materially from the entire set of documents in respect to the findings reported here. See, for example, the Kaiser's marginal annotations, or the various minutes of Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

TABLE II. PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES: FREQUENCY OF "CHOICE," "NECESSITY," AND "CLOSED" ALTERNATIVES FOR OWN NATION AND ENEMIES

GERMANY

	Choice	*Necessity*
Self	10	109
Enemies	21	3

$\chi^2 = 73.6$ $p < .001$

	Choice	*Closed*
Self	10	19
Enemies	21	0

$\chi^2 = 22.2$ $p < .001$

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

	Choice	*Necessity*
Self	13	80
Enemies	0	3

Fisher exact $p = .65$

	Choice	*Closed*
Self	13	7
Enemies	0	0

Fisher exact $p = 1.00$

RUSSIA

	Choice	*Necessity*
Self	7	20
Enemies	6	2

Fisher exact $p = .02$

	Choice	*Closed*
Self	7	7
Enemies	6	0

Fisher exact $p = .04$

FRANCE

	Choice	*Necessity*
Self	1	13
Enemies	12	2

$\chi^2 = 17.8$ $p < .001$

	Choice	*Closed*
Self	1	6
Enemies	12	3

Fisher exact $p = .006$

GREAT BRITAIN

	Choice	*Necessity*
Self	7	20
Enemies	21	2

$\chi^2 = 21.6$ $p < .001$

	Choice	*Closed*
Self	7	23
Enemies	21	0

$\chi^2 = 29.3$ $p < .001$

other nations—the decision-makers in Vienna perceived themselves to be acting out of necessity and closed options rather than open choice. There are only three Austro-Hungarian statements regarding the options of the enemies and none are perceptions of choice. This finding is not surprising. After the earliest phase of the crisis, the policy of punishing Serbia was pursued in Vienna with a single-mindedness not evident in the British policy of seeking a mediated solution; nor in the German policy of trying to preserve the "dignity and honor" of her ally, while averting a general war which many Germans perceived would end disastrously;[20] nor in the Russian policy which, like that of Germany, sought to support the prestige of a weak ally without a world war.

Leaders of the Triple Entente nations perceived few acceptable alternatives open to themselves in regard to the Balkan crisis. Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 24 that "We can do nothing for moderation unless Germany is prepared *pari passu* to do the same."[21] Almost to the end leaders in Berlin opposed mediation. According to Bethmann-Hollweg, "We cannot mediate in the conflict between Austria and Serbia but possibly later between Austria and Russia."[22] Nor were the Russians inclined to mediation because, in the words of Sazonov, "We have assumed from the beginning a posture which we cannot change."[23] Yet the same leaders tended to perceive more freedom of action for members of the other alliance.[24]

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[20] An earlier study of the 1914 crisis revealed, for example, that German decision-makers were fully aware of Germany's inability to wage a successful two-front war in 1914. Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961). Admiral Tirpitz wrote, "It [the German Government] was convinced from the very beginning that we should not win . . . that government itself was most deeply convinced of its hopelessness." Alfred von Tirpitz, *My Memoirs* (London, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 1919).

[21] Great Britain, *op. cit.*, #103.

[22] Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #247.

The tendency to perceive one's own alternatives to be more restricted than those of the adversary is also evident in the reaction to the events leading up to general war. On July 28 Nicholas II had warned that, "I foresee that I will succumb very soon to the pressure put upon me and will be compelled to take extreme measures which will lead to war."[25] Three days later—in the course of his desperate last minute correspondence with the Kaiser, the Tsar asserted, "It is technically impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilization.[26]

The reaction of German decision-makers to the series of events leading up to mobilization and war was almost identical to that of the Tsar. On the one hand they repeatedly asserted that they had no choice but to take vigorous military measures against the threat to the east.[27] These were, on the other hand, interspersed with statements that only Russia was free to act in order to prevent war.[28] And Wilhelm, like the Tsar, finally asserted that he had lost control of his own military and that only the actions of the adversary could stop further escalation:[29]

> On technical grounds my mobilization which had already been proclaimed this afternoon must proceed against two fronts, east and west as prepared. This cannot be countermanded because I am sorry your [George V] telegram came so late.[30]

The same theme of a single option open to one's self, coupled with perceptions that the initiative for peace rested with the enemy, are evident in the French and Austrian statements regarding their own mobilizations.[31] During the last week only the British consistently stated that they were able to act with some degree of freedom. Owing in part to a badly divided Cabinet, to estimates of public apathy, and to pressure from the business community for neutrality, Grey asserted that British "hands were free."[32]

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[23] Russia, *op. cit.*, #118.

[24] After the outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, Grey wrote: "The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace" (Great Britain, *op. cit.*, #263).

[25] Russia, *op. cit.*, #170.

[26] Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #487.

[27] "Then I must mobilize too! . . . He [Nicholas] expressly stated in his first telegram that he would be presumably forced to take measures that would lead to a European war. Thus he takes the responsibility upon himself." *Ibid.*, #399.

[28] "The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your [Nicholas] power to avert it." *Ibid.*, #480.

[29] To students of strategy the assertions of the Kaiser and the Tsar may appear to be a "real life" application of the tactics of "commitment: a device to leave the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so that the other party must choose in one's favor." Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 37.

The behavior of military leaders in St. Petersburg and Berlin proved, however, that neither monarch was merely bluffing. After Sazonov and General Tatischev had browbeaten the vacillating Nicholas into ordering general mobilization, the former called General Ianuschkevitch and said: "Now you can smash the telephone. Give your orders, General, and then—disappear for the rest of the day."

In Berlin Moltke effectively undermined belated German efforts to restrain Austria-Hungary by wiring: "Stand firm to Russian mobilization. Austria-Hungary must be preserved. Mobilize at once against Russia. Germany will mobilize."

In Vienna Conrad von Hotzendorf insured himself against any second thoughts Francis Joseph might have had by ordering mobilization one day ahead of schedule.

One factor which contributed to the perceptions of a single alternative was the rigidity of the various mobilization plans. The Russian attempt to mobilize against only Austria was anathema to the Russian generals because no such plan had been drawn up. According to General Dobrorolski, "The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its final conclusion and in all its detail. . . . Once the moment is chosen, everything is settled; there is no going back; it determines mechanically the beginning of war." Virginia Cowles, *The Kaiser* (New York, 1964), pp. 343–46.

Similarly the Kaiser's last minute attempt to reverse the Schlieffen plan—to attack only in the east—shattered Moltke, who replied: "That is impossible, Your Majesty. An army of a million cannot be improvised. It would be nothing but a rabble of undisciplined armed men, without a commissariat. . . . It is utterly impossible to advance except according to plan; strong in the west, weak in the east." Moltke, *Erinnerungen*, quoted *ibid.*, pp. 348–9.

[30] Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #575.

According to the second hypothesis (2b) relating stress to perceptions of alternatives:

> In a crisis situation, decision-makers will tend to perceive their allies' range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

European leaders perceived fewer alternatives open to themselves than to their adversaries; they regarded their allies to be in a similar position. On the one hand German documents are replete with explanations that Austria was pursuing the *only* policy open to her, thus preventing Germany from playing a moderating role in Vienna.[33] On the other hand the Kaiser was apparently convinced that England could perform the very function which he felt was impossible for Germany—the restraining of the most belligerent member of the coalition.[34] The assumption of British freedom, coupled with restrictions on German policy, is nowhere as clear as in one of the Kaiser's marginal notes:

> He [Grey] knows perfectly well, that if he were to say one single serious sharp and warning word at Paris and Petersburg, and were to warn them to remain neutral, both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word, and threatens us instead! Common cur! England *alone* bears the responsibility for peace and war, and not we any longer![35]

This approach to the problems of allies was not confined to Berlin. Nicolson wrote on July 29: "I do not think that Berlin quite understands that Russia cannot and will not stand quietly by while Austria administers a severe chastisement to Serbia."[36] Grey assessed the requirements of his French ally in similar terms.[37] At the same time, however, he believed that Germany could constrain her southern ally.[38]

Only when mobilizations and other actions had gone too far to be stopped, were some futile attempts made to restrain the militant members of each alliance. For example, at the last minute Bethmann-Hollweg tried to hold Austria in check, but he was effectively countermanded by Moltke's wire to Vienna urging immediate general mobilization.[39]

Because there are relatively few perceptions of allies' alternatives, the data for the second hypothesis have been aggregated by alliance rather than by nation (Table III). For both the Triple Entente and the Dual Alliance there is a significant ($p \leq .02$) difference between the choice

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[31] Austria-Hungary, *op. cit.*, #11203; France, *op. cit.*, #532, #725.

[32] Great Britain, *op. cit.*, #447. These statements explain, in part, the Kaiser's violent reaction to Grey's telegram of July 29 that, "There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we know very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid." *Ibid.*, #286. Upon reading this, Wilhelm wrote, "The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her persistently prosecuted purely anti-German world policy . . ." Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #401.

[33] "Thus, there remains nothing for the Austro-Hungarian Government to do unless it is willing to make the final sacrifice of its status as a Great Power, but to enforce its demands by the use of heavy pressure, or, if need be, by taking military measures." *Ibid.*, #423.

[34] "Instead of mediation, a serious word to Petersburg and Paris, to the effect that England would not help them would quiet the situation at once." *Ibid.*, #368.

"If Grey wanted really to preserve peace he need only as Prince Henry suggested on 20th July intimate to the two allies France and Russia —not to mobilize but to wait, until the pourparlers which I was directing had succeeded or otherwise between Vienna and Russia." *Ibid.*, #720.

[35] *Ibid.*, #368.

[36] Great Britain, *op. cit.*, #264.

[37] "France did not wish to join in the war that seemed about to break out, but she was obliged to join in it, because of her alliance." *Ibid.*, #447.

[38] "But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action in Vienna." *Ibid.*, #99.

[39] On July 30, Bethmann-Hollweg concluded a telegram to Vienna: "Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above mentioned honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us." Montgelas and Schücking, *op. cit.*, #395.

TABLE III. PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES: FREQUENCY OF "CHOICE," "NECESSITY," AND "CLOSED" ALTERNATIVES FOR ALLIES AND ENEMIES

DUAL ALLIANCE			*TRIPLE ENTENTE*		
	Choice	*Necessity*		*Choice*	*Necessity*
Allies	13	20	Allies	30	17
Enemies	21	6	Enemies	39	6
$\chi^2=8.9$ $p=.005$			$\chi^2=6.4$ $p=.02$		
	Choice	*Closed*		*Choice*	*Closed*
Allies	13	3	Allies	30	7
Enemies	21	0	Enemies	39	3
Fisher exact $p=.07$			$\chi^2=2.5$ $.20>p>.10$		

and necessity perceptions for allies and enemies. The difference between perceptions of choice and those of closed alternatives is in the predicted direction, but in the region of doubt.

Hypothesis 3a states that:

> As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.

A valid test of the hypothesis, free from the effects of message volume, required a prior adjustment of frequency of "necessity" and "closed" perceptions similar to that performed on the time data. The resulting figures were again divided into two periods: June 27–July 28 and July 29–August 4. A Mann-Whitney *U*-Test reveals that the difference for each coalition is in the predicted direction, and is statistically significant ($U=7, p=.05$).

According to the final hypothesis (3b) relating crisis-induced tension to perceived alternatives,

> As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to adversaries or potential adversaries to expand.

To test the hypothesis, frequency of perception was again adjusted for message volume and the data are divided into the periods of lower (June 27–July 28) and higher (July 29–August 4) stress. A Mann-Whitney *U*-Test lends only partial support to the hypothesis. For both alliances, differences between the early and later periods are in the predicted direction—the "choice" alternatives open to members of the opposing coalition were perceived to be increasing as the crisis deepened. In the case of the Dual Alliance, the increase in perceptions of the open alternatives for adversaries is significant ($U=5$, $p=.02$); for the Triple Entente, however the difference is not sufficient to support the hypothesis ($U=10$; $p=.13$).

IV. PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION

The data used to test hypotheses relating to communication in crisis differ from those in earlier sections of this paper in one important respect: all 5269 documents in the Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German and Russian collections, rather than those authored by selected decision-makers, were counted and classified into four categories:

1. Documents from officials abroad (ambassadors, ministers, attachés, consuls, etc.) to their central decision-makers.
2. Documents from central decision-makers to their officials abroad.
3. Documents from the central decision-makers of one nation to those of another nation.
4. Documents circulated within a central decision-making unit.

Two units of measurement are used to describe message volume—the document and the word. An index of the average number of words per line in each volume was determined by an exact count of every fiftieth page. The number of lines in each document was then counted and multiplied by the index figure. No attempt was made to adjust message volume for linguistic style, which may affect word counts.[40]

The initial communication hypothesis (4a) to be tested is that:

> The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the heavier the overload of channels of communication.[41]

Figure 1—in which message volumes for all five nations have been aggregated by type—reveals sharp increases in daily average message volume during the latter stages of the crisis. During late June and early July, for example, the average frequency of messages from a nation's diplomats abroad was approximately four per day. By July 30, this figure had risen over tenfold.

For purposes of testing the hypothesis, the data have again been divided into two periods: June 27–July 28, and July 29–August 4. A

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[40] For an attempt to adjust for linguistic differences—that is, the necessity to use a different number of words in various languages to express the same idea—see Dina A. Zinnes, "Expression and Perception of Hostility in International Relations," Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1963, pp. 137–43.

[41] Hypothesis 4a clearly presupposes the existence of a quantitative definition of "overload." This problem is discussed, but not resolved, below.



FIG. 1. Daily average message volume by type and date. Figures for Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Russia and Great Britain combined.

Mann-Whitney *U*-Test for the direction and magnitude of differences between the two periods was applied to the message volume—measured both in documents and words—of each nation and for each type of communication (Table IV).

The increase in message volume appears to depend on three factors: the degree of involvement in the early stages of the crisis, the channel of communication, and the unit of measurement.

Austria-Hungary was most deeply involved in the crisis during the early period, and increases in Austro-Hungarian message volume from the early to the later period of the crisis are generally lower than for Germany. Similarly, among members of the Triple Entente, Russia was the first to be involved in the Balkan crisis, and the increase in Russian message volume is less significant than that for either France or England. Thus, the less dramatic increase in message volume for Austria and Russia during the most intense period of crisis may be interpreted as adding support to the hypothesis.

The change in message volume also appears to depend on the source and destination of the documents. The rate of increase was highest for messages from ambassadors and other officials abroad to the various capitals of Europe. This finding is generally consistent with Taylor's thesis that the decision-makers in 1914 were "snowed under by the blizzard of information" [information input] and that "decisions" [information output] tended to lag behind events."[42] The differences in message volume within the central decision-making unit between the early and late period of the crisis are in the predicted direction, but rather marginal. This is probably the result, in large part, of increased reliance upon oral communication during the final days prior to war.

Finally, when the rate of communications is measured by the number of documents, the change from the early to the later period of the crisis is more significant than when a word count is used.

The second communication hypothesis (4b) states that:[43]

> The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the more stereotyped will be the information content of messages.

The average length of messages has been taken as a measure of stereotypy, on the premise that richness of information concerning the course of events, possible alternatives, and completeness of detail are more characteristic of longer documents. The data lend strong support to the hypothesis. The average length of messages decreased systematically as war

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[42] Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 220–21.

[43] This hypothesis is not dissimilar to Lasswell's prediction that "style grows terse . . . when the crisis is recognized as serious." Harold D. Lasswell *et al.*, *The Language of Politics* (New York, George Stewart, 1949), p. 28.

TABLE IV. DIFFERENCES IN MESSAGE VOLUME BETWEEN EARLY (JUNE 27–JULY 28) AND LATE (JULY 29–AUGUST 4) PERIODS OF THE 1914 CRISIS: MANN-WHITNEY *U*-TEST

	Messages from Officials Abroad to Central Decision-Makers		Messages from Central Decision-Makers to Officials Abroad		Messages within Central Decision-Making Unit	
Daily Average Volume—No. of Documents	U	p^*	U	p^*	U	p^*
Austria-Hungary	0	.008	5	.133	15	n.s.
Germany	2	.005	3	.009	3	.009
England	1	.003	5	.024	8	.074
France	3	.009	5	.024	7	.035
Russia	2	.005	9	.101	14	n.s.
Daily Average Volume—No. of Words						
Austria-Hungary	2	.033	11	n.s.	12	n.s.
Germany	6	.037	4	.015	6	.037
England	5	.024	10	.134	14	n.s.
France	7	.053	12	n.s.	6	.037
Russia	11	n.s.	11	n.s.	15	n.s.

* $n_1=7$ $n_2=5$, except for Austria-Hungary, $n_1=7$, $n_2=3$.

approached. Each document written immediately following the assassination averaged 326 words in length. During the two days immediately prior to England's entry into the war the average message was only 97 words long. A Mann-Whitney *U*-Test reveals that documents were significantly ($U=2$, $p=.005$) shorter during the period of highest stress (July 29-August 4).

Prior to World War I, the normal and most important channel of communications between two nations was the diplomatic corps. When leaders in London wished to communicate with their counterparts in Berlin, the message was sent to the British Ambassador to Germany, who would then convey its contents to the proper German decision-makers.[44] Direct communication between top level leaders was clearly the exception to normal procedures. According to the third hypothesis (4c) relating stress to communications:

> The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.

Of the 2780 inter-state messages, 1530 occurred from June 27 to July 28; of this total, only 74 (4.8 per cent) were direct communications between central decision-makers. During the last seven days of the crisis, on the other hand, 116 out of 1250 (9.3 per cent) messages were sent directly to another state's decision-makers, bypassing the ambassadors. The difference between the two periods is statistically significant ($X^2=21.3$; $p<.001$).

As crisis deepens, the need for clear and unimpeded communication between potential adversaries is likely to become both more urgent and more difficult. It is unlikely that similar difficulties in communication will arise between members of the same coalition. Hence the hypothesis (4d) that:

> The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the higher the proportion of intra-coalition—as against inter-coalition—communication.

When inter-nation messages are classified according to date and divided into inter-coalition and intra-coalition communications, the results support the hypothesis. During the first month after the assassination, 830 out of 1530 (54.3 per cent) inter-nation messages were exchanged between members of opposing coalitions. During the week prior to the outbreak of general war, on the other hand, inter-coalition messages account for only 580 out of 1250 (46.4 per cent) messages. The difference between the two periods in regard to communications within and between alliances is significant ($X^2 = 17.3$; $p < .001$).

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[44] A more comprehensive description of the normal patterns of communication in 1914 may be found in Zinnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–24.

The four communication hypotheses have generally been supported by the 1914 data, but some interesting questions remain unanswered. For example, the assumption that information input overload is as dysfunctional as lack of information, is supported by evidence on at least five levels—the cell, the organ, the individual, the group, and the organization.[45] Although there is strong evidence that channel capacity is inversely related to the size of the system, we know comparatively little about *what magnitude of input constitutes overload* at complex levels such as foreign policy decision-making units.

A second problem is that the communication hypotheses have been concerned solely with the volume of messages without regard to their content. While these two factors are not independent of each other, further research on information input overload must consider such factors as the ratio of signal to redundancy and noise.

The most difficult aspect of studying communications in historical situations is the assessment of its impact on policy. For example, how is the behavior of decision-makers changed by communication overload? In his survey of the experimental literature, Miller has identified a number of coping mechanisms: omissions, error, queuing, filtering, cutting categories of discrimination, employing multiple channels, and escape.[46] Some insights can be derived from the 1914 data; the employment of multiple channels during the latter stages of the crisis—through more frequent direct communication between decision-makers—has already been noted. But data regarding such consequences as selective filtering of incoming information is at best fragmentary. Thus, even with the relatively complete documentation available for the 1914 crisis, the findings on some important questions are only suggestive.

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion it may be useful to consider some questions of more general concern. First, do the concepts and findings in this paper have any relevance beyond the historical one of illuminating a series of unique events?

The factors of perceived time, perceived alternatives, and patterns of communication are usually treated as generic concepts in the decision-making literature. The experimental evidence from psychology supports the assumption that they are among the key factors which affect the performance of individuals and groups, particularly those engaged in complex tasks. Further support for the findings in this paper appears to be forthcoming from laboratory simulation studies.[47] Their ultimate importance for the student of international politics must, however, be established in case studies of actual foreign policy decision. In this connection, a study of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 assessed the importance of the factors discussed in this paper; it was shown that the crucial factors in the settlement of the crisis without recourse to war included the ability of President Kennedy and his advisers: (1) to maintain multiple options for both the United States *and* the Soviet Union; (2) to lengthen decision time, again for *both* the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; and (3) to use effectively multiple channels of communication.[48]

A second question concerns research strategy. Are these hypotheses merely a matter of "common sense," and if so, do they warrant the extensive research effort which is entailed in the use of content analysis? A major drawback to the type of data used in this study is found in the very nature of content analysis, which requires considerable expenditure of scarce research resources. Recent developments in programming computers—such as the IBM 7090—for content analysis have gone a long way toward solving the problem.[49] An adaptation of the "General Inquirer" system of automated content analysis permits studies such as that of the 1914 crisis with substantial reduction of manual effort while materially increasing speed, reliability, and flexibility.[50]

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[45] James G. Miller, "Information Input Overload and Psychopathology," *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 116 (1960), pp. 695–704.

[46] Miller, "Information Input Overload," *Self Organizing Systems—1962*, n. p.

[47] A full report of the findings from this simulation will be found in a doctoral dissertation by Charles F. Hermann, Northwestern University.

[48] Holsti, *et al.*, "The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations, October 1962," to appear in a reader edited by Richard C. Snyder and Dean Pruitt, in press. The theoretical and practical implications of such future studies may be somewhat different. For example, should one find that 1914-like results appear only in every tenth case, the social scientist might reject the hypotheses. The criteria of practical relevence might be less rigid. Given twentieth century military technology, such findings should give little rise to complacency. As Brodie, *op. cit.*, p. 175, has pointed out, today a *single case* of deterrent failure is too many.

The more fundamental question of research strategy relates to the choice of "common sense" hypotheses for extensive research. Yet as Robinson[51] has shown, in his study of some propositions similar to those in this paper, decision-makers generally characterize their *own* activities in terms of classical economic models of decision-making (reviewing all alternatives for the optimum one). They often apply the same model to the decision processes of *other states*. Moreover, it is not difficult in almost every case to develop precisely the reverse proposition. For example, it is wholly consistent with the concept of crisis as a situation of potentially high penalties, *as well as with common sense*, to hypothesize that:[52]

As stress increases, decision-makers will be motivated to search for, and to consider an increasing number of alternative policies.

While the last two decades have seen a great deal of theorizing about international relations, as well as the development of numerous promising techniques of generating and analyzing data, a basic theory—solidly grounded in empirical evidence—remains a distant goal. Given the rudimentary state of international relations as a discipline, it may be that research directed toward illuminating and rendering more precise our notions, even of "common sense," is not wholly misdirected, either from the standpoint of developing a viable theory of international relations or of contributing to a more stable world.

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[49] Philip J. Stone *et al.*, "The General Inquirer: A Computer System for Content Analysis and Retrieval Based on the Sentence as a Unit of Information," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 484–494.

[50] Holsti, "An Adaptation of the 'General Inquirer' for the Systematic Analysis of Political Documents," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 9 (1964), pp. 382–88.

[51] Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

[52] A series of assertions which tend to contradict the hypotheses in this paper may be found in Theodore Abel, "The Elements of Decision in the Pattern of War," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 6 (1941), pp. 853–59, in which the author writes:

"1. The decision to fight, unless the opponent abandons resistance without a struggle, is not reached on the spur of the moment. In every case the decision is based upon a careful weighing of chances and of anticipating consequences. . . . In no case is the decision precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd-behavior, or other irrational motivations.

"2. The rational, calculating decision is reached far in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities."

LAW, SOCIETY AND THE DOMESTIC REGIME IN RUSSIA, IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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American experts on the Soviet Union have given much of their time to discussing whether the Russian communist government is going to remain "totalitarian" or instead turn "liberal." Journalists and scholars alike judge Soviet policies and decrees largely according to whether or not they extend more "freedom" to the Russian people.[1] Similarly, American writers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries almost never inquired as to what purposes the Russian imperial government's policies and decrees were actually intended to serve but only how liberal they were or were not. When one writer said that the Tsar was liberalizing, another would reply that he had not actually surrendered any of his arbitrary power and that Russia was still as oppressive as ever.[2] In American eyes, then, the Russian state apparently cannot move except along a single line that extends from freedom to oppression, democracy to absolutism, similarity to Western institutions to dissimilarity. If Russia is not moving toward one of these poles, then she is not moving at all. Few have suggested that Russian statesmen have been operating along other lines and coping with other problems. Seldom has it occurred to American observers that the question of liberalization has actually been rather a minor one in Russian development.[3]

I

Political freedom, as Americans use the term, is fundamentally an attribute of society rather than of the individual. Individual rights do not repose in separate persons but in the common recognition of them by the citizenry as expressed in law. A citizen's right to speak freely resides not so much in him as in the men around him. If they believe in the abstract principle that government cannot interfere with the individual's right to speak, and if all statutes and government decrees conform to this principle, then the citizen possesses the right. To be more specific, if in some particular instance the men around him do not agree that he is free to express himself, the legal system and their respect for it limits the actions they can take to stop him.[4]

Conceived in this way, law proceeds from abstract principles, applied to everyday life in such a way that specific enactments and decisions are supposed to be rationally consistent with the principles and with each other. Theoretically, the very legitimacy of the state stems from its consistency with an integral constitutional system based on explicit guarantees of rights common to all citizens.[5] Men may be unequal in a free society but not by express provision of the law.

Freedom, in this view, is not simply the right to do whatever one wishes. It is the condition of men whose experience has inculcated in them common notions of the rights properly belonging to the individual and whose law embodies these notions. When Americans say that a government is liberalizing, they mean in effect that it is limiting itself to operate within a purportedly consistent legal system based on constitutional principles which the citizens generally recognize as legitimate—a constitution of the sort that Sartori has called *garantiste*.

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[1] *E.g.*, R. Conquest, "After Khrushchev: A Conservative Restoration?," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 12 (September–October, 1963), pp. 41–6.

[2] Typically, the author of "Civil Liberties in Russia," *Outlook*, Vol. 54 (November 1905), pp. 543–4, believed the Tsar was liberalizing in October 1905, while the author of "The Russian Chaos," *Living Age*, Vol. 247 (November, 1905), pp. 502–4, believed he was shamming.

[3] A welcome exception is T. Von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?* (New York, 1964.)

[4] T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 100–5, notes that the social origin of individual rights has been ignored by Western liberal thought ever since John Locke. The social-historical development that produced the eighteenth-century ideal of "natural" rights has been what Parsons calls a residual category, an assumption which is necessary to the validity of an idea but which is left unstated and unnoticed.

[5] A. L. Goodhart, "Some American Interpretations of Law," in *Modern Theories of Law* (London, 1933), pp. 1–20, acknowledges that the legal system in America is not in fact reducible to a consistent framework. Nevertheless, he says, American judges make their decisions with the aim of developing and maintaining as consistent a body of law as they can. See also R. Pound, *Social Control through Law* (New Haven, 1942); A. Hagerstrom, *Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals* (Stockholm, 1953); and L. Petrazhitsky, *Law and Morality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).

In Russia, neither freedom nor law have commonly carried these meanings or even implied them. Russian society has never produced a commonly recognized legal system based on abstract governing principles. Russian social institutions have generally been narrowly local and isolated from one another. In cities and villages alike, the members of "family groups," as the communists have quite accurately termed them, have been set into separate social positions in hierarchical relation to one another either by inheritance or the personal favor of someone in authority.[6] Each Russian has been sharply aware of his own special privileges and prerogatives, but the concept of rights shared by *all* men, rights whose force and legitimacy derive entirely from the fact that they are shared, he has comprehended only dimly at best.[7]

Up to the last few decades, over four-fifths of the Russian people were peasants, living in small, self-sufficient, culturally isolated villages. To them, the word freedom meant primarily the absence of any outside interference that threatened their personal status in their separate villages. Law had two meanings. The word *pravo*, formally equivalent to the German *Recht*, meant both the traditional social structure of his own immediate group, based largely on common habits, and the arbitrary authority of the ruler.[8] Ideally, these two meanings represented aspects of a single system, in which a benevolent tsar (or, later, a party secretary) exercised his personal power to protect the local hierarchical group from harm. In practice, the tsar's power has been exercised ever since the fifteenth century by a number of agents and landholders, each and all of whom were themselves arbitrary authorities who could interfere with or protect the peasant villages pretty much at will. The people at large shared no common legal relations, consequently the tsar had no basis on which to compile a law that would guide and limit his officials. Whatever intentions he had and however many pious phrases he inserted into his decrees, all he could grant to his agents in fact was an undefined authority, and the only way he could limit their activities was by setting them in opposition to one another. From the peasant's view, then, the concrete forms of the tsar's authority did not constitute *pravo*. The tsar's power as *pravo* was an abstraction, a dream of an all-powerful demi-god who would correct the evils of his own government if only someone told him about them. Thus, the peasant's experience taught him that political authority in practice had nothing to do with *pravo*. Even when the agents of the state followed their regulations, their power seemed arbitrary to the people with whom they had to deal.

In the nineteenth century, when the ruler began to attempt to govern the peasants by law, his agents and judges still seemed as arbitrary to the peasant as they had always been. The peasants continued as before to utilize or appeal to or bribe the government agents, but the essential quality of the state's minions continued to be their arbitrary power, not the consistency of their operation.[9] Toward such a power the peasant might feel reverence and awe, but no duties and no responsibilities. The peasant could conceive of the state and even feel a vague loyalty toward it, but the idea of legal relationships with it involving rights and duties was quite foreign to him.

The typical Russian peasant has not generally resented arbitrary rule as such. With few exceptions he has recognized the central government as necessary and tried to utilize the power of its agents for his own purposes, usually by bribing them. If one agent acted oppressively, a peasant was more inclined to appeal to another agent than to any abstract law. The significant characteristic of the Russian's legal consciousness, that which has distinguished his concept of law most clearly from the American, has not been that he has opposed central governmental authority but that his notion of law as either habit or force has produced very little sense of duty or responsibility in him. The legal rules the peasant has known have been primarily confined to habitual attitudes. Political power as he has experienced it has neither needed nor claimed his active support.[10]

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[6] M. Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 85–9, 407–8.

[7] B. A. Kistiakovskii, *Sotsialnyia nauki i pravo* (Moscow, 1916), pp. 619–59, discusses the weakness of legal consciousness in Russian society prior to the Revolution.

[8] A. Leontev, "Volostyni sud i obychnoe pravo," *Zhurnal iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri S-Petersburgskogo universiteta* (November, 1894), pp. 23–33, 41–7.

[9] N. M. Druzhinin, *Gosudarstvennye krestiane i reforma P. D. Kiseleva* (2 vols., Moscow, 1946, 1958), describes the government's first consistent attempt to establish a legal system over and within the peasant communities; see esp. II, 74–8.

[10] Sorokin has made it abundantly clear that

The Russian peasant's characteristic attitude toward the state is both a cause and a result of the state's historical development. From its beginnings, the Russian state grew up around a band of warriors whose battlefield extended from the White Sea to the Black and from the Baltic to the Caspian.[11] The problems and policies of the warriors took form on such a vast scale, and the social horizons of the people were so limited that for all practical purposes the Russian state evolved apart from Russian society. Its needs and purposes were quite beyond the consciousness of its subjects, and thus the unity it imposed on them possessed no other institutional form than what the central government itself established.

The Russian state has always lived in fear of its neighbors. United, the powers within striking distance of its borders have always possessed ample strength to invade and perhaps overcome it and they have often threatened to do so. That they have never fully succeeded has been due not only to Russia's own military prowess but also to their continuing struggles with each other. The same could be said for the other powers of Eastern and Central Europe during the last five centuries. They have all dreaded one another ever since they have been recognizable as states, and their mutual fear has been its own justification. Acts of defense in Eastern Europe have usually been indistinguishable from acts of aggression; weakness has been an invitation to invaders; military power has been a state's only security and the foundation for its independence and identity. In every state the desire to survive has merged easily into the urge to conquer. In short, warfare, both hot and cold, has been constant in Eastern Europe for several centuries. All governments have had to concern themselves primarily with survival against enemies whose strength might at any moment become overpowering. In good seasons and bad the most compelling problems of government in Russia have been to field an army and to keep neighboring powers disunited.

In the early eighteenth century, Russia became a European power, and the area with which her statesmen had to concern themselves became extended abruptly to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Her new competitors were perhaps more orderly but hardly less warlike and threatening than the ones that had plagued her in the preceding centuries. Most significant, the West European states possessed the economic resources to support very expensive armies, and Russia's armies likewise had to be very expensive.

Like all the larger continental European states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian government not only collected taxes, but involved itself directly in national economic development. In Russia, as in Western Europe, the state attempted to regulate society as a means to the fulfillment of its economic needs and to resolve those conflicts of economic and social interests among its subjects to which economic development gave rise. In the West, however, the state found social institutions and economic classes that had already undergone a long experience of interaction with one another. Various groups had developed interests and purposes and philosophies that identified what the members had in common with one another and that defined the relationships between groups. Society itself had gone a long way toward replacing hierarchical relationships with those of common interest and collective self-awareness. When the state acted, therefore, it expressed to some extent the growing social awareness of its subjects. Their interest groups and institutions were already in being and in interaction. They had made coherent political forces of themselves and found avenues for political action. They conflicted with each other, but they were doing business. Although they were often opposed to the state, they constituted concrete political forces with which the state could negotiate and form relationships that would give a measure of consistency and legitimacy to its policies. Conflicts of interest among the various social and economic groups and between them and the state gave rise to a legal system, the necessary institutional concomitant of modern economic development. In the West, all levels of society participated in social evolution and formed their interests, purposes, and ways of life around it. Social and economic groups grew

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peasant life is typically ritualistic and liturgical. See P. A. Sorokin *et al.*, eds. *A Systematic Source-book in Rural Sociology*, 3 vols. (Minneapolis, 1930), I, 13–4; II, 124–34. Good discussions of the Russian peasant's attitudes toward law and the state may be found in K. D. Kavelin, *Krestianskii vopros* (St. Petersburg, 1882); A. Novikov, *Zapiski zemskogo nachalnika* (St. Petersburg, 1889); Leontev, cited above, n. 8; and V. A. Beer, *Kommentarii novykh provintsialnykh uchrezhdenii 12 iulia 1889 goda* (Moscow, 1894), pp. viii–xi.

[11] One of the best descriptions of Russia's perennial problems of foreign policy is J. Fennell, *Ivan the Great of Moscow* (London, 1961). Although Fennell's study is limited to the late fifteenth century, the nature of Ivan III's problems is suggestive concerning the situation he left to his successors.

increasingly dependent on one another whether they liked it or not.[12]

In Russia, on the other hand, the groups that responded to the state's growing efforts to maintain itself did not engage in much interaction with each other before the late nineteenth century. Up to the 1860s, society in cities and villages alike was still strongly hierarchical at all levels, and the interests of the various "families"—the hierarchies of personal influence—were still confined largely to maintaining their established local positions. All the commercial and industrial development of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries notwithstanding, self-conscious groups based on common economic interest and commonly accepted practices had not yet replaced the hierarchical relationships of the old society.

The habit of negotiation had struck only a few weak roots in Russia by the eighteenth century, when the state began its attempts to stimulate economic development. Peter the Great found no major political forces to work with. There were only separate "families", each concerned primarily to maintain its own social position or to better it, pursuing its ends not by cooperating with other groups, but by attaching itself to some higher power in hopes of rising above and so displacing other groups. People on all social levels were inclined to see the state in the image of their own local societies, as a gigantic hierarchy of persons rather than an institutionalized negotiation between groups each united by common interests or purposes. In 1613, on the one occasion when the responsible leaders of Russian society exerted themselves on their own initiative to restore the unity of their country after a period of foreign invasions and acute domestic disorders, they had simply restored the hierarchy largely as it had been: they installed the Romanov dynasty. That they made no serious attempt to draw up law codes or set up institutions that would represent their separate interests and negotiate between them is a clear indication that there was no basis for such laws or institutions in Russian social experience.

Lacking any system of *de facto* legal relationships, the Russian state has had to negotiate directly with family-type groups to achieve its ends. It has offered the rewards of political influence and economic power to the social groups which could best serve its purposes, just as the Western European states have done. In a hierarchical society, however, to offer a reward to one group—or rather to its head—is *per se* to punish another, in a zero-sum game. Any extension of political influence to a particular servitor is likely to disrupt the existing hierarchical structure; and since the argument revolves around social position rather than interests, there is little room for compromise. New arrangements that would satisfy all parties and the state as well are not likely to emerge from squabbles over hierarchical position. The social conflicts that plagued the Russian state were therefore qualitatively different from those that produced the Western legal systems. Conscious interests did not produce new legal relationships that would lend stability to society, but only a perpetual struggle between "families" whose heads were in favor and those whose heads were being shunted aside. Civil wars and rebellions did not involve the clash of interests so much as widespread struggles for position between members of hierarchies and outcasts.[13]

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[12] Two excellent descriptions of government interaction with society in Western Europe prior to the industrial revolution are F. O. Hertz, *The Development of the German Public Mind*, 2 vols. (London, 1957, 1962); and G. T. Matthews, *The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth Century France* (New York, 1958).

[13] The later peasant uprisings of the period 1900–1917 and the widespread workers' strikes of about the same period are the only cases of mass violence in Russian history in which a significant part of the trouble stemmed from conflicts between social groups each identified by common interests other than status position. Even in these years, whenever revolutionary violence reached its height the social classes whose interests were jeopardized hastened to identify themselves with the government rather than to compel the government to accept their demands. Western European states, on the other hand, prior to the 1920s, characteristically responded to crises by making significant concessions to the social elements that could support them the most effectively. The October Manifesto of 1905 was, of course, a concession by the Imperial government to the dominant social classes in Russia, and as such it is unique in Russian history. Nevertheless, the government cancelled it out within two years by openly violating its guarantees—and this with the general approbation of the very classes to whom it had been a concession. The cancellation, not the Manifesto, proved to be lasting. The "ruling classes" were still more concerned to be in-groups than to struggle for their interests. Both the landowning gentry and the business and industrial leaders threw themselves behind the central government from 1905 on and became, in effect, parts of its organization. See R. Roosa, "Russian Industrialists Look to the Future: Thoughts on

Social interaction in Russia before the Revolution was far less a dynamic force for social change than in the West. In all modern states the government has had both to keep order and to foster progress; and in all states this has involved the government in contradictions. In Russia, the contradiction has been extreme. Keeping order has meant preserving static hierarchies; fostering progress has meant breaking them down and, inadvertently, forming new ones still as helplessly attached to the state as their predecessors. Until the last century, Russian society did not itself progress toward closer unity. Its people did not grow significantly more conscious of their dependence on each other but only clung to their habitual relationships. When the state fostered progress, therefore, it was in effect imposing goals of economic achievement and social reform upon its people which were formulated apart from their conscious needs and their traditions. The tsar from time to time tried to insert foreign methods, organizations, legal systems, and even ethical values into a reluctant society in order to establish workable legal and economic relationships with the people and among them, but his efforts, however successful, also served thereby to alienate the state from society and to disrupt society itself.

II

The domestic aims of Russian government have derived basically from the peculiar role it has played in Russian society. The government has taken form primarily as an instrument for the tsar (and later, the party secretary) to use in order to direct the energies of the people toward the alien goals he and his supporters have selected for them.[14] Soviet and tsarist statesmen alike have generally regarded themselves as preservers of their people's "freedom." They have always assumed in practice that society by itself was not free, that individual subjects were unable to protect their own interests except by appealing to persons in power. Russian society until lately has been, in their eyes, only an interminable and aimless squabbling among narrow, selfish family-type, hierarchical groups with no broader aim than to put other groups down so that they might rise higher themselves. In such a milieu only the ruler and his favorites have stood for "freedom."[15] They have consistently believed that their personal power has been the only vital force for social order, economic progress, popular morality, and all the other good things that Americans and Russians alike are fond of associating with freedom.[16] It is not surprising, therefore, that the main political concern of Russia's leaders has been to make the central government organization a more effective instrument for the exercise of power. Liberalization, in the sense of a surrender of the tsar's authority to institutions purporting to represent public opinion, has only very rarely been a practical aim among Russian statesmen.[17]

Economic Development, 1906–1917," in J. S. Curtiss, ed., *Essays in Russian and Soviet History* (New York, 1963), pp. 198–218, for a survey of the attitudes of the industrial leaders. No systematic study of gentry attitudes in this period exists, but evidence is plentiful showing their wholehearted support of the state's interest as if it were their own. See D. N. Shipov, *Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 501–31; S. I. Shidlovskii, *Vospominaniia*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923), I, 130–218; and the programs set forth by various gentry groups in 1906 in B. B. Veselovskii, ed., *Agrarnyi vopros v Sovete Ministrov, 1906 g.* (Moscow, 1924), pp. 23–7, 152–3.

[14] The distinction between the government's role in social development in Russia and in Western Europe is pointed out in Kavelin, cited above, n. 10, and in D. P. Troshchinskii, "Zapiska Dmitriia Prokofevicha Troshchinskogo ob uchrezhdenii ministerstv," *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* (148 vols., St. Petersburg, 1867–1917), III (1868), 45–58, 86–7 (see below, n. 22).

[15] M. Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven, 1961), pp. 84–8, argues that the Russians conceived of the tsar as a source of law in himself; his personal will was above society, whereas in Europe the most absolute of monarchs derived most of his power from an extant traditional legal framework (pp. 26–9). The tsars, like the European monarchs, claimed to be the preservers of the law (see, *e.g.*, Ivan IV's charge to the ecclesiastical assembly of 1551 in *Le Stoglav*, Paris, 1920, pp. 14–25), but in fact there was not much law to preserve.

[16] *E.g.*, K. Pobedonostsev, *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (London, 1898), pp. 254–62. It has been a communist dogma that the power of the party leaders is equivalent to the people's freedom. See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course* (Moscow, 1951), pp. 79–82.

[17] Many statesmen have recognized that Russia needed legal and constitutional reforms before her people could be "free," but even these functioned from day to day in absolute dependence on the ruler, and they have recognized the necessity for his supremacy until such time as law was in fact developed. P. A. Valuev, Minister of Internal Affairs from 1861 to 1868, is a good example. He

Most American authorities say otherwise. The current version of Russian history exhibits several rulers, notably Catherine II, Alexander I and Alexander II, who are supposed to have been liberal at one time or another during their reigns.[18] But there is no basis for this interpretation. All Russia's rulers have desired to develop a system of law that would establish justice among their people, but none has ever thought that such a system already existed or that all his people possessed rights of their own as individuals apart from what the state power allowed. Every ruler has been aware that rights apart from state power were in Russia only individual privileges, and that where they did have force, they did not make anyone "free." Catherine granted the gentry their land as private property in 1785, but this was a grant more than a right. She and her successors hoped that the gentry would someday become citizens whose consciousness of right carried with it a consciousness of duty, but no tsar ever believed that that day had arrived in his own time. Catherine never suggested that she was only recognizing a right that the gentry already possessed naturally.[19] Alexander I's schemes in the early nineteenth century were all directed primarily to the improvement of the government's executive organization,[20] and so were Alexander II's local autonomous institutions.[21] Seen from the government's point of view, even the emancipation of the serfs was an administrative reform. Alexander II's purpose was not to recognize the peasants' liberties or even to grant them. He and his statesmen simply wanted to govern them more effectively. If these rulers are to be termed liberal, we should also have to speak of the liberal years of Ivan IV, Peter I, Nicholas I, Alexander III, and Josef Stalin, all of whom devoted their lives to improving the government organization so that it could bring the Russian people "freedom" more effectively.

No Russian ruler has ever willingly considered the outright surrender of state power to institutions apart from the central government's executive organization. Russian legal convictions have tended to keep society fragmented rather than to unite it. Social groups have devoted their separate efforts to fortifying their own narrow traditions, not to the development of a legal system based on abstract principles common to all Russia. The tsars (and the party secretaries after them) have dreamed of developing a unity of convictions and practices among their people from which a coherent legal system could be derived, but they have realized that such a system could not be based directly on the existing family-type institutions of Russian society.[22] Power surrendered to family-

It is true that the tsars made many attempts to divide the government into regional units, but none of these were founded on existing social institutions, and in any case they all failed, primarily because regional administrators were as

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may have been limited in his intellectual horizons and his policies were not always enlightened, but he was generally realistic and relatively straightforward. His diary (*Dnevnik*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1961, 1964) shows him often in profound disagreement with Alexander II and with what he himself had to do, yet never wavering in his conviction that the tsar's absolute power was indispensable for the government of his day. His conviction seems to have been constantly reinforced by his day-to-day experience in the government service (see P. A. Zaionchkovskii's introduction to vol. I of *Dnevnik*, pp. 20–1, 26–32; and Valuev's own entries for 13–14 April 1861, pp. 97–101). On 14 April Valuev conversed with Prince Dolgorukii on the need for a constitution in Russia. Dolgorukii said that Russia needed a constitution but that the tsar was opposed to it; then he asked Valuev what he thought should be done. Valuev replied, "Wait in loyal submissiveness until the tsar changes his mind" (p. 101).

[18] See, *e.g.*, A. Mazour, *Rise and Fall of the Romanovs* (Princeton, N. J., 1960), pp. 72, 89, 108–11.

[19] V. Leontovitsch, *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1957), pp. 25–36; and N. M. Korkunov, *Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1909), II, 435–7.

[20] Leontovitsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–100.

[21] Korkunov, *op. cit.*, II, 533–4, discusses the purpose of the zemstvoes and city dumas. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Provedenie v zhizn krestianskoi reformy 1861 g.* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 93–9, describes the organs of peasant government, especially their relation to the central administration.

[22] See Troshchinskii, *op. cit.*, above, n. 14. Troshchinskii was a high-level official from about 1793 until his retirement in 1817. He disagreed with the prevailing tendencies in the administration of his time, chiefly the innovations of Michael Speranskii; but his view of Russian society was common among both innovators and conservatives in the government. He said that Russian society possessed no effective political institutions and had no basis for developing them except the power of the tsar. Only the tsar could furnish the necessary leadership to develop the institutions of a modern legal system in Russia. For some comparable Soviet views regarding the role of the ruler in Russia see J. Hazard, *The Soviet Legal System*, 3 vols. (New York, 1962), I, 5–12.

type, hierarchical groups has been in effect power lost to the state and unity lost to the nation.

In the past two centuries the only politically significant Russia-wide organizations have been the Orthodox church, the central government, and, since 1917, the communist party. They have all been for the most part clusters of family groups, hierarchies of personal status joined to each other in a similarly hierarchical order, so that the whole of each organization has been in essence a network of personal influence, seemingly rigid but easily corrupted and manipulated in practice. Government, church and party alike have been united chiefly by liturgy and ritual, not by a rationally consistent system of law recognized by the members as legitimate in itself.[23] Only exceptionally has any functioning organization in Russia been able, at least until very recently, to operate within a system based on abstract legal principles. Law in practice has been largely a matter of status structures. Villages, guilds, towns, government ministries, revolutionary groups, and regiments alike have always tended to isolate themselves into "families."[24]

The isolated hierarchies that have made up traditional Russian society cannot be dismissed as merely the products of ignorance and stupidity. On the contrary, they have represented valid organizational forms in a country where neither legal system nor effective, consistent law enforcement has ever existed for the mass of the people nor for the government itself. Personal bonds have furnished the only available guarantee of unity and solidarity against a hostile world full of bandits, indifferent and oppressive landlord-owners, and ruthless government agents. The government officials themselves have generally formed hierarchies of personal status within their organization in order to protect their positions against arbitrary superiors. Family-type groups have persisted up to recent times on all levels of society because they have constituted the best way for individual Russians to cope with the realities they have faced. Chekhov's metaphor of the ocean steamer portrays these realities as the Russians experienced them more vividly than any scholarly analysis could do:

> . . . there is darkness and disorder. Tall waves are making an uproar for no reason. Each one of them as you look at it is trying to rise higher than all the rest and to chase and crush its neighbor; it is thunderously attacked by a third wave that has a gleeming white mane and is just as ferocious and ugly.
>
> The sea has neither sense nor pity. If the steamer had been smaller, not made of thick iron plates, the waves would have crushed it without the slightest remorse, and would have devoured all the people in it without distinguishing between saints and sinners. The steamer's expression was equally senseless and cruel. This beaked monster presses forward, cutting millions of waves in its path; it fears neither darkness nor the wind, nor space, nor solitude—it's all child's play for it, and if the ocean had its population, this monster would crush it, too, without distinguishing between saints and sinners.[25]

The deep-seated and continuing tendency toward forming personal hierarchies has forced all Russian statesmen to pursue mutually contradictory aims. On the one hand the ruler and his agents have had to do the daily work of maintaining the state without any reliable legal system to direct them, beyond orders from superiors to subordinates. On the other, they have tried to establish or discover workable, mutually consistent laws that would guide the actual practice of the government administrators and the people. Tsars and party secretaries alike have regarded a coherent system of law as an essential means to secure their power and to

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wont to form separate family groups as anyone else in Russia. B. Rauch, *Russland* (Munich, 1953), describes the various attempts by Russia's rulers to create federalist systems.

[23] The characteristics of Orthodox Church organization are described in E. Benz, *The Eastern Orthodox Church* (New York, 1963), pp. 43–7, 202–8. Fainsod, *Smolensk*, *op. cit.*, discusses "family groups" in communist organization in the 1920s and 1930s and J. D. Littlepage, *In Search of Soviet Gold* (New York, 1937), pp. 8, 13, 42, 160–2, gives examples of status hierarchies in Soviet industrial organization. M. Raeff, "The Russian Autocracy and its Officials," in H. McLean *et al.*, eds., *Russian Thought and Politics* (*Harvard Slavic Studies*, Vol. 4, Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 77–91, describes the hierarchies in the tsarist government prior to 1861.

[24] N. I. Lazareskii, *Lektsii po russkomu gosudarstvennomu pravu* (2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1910), I, 103–261, esp. p. 210. Max Weber has described the evolution of the modern legal system in Western Europe out of older, family-type forms. See *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). To use his terms, Russian administrators have tended to organize themselves into a "formal-irrational" system even though the terms and ideals of the written laws have been largely "formal-rational."

[25] From "Gusev," in *The Portable Chekhov* (New York, 1947), p. 265.

carry out their policies. But because daily operation has had to proceed through a hierarchy of personal influence whose customary ways have kept it disunited rather than united, central authority has had to be itself arbitrary in order to be effective at any particular time. Government officials on all levels have had to disrupt the rules they have been ordered to uphold simply to get the necessary work done. The tsars and party secretaries have themselves set the example for arbitrary rule by frequently violating their own decrees.[26]

The edicts of the Russian state, although duly recorded for the last two or three centuries as laws of the land, have rarely been more in fact than temporary regulations applicable at best only to a single locale or government office. As permanent statutes, they have often obstructed the unification of the Russian legal system. Hierarchical groups within the administration have been able to protect themselves against the vigor of reforming statesmen by citing clauses from past decrees, long since inoperative. Would-be reformers have had either to ignore the law entirely or to issue new orders to cancel the old ones, in which case they have upset whatever regularity had developed in practice. New commands have served only to accomplish specific, immediate purposes. New statutes have constituted only statements of purpose—ideals to be achieved in the future and experimental attempts to achieve them rather than operational rules.[27]

For about five hundred years, since the time when the church persuaded the Grand Duke of Moscow to act consistently as a statesman, the government of Russia has been at cross purposes with itself. The ruler has had only two procedures available to him for the effective exercise of his power. At times he has worked through the hierarchies, respecting and guaranteeing their customary ways and privileges, while at other times he has attacked them, breaking them down by his arbitrary power and replacing their members with new men, more responsive to his wishes. Not infrequently, he has utilized both methods in combination. The periodic purges of government servitors since the late fifteenth century have been drastic and far-reaching applications of the latter approach. But purges by themselves have worked no constructive reforms in government organization. They could never eliminate personal hierarchies as such; on the contrary, the arbitrary exercise of force compels men to seek the protection of personal influence with redoubled urgency.

In the absence of consistent laws and regulations, government servitors in Russia have almost never formed anything resembling a rational network of operating relationships among themselves extending throughout the government organization. Servitors on the lowest echelon of both tsarist and Soviet governments—those men who have actually collected the taxes, assembled recruits for the army, built schools and roads, run factories and the like—have had to deal with people isolated from one another by their traditions. A government agent who has confined himself strictly to following the formal regulations of his superiors has had to violate the existing order among those subject to him, thereby increasing the difficulties involved in accomplishing his tasks. Normally, therefore, the agent has worked through the hierarchies as he has found them among his "subjects" or subordinates and he has even made efforts to preserve them, which is to say that he has become a part of them. In cases where an especially strong official has usurped the places of established leaders among his "subjects" or subordinates and forcibly replaced them with men more willing to carry out his orders, he has not created a system that could operate by a set of formal regulations but only a new hierarchy of persons with himself at its head. Strong and vigorous leaders have been governed by the crude necessities of their power rather than the dictates of tradition, but they have still had to act as members of local hierarchies, not as the agencies of a rationally consistent system.

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[26] Troshchinskii, pp. 56–65, 86–8. S. Dobrin, "Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism," *Law Quarterly Review*, Vol. 52 (July, 1936), pp. 402–24, shows that this contradiction has carried over into the Soviet period. Soviet statesmen generally avoid any explicit reference to it, but their habit of demanding legal procedure while simultaneously violating it themselves is well known. The outstanding example was A. Ia. Vyshinskii, who in 1937 was conducting the infamous purge trials with one hand while strenuously working for the observance of law in the government administration with the other. See G. Morgan, *Soviet Administrative Legality* (Stanford, 1962), pp. 91–116, esp. p. 112.

[27] Druzhinin, *op. cit.*, II, 77–8, has shown that this was true of Kiselev's reform legislation of 1837–1838. Lenin said that he used decrees as experiments during the civil war years; see his speech before the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, quoted in S. N. Prokopovich, *The Economic Condition of Soviet Russia* (London, 1924), pp. 13–4. Hazard calls the constitution of 1918 a "statement of lofty aims" rather than a "set of rules," *op cit.*, I, 27, and it is clear from Morgan's account, cited above, n. 26, that statutory laws in the Soviet Union have often been ideals rather than norms, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–53, 73–5, 96–116. Michael Speranskii, who did more, perhaps, than any other man to bring law to Russia, explained the difficulties involved in a series of memoranda printed in *Proekty i zapiski* (Moscow, 1961), especially pp. 17–28. Speranskii was primarily responsible for the publication of the first *Svod Zakonov* (Digest of Laws) in Russia in 1833, after almost thirty years of work. He in turn based his studies on more than a century of previous attempts by various commissions, elected and appointed, to organize Russian law into a coherent system. Even with all this preparation, Speranskii denied that the product of his efforts was really a code. See N. M. Korkunov, "Znachenie svoda zakonov," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia* (Sept., 1894), reprinted in his *Sbornik statei* (St. Petersburg, 1898), pp. 77–96; and V. Gribowski's review of this article in the *Zhurnal Iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri imperatorskom S-Petersburgskom universitete* (January, 1895), pp. 4–6.

These contradictions have communicated themselves to successively higher levels of the administration and ultimately to the ruler himself. Officials on all echelons have had to cope with a hodge-podge of personal hierarchies, operating according to a wide variety of customs and necessities. Whatever purposes or goals Russia's leading statesmen have pursued, hierarchical groups have generally been the only available means for pursuing them. In a real sense, then, the rulers of Russia have been trapped by their own government organization. They have had the power to enact regulations but never to enforce them as such. Laws they have published in great profusion, but a system of legal relations has been slow to develop.[28]

During the last several decades of the tsarist regime, convictions regarding the individual rights of all citizens did develop among the gentry and some of the "upper middle class." Legal institutions emerged or began to be established which reflected a Russia-wide social consciousness. Nevertheless, no more than ten to fifteen per cent of the population experienced this development. For the peasant masses, law remained essentially a random mixture of local custom and arbitrary force, and in the years prior to World War I local custom was rapidly breaking down.[29] With the peasants in turmoil, the tsarist administration continued to regard itself as necessarily above any legal system, constituting an all-powerful and impartial arbiter apart from the factions and classes of society—the guardian and director of its people and the keystone of the Russian nation. The legal system, said the statesmen, was not yet strong enough in itself to eliminate the need for arbitrary power.[30] Paradoxically, the need for the exercise of arbitrary power increased in Russia at the very time when a modern legal order seemed on the point of being successfully established.

The traditional keystone of the Russian state itself proved vulnerable to the personal weakness of the tsar, and in March 1917 it disappeared. A government based entirely on legal relationships tried to replace it, but the factions and classes had not yet developed institutions that could cooperate effectively on their own under the stress of war. The old contradiction between the necessity for action and the striving for legal system became suddenly very sharp, and at last it became clear that only force could restore order. The attempt to govern Russia under law collapsed in November 1917.[31]

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[28] Lazarevskii, II, 158; Troshchinskii, pp. 37–41.

[29] V. I. Boshko, *Grazhdanskaia pravosposobnost krestian v oblasti zemlevladeniia* (Kiev, 1917), gives some idea of the degree to which legal system had entered into the peasant way of life by the end of the tsarist regime. B. S. Martynov, *Poniatie zemleustroistva* (St. Petersburg, 1917), describes the difficulties involved in establishing legal definitions of ownership among the peasantry. S. N. Dubrowski, *Die Bauernbewegung in der russischen Revolution, 1917* (Berlin, 1929), pp. 37–62, describes peasant violence in the years before 1914.

[30] *E.g.*, P. A. Stolypin's speech of 1 April 1911 to the State Council, in E. V. [erpakhovskaia], *Gosudarstvennaia deiatelnost P. A. Stolypina* (3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1911), II, 150.

[31] P. P. Gronsky and N. J. Astrov, *The War and the Russian Government* (New Haven, 1929), furnishes a useful chronicle of government organization up to November 1917. The sudden collapse of Russian society in 1917 reflects the flimsiness of social order in Russia and the tensions which still plagued the newly industrializing economy. Between 1917 and 1920 a number of generals and liberal politicians called upon the "Russian people" to overthrow the communists and restore some facsimile of legitimate order. Their appeal would seem to have been reasonable. The communists were in fact usurpers; they forced the Constituent Assembly, the legally elected representatives of the people, to disband. Nevertheless, throughout all Russia there was almost no response to the generals' appeal except from the non-Russian nationalities, and these

III

The years 1917–1920 saw a phenomenon very close to total social collapse in Russia. Nicholas II abdicated, removing not only himself but, in the absence of a suitable heir, the institution of tsardom as well. Within a few months, the classes which had attached themselves to the ideal of a Russian nation under a common legal system lost their hold on the armed crowds that dominated the cities. Factories shut down, railroad traffic dwindled, and the cities lost half their population. Russian society came close to dissolution, and the state would probably have been scattered into a number of League mandates, had not a few ruthless leaders acted to preserve it. Inevitably, the new order that they constructed was in effect a crude hierarchy, utterly without legal system, whose desperate leaders could pull Russian society together only by taking measures which alienated them from it. The new communist rulers relied almost wholly on arbitrary force to sustain their power. They dragooned indifferent peasants into their hastily formed armies, forced hostile servitors from the tsarist regime to staff their administration, and marshalled even their own party into a ruthless band held together only by a chain of personal influence. No one, not even party members, could act effectively except under compulsion. In social chaos, no one could decide rationally and no one could agree. There were only those who were courageous enough to command and those desperate enough to obey. Within a few months after they seized power, even the most capable and devoted communist leaders had fallen to bickering among themselves and attacking one another with such intensity that only a strong and arbitrary commander could hold them together. They found themselves tied fast to each other by their struggle for survival and yet unable to work together effectively. Utterly dependent on one another and yet utterly without the habits of active cooperation and mutual trust, they clung to Lenin, as their own subordinates clung to them, with a fervent desperation.[32]

Since 1917 the communist party has had to contend with much the same contradictions that plagued the tsars. Its leaders have had to build up Russia's defenses against enemies so powerful that their failure to crush the Soviet government at the outset surprised Lenin himself. Like the tsars, the party leaders have worked feverishly to develop Russia's military and economic strength and in so doing have brought violent upheaval to the narrow hierarchies in which they and their people have lived. It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the communists' devotion to Marxist principles, they adopted the most arbitrary of the old tsarist methods of governing immediately upon seizing power.[33] The democracy of the Soviets disappeared within the first year. Democratic centralism in the party organization gave way to a centralized hierarchy, whose power the party itself sanctioned in March 1921.[34] Stalin definitively renounced the equalitarian ideal in 1931.

Until the last decade, the communists have controlled their government largely through picked agents possessing broad and ill-defined powers, responsible directly to the center.

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were only trying to get free of Russia, not to restore her. In Russia proper almost no one voluntarily attacked the communists and almost no one supported them. In fact, the "Russian people" did not care who ruled Russia nor did they care what happened to their elected representatives. See D. Footman, *Civil War in Russia* (New York, 1962), pp. 49–55, 104–11, 139–42, 303.

In Finland the native communists also forced out the elected Diet and seized power, but here the result was quite different. General Mannerheim, who was no more nor less reactionary than the Russian White Army leaders, found himself at the head of a united and aggressive volunteer army made up largely of Finnish peasants actively concerned over who was ruling them. Within four months he was able to drive out the communists and restore legitimate government. He had German help, but it was no more significant than what the Allies gave the Russian White armies. In Finland, then, the tsar's abdication did not seriously weaken society as such, whereas in Russia it represented in fact the removal of a keystone. See C. Mannerheim, *Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim* (New York, 1954), pp. 130–83; and C. Smith, *Finland and the Russian Revolution* (Athens, Ga., 1958), p. 211.

[32] A. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine* (New Haven, 1963), portrays the emergence of essentially hierarchical relationships among the Bolshevik leaders out of the actions they undertook in the Civil War. In general these relationships seem to have developed against the will of the leaders themselves. See esp. pp. v–viii, 28, 116–27.

[33] Morgan, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–3.

[34] A good chronicle of the early disappearance of democracy and the growth of a hierarchy of personal rule in both government and party emerges from Sverdlov's speeches and dispatches. See the last two volumes of I. M. Sverdlov, *Izbrannye proizvedenniia* (3 vols., Moscow, 1959).

These agents have worked outside the operating government organization in order to be in a position to enforce the orders of the leaders directly. Such have been the party commissars, the party control commissions, the workers' and peasants' inspectorate, the procuracy, and above all, the secret police. Until recently, this host of arbitrary supervisors has been practically the only means of direction and control available to the Soviet leaders. Only arbitrary power on all levels could cope with the hierarchical groups that formed in all the operating departments of the executive administration, and only they could furnish the center with anything approaching reliable information.

In their time, the tsars had utilized special agents vested personally with arbitrary and undefined powers. By the early 1800s, if not before, such agents as the *oprichniki*, the procurators, the *revizorii*, and the governors-general had gained a permanent place in Russian political thought. The writings of Michael Speranskii—a liberalizer according to the view of Russian history now in vogue—offer a convincing account of how to use all-powerful agents, a description of the circumstances under which they should be used, and a warning as to the disadvantages of using them.[35] But the most tyrannical of the tsars never set up anything so extensive as the incredible accumulation of secret and semi-secret inspectorates which guided Soviet administration in its first four decades.

IV

Rarely has history furnished such a clear demonstration of the force of state necessity as the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath. It cannot be imagined that the communist rulers gave the lie to their ideals and aspirations willingly. Their words, their early, abortive attempts to introduce communist institutions, their continued bickering to the present day over the details of what they are pleased to call Marxism-Leninism, are clear proof that they still cherish their old dreams. Indeed, they are still communist insofar as their necessities have allowed them to be. Yet in practice they have junked most of their professed ideals and surrendered themselves utterly to the superhuman task of putting together and governing a shattered Russia. They are, of course, still working toward a society where every man regards it as a virtue to give what he can and take only what he needs. They call this Marxist and so it is; but Marx shared this particular ideal with such eminent economic liberals as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Samuel Smiles, to name only a few.[36] It is in fact little more than an ethic common and necessary to all societies possessing modern economic organization, whatever their political systems. The communist vision of the ideal man is not so different from the "bourgeois" ethical notions which have been vital to Western capitalism, except that Russian "communism," contrary to both Marxian and Western liberal prescriptions, calls for the state to take the lead in remaking the Russian people in the image of this ideal man.[37] But this, of course, is precisely what the Russian state has been consciously trying to do for over two centuries.

The circumstances in which Russia's leading statesmen have had to work make it clear why liberalization in the Western sense of the word has never been relevant to Russian development. The state has had to organize itself in accordance with necessity rather than Russia's social institutions. The government's very action to unify its organization has been characteristically arbitrary, and its own action has served inadvertently to perpetuate the traditional hierarchical fragmentation of Russian society. Russia's failure to liberalize, then, has not resulted from the ignorance and mental rigidity of her rulers, any more than the failure of Russian society to unite itself represents some inherent deficiency in the people. Both "failures" spring from the peculiar circumstances of Russia's historical development, which have set government and society in a unique relationship to one another.

If the main problem of Russian government has always been that the executive organization could not operate within a consistent legal system, then it is obvious that removing the arbitrary ruler and replacing him with an elected president or legislative assembly would at no time have made any relevant contribution to Russian development. In fact, an elected legislature in a society traditionally broken down into hierarchical fragments is most likely to become the tool of a single privileged group, freezing the government itself into an immovable hierarchy without liberating anyone at all.[38] Until such a time as Russian society became unified by its own of life, laws passed by an elected assembly could have had no more effect than the ruler's decrees.[39] Indeed, the relation between government and society in Russia has been such that only an absolute personal authority has been able to hold it together.

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[35] Speranskii, *loc. cit.*, n. 27, pp. 80–1, 105–25.

[36] J. Bentham, *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (New York, Hafner Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 3–4; J. S. Mill, *On Liberty* (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1949), pp. 95–6; and S. Smiles, *Self-Help* (New York, n.d.), pp. 293–7.

[37] J. Triska, ed., *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules* (San Francisco, 1962), pp. 112–3.

[38] S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (Glencoe, Ill., 1963), pp. 13–27.

Quite without foundation, however, is the argument that since Russian government has not been liberalizing, it has therefore not been changing or developing at all. Obviously tsarist and Soviet rulers have both wanted to base their regimes in a rationally consistent law that actually would govern the everyday life of the people and regulate the government, a condition which would approximate that of Western society, but which, doubtless, would embody very different political forms. The communist party has been striving to find roots in Russian society by developing legal relationships among its people, just as the tsarist government did in its time and for the same reasons.

Rule by arbitrary force is inherently disruptive and therefore dangerous for any government that employs it.[40] The rulers of Russia, especially the communists, have used force and violence against their own subordinates and by so doing have strengthened the very hierarchies which have made a coherent administration impossible; but this has never been by choice. Those scholars and *emigrés* who imagine that Soviet leaders use purges and spies purposely in order to inspire distrust among their subjects and their subordinates have either failed or simply refused to recognize the traditional fragmentation of Russian society.[41] No sane statesman has ever desired to alienate his people by terror or any other means except as an expedient measure against groups which actually block government action or threaten the statesman's own position. The alienation of the citizenry has never increased the power of a state, but only rendered both rulers and ruled more desperate. Arbitrary force—specifically the use of all-powerful inspectors, purges, and spies—is in any case a very clumsy method of control. Secret police and trusted men are not by themselves an adequate means for securing information and directing subordinate agencies, especially in a modern industrial society. As Speranskii pointed out long ago, if such men make only brief visits to the agencies they are assigned to inspect, then they will not have time to find out what is really going on. If they stay long, they themselves become part of the "family" and cease to be effective as agents and informants for the rulers.[42] Government by purely arbitrary power is only useful to a ruler who, like Machiavelli's usurper, possesses no other means of control.

What actually does develop in Russia will not be a matter of what Soviet leaders want to do but rather what they *can* do under the circumstances, internal and external, which they face. The technical requirements of maintaining a massive industrial plant, the effects of widespread education, the coming to maturity of new generations born into a modern society unified by economic interdependence and a sense of collective accomplishment—all have had and will continue to have their effects on the old struggle between rulers and people. The results are impossible to predict, because the process of change is inherently contradictory and subject to both global and domestic circumstances, but Americans might come closer to understanding what the Soviet leaders are about if they direct their attention more to the circumstances confronting the Russian state and less to distorting their observations to fit their preconceptions. American political theory, which is concerned primarily with rendering a government administration powerless in itself, is irrelevant to the attempts of Russian statesmen to erect and maintain an effective state organization that can unite a people who have never been themselves a nation.[43] Whatever Russia may become, she will not be likely either to follow or to deny the principles of Thomas Jefferson. Her statesmen will simply ignore them as they always have and go on trying to find Russia's own course.

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[39] Korkunov, *op. cit.*, I, 417–50.

[40] Speranskii, *loc. cit.*, pp. 56–67.

[41] J. D. Littlepage's description of Russian behavior patterns, based on his experience as a mining engineer in the Soviet Union, shows the effects of this fragmentation on Soviet organization at all levels during the early 1930s. See his *In Search of Soviet Gold*, cited above, n. 23.

[42] Speranskii, *loc. cit.*, pp. 105–6.

[43] V. Weidle, *Russia: Absent and Present* (New York, 1961), pp. 34–7; Cherniavsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–96.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VOID BALLOTS IN WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS*

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In the 1961 federal election six per cent of West German voters failed to cast two valid votes under the single-ballot, two-vote German electoral system: 1.3 million voters cast their party list vote invalidly, while almost one million failed to vote validly for a district candidate.[1] Since 1949—and 1953, when the present single-ballot, two-vote system was introduced—the development of the invalid vote has been as shown in Table I.

TABLE I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVALID VOTE IN GERMANY, 1949–1961[2]

Year	First Votes		Second Votes		Either Vote or Both Votes
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Per cent
1949			763,216	3.1	
1953	959,790	3.4	928,278	3.3	5.1
1957	916,680	3.0	1,167,466	3.8	5.7
1961	845,158	2.6	1,298,723	4.0	6.1

Not only has the total invalid vote increased steadily, despite the counter-movement of first and second vote trends; it has also been exceptionally high in comparison to the Weimar Republic, Imperial Germany and other Western European countries. Thus in pre-Hitler Germany the invalid vote seldom exceeded 1 per cent of the poll. In postwar parliamentary elections in Scandinavia it has not yet exceeded 1 per cent while in Britain, Switzerland and Austria it has approached 2 per cent only in rare instances. In Fourth and Fifth Republic France spoiled and blank ballots have been constant at about 3 per cent of the poll. Only in isolated cases—for example, where compulsory voting is combined with a deep-seated social and political *malaise*, as in Belgium—has the invalid vote been comparable in proportion to that of Western Germany.[3] Yet comparison here seems problematic, for in the Federal Republic voting is voluntary, social cohesion high, and the political temperature low; indeed, never before in this century have social calm and political consensus appeared so broad or deep.

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* I am indebted to Professor Otto Kirchheimer for his encouragement and advice in the preparation of this article, and to Professor Juan Linz for his critical reading of an earlier draft.

[1] The German ballot consists of a single sheet of paper on which are printed two parallel columns of contestants. Each voter casts a *first vote* from the column on the left side of the ballot for the party-sponsored or independent candidate whom he favors in his local election *district*; and casts a *second vote* from the right-hand column for the Land (state) *list* of the political party which he favors nationally. His two votes need not coincide and need not both be exercised. Since each vote is tallied separately, an invalid vote in one column does not invalidate the vote in the other column. For a detailed description of Germany's mixed system of "personalized proportional representation," see Uwe Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 17–37.

[2] Based on official publications of: Germany (Federal Republic), Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden (hereafter referred to as "Bundesamt"). Data for the 1949, 1953 and 1957 elections appeared as *Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Vol. 10 (1949); Vol. 100, Nos. 1–2 (1953); and Vol. 200, Nos. 1–4 (1957). Data for the 1961 election appeared in the new electoral series, under *Fachserie A: Bevoelkerung und Kultur, Reihe 8, Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag*, as *Wahl zum 4. Deutschen Bundestag vom 17. September 1961*, Nos. 1–4. (Hereafter these documents will be cited as "Bundesamt: 1949," "Bundesamt: 1953 (2)," etc.). For a detailed bibliography of official electoral statistics published by the Bundesamt and state statistical offices, see Bundesamt: 1961(1), pp. 59–67. A useful compilation of federal and state election statistics, 1946–1960, is contained in Erwin Faul, ed., *Wahlen und Waehler in Westdeutschland* (Villingen-Schwarzwald, Ring-Verlag, 1960), pp. 321–363.

[3] German invalid vote data for 1871–1919 are found in Germany, Statistisches Reichsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich*, Vol. 42 (Berlin, 1921/22), pp. 354–355; and for 1919–1932, *ibid.*, Vol. 52 (Berlin, 1933), p. 539. Some comparative data are given by Richard M. Scammon, "Postwar Elections and Electoral Processes," in E. H. Litchfield, ed., *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 505. For France see David B. Goldey, "The French Referendum and Election of 1962: The National Campaigns," *Political Studies*, Vol. 11 (October, 1963), p. 302; and Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (2d

Why, then, is the invalid vote so high? And why is it increasing? Is the problem essentially a technical one, solution of which depends on increased civic instruction in the use of the allegedly complex two-vote ballot? Does it represent a small nucleus of political protest? Or is it the product of deeper sociological and psychological factors on the contemporary German political scene?

Most observers of German electoral politics—political scientists, the Bundesamt, and most state statistical offices—consider the invalid vote negligible in number and politically unimportant. While paying lip service to other interpretations, most analysts hold that its principal cause is the failure of some voters to understand the possibility or at least the technique of voting twice.[4] One optimistic appraisal places the technical-complexity argument in the center of its analysis, then concludes that "the low magnitude of invalid votes is as favorable a sign of the success of political education in postwar Germany as the high level of popular participation."[5]

Yet we have seen that the invalid vote is both high and increasing; and the contention of this article will be that the frequent occurrence of invalid votes is a small but distressing sign of the underdevelopment of political interest, involvement and integration in the West German variant of industrial mass society; that it stems in part from the deceptively high level of electoral participation (which is high in quantity but not in quality); and that it expresses a variety of political discontent. We shall turn first to the general patterns of invalid voting, then to the motivations which underlie it.

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ed., New York, Longmans, 1958), p. 324 and pp. 446–447.

Comparative data on invalid votes in parliamentary elections in fifteen Western European countries since 1945 are found in the appendix on post-war election statistics in Uwe Kitzinger, *Britain, Europe and Beyond: Essays in European Politics* (Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1964), pp. 183–217. See also Kitzinger's discussion of invalid votes in Belgium, and in the cantons of Switzerland and states of Austria where voting is compulsory, in his chapter on "The Belgian Electoral System," *ibid.*, pp. 174–175. For an analysis of the cleavages in Belgian politics, see Val Lorwin's chapter on Belgium in R. A. Dahl, ed., *Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965), forthcoming.

Herbert Tingsten, in an extensive examination of the effects of compulsory voting in several European countries before the Second World War, demonstrated that compulsory voting—which, if effectively enforced, inevitably involves the electoral mobilization of some citizens who are more or less unwilling or apolitical—was in most cases accompanied by increases in both the level of participation and the proportion of invalid votes. See his *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics* (Totowa, New Jersey, The Bedminister Press, 1963; first published as *Stockholm Economic Studies*, Vol. 7, 1937), ch. 4.

Besides Belgium, only Luxembourg has consistently recorded an invalid vote well in excess of 3% of the poll; clues for the reasons underlying it may perhaps be found in highly effective compulsory voting regulations and the relatively complex electoral system, described by Kitzinger, "The Luxembourg Electoral System," in Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, pp. 181–182.

Italy, in 1953, completes the list of deviant Western European examples: 4.6% of the voters spoiled their ballots in that year's parliamentary election. The chief motivation seems to have been popular resentment of a specially rigged electoral law pushed through parliament just prior to the election and designed to insure continued dominance by Italy's four-party governing coalition. The law provided that any associated group of parties which received 50% plus one of the votes cast was to obtain two-thirds of the parliamentary seats; thus it represented an attempt to overthrow Italy's traditional proportional representation electoral system. For many Italians the law was unhappily reminiscent of Mussolini's Acerbo Law of 1923. Dubbed the "swindle law" by the Communists, it elicited a great deal of bitter debate both in parliament and in the election campaign itself. *Cf.* Gerard J. Mangone, "Italy," in Taylor Cole, ed., *European Political Systems* (2d ed. rev.; New York, 1959), pp. 508–509.

[4] Some representative examples are: Samuel H. Barnes, Frank Grace, James K. Pollock and Peter Sperlich, "The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (December, 1962), pp. 905–906; Bundesamt, "Ungueltige Stimmen bei der Bundestagswahl 1961," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1962, No. 3, pp. 145–147 (hereafter cited as "Bundesamt: WS 1962(3)"); and Baden-Wuerttemberg, Statistisches Landesamt, *Statistik von Baden-Wuerttemberg*, Vol. 80 (1961), pp. 10–11.

[5] Barnes, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 906.



Stimmzettel

für die Bundestagswahl im Wahlkreis Nr. 22 Hamburg VIII am 17. September 1961

Jeder Wähler hat

eine **Erststimme** für die Wahl des Wahlkreisabgeordneten	und	eine **Zweitstimme** für die Wahl nach Landeslisten

1	**Schmidt, Helmut** Dipl.-Volkswirt Hmb.-Gr. Flottbek 1 Zickzackweg 6b	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD	○
2	**Gewandt, Heinrich** Drogist Hamburg 39 Sierichstraße 20	Christlich-Demokratische Union	CDU	○
3	**Rademacher, Willy Max** Sped.-Kaufmann Hamburg 39 Sierichstraße 90	Freie Demokratische Partei	FDP	○
4	**Dr. Bialas, Rolf** Arzt Hmb.-Fuhlsbüttel 1 Fehrsweg 12	Gesamtdeutsche Partei (DP - BHE)	GDP	○
5	**Bethge, Horst** Lehrer Hamburg 22 Pelkumstraße 7	Deutsche Friedens-Union	DFU	○
6	**Dr. Nielsen, Ernst** Baurat Hamburg 19 Eichenstraße 50	Deutsche Reichs-Partei	DRP	○

1	**Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands** Dr. Brauer, Wehner, Frau Kellhack, Schmidt, Kalbitzer	SPD	○
2	**Christlich-Demokratische Union** Blumenfeld, Dr. Bucerius, Dr. Seffrin, Gewandt, Frau Blohm	CDU	○
3	**Freie Demokratische Partei** Rademacher, Dr. Dehlgrün, Frau Dr. Klep-Altenloh, Dr. Frankenfeld, Dr. Naumann zu Königsbrück	FDP	○
4	**Gesamtdeutsche Partei (DP-BHE)** Dr. Behn, Radtke, Frau Kayser, Baasa, Glabbatz	GDP	○
5	**Deutsche Friedens-Union** Prof. Dr. Gröbe, Frau Dr. Beck, Berg, Lippold, Dr. Colpe	DFU	○
6	**Deutsche Reichs-Partei** Prof. Dr. Kunstmann, Kupka, Hobinder, Bister, Trute	DRP	○

BALLOT

For the Federal Election of September 17, 1961
Electoral District No. 22 Hamburg District VIII

Each Voter Has

One **First Vote** for the election of his district deputy	and	One **Second Vote** for the election from Land lists

1	NAME of Candidate Occupation Address	Party	○

1	NAME of Party Names of Candidates	○

From *Patterns of Government*, by Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam. © Copyright 1958 by Random House, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

I. GENERAL PATTERNS

The sample survey data collected by the Federal Statistical Office in 1961 in 1,125 representative precincts throughout the Federal Republic produced the following composite picture of invalid votes by type and combination:

TABLE II. INVALID VOTES BY TYPE AND BALLOT COMBINATION, 1961[6]

	Number	Per cent
A. Invalid First and Second Votes	338,500	18.0
1. First and second vote columns blank	236,600	12.6
2. First vote blank, second vote multicrossed	25,300	1.3
3. Second vote blank, first vote multicrossed	37,600	2.0
4. Both votes multicrossed	30,100	1.6
5. One vote blank, other vote miscellaneous causes	2,500	0.1
6. Both votes miscellaneous causes	6,400	0.3
B. Invalid First and Valid Second Vote	583,600	31.0
7. First vote blank	572,300	30.4
8. First vote multicrossed	9,800	0.5
9. First vote miscellaneous causes	1,400	0.1
C. Invalid Second and Valid First Vote	959,400	51.0
10. Second vote blank	847,800	50.4
11. Second vote multicrossed	10,500	0.6
12. Second vote miscellaneous causes	1,100	0.1
Total	1,881,500	100.0

The striking fact which emerges from this table is that 82 per cent of all invalid votes (51 per cent of party list votes, 31 per cent of district votes) were paired with a valid vote. Moreover, most invalid votes were void because they were left blank—scarcely 6 per cent were multicrossed, while fewer than 1 per cent were voided by miscellaneous causes.

Except for Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen, high invalid list votes have been most prominent in the southern and western areas of the Federal Republic. They have been a characteristic feature of voting patterns in the Saarland, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Baden-Wuerttemberg since the first postwar Landtag elections. Exceptionally low invalid votes, on the other hand, have been common since 1949 in the northern German states of Niedersachsen, Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen.[7] But if the rank-order of the states according to per cent of invalid list votes has remained fairly constant, the patterns of increase have not; only one of the ten German states has never ranked among the first four states in rate of void list vote increase on at least one occasion. The federal average is particularly sensitive to voting fluctuations in the bigger states; thus the largest increase—0.5 per cent in 1957—resulted chiefly from the exceptional increases recorded that year in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen, not from admission of the Saarland as some observers have maintained.[8]

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[6] Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 11. According to Paragraph 39 of the West German Federal Electoral Law, a vote is considered invalid if the voter's preference for a district candidate or party list is not unmistakably clear. In Table II, "blank" votes include a small number of crossed-out vote columns as well as those which were unmarked; "multicrossed" votes are those marked for more than one candidate or party list; and "miscellaneous causes" include vote-columns defaced by marks, tears or comments, as well as those on which the voter's mark is unclear. The special count of invalid votes is described in Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 145. On the sample survey, see Bundesamt: 1961(3), pp. 4–8.

[7] Faul, ed., *loc. cit.* Void district votes have also been consistently higher in the southwestern part of the Federal Republic, except for 1953 when they were also high in these three north German states. With few exceptions the void district vote has decreased steadily in all states and in every election since 1953.

[8] See, for example, the contentions of Barnes, *et al.*, *op. cit.* But in 1957 void list votes increased

TABLE III. INVALID VOTES AND BALLOT COMBINATIONS BY AGE AND SEX, 1957–1961

Age-Group, Men		Number of Votes Cast Invalidly Per 1000 Voters			
		Both Votes	First Vote Only	Second Vote Only	Either Vote
21–30	1957	10.6	13.5	20.5	44.6
	1961	7.4	11.8	24.2	43.4
30–60	1957	11.7	14.9	17.4	44.0
	1961	10.3	13.2	21.0	44.5
60 and over	1957	12.2	18.4	22.0	52.6
	1961	12.2	19.5	31.8	63.5
Total	1957	11.6	15.4	19.0	46.0
	1961	10.2	14.4	24.1	48.7
Age-Group, Women					
21–30	1957	11.6	20.0	30.1	61.7
	1961	8.0	16.6	34.3	58.9
30–60	1957	12.5	21.7	29.9	64.1
	1961	10.9	20.7	35.8	67.4
60 and over	1957	13.5	27.4	36.5	77.4
	1961	11.5	30.9	46.0	88.4
Total	1957	12.6	22.7	31.4	66.7
	1961	10.6	22.5	38.0	77.1
Total, Both Men and Women	1957	12.1	19.3	25.7	57.1
	1961	10.4	18.8	31.6	60.8

Some voters are more prone than others to cast invalid votes. The chief variables identified by the sample survey are the voter's age and sex, the size and location of the community in which he lives and his political party preference. Especially relevant are age and sex factors, as shown by Table III. In the 1961 election 7.7 per cent of women voters (and 8.8 per cent of women over 60) and 4.9 per cent of men voters failed to cast two valid votes. The larger proportion of imperfect ballots cast by women was due primarily to the fact that women much more frequently than men combined a valid vote with an invalid vote. Older voters of both sexes shared chief responsibility for paired invalid votes. With increasing voter age, void district votes among women increased from 1.7 to 3.1 per cent; among men from 1.2 to 2.0 per cent. Likewise, with increasing voter age, void list votes among women increased from 3.4 to 4.6 per cent while the corresponding figures among men were only 2.4 and 3.2 per cent.[9]

Thus both men and women of all ages cast more invalid list votes than district votes; more women voted invalidly than men in every age group and on every possible ballot combi-

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in Baden-Wuerttemberg by 68,000 (1.3%), in Nordrhein-Westfalen by 62,000 (0.4%); the Saarland added 38,000. Nordrhein-Westfalen increased by only 0.2% in 1953, and decreased by 0.4% in 1961. Baden-Wuerttemberg decreased by 0.9% in 1953, and increased by 0.6% in 1961. Therefore, even without the Saarland, the federal average invalid vote for 1957 represented an increase more than twice the federal increase of 1953 or 1961. Bundesamt: 1957(3), pp. 64–65; Bundesamt: 1961(1), p. 8.

[9] Since women form a majority among voters, their share of the invalid vote is numerically even more striking. Bundesamt, "Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe der Maenner und Frauen nach dem Alter bei der Bundestagswahl 1961," WS 1962(2), pp. 75–79.

nation save paired invalid votes cast by elderly men; and more older voters than younger voters failed to cast two valid votes. Since 1957 the paired invalid vote has decreased among all age-groups of both sexes; the combination of an invalid district with a valid list vote has decreased among all but the oldest voters of both sexes; and the combination of an invalid list with a valid district vote has increased among all age-groups of both sexes, and most conspicuously among voters over 60.[10]

These figures suggest a partial explanation for the counter-movement of district and list vote trends. Although the correlation coefficient for invalid votes and participation shows no relationship between the two factors,[11] it is nonetheless clear that both the size and development of the invalid vote are partly determined by changes in the sociological composition of the participating electorate. In 1961 three principal changes occurred; all three affected the invalid vote. First, there was a great increase in the number of voters over 60, among whom the occurrence of blank second votes was especially frequent and the increase from 1957 especially marked. Second, there was a great increase in the number of voters under 30, among whom participation in past elections had been very low, among whom the occurrence of invalid second votes was relatively frequent and increasing, and among whom the occurrence of invalid first votes was least frequent and decreasing. Finally, the number of women participating increased substantially, which had a decisive over-all impact on the number of invalid votes cast. In some states—for example, Baden-Wuerttemberg—certain of these trends were even more pronounced and the net increase of invalid votes correspondingly larger than in the Federal Republic as a whole.[12]

No less important than differences in the frequency and patterns of invalid voting among age-groups and between sexes have been differences among various sizes of community. Voters in village and rural areas (about one-third of the electorate) are more likely to cast invalid votes than are voters in small and medium-sized towns and cities. Thus the highest invalid vote is normally recorded by men and women over 60 in communities of fewer than 3000 inhabitants. Above we noted that void list votes tend to increase among all age-groups of both sexes, while void district votes increase only among the old. Although this pattern retains its basic shape, it shifts from one size of community to another. In village and rural areas the increase in void district votes was just slightly less pronounced in 1957 than the increase in void list votes, and then not only among older voters but also among middle-aged men from 30 to 60. On the other hand, in cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, the per cent of invalid district votes cast by older citizens did not change; but of course the absolute number increased owing both to the high turnout and increased number of older voters.[13]

Data on the political party orientations of invalid voters are also relevant to an understanding of the general patterns of invalid voting in the Federal Republic. Nearly 61 per cent of all void list votes in 1961 were cast by electors who gave their district vote to the candidate of the CDU (33 per cent) or SPD (28 per cent); another 25 per cent were cast by "straight-ticket" invalid voters—that is, by voters who cast no valid vote at all. Corresponding data for void district votes show similar patterns: over 50 per cent were cast by major party list voters, only 13 per cent by minor party voters, and some 36 per cent as straight tickets. However, while under 2 per cent of SPD or CDU voters failed to vote for a district candidate, and slightly more than 3 per cent for a party list, over 5 per cent of the minor party electorate cast void district votes and over 4 per cent void list votes. Since 1953 the per cent of both major and minor party voters failing to cast two valid votes—and particularly those failing to cast the important party list vote, on the basis of which proportional representation is figured—has gradually increased.[14]

II. CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

At least four main causes of invalid voting can be identified. They are: (1) protest; (2)

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[10] Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 11.

[11] Barnes, *et al.*, *loc. cit.*

[12] Baden-Wuerttemberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11. For the federal trends see Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 9; and Bundesamt: WS, *loc. cit.*

[13] Bundesamt: 1957(3), pp. 21–22. Most of the districts (24 of 27) which ranked highest in 1953, 1957 or 1961 in per cent of invalid votes—and three-fourths of those with consistently high percentages—were comprised predominantly of farms, villages and small towns. *Cf.* Bundesamt, *Statistische Berichte*, Arb.-Nr. VIII/5/12 and Arb.-Nr. VIII/5/15; and Bundesamt: 1953(1), pp. 52–63. See also Bundesamt: 1961(4), p. 26, for the results of the 1961 sample survey.

[14] Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 10; 1957(3), p. 53; 1953(2), p. 47. For 1953 see also W. Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schuetz, *Waehler und Gewaehlte: Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953* (Berlin and Frankfurt, Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1957), pp. 322–333.

ignorance of voting techniques; (3) cross-pressures; and (4) apathy. Their exposition will be somewhat clearer if we organize our discussion according to the types of invalid votes and their combination on the ballot papers (see above, Table II).

Votes invalidated by the addition of extraneous marks, tears or comments were a comparative rarity in the 1961 election, accounting for just 0.5 per cent of all invalid votes. They represent—as do probably the crossed-out vote columns—the irreconcilables present in all organized political societies, voters who use their ballots to indicate in drastic fashion their total alienation from the political system in which they live.

More significant, if still relatively infrequent, were the 113,000 votes invalidated by multicrossing. Few of these can be considered products of political protest; on the other hand, it is thoroughly conceivable that many of these voters had an insufficient understanding of the electoral system. Voters who placed both their marks on one side of the ballot may have wished to cast their two votes for two different political parties but erred in the attempt to do so. Other voters may have assumed that they were permitted two votes for each or either column, despite minor technical improvements in ballot design and instructions between 1953 and 1957. More important than lack of information or inability to read directions may have been the problem of conflicting information, owing to the wide variety of electoral systems (and hence of vote-casting experiences) in use at state and local government levels in the Federal Republic. For example, the municipal and county electoral systems in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayern permit each elector several votes, which he may split among several candidates, cumulate for a single candidate, or cast as a block for a single party list without change. The per cent of invalid votes voided by multicrossing is significantly higher in these two states than in the rest of the Federal Republic.[15]

Another possible interpretation of multicrossing—at least where valid votes are paired with invalid votes—is that of cross-pressures. Unable to decide between two parties or two candidates which strongly appeal to him, the voter marks his ballot for both. Although we lack precise information on the combination of multicrossed invalid votes for the Federal Republic, an examination of such ballots in Bayern found that when people voted for two parties they nearly always voted for two which were ideologically relatively close to each other, indicating perhaps that multicrossing was not so much the product of errors as of political impotence in the face of equally attractive choices.[16]

Most invalid votes were simply abstentions. Almost a quarter of a million voters turned in unmarked ballot papers; they cast neither a district nor a party list vote. Whether they "voted" for the sake of appearance or because they wanted to, they apparently came to the polls with the sole intention of casting an unmistakable and cogent protest vote, not only against the choice of candidates and political parties, but against the political system itself. More interesting, therefore—and statistically much more important—are the one and one-half million voters who paired an abstention with a valid vote. One-third of all voters who cast such a combination failed to mark the left side of their ballot paper (for a district candidate), two-thirds the right side (for a party list).

The most frequently cited explanation for valid and blank vote combinations is ignorance by some voters of the purpose and technique of casting two votes, And in fact a convincing case can be made for this thesis. There is, first of all, some evidence from local, state and federal elections which indicates that the size of the invalid vote varies directly with the complexity of the electoral system and the design of the ballot.[17] Moreover, in some cases where direct efforts have been made to acquaint prospective voters with details of the electoral system—an example is the postal ballot in 1961—the invalid vote has amounted to 1 per cent or less.[18]

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[15] Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 146.

[16] Richard Schachtner, "Wahlberechtigte, Wahlbeteiligung, Nichtwaehler und Falschwaehler," *Bayern in Zahlen: Monatsheft des Bayerischen Statistischen Amtes*, Vol. 6 (January, 1952), p. 21. *Cf.* S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N. Y., 1963), pp. 212–213. Of course, cross-pressures could equally well lead to withdrawal and abstention. *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 211ff.

[17] For example, see Schachtner, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21; Baden-Wuerttemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen*, Vol. 4 (January, 1949), p. 15; also Friedrich Erbe, "Vierzehn Jahre Wahlen in Westdeutschland (1946–1960)," in Faul, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 40. However, the Bundesamt noted that introduction of the two-vote, two-column ballot in 1953 had had only a fractional impact on invalid voting; void list votes increased by only 0.2% from a sum which in 1949 (see Table I) the Bundesamt had regarded as chiefly an overt expression of political protest. Bundesamt: 1953(2), p. 47; 1949, p. 7. Already by 1957 and especially in 1961 the Bundesamt's position inexplicably changed; its new emphasis has been on technical complexity as the sounder explanation for both the size and successive increases of invalid votes. See Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 21 and p. 52; and Bundesamt: WS, *loc. cit.*

Detailed studies of West German cross-voting behavior in each of the past three federal elections also suggest an interpretation of partially void ballots which emphasizes error rather than intent as the chief cause of invalid votes. Despite the fact that each elector who casts two votes must vote separately for the district candidate and the party list of his choice, 89 per cent of the voters in 1957 and 94 per cent in 1961 cast their two votes for the same party: thus the personality of the district candidate can have played only a minor role in the voter's choice compared with his party label.[19] This conclusion is substantiated—despite the larger number of void list votes—by extensive survey research data from the Divo, Allensbach and Emnid institutes of public opinion. Thus it was found that most voters paid little attention to, and had scant knowledge of, the electoral law or the personal qualities of district candidates; very few of those questioned considered the candidate's personality to be the basis of their electoral choice. Instead, the issues to which the electorate responded were bound up with images of a few nationally known politicians and the great political parties—with their achievements, programs and relative capacities for national leadership.[20] Many of the voters who allowed the important party list vote to remain a blank must therefore have committed unintentional errors. They probably thought that by voting for a district candidate whose name was also marked with a party label they had fulfilled their electoral duty.[21]

The first use of voting machines in a German federal election in 1961 in four precincts also lends credence to the technical-complexity explanation for invalid voting. The machines were designed to render impossible the casting of accidental invalid votes; and a measure of their success appears to be that whereas in 1957 the number of invalid votes polled in the four precincts had ranged from 13 to 34 district votes and from 15 to 63 party list votes, in 1961 no precinct had more than three invalid first votes or seven invalid second votes. Moreover, in three of the four precincts there were equal numbers of invalid first and second votes (not an excess of the latter as one would expect); in one precinct there were no invalid votes at all; and in the fourth precinct there were only two invalid first votes, seven invalid second votes. (See Table IV.)

But if voter ignorance thus appears to be a relevant explanation for blank votes, it is neither the only nor the most important one. An equally important cause is political protest, rooted in electoral alliances; in the decline of radical political parties; and in the reaction of local populations to temporary political, social or economic dislocations.

A principal cause of invalid first votes has been the device known as *Wahlabkommen*, or electoral alliance, whereby a political party refrains from nominating a candidate in a particular election district and instead instructs its

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[18] Bundesamt, "Ergebnis der Briefwahl bei der Bundestagswahl 1961," WS 1962(1), pp. 23–25. There are, however, special features of the postal ballot which impair its comparability with other aspects of invalid voting; for a brief discussion, see Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 284–285.

[19] Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 54; Bundesamt: WS 1962(2), p. 79. *Cf.* Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, p. 288.

[20] For 1961 see Emnid-Institut, *Der Prozess der Meinungsbildung* (Bielefeld, 1962), excerpts from which appear in Klaus D. Eberlein, "Die Wahlentscheidung vom 17. September 1961, ihre Ursachen und Wirkung," *Zeitschrift fuer Politik*, Vol. 9 (September, 1962), pp. 236–257; and Gerhard Schmidtchen and E. Noelle-Neumann (Allensbach), "Die Bedeutung repraesentativer Bevoelkerungsumfragen fuer die offene Gesellschaft," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 4 (June, 1963), pp. 174–179. For 1957 see Divo-Institut, *Untersuchung der Waehlerschaft und Wahlentscheidung 1957* (Frankfurt, 1959), pp. 72–121 and pp. 170–235. For 1953 see Hirsch-Weber and Schuetz, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–355.

[21] Kitzinger, *loc. cit.;* and Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 21 and p. 52. The Bundesamt's suggestion that void party list votes may have resulted from rejection by major party voters of unalterable state party lists over whose composition and order they have no influence, seems improbable in the light of these data, since it is the party and not the man for whom the voter apparently marks his ballot. Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 21. In Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayern, where voters have long been able to alter lists and cumulate votes, and where, therefore, one might expect such considerations to be especially relevant, the void list vote has been high, but lower than in several other states where voters are not permitted to alter lists or cumulate votes. Moreover, the data from both states suggest that the more choices a voter has, the more likely he is to cast invalid votes, rather than *vice versa.* See Schachtner, *loc. cit.;* and Baden-Wuerttemberg, *loc. cit.*

TABLE IV. VOTING MACHINES AND INVALID VOTES IN FOUR PRECINCTS, 1953–1961[22]

District In Which Precinct Located	Year	Electors	Voters	Per cent	First Votes Invalid		Second Votes Invalid	
Krefeld, 81	1953	882	689	78.1	14	2.0%	14	2.0%
	1957	1250	1123	89.8	13	1.2	15	1.3
	1961	1624	1227	75.6	2	0.2	7	0.6
Duisburg I, 92	1953	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1957	700	634	90.6	21	1.7	41	6.5
	1961	679	585	86.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
Dortmund I, 116	1953	1080	925	85.6	29	3.1	38	4.1
	1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1961	861	605	70.3	3	0.5	3	0.5
Darmstadt, 145	1953	1509	1226	81.2	28	2.3	41	3.3
	1957	1632	1388	85.0	34	2.4	63	4.5
	1961	1289	1036	80.4	3	0.3	3	0.3

supporters to give their first votes to the candidate of an ally-party.[23] Rejection of electoral alliances by some voters of both large and small political parties produced an artificially high invalid first vote in 1953 (when there were 39 such alliances[24]) and 1957 (when there were 20[25]). Consequently a true comparison of invalid first votes for 1953, 1957 and 1961 (when there were no alliances) is extremely difficult; for example, if the ten districts without major party candidates are subtracted from the 1957 totals, the percentage decrease of invalid first votes from 1957 to 1961 is 50 per cent less than that indicated by the official election returns.[26] Should the electoral alliance reappear—which seems unlikely in view of party consolidation and the acknowledged dominance of the two big catch-all parties—the downward trend of void district votes could be slowed, halted or even reversed.[27]

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[22] I am indebted to Dr. Karl Schwarz of the Bundesamt for a photostatic copy of the data on which this table is based. The Bundesamt's own brief analysis appears in Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 146. For a description of the voting machines, see *Das Parlament*, September 13, 1961, p. 16.

[23] A complete list of *Wahlabkommen* appears in Erbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85. By means of this device the Bavarian and Center parties in 1953 and the German Party in both 1953 and 1957 managed to circumvent the electoral law's splinter party clauses and obtain representation in the Federal Bundestag.

[24] In 1953, 14 of the 20 districts with an invalid first vote exceeding 5% were districts in which alliances had been concluded between two or more of the bourgeois parties. The largest invalid vote was recorded in districts in which the CDU withdrew in favor of one of the smaller parties; in 20 of 22 such districts the invalid first vote exceeded 4%, while that was the case in only 8 of 23 districts in which a smaller party renounced in favor of the CDU. Notice that 27 of the 39 *Wahlabkommen* were in Niedersachsen, Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen, which thus explains their unusually high polls of void district votes that year; see above, note 8.

[25] In 1957 *Wahlabkommen* were concluded between the CDU and German Party (DP) in 12 districts, between the SPD and Bavarian Party (FU) in 8 others. In 8 of the 10 districts where the SPD or CDU renounced, invalid votes numbered more than 7%, ranking first through eighth among German election districts. In each of the other two, void district votes exceeded 5%. For an analysis of the cross-pressures impinging on the SPD and FU electorates, and the resultant high incidence of first vote abstentions especially among SPD voters, see the local study of Munich-Land by Keith Panter-Brick, in Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 338–339.

[26] Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 147.

[27] If the CDU's Bavarian sister-party, the CSU led by Franz Josef Strauss, should follow through on its apparent 1965 *Wahlabkommen* with the small right-wing Bavarian GDP (whereby the GDP is to "deliver" the right-wing vote to the CSU, and the CSU is to guarantee the GDP two direct mandates and three list mandates, thus permitting it to reenter the Bundestag; see *Die Zeit*, January 22, 1965, p. 3), void district votes by disenchanted CSU voters could contribute to a relatively higher invalid first vote in particular districts.

The decline of radical parties has also contributed to the gradual increase in the number of ballots intentionally invalidated in whole or in part by disenchanted, protesting voters. On the political Right the relationship seems manifest particularly in 1953 and 1961, on the Left chiefly in 1957. In 1953 the rate of void list vote increase was greatest—more than five times the federal average—in Bayern (+1.0 per cent), where the right-wing WAV, which had polled 14 per cent of the vote there in 1949 and sent 12 deputies to Bonn, no longer existed. Sharp increases in the number of void list votes were recorded in nearly every area of former WAV strength; and in one-half its 1949 refugee and lower middle-class citadels the percentage increase amounted to twice the Bavarian and ten times the federal average increase.[28] Similar results also obtained in the two North German states of Bremen and Niedersachsen, where the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party, outlawed in 1952, scored political breakthroughs in Landtag elections in 1951.[29] Not until 1959 did a right-wing extremist party again score comparable gains in state politics. The DRP that year polled 5.1 per cent of the vote in Rheinland-Pfalz; and two years later, in the 1961 federal election, the invalid vote rose most sharply—between three and four times the state and 15 times the federal increase—in the seven small town and rural areas where in 1959 the DRP had been most successful in mobilizing the disaffections of economically depressed vine-growers and small farmers.[30]

Dissident Communist voters, bereft of their party vehicle after prohibition of the KPD by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1956, contributed—often extensively, it appears—to the 1957 upsurge of invalid votes in five states where the KPD had polled well in Landtag elections during the immediately preceding two years.[31] Thus the SPD (which is supposed to

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In the absence of *Wahlabkommen*, however, the downward trend of void district votes may even accelerate as minor and splinter party voters make the transition to voting for the major parties. In the past, these voters have often cast invalid first votes in districts where their party ran no candidate. For example, in 1953 special counts revealed that 25% of the DRP voters in Rhineland-Pfalz and over 11% of the Center Party's voters in Nordrhein-Westfalen invalidated their first vote because they had no opportunity to vote for a DRP or Center Party candidate in their district; see Hirsch-Weber and Schuetz, *op. cit.*, p. 330 and p. 333. For 1957 see the data and analysis in Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 53. Representative of such districts in 1961 were 153 in Rhineland-Pfalz and 198, 211, 213, 218, 221, 230, 232 and 239 in Bayern; see Bundesamt: 1961(1).

[28] See especially districts 196, 198, 199, 205, 208, 211, 212, 213, 217, 224, 226 and 228. Bundesamt: 1949, p. 24; 1953(1). In noting that voters did not vote invalidly in 1953 as often as had been expected owing to introduction of the new two-vote, two-column ballot, James K. Pollock implies that voter ignorance of the technical aspects of vote-casting was particularly minimized in Bayern, where the voters already had experience with a comparable electoral system. James K. Pollock, ed., *German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1955), p. 88 and p. 193, note 11. Were voter ignorance actually the primary cause of invalid votes in the Federal Republic, however, Bayern should have recorded no significant increase from 1949 and should have polled among the fewest invalid votes of any of the German states. In fact, it registered a larger increase in 1953 than any other state and ranked third in per cent of invalid second votes.

[29] The relevant figures by district are found in Bremen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Statistische Mitteilungen*, 1951, No. 3 and 1953, No. 4; and in Niedersachsen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Wahlen und Abstimmungen, Reihe F*, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 3. Detailed information on the SRP may be found in Otto Buesch and Peter Furth, *Rechtsradikalismus im Nachkriegsdeutschland: Studien ueber die 'Sozialistische Reichspartei' (SRP)* (Berlin and Frankfurt, Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1957), esp. pp. 93 ff., 97 ff., 152 ff., and 156 ff.

[30] The areas are included in federal districts 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159 and 160. See Rheinland-Pfalz, Statistisches Landesamt, *Statistische Mitteilungen*, November 1961, pp. 259–266 and May 1959, pp. 99–104. *Cf.* Richard S. Cromwell, "Rightist Extremism in Postwar West Germany," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (June, 1964), pp. 284–293. A contributing factor in the void list vote increase in Rheinland-Pfalz was probably the merger of the increasingly right-wing Refugee Party with the former German Party to form the All-German Party (GDP). The GDP suffered an 83% drop in 1961 from the combined 1957 strength of the two parent parties; at the same time the per cent of GDP electors casting void list votes jumped to 8.3, four times the party's national average (which in any case was up sharply from 1957). Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 10 and p. 20; 1957(3), p. 53. On the resentment engendered among former DP supporters by the merger with the Refugee Party, see Eberlein, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246.

[31] Invalid list votes increased in the Saar, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bremen, Hessen, and

have absorbed the Communist vote) increased its vote in 1957 in Nordrhein-Westfalen by only one-half its federal average proportionate increase and by only two-fifths of the percentage which the Communists and other left-wing parties had polled in 1953;[32] meanwhile, 15 of 17 districts which had given the KPD at least 4 per cent of the vote in 1953 recorded void list vote increases in excess of the average Nordrhein-Westfalen increase.[33] It appears likely that many Communist voters in the Saarland simply sat out the 1957 election, only to vote invalidly with at least one of their two votes in 1961, when they came to the polls in response to election appeals by the newly founded, left-neutralist German Peace Union (DFU).[34]

The Saarland provides an excellent case study in the use of invalid votes as a weapon of political protest. Reunited with Germany politically in 1957 following popular rejection of political autonomy by referendum in 1955, and reunited economically in 1959 following dissolution of the Franco-Saar economic union concluded in 1947, the Saarland has participated in only two German federal elections. This has prompted some observers to dismiss the relatively higher invalid vote recorded there in 1957 and 1961 with the simple assertion that Saar voters "have had less experience than others with the German electoral system."[35] Had that been the real cause, however, half-valid ballots should have been considerably more numerous in the Saarland than elsewhere; but in fact 44 per cent (federal: 25 per cent) of void list votes and 55 per cent (federal: 36 per cent) of void district votes were paired with another invalid vote in 1961 in unambiguous protest against the prevailing political situation.[36] In addition to the partyless Saar Communists, it appears on the basis of available voting data that former supporters of the Saar Christian People's Party (CVP), who were opposed to integration with Germany, may have selected the invalid vote as their own medium of political expression.[37] In Saarlouis, Merzig-Wadern and St. Ingbert the void list vote was little short of amazing: in 1961 it actually exceeded 10 per cent of the poll in one-third of the Saar precincts where the CVP had obtained 20 per cent of the vote in its final electoral appearance (as the Saar branch of the Bavarian CSU) in 1957.[38]

Nordrhein-Westfalen, invalid district votes in all but Nordrhein-Westfalen. The KPD had polled 3.4% of the vote in Hessen and 3.8% in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 1954, 6.6% in the Saar and 5.0% in Bremen in 1955, and 3.2% in Baden-Wuerttemberg as late as April, 1956. Among states with no appreciable Communist vote, only Schleswig-Holstein recorded a large invalid vote increase in 1957. See the data in Faul, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 321–363. The unusual parallel increase of invalid first and second votes may have been a reflection of the great regularity of KPD straight-ticket voting (exceeded only by the SPD) in 1953. See Bundesamt: 1953(2), p. 47.

[32] Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, p. 284. Moreover, the per cent of SPD electors casting void district votes rose steeply, possibly indicating a less than wholehearted commitment even among those KPD voters who did switch. Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 53; 1953, *loc. cit.*

[33] *Cf.* especially the results in districts 74, 75, 76, 89, 90, 92, 99, 102, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117. Bundesamt: 1957(1); 1953(1).

[34] The correlation is particularly clear in the Saar districts of St. Wendel (Federal election district 246) where the KPD had won a plurality in the Saar Landtag election of 1952: *i.e.*, 229, 235, 249, 261, 268, 275, 282. It is noteworthy that Communist strength in postwar Saarland scarcely wavered: in 1955 the party received about the same number of votes it had in 1947 and only 7% fewer than in 1952. See Saarland, Statistisches Landesamt, *Statistischer Bericht*, B III 1, January 1961; and *Kurzbericht*, II/10, 1955 and II/1, 1956. On the character of the German Peace Union (DFU) see *Der Spiegel*, August 23, 1961; and Eduard Wald, "Communism," in Walter Stahl, ed., *The Politics of Postwar Germany* (New York, 1963), pp. 293–294. On Communism and invalid voting in the Saar, *cf.* also Erbe, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[35] Barnes, *et al.*, *loc. cit.*

[36] Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 22.

[37] Erbe, *loc. cit.*; Bernhard Beger, "Anatomie einer Wahl, Gewinne und Verluste am 17. September," *Politische Meinung*, Vol. 6 (October, 1961), p. 19.

[38] Saarland, Statistisches Landesamt, *Statistischer Bericht*, B III 1, January 1961. Actually, Saarlanders had waged political battles with invalid votes even prior to the 1955 referendum, but then the source of discontent was the obverse of 1957 or 1961. In 1952, for example, almost a quarter of the Saar electorate invalidated their ballots in response to appeals for abstention by the Deutscher Saarbund and the pro-German political parties, which the fearful and mildly authoritarian Saar government had refused to license. See Hans-Joachim Hagmann, *Die Saarlaendischen Landtagswahlen vom 30. November 1952* (Cologne, 1953), pp. 111 ff. and pp. 174 ff.; Richard Schachtner, *Die deutsche Nachkriegswahlen* (Munich, Isar Verlag, 1956), pp. 171–173; Erbe, *op. cit.*, p. 40; and esp. Jacques Freymond, *The Saar Conflict 1945–1955* (New York 1960), pp. 125–128. Only in 1955, when all

Finally, invalid protest votes result from the disaffection of local populations with temporary political, social or economic dislocations, as we have already noted with respect to Rheinland-Pfalz in 1959 and 1961. An especially fertile source for the study of literally thousands of examples of invalid voting as a weapon of political protest are the state and local elections in south-central and southwestern Germany during the period of the military occupation.[39] For example, in Hessen in 1946 refugee discontent at the refusal of American Occupation authorities to authorize an all-refugee political party found expression through invalid votes at the first Landtag election; three years later, in the first Bundestag election, the number of invalid votes declined in certain districts in proportion to the vote polled there by refugee candidates standing independently of the licensed political parties.[40]

In the French Occupation Zone—where invalid voting was especially frequent—the number of void ballots cast at the first Landtag elections varied in direct proportion to the efforts expended by France to dissociate occupied areas from German control. Thus it reached 11.1 per cent in Rheinland-Pfalz, 9.2 per cent in Baden and 7.5 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern.[41] One of the best examples of invalid protest voting during the Occupation period occurred in a special election held in September, 1947 to select a member of the Rheinland-Pfalz Landtag to represent communities transferred from the Saarland back to German jurisdiction: nearly 30 per cent of the voters cast invalid votes in protest against the transfer.[42]

Political protest (defaced and blank votes); cross-pressures (multi-crossed and blank votes); and voter ignorance of vote-casting techniques (multicrossed and blank votes) are three major causes of invalid voting. A fourth—which to some extent gives rise to the other three—is the coupling of widespread political apathy with an unusually high voting turnout.

Voting in Western Germany is not compulsory; yet electoral participation has been consistently and remarkably high even by European standards, increasing from 78.5 per cent in 1949 to almost 88 per cent in 1957 and 1961.[43] Although some political scientists have welcomed high turnout as a sign of the success of political education in postwar Germany,[44] available survey data suggest quite different conclusions. Survey research data from the 1953, 1957, and 1961 elections—some of which have already been cited—indicate that the politically well-informed (with respect to the candidates, issues and voting techniques) constitute much the smaller part of the German electorate; moreover, there is ample evidence that high electoral participation occurs independently of either political interest or of personal political involvement on the part of most German voters.[45]

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claimants competed openly for the first and last time in a postwar Saar election, did the invalid vote amount to no more than a "normal" 1–2%.

[39] The most useful compilation of election statistics for the immediate postwar period is that prepared by the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Elections and Political Parties in Germany, 1945–1952* (Bad Godesberg/Mehlen, Germany, 1952), pp. 37–71. See also the extensive publications of state statistical offices for the state and local elections of this period, to which the bibliography in Bundesamt: 1961(1), pp. 59–67, provides a convenient guide.

[40] Erbe, *loc. cit.* On other aspects of anti-Occupation protest voting with invalid ballots in Hessen, see Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1947), pp. 20–26; and Vol. 4, No. 1 (1949), p. 13 and p. 15.

[41] *Cf.* Erbe, *loc. cit.* Invalid votes in all three areas may also have reflected the relatively greater social unrest in the French Zone caused by severe local economic dislocations resulting from France's harsh reparations, monetary and commercial policies, described in F. Roy Willis, *The French in Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1963). For a brief description of local disruptions in Rhineland-Pfalz, *cf.* Freymond, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53 and pp. 245–248.

[42] Scammon, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

[43] Comparative data are found in Kitzinger, *Britain, Europe and Beyond*, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–217. For Germany, see Erwin Faul, "Soziologie der westdeutschen Waehlerschaft," in Faul, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 135–315.

[44] For example: Barnes, *et al.*, *loc. cit.*

[45] In 1957 less than half the Divo respondents expressed interest in the campaign; only 4 in 10 could remember having discussed the outcome of the fall election when questioned shortly before it took place; discussion was least frequent among women, older persons, CDU voters, and in outlying areas. Divo-Institut, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–209; 72–75; 268–269. Few voters could perceive any relationship at all between the possible electoral result and their personal lives. *Ibid.*, pp. 294–295. *Cf.* Allensbach Institut, "SPD und oeffentliche Meinung," *Politische Meinung*, Vol. 8 (July–August, 1963), pp. 103–105; and Lewis J. Edinger, "Electoral Politics and Voting in Western

Nor do most Germans believe that voting serves the citizen as an effective means of participation in public affairs; only a fraction of the population would actually seek redress for personal political problems by voting for or against either of the major political parties.[46] On the contrary, the real political process is viewed as a rather distant play in which the citizen-actor has no role; political affairs impinge on the individual but are intractable to his influence.[47] One's focus is in any case on one's particular "veto-group," or his private life, to which the state relates chiefly in its capacity as administrator of social welfare schemes or collector of taxes.[48] In short: it appears probable that among broad segments of the West German population, political interest and insight are minimal, electoral involvement impersonal and peripheral, and both the expectation of real political change and the assessment of one's own political efficacy negligible.

Why, then, does the German citizen vote? Several explanations are possible. Above all, however, going to the polls seems to be a variety of social conformism—possibly rooted in the Third Reich and the Occupation[49]—and an expression of the widespread German feeling that voting is a moral obligation, a duty which the state imposes on its citizens before releasing them to private life.[50] Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that German elections over the years may have mobilized and brought to the polls a large number of less interested and less discerning citizens who have lacked a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the single-ballot, two-vote electoral system and who, therefore, have sometimes cast unintentional invalid votes.[51] The Divo survey in 1957 identified these 14 per cent of least informed and least interested "mobilized" voters as predominantly women, older men, supporters of the CDU and residents of village and rural areas.[52] The link between "mobilized"

Germany," *World Politics*, Vol. 13 (April, 1961), pp. 480–481.

[46] Wolfgang Hartenstein and G. Schubert, *Mitlaufen oder Mitbestimmen: Eine Untersuchung zum Demokratischen Bewusstsein und Politische Tradition* (Frankfurt, 1961), pp. 43–48; W. Hartenstein and K. Liepelt, "Party Members and Party Voters in W. Germany," in Stein Rokkan, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation* (Special Issue of *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 6, Fasc. 1–2, 1962), pp. 43–52; Sidney Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study," *ibid.*, pp. 22–42.

[47] U. Lohmar, *Innerparteiliche Demokratie* (Stuttgart, F. Enke Verlag, 1963), pp. 26–34. *Cf.* Otto Kirchheimer, Appendix to his chapter on "Conditions of a Stable Opposition: Germany," in Dahl, ed., *op. cit.*

[48] *Cf.* the remarks in Otto Kirchheimer, "German Democracy in the 1950's," *World Politics*, Vol. 13 (October, 1960), pp. 256–257.

[49] That is, in coercive plebiscitarian voting (which particularly mobilized women and residents of village and rural areas) or in the circumspect habits acquired under the watchful tutelage of foreign military authorities. On the former see Faul, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–151 and p. 159; on the latter see Hirsch-Weber and Schuetz, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[50] In one recent poll 52% of the respondents felt that even persons who were politically totally uninterested should vote; 39% considered voting a formal duty. Hartenstein and Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 37. For 1957 data, see Divo-Institut, *op. cit.*, p. 295 and Table 159. Less than a quarter of the Divo respondents cited ideological or pragmatic political reasons for voting. This relationship between sense of duty and voting turnout is not necessarily a uniquely German trait; Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), p. 106, report a similarly close correlation between the two factors for the 1956 U. S. Presidential election. Nevertheless, as Almond and Verba have clearly demonstrated, this combination of high frequencies of formal participation and a passive orientation to that participation is an attitude and behavior pattern that reaches far more deeply into the German political culture than it does the American or British, with important consequences for democratic politics. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1963). *Cf.* Verba, *op. cit.;* and the same author's excellent chapter, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965).

[51] Others, more knowledgeable in at least the technique of voting, perhaps felt competent to choose between national parties and programs but unable to decide between local personalities who were often unknown to them; according to Kitzinger, many of these voters no doubt deliberately allowed the left-hand side of their ballot paper to remain blank. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, p. 288.

[52] Divo-Institut, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–161. Sex is probably the most striking variable: in late 1963 only 15% of the women (but over 50% of the men) interviewed by the Allensbach Institut expressed an interest in politics. See "Umfragen: Interesse fuer Politik," *Politische Meinung*, Vol. 8 (December, 1963), pp. 84–88.

voting and invalid voting seems fairly clear: both mobilized and invalid voters have been recruited from among substantially the same groups of West German citizens.

More worrisome than mobilization of apathetic voters could be the mobilization of citizens characterized by Lipset as "normally disaffected habitual nonvoters."[53] Under other political regimes such individuals might tend to withdraw and to isolate themselves from politics; but in Western Germany they may come to the polls despite their political nonintegration simply for the sake of appearance, in response to the general social pressure to vote. Once inside the voting booth such voters may well invalidate their ballots in whole or in part. In particular, it may be that alienated middle-aged and older voters in village and rural areas, affectively tied to the fortunes of a political party which no longer competes effectively on the political scene, frequently prefer the anonymity of invalid voting to the publicity of nonvoting.[54]

Several recent studies of right-wing and restorative tendencies have suggested that public accommodation by political conservatives to the generally accepted standards of political speech and behavior prevalent in the Federal Republic (presumably including, for many, the act of voting), camouflages political attitudes by these persons which are often dangerously uninformed and frequently hostile.[55] It is scarcely worth noting that when deviant political attitudes exist in an environment which is intolerant of deviant political behavior, some other expression must be found for those attitudes; and in Germany a partial answer may be conformist electoral participation but invalid voting. In this connection the data associated with the voting machine experiment are not unambiguous. Thus the most interesting aspect of this experiment is perhaps not that the number of invalid votes decreased, but that turnout decreased sharply in each of the four precincts; it may be that the well advertised introduction of voting machines inhibited some voters from going to the polls, all the more so if they intended to cast void or partly void ballots: turnout then became less important than the imagined risk of losing one's anonymity when casting an invalid vote.[56]

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[53] Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

[54] See the analysis of rural invalid voting in Bavarian elections by Richard Schachtner, "Wahlberechtigte, Wahlbeteiligung, Nichtwaehler und Falschwaehler," *Bayern in Zahlen: Monatshefte des Bayerischen Statistischen Amtes,* Vol. 4 (August, 1950), pp. 402–403; *cf.* Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen,* Vol. 4 (February, 1949), p. 15; and Faul, *op. cit.*, p. 160. The practice of reporting election results by precinct even in sparsely populated rural areas probably tends also to increase the general social pressure to vote; *cf.* Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 35–36. Concerning the factors which generally promote a combination of high electoral participation and comparatively low interest in politics in rural areas, see Juan Linz, *The Social Bases of West German Politics,* Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1959; Microfilm Publication #59-4075 (University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan), pp. 731–790.

Minor and radical political parties were supported chiefly by older and middle-aged voters (especially men) in rural and village areas. Bundesamt: 1957(3), pp. 46 ff. and p. 53. Significantly, the least decrease in paired invalid votes has occurred among older and middle-aged voters (esp. men); invalid list votes have been most numerous and have increased most rapidly among older voters; while the only increase of invalid first votes has occurred among the elderly and among middle-aged men in rural areas. The slow increase in the percentage of major party electors who cast valid district votes but void list votes also is indicative of the relationship between invalid voting and minor party political orientation; moreover, the increase is faster for the CDU, which absorbed most of these minor party switchovers, than for the SPD. (See above, text and references on "General Patterns" of invalid voting). Another suggestive relationship is the following: the spatial distribution of radical political party strength in postwar Germany has tended to be concentrated along roughly the same belt where the Nazis formerly polled best and where the invalid vote tended later to be highest. *Cf.* Faul, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

One final remark concerning the mobilization of these peripheral voters may be relevant: in many countries the habitual, uninterested or disaffected nonvoter-type simply stays home; when forced to vote (in Belgium or Luxembourg, or in the cantons of Switzerland or states of Austria where voting is compulsory) he may vote invalidly. In Germany social compulsion replaces legal compulsion but the effect is the same: nonvoters vote invalidly. *Cf.* above, note 3.

[55] *Cf.* some of the data in J. Habermas, *et al.*, *Student und Politik: Eine Soziologische Untersuchung zum Politischen Bewusstsein Frankfurter Studenten* (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961), summarized in part by Kurt Tauber, "Nationalism and Social Restoration: Fraternities in Postwar Germany," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 78 (March, 1963), pp. 83–85; Peter Schoenbach, "German Reactions to Anti-Semitic Incidents—A Sociological Study," in Stahl, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 329–331. See also Hans-Helmuth Knuetter, "Extreme-Rightism," *ibid.*, pp. 213–228; and Manfred Jenke, *Verschwoerung von Rechts? Ein Bericht ueber den Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland nach 1945* (Berlin, Colloquium Verlag, 1961).

Finally, a cursory analysis of void ballots at state and local elections also helps to clarify the general factors which lead voters to spoil their ballots, rather than to cast a valid vote for a candidate or political party. Such an appraisal yields several instructive points. First, in most states participation, invalid votes and the CDU's share of votes all tend to be lower than the comparable figures at national elections—partly because the CDU is unable to mobilize less committed, indifferent women and older voters as effectively in state as in federal elections.[57] Second, because of the wider latitude of political choice, there tends to be a greater scattering of votes among independent and splinter party candidates than is true in federal elections—and, perhaps as a consequence, a lower number of spoiled ballot papers are cast by particularist voters who are unable to find the candidate or representative of their choice.[58] A third feature of void balloting at the state and local levels of government is the startling degree to which the reasons for invalid votes often may be traced to highly specific local and personal factors, rather than to questions of national or party politics or to some combination of national and local factors.[59]

III. CONCLUSIONS

Invalid votes are most conspicuous among women, older citizens, village and farm dwellers, previous nonvoters, and supporters or former supporters of minor political parties who now vote CDU or SPD. They are based at once on the most apathetic segments of the population and—drawing as they do from the electorates of the extremist parties as the latter decline—on political radicals and disaffected persons in outlying regions who have not done well in economic life. Insofar as voter ignorance of the electoral system produces invalid votes, it is centered to a great extent among individuals who are only imperfectly integrated into the West German political system, who are more concerned with personal than with public affairs, and who vote only because they think they ought to or because everyone else does.

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[56] Note particularly the sharp 14% drop in Krefeld from 1957 and 15% drop in Dortmund from 1953. See above, Table IV.

[57] For the basic data, see Faul, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 321–363; for the extensive literature on sample surveys conducted by state statistical offices, see Bundesamt: 1961(1), pp. 59–67. *Cf.* Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 291–295. There are of course additional reasons for lower participation rates, as well as for the relatively poorer showing of the CDU; see Edinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 436–437; and Erbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–39. However, the reason cited seems to be decisive for the lower invalid vote in most cases.

[58] For a concise survey of most of the minor and splinter party groups which have appeared since 1945, see Erbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–63. *Cf.* above, the material cited in notes 29, 30, 31, 38; such examples could be multiplied many times over. However, in many cases at the lower levels of self-government, a narrowed range of political choice again obtains and the invalid vote increases: frequent failure of the major parties to nominate candidates for local office in small towns and villages deprives many voters of the opportunity to vote for the party of their choice—in this case usually CDU or SPD—and they respond to that situation by depositing a blank or crossed-out ballot in protest. As a result, the invalid vote in peripheral areas at local elections often exceeds that cast in these same areas in federal elections. For example, in the 1960 communal elections in Hessen, the SPD put up a party list in just 900 of the 2600 communities, the CDU in 357, the BHE in 388 and the FDP in 78. Invalid votes varied directly with the number of parties competing in a given commune: the more parties, the fewer invalid votes, and *vice versa*. In the larger, *kreisfreie* cities—those detached governmentally and administratively from the county in which they are situated—all the parties put up lists of candidates; there the invalid vote was just 1.3%. The neglected areas were mainly the smaller of the *kreisangehoerige* towns and villages in less accessible rural areas; in these the invalid vote averaged 6.0%, depending on which party or combination of parties failed to present candidates. In communes where the parties presented lists for the first time in 1960, there was a noticeable retrenchment in the percentage of invalid votes cast in 1956. Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Beitraege zur Statistik Hessens*, No. 124; and *Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen*, Vol. 15 (October, 1960), pp. 253–256.

[59] A classic example was that of the commune of Rockensuess (*Kreis* or County Rotenburg), in the 1952 Hessen communal elections, where nearly 55% of the ballots deposited were invalid. Close examination revealed that most of these had been cast in a single polling district, the neighborhood of Cornberg (where 82.7% of the voters spoiled their ballots); Cornberg was campaigning for detachment from Rockensuess and status as a self-governing commune. Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, *Beitraege zur Statistik Hessens*, No. 52. A number of personal and local factors in particular Saar communes in 1955 also provide instructive insight; they are described in Freymond, *op. cit.*, pp. 252–254. *Cf.* especially the case of Webenheim. Schachtner's two articles on invalid voting in Bayern in the early 1950s (see above, notes 16 and 54) are also valuable, particularly for their detailed differentiation of urban and rural patterns.

Hence there are basically two categories of invalid voters. The first is the apathetic "invalid," who is borderline from the nonvoter, who responds to the general electoral mobilization because it is the thing to do, but who remains actually indifferent to the political system. Whether out of ignorance, negligence or cross-pressures, he fails to cast two valid votes. The second major category is formed by the highly politicized "invalid," who knows exactly how he would vote if he could find the party corresponding to his ideas, but who, not finding that party, deliberately invalidates his ballot as a political act.[60] Each of these two groups has its own potential significance.

The highly politicized. To the extent that radical voters are merely leftovers from the authoritarian past, they will in time disappear and the invalid vote based on them will continue to decline. On the other hand, given the gradual narrowing of the political party choice spectrum (both in the number of parties and in the differences between the big "catch-all" parties which remain) and the effective closure of the system to new political party aspirants, some groups of otherwise dedicated Bonn citizens may come to feel that the only effective exercise of political opposition which remains open to them is the deposit of void ballots at federal elections. The potential political usefulness of the invalid vote as an avenue of political protest has recently been recognized by Pastor Martin Niemoeller, one of the leading (and most controversial) figures of postwar German Protestantism, who is openly advocating the deposit of void ballots at the forthcoming September, 1965 election.[61]

The apathetic. The significance of the apathetic "invalids" is more difficult to assess. To the extent that electoral mobilization has provoked invalid votes by less competent voters in the older age groups, these too may in time decrease.[62] However, to the extent that the apathetic "invalids" are representative of an underdeveloped political interest, involvement and integration incident to much wider circles of the German electorate, they merit attention and raise troublesome questions. For a democracy in which substantial numbers of persons—both voting and nonvoting—are, politically speaking, totally uninterested and uninvolved may be one in which democratic political consensus and commitment are relatively low. Scepticism, cynicism and hostility may not be far removed from apathy and ignorance, especially under potential conditions of external or internal crisis.

German political culture is not yet a "given"; the critical questions of boundaries and national identity are still unresolved, producing that curious West German paradox in which politics is both nowhere and everywhere, nothing and everything.[63] As Verba has noted, "the future level and form of German political involvement is unpredictable because the issues of German politics—issues connected with both the German past and the German future—are so important."[64] Present stability, without real political integration, may be deceiving or at least vulnerable. Moreover, privatization, while helpful in reducing political and social conflict over the last decade and a half, may only have made it more difficult to perceive and guard against latent forms of antipathy or nonintegration. High voting turnout by indifferent citizens may actually camouflage depoliticization which is more apparent than real.[65]

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[60] This can even be stated as a rule: wherever there is a perceived constriction of political choice, some invalid votes will be cast by those who feel deprived. In addition to the data on German federal, state and local elections presented in this paper, evidence in support of this rule may be found in the first (comparatively less regimented) Nazi and East German elections, in which invalid votes were often unusually frequent, and in some communes even more numerous than valid votes (*e.g.*, at the East German communal elections of 1946); in the Italian elections of 1953, cited in footnote 3; and in occasional single-member constituency elections in Switzerland in which only one candidate has been nominated. See: Germany, Statistisches Reichsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich*, Vol. 53 (Berlin, 1934), p. 550; Bundesministerium fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *Die Wahlen in der Sowjetzone: Dokumente und Materialien* (5th ed.; Bonn and Berlin, Deutscher Bundes-Verlag, 1963); Scammon, *op. cit.*, pp. 526–531; and Uwe Kitzinger, "Swiss Electoral Democracy," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 13 (Summer, 1960), p. 339.

[61] Niemoeller, a neutralist who opposed German rearmament, was formerly director of the bureau of foreign affairs of the EKD (*Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland*), and president of the provincial evangelical church of Hessen-Nassau. For Niemoeller's appeal and reasons for casting invalid votes, as well as the sharply critical response of the press and leading politicians, consult: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 30, 1964 and January 4, 1965; *Christ und Welt*, January 8, 1965; *Die Zeit*, January 15, 1965.

[62] Although we have stressed the dominance of older age groups, it should be pointed out that more than 4.0% of the voters in each age group of both sexes failed to cast two valid votes in both 1957 and 1961. See above, Table III.

[63] *Cf.* Kirchheimer, "German Democracy in the 1950s," pp. 262–265.

In these circumstances the invalid vote may acquire functional significance as a "barometer of discontent"; it can serve political democracy as an early warning system against potentially stabilizing political attitudes existing or forming among the electorate.

But if the invalid vote is to serve as an auxiliary tool by which to study German political cleavage and consensus, we must first learn a great deal more about it. Inclusion of an "invalid vote" lever on the new German voting machines is one step in this direction. Another would be the incorporation of a series of questions designed to illuminate invalid vote patterns and motivations into projected Divo, Emnid and Allensbach studies of the forthcoming 1965 election.[66]

The West German invalid vote is not simply technical and cannot be eliminated solely by a program of civic instruction designed to reduce voter error. Rooted in several shades and varieties of political protest, and in a generally low level of mass political interest, involvement and integration with the political system; relatively extensive in comparison with other Western European countries; and possessing a potential significance as a "political barometer" which may reach well beyond the small number of voters it actually encompasses, the invalid vote permits, in limited but useful fashion, insights about a number of complex and important problems of mass political participation in contemporary Western Germany.

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[64] Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," *op. cit.*

[65] In this connection, see the provocative discussion in Ulf Himmelstrand, "A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depoliticization and Political Involvement," in Rokkan, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 83–110, and esp. p. 110; and in Lohmar, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–31.

[66] For an intriguing letter-to-the-editor by a disenchanted German citizen, proposing such survey questions as a means of both exercising political opposition and analyzing it, see *Christ und Welt*, January 8, 1965, p. 11. Unfortunately, the Bundesamt has implied its endorsement of vote-counting measures which would obfuscate rather than clarify invalid vote patterns. It suggests that a more realistic appraisal of the number of invalid votes could be gained if separate ballot papers were used for first and second votes, with the voter free to deposit one or both ballots as he sees fit. The two ballots would then be tallied separately. Abstentions would thus appear statistically as lower turnout rather than as deposited blank (invalid) votes. See: Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 145. No doubt, this would be a convenient device for reducing the per cent of invalid votes, but at the expense of making it even more difficult to assess the possible political significance of invalid votes and their combinations on the ballot papers.

SCIENTISTS AND THE POLICY PROCESS*

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Alan T. Waterman (retired Director of the National Science Foundation and past president of the A.A.A.S.) recently insisted that there is a considerable difference between observations and perceptual images of scientists' behavior in governmental and policy-making situations when made by scientists and when they are made by persons "outside of science."[1] Waterman went on to say that most natural scientists would prefer to write on "science" rather than "scientists" in policy-making. Reflection on the implications of these distinctions raises several fascinating questions. In what senses may there be a political science of science? Are only natural and biological scientists equipped to investigate and interpret the behavior of scientists in non-laboratory, public policy-formulating situations? Is it necessary to have separate "natural-scientific" and "social-scientific"—to say nothing of any number of "humanistic"—views of the political role of science? What does it mean to say that the proper focus of study is the representation of science, rather than scientists in government?

The foregoing questions could be analyzed and argued philosophically; but that is not my purpose here—beyond conveying the reminder that "science makes progress largely by redefining the key questions and problems." The present paper, based on selective interviews and intensive examination of the growing literature on science-government relations, attempts instead to do three things: (1) to identify the principal concepts and models that postulate the separation, but at the same time the vital connection, between the political framework of coercive public authority and the voluntary, established organization of scientific effort in society, and in so doing to make explicit certain attributes and characteristics of science and scientists viewed as a political constituency; (2) to report some findings from a study of scientists in the Executive Office of the President, including an appraisal of the conditions attached to accepting responsibility for shaping controversial decisions of public policy; and (3) to distinguish several major, different types or patterns of policy-making affecting science. The paper specifically excludes consideration of the effects of government policy and scientific participation therein upon the conduct of scientific research in government, industry or the universities.

I. SCIENCE AND THE POLITICAL ORDER

The first step in cutting through the conceptual complexity and semantic confusion that bedevil understanding of science-government relations is to develop a skeptical attitude toward divisions of the field into two broad categories, such as Wiesner's differentiation of "science in policy" from "policy for science,"[2] Wright's separation of "science" from "science affairs,"[3] and Waterman's notion that the "representation of science" in government is somehow different from scientists acting as official advisers and administrators in government positions. Useful as such ideas may be in a preliminary way to introduce order into chaos, it turns out that these distinctions are not really fundamental analytical categories, but are actually labels for different parts of the total problem.

Thus Wiesner very understandably differentiates between (a) the policy problems of recruiting and mobilizing competent scientific advice to work on the formulation of urgent national policies which require a considerable amount of technical, scientific knowledge for their resolution, and (b) working out either in general or in particular areas the terms and conditions of government support for scientific research, manpower, education and information. For different reasons, Wright, along with Wohlstetter and others, properly insist upon the situational and environmental differences between the methods and behavior of scientific workers in the laboratory, when the scientist is engaged in investigating a problem of knowledge, and what is involved when scientists engage upon the external affairs of science, *e.g.*, the work of planning, organization, finance, communication and consultation that links the world of science with education, industry and government. Waterman, finally, groups together what to him are the important issues of public support for science and taking a scientific approach (that taken by scientists) to policy questions—preferring not to discuss the less interesting, perhaps distasteful organizational and administrative problems of getting scientists into jobs at appropriate levels and points of public decision-making. Each of these terms or phrases refers to a problematic aspect of science policy; none of them provides a reliable conceptual map of the field.

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[1] *Science*, Vol. 144 (19 June 1964), p. 1438. A review of R. Gilpin and C. Wright, *Scientists and National Policy-Making* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964).

[2] Jerome B. Wiesner, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, *Systems Development and Management*, Part 1, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (1962), p. 142.

[3] Gilpin and Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

Does such a map exist? The rudiments have been outlined for the United States in Vannevar Bush's famous 1945 report, *Science: The Endless Frontier,* which should be read with the annotated progress report 15 years later by Alan Waterman,[4] in penetrating articles by Don K. Price and Wallace Sayre,[5] and in two comparative sketches by Alexander King.[6] From these sources we can visualize national science policy (used interchangeably with the term "Government-Science Relations"), as an area comprising the following related elements:

1. The values and relations of science to the nation
2. The national strategy of scientific development
3. Government science organization
4. Policies and practices in support of science

Elaboration of these categories should produce a comprehensive picture of the field, understanding of the linkages between the parts and the whole, and identification of the institutional components of the system and processes of science policy-making.

Detailed elaboration of the above categories will have to be reserved for another place. For the present, it must suffice to observe that what we call *the values and relations of science to the nation* are the authoritative public attitudes and doctrinal beliefs defining the national purposes with respect to science and establishing the boundaries between the scientific and the political communities. By *national strategy for science* is meant the operative, explicit and implicit norms of the policy processes that guide the determination of goals and priorities among the competing claims for support of scientific research. *Government science organization* refers to the official, authoritative definitions of the structure, location and missions of government departments and agencies administering programs of scientific research and development, including the instruments of coordination and communication with the President and Congress. *Policies and practices in support of science* is a listing of the various kinds and processes of government financing of scientific research, *e.g.,* (1) basic research; (2) science education, training and manpower; (3) facilities; (4) planning (determination of trends and requirements); (b) budgetary policy (determination of total amounts and allocation of available resources among different programs and projects); (6) government-university and government-industry relationships (including policies governing awards of contracts and grants, indirect costs, conflicts of interest and standards of conduct for persons engaged in government-financed research, etc.); (7) scientific information; (8) civilian technology; and (9) international aspects of science. The list, of course, could be expanded to include the whole range of subject-matter areas of government support for scientific research, such as military weapons, space exploration, atomic energy, medical and agricultural research, down through the more controversial fields of natural resources and conservation, communication and transportation, housing and urban redevelopment, measures for alleviating unemployment and retraining of technologically displaced workers, delinquency and crime, social insurance, and so on throughout the entire agenda of modern government.[7]

Taking these four categories, with their accompanying subdivisions, to constitute an adequate conceptual outline of the field of government-science relations, it immediately appears that much of what has been called the "politics of science" falls within the first two, which have to do with the *constitutional principles* that in broad terms define the legitimate, respective spheres of science and government and the relations between them, and the *political assumptions* that provide the context for controversial decisions establishing goals and priorities among conflicting claims for government support of scientific research. Constitutional principles and political assumptions may be called operative norms, authoritative attitudes, embodied in a public philosophy of science-government relations. As such they are intangible matters of conviction and belief; they also reflect or are associated with very materialistic interests and values; they are at once the product and the source of historical evolution and institutional change. In the United States we have seen both massive, long-run and dramatic, short-run changes in these constitutional attitudes during the twenty-five years since 1940 (for evidence, compare the National Resources Planning Board's 1938 report, *Research: A National Resource* with Appendix G of the *President's Executive Budget* for 1964). In this political perspective of changing values, interests, and institutions, what models or theories help to explain the evolving relations of science and government?

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[4] National Science Foundation, 1960 (NSF-60-40).

[5] Reprinted in Gilpin and Wright, *op. cit.,* pp. 19–40; 97–112.

[6] "Towards A National Science Policy," *Impact of Science on Society,* Vol. XII (1962), pp. 157–175; "Science and Technology in the New Europe," *Daedalus* (Winter, 1964), pp. 434–58.

[7] Charles A. Beard, *The New Leviathan* (New York, 1930) was an early effort to treat American government in the context of science and technology.

Even if we accept the "scientific war" of 1939–1945 as the great divide marking the revolution in the relations between science and politics, there are strong reasons for questioning the representative accuracy of the notion of the pre-1940 scientific world as one inhabited by isolated, autonomous, independent workers in university or industrial laboratories, engaged in a "pure" quest for knowledge for its own sake, motivated only by the curiosity of the truth-seeker. Undoubtedly such individuals existed, but the scientific societies and institutes financed by royal (European) and philanthropic or industrial grants (United States) were always proud to justify their work and activities by the derivative benefits and technological uses of scientific ideas. Moreover, the organization of scientific research comprised the same groupings before 1940 as after 1945—namely, *university* professors and research assistants engaged in research, *industrial* research laboratories, *government* agencies engaged in more or less basic research associated with the missions (purposes) of their parent departments (Naval Observatory, Weather Bureau, Geological Survey, Agricultural Experiment Stations, Bureau of Standards, etc.), and nonprofit research corporations and institutes financed both by *private foundations* and public capital (Carnegie Institution, Rockefeller Institute, Smithsonian Institution, to name but a few). Scientists were organized into professional associations by disciplines of knowledge, and by cooptive recognition into National Academies of Science for voluntary and cooperative services to the nation upon request. Even the devices of governmental delegation or devolution of scientific research by contract or grant to universities, industrial corporations, or nonprofit research organizations, were known before 1940. The quantum shift that World War II brought about was partly attitudinal, partly materialistic, in the sheer magnitude of changes in dollar volume of governmental support for scientific research. It followed from the mutual recognition of politicians, science administrators and scientific workers that: (a) science and technology were strategically important elements of national strength and power, militarily speaking, (b) science and technology were not merely culturally and educationally advantageous in personal terms, or industrially profitable, but were a national asset and resource upon which national political and economic development depended.

Not all at once, and not without controversy, nations discovered that the advancement of scientific knowledge had become an object of major national policy, not only in conjunction with specific agency programs (Defense, Atomic Energy, Space) but also to encourage and enlarge the supply of scientific manpower in the nation by direct support of scientists engaged in basic research and of institutions engaged in recruiting and educating scientists for the future. This shift in "constitutional thinking" was not brought about by ideological conversion, but by the dramatic demonstration of events, and by scientists who participated in the construction of those events becoming convinced that they should participate in the policy decisions establishing the conditions of government support for scientific growth and progress.

Much of the story of how scientists were mobilized for the nation's service has been and is being written elsewhere.[8] In searching for a model to describe the process whereby the revolution in government-science relations was brought about, the notion of some of the atomic scientists that the effective instrument was their organizing themselves into a pressure group for purposes of popular information and congressional lobbying, I am convinced, has been overstated. The political concept, and the instrument, of the transformation that comes much closer to reality is, in my opinion, Don K. Price's idea of the *establishment*—that is to say,

[8] R. G. Hewlett and O. E. Anderson, *The New World: 1939–1946* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962); the autobiographical works of A. H. Compton, Harold Groves, and L. L. Strauss; Hunter Dupree, *Science in the Federal Government* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960); D. K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York, New York University Press, 1954); J. S. Dupre and S. A. Lakoff, *Science and the Nation* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962); D. Wolfle, *Science and Public Policy* (University of Nebraska Press, 1959); R. Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1962).

certain individuals who made themselves useful in the achievement of governmental purposes by showing the politicians and administrators helpful and acceptable ways of mobilizing for government employment the skills and resources of scientists.

Such relationships of course go back many years. The most recent stage began around 1940, when scientists began to work on weapons technology, such as the development of radar and electronic detection devices, the proximity fuse, and the controlled release of nuclear energy, for the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Such men as Vannevar Bush, J. B. Conant and K. T. Compton were the mediaries between the President, the military and the M.I.T. and California Radiation Laboratories, the Chicago and Los Alamos Metallurgical Projects. Second, some scientists in Britain and the United States began to work on so-called "operations research," constructing mathematical models of alternative military situations, predicting and evaluating the results of alternative weapons systems and strategies. At a lower level, others accepted employment as consultants and advisers to military and civilian agencies, developing and testing technical aspects of their operating programs.

After the war, a new form of assistance to government came on the scene, namely, that of reviewing and advising on the desirability and feasibility of research proposals submitted to government agencies (again both military and civilian) for support; this led naturally to being asked by such agencies to evaluate (including recommendations to proceed with, to modify or to drop) specific scientific or technological programs for budgetary purposes or policy reasons related to the national health and safety. Having earned their keep, as it were, in connection with operating departmental and bureau programs in the military and civilian agencies, it was only a matter of time (1951) and Sputnik (1957) before scientists were drafted into service at the highest executive and legislative levels of government to evaluate competing programs and proposals between departments for budgetary and other policy reasons, to study specific areas of science to identify new opportunities for research and development, to formulate coherent national programs of research support, and to advise on organizational responsibilities involving the most effective coordination and economic allocation of scientific resources.[9] In all this, by making their services available, valuable, and sought after by the government, scientists were not acting in a representative capacity, speaking for the scientific community and bringing pressure to bear upon government after the manner of a pressure group, but rather were acting as a skill group of varying technical specialties, individually contributing their services as members of the official team (not to say "family") determining policy for science-related and science-affecting government programs.

Now, it is not quite accurate to say that the scientific establishment acts only through individuals. Their ability, reputation and contribution are the product of a complex system of professional training, competence, standards, performance, recognition, and employment by a university, industrial concern, foundation or government giving them autonomous and prestigious status in society. The utilization of scientists as a professional skill group resembles that of the lawyers more than the military specialists, whose recruitment, training and equipment is that of a special class of government service. In contrast with the differentiated processes of formal litigation and the application of organized force that the legal and military groups have developed, there is as yet no technique conventionally recognized as a distinctive process of *scientific* policy-making and execution, in the general sense of "the systematic application of logico-experimental methods of testing knowledge to the solution of public problems." The calling or vocation of science may share common or general standards of competence and evidence for ascertaining truth, including personal and social values required for supporting the advancement of knowledge,[10] but the *methods* of science seem to be limited by the nature of the subject-matter and the technical specialties appropriate to the analysis of the particular segment of reality selected for investigation. Scientists may become politicians or administrators, just as lawyers do, but *the fact that the content of so many political decisions has become heavily scientific has not yet produced a transformation (or adaptation) of governmental decision-making processes to the scientific model for resolving conflicts of opinion, interest or power.* We cannot yet specify an agreed-upon statement of the requisite conditions of a scientific model for public decision-making,[11] operations research and game theory to the contrary notwithstanding.

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[9] Harvey Brooks, "The Scientific Adviser," in Gilpin and Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–75.

[10] Max Weber, "The Vocation of Science," in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in General Sociology* (Oxford, 1946); W. R. Schilling, "Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics," in Gilpin and Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 144 ff; D. Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction," *Daedalus* (Summer 1964), pp. 845–80.

We thus are obliged to conclude for the time being that the scientific community is not organized nor does it act in the conventional sense of a political constituency or interest group. Its usefulness to government consists in objective skills associated with control of the material environment.[12] Scientists as a technical, policy-making skill group are organized on a craft and confederation basis cutting across the private and governmental economies; they are represented in the public order by a variety of cooptive, consultative, contractual, employment and subsidy arrangements. Instead of visualizing a single process or agency (such as a Department of Science) staffed by scientists prepared to apply a distinctive body of concepts and techniques to the solution of problems, we must continue to visualize and invent improved ways of associating different kinds of scientists with different kinds of responsibilities for achieving public purposes, at operating, staff, executive and legislative levels.[13]

II. REPRESENTATION OF SCIENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

In 1960–61 there were approximately 1,400,000 professional scientists and engineers in the United States; some 387,000 were working on federally financed research and development; 201,000 scientists (relatively few engineers) reported to the National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, and about 155,000 scientists and engineers were employed by the federal government. Robert C. Wood and Christopher Wright have independently estimated the size of the science establishment—depending upon whether one takes the criterion of "consistently influential in national science policy" or "continually engaged in the conduct of national science affairs" at from 200–400 at the lower limit to 800–1,000 at the upper.[14] During the winter of 1962–63, the writer had the opportunity of examining the names and institutional affiliations of persons currently serving as members of panels, subpanels and consultants to the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). There were 290 individuals of whom one-half were affiliated with universities in either a scientific or administrative capacity, one-fifth each came from private, nonprofit research institutes and from industry, and one-tenth were government scientists or administrators. Most of them worked on a part-time basis, of course, presumably on leave of absence from, or in addition to, regular research, teaching or administrative duties.

TABLE I. INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF MEMBERS OF PANELS, SUBPANELS, AND CONSULTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 1962–63*

Category	Number	Per Cent
University scientists and administrators	153	50.7
Research foundations, institutes, contractors	53	18.3
Industrial research executives	52	18.2
Government scientists and administrators	32	10.8
Total	290	100.0

* I am indebted to Mr. Daniel Z. Beckler, Assistant to the Director, Office of Science and Technology, for access to the materials from which this table was compiled.

Taking them by their institutional affiliations, the 22 members of the PSAC and alumni consultants-at-large were numerically dominated by university professors (16), the remaining six being divided between medical research (2), university or business administration (2) and industrial research (2). By scientific occupation, physics and electrical engineering dominated the group (12); next came chemists and the chemical engineers (4), with medical research and administration (4), and finally mathematics (2). Informal, personal and experimental bases of group alignments within PSAC remain to be derived from career and interview data. For example, a number served on the Research and Development Board and advisory committee structure of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission; several were associated with the M.I.T. and Berkeley Radiation Laboratories during World War II. Geographically, the residences of the PSAC members were concentrated among states on the east coast (17), with only 2 from the west coast and 3 from the midwest. Terms of appointment to PSAC are normally for four years; reappointment is not uncommon, so that about half of those serving in 1962–63 had been members in 1958. The average age of the members was reported in 1963 to be 49. The recruitment process appears to be one of co-optation, governed by the following factors: (1) experience, contribution and distinction during World War II; (2) distinguished service and prominence on departmental or agency advisory committees in the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission; (3) the presidency or high office in the National Academy of Sciences; (4) distinguished service with one of the outstanding private research foundations; (5) major theoretical or technical contributions to basic science. As time goes on, we may expect the importance of (1) and (5) to decline relatively to the other three. There is a remarkable continuity and overlapping of names on the rosters of OSRD and the research organizations it supported, the consultants and advisers to the Office of Naval Research and Research and Development Board of the Defense Department (1947–53), the Defense Science Board (after 1953), and the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission.

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[11] Huxley's *Brave New World*; Orwell's *1984*; Harvey Wheeler, *Science and Democratic Government* (Center for Study of Democratic Institutions); and the literary attack upon C. P. Snow's *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* are familiar illustrations of the controversies. But see J. Bronowski's *Science and Human Values* (1956) and K. Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge* (1958).

[12] R. C. Wood, "Scientists As an A-Political Elite," in Gilpin and Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–72.

[13] D. Lerner and H. C. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford University Press, 1949); D. Lerner, ed., *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (Meridian Books, 1959).

[14] Gilpin and Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 273.

These data go far to support Huntington's thesis that the group affiliations and the interpenetration of institutional hierarchies are two of the critical indices for assessing the political influence of policy-making elites (in that case, the military).[15] When to them is added the criterion of association (through consultation and recommendation) with the allocation of tremendous sums for particular weapons systems, approval or "scratching" of broad, national programs of support for both research *and* facilities, and assignment of respective organizational responsibilities, there is no doubt that the university scientists have acquired a strong position among the seats of the mighty. However, certain conditional features of their influence should be specified, both of a positive and negative character.

First, and perhaps the most important dependent variable, is their technical usefulness to the Chief Executive, namely, to review and evaluate objectively the competing, interested, bureaucratic claims (from the military or civilian agencies of government, university or industrial interests) for the need and priority of their research or operating programs, *all of which have their own scientific protagonists.* It is this variable, probably, which explains the atmosphere and environment of secrecy surrounding PSAC proceedings, in what C. P. Snow calls "closed committee politics."[16] Scientific advice also loses its helpfulness to the Chief Executive if he cannot trust technical recommendations tainted by special scientific interests, personalistic drives, and political motivations either in the partisan or the interest group sense. At the same time, scientists do not relish publicity among their colleagues with respect to their personal responsibility for official decisions vitally affecting the lives, interests and reputations of their professional colleagues. Closely connected with these implicit factors in the environment of decision is the hard fact that the scientific, technical alternatives—quite aside from the intangible assumptions about the national interest—are neither understood by nor susceptible to the test of public preference and popular satisfaction. For such considerations the Chief Executive must assume responsibility (in the basic sense of political representation), until such time as we can invent ways of sharing his authority with leaders of legislative and influential group opinion. Interest group negotiation on behalf of publicly informed constituencies would destroy the utility and defeat the purpose of objective deliberation and scientific recommendation in the Executive office.[17]

The second structural, dependent variable which qualifies the influence of non-government scientists on the PSAC is their relation to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. While the members collectively have the right to elect their own chairman and to report directly to the President, under all four Assistants (Killian, Kistiakowsky, Wiesner and Hornig) they have in fact chosen the President's Assistant as their chairman, and found communication and reporting through him quite compatible with maintenance of their professional objectivity and public responsibility. This balance or equilibrium is extremely important, because the President cannot talk familiarly and confidentially to a committee of part-time consultants and advisers, while the usefulness of his Science Adviser depends very largely upon the latter's ability to mobilize the working energies and retain the respect of leading scientists throughout the nation. When this relation is operational, the PSAC serves the nation in giving the President competent help not only in deciding complex specific issues of weapons technology, affecting military and foreign policy, but also in broad decisions as to areas and programs of scientific research to support. Through a series of educational reports, it helps him to lead and create public and congressional opinion concerning the conditions, uses, limitations and needs of scientific progress.

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[15] S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Random House, Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 88–9.

[16] *Science and Government* (Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 56–66.

[17] D. K. Price, *Science*, Vol. 142 (6 December 1963).

The third conditioning variable is the relationship between the non-government (mostly university) scientists on the PSAC and the government scientists and science administrators. The diversified, hierarchical governmental structure requires some formal mechanism, which usually takes the form of an interdepartmental committee, and since 1959 has been called the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST). This also is chaired by the President's Special Assistant, and is composed of eight other government officials, either the chairman or administrator of a major science agency (NASA; AEC; NSF) or the assistant secretary or principal science adviser to the Secretaries of the largest science-affecting departments (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, HEW, and Interior). Like PSAC, the FCST works primarily through committees and subcommittees. In 1962–63 there were nine standing committees, composed of some 70–80 subordinates of the nine Council members, and a secretarial staff drawn from the Office of Science and Technology and Bureau of the Budget. Here all the problems of government structure and hierarchy are presented: the government laboratory scientists have to filter their views through administrative superiors; bureau chiefs have their own problems of access and influence with department heads, assistant secretaries and other bureau chiefs; and the principals on the Federal Council are themselves mostly at a level below the Secretarial or Cabinet level, and so cannot report directly to the President. Government scientists therefore feel that they are under-represented in the Executive Office, in prestige and influence, compared to non-government scientists in the PSAC. This is probably unavoidable, unless in the unlikely event that the President were to delegate—and so downgrade—the staff function of his Special Assistant for Science to a Cabinet (Interdepartmental) Committee. The PSAC is very much aware of the problems of government science: it was responsible for the creation of the FCST in 1959. Through the leadership and initiative of the President's Assistant, it has invited many government scientists, members of the Council and their alternates to serve on PSAC panels; it has encouraged and participated in several investigations and reports dealing with the problems of recruiting, compensating, morale-building and retaining scientists in government employment; it has fostered and supervised the work of several interdepartmental committees, notably in oceanography and atmospheric sciences, which developed coordinated, long-range, inter-agency programs of government research support. In the last analysis, however, the PSAC's and the Special Assistant's value consist not in solving the administrative problems of government science—to which they can contribute only tangentially—but in their detachment from departmental, agency and bureau programs, and in bringing their objective judgment to bear on the national problems of balancing the programs and interests of university, government, and industrial research.

The first postwar presidential science adviser (Oliver Buckley of the Bell Telephone Laboratories), appointed in 1951 by President Truman, came from industry. But his four successors have been university-affiliated, and industrial scientists have never constituted more than a small minority of PSAC and its panels. Industrial research executives have been more prominent on Defense and AEC advisory and consultative groups, as perhaps might be expected, in connection with operating programs of applied research and development, rather than in promotion of basic science or at the Executive Office level. On the other hand, private research foundations have contributed significantly to the personnel of presidential science consultation, beginning with Vannevar Bush from the Carnegie Institution and continuing through Detlev Bronk of the Rockefeller Institute and National Academy of Sciences (which in the United States is a non-government instrumentality, although chartered by Act of Congress in 1863).

At one time it was thought that the National Science Board and its Director under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 would become an instrument of science representation and national science policy-making. Under its first Director, Alan T. Waterman (1950–1963), the National Science Board became representative more of college and university presidents than of scientists, and the Board confined itself to policy development primarily in the fields of basic research, education and government-university relations rather than in the coordination of government science policies generally, or in the resolution of science-related policy issues involving military or other agencies at the presidential level. The Board and the Foundation have always contributed greatly through staff assistance and other help to the work of PSAC and the Presidential Science Assistants, particularly in the fields of scientific manpower and education. In 1962, President Kennedy's Reorganization Plan No. 2 (87th Cong., 2d sess., H.R. Doc. 372) creating the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in the Executive Office of the President, headed by the President's Special Assistant, finally transferred the statutory powers of the National Science Board for evaluation, review and coordination of federal science programs to the OST.

It is still too soon to evaluate properly the effects of the 1962 action giving statutory status to the Presidential Science Adviser as Director of OST, almost parallel to the Director of the Budget and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. The significance of the step was a gesture to Congressional feelings of ignorance and uncertainty concerning the facts and responsibilities for important policy decisions affecting science being made in the Executive Office. The first Director of OST, in his testimony justifying establishment of the Office, made the explicit distinction between matters of confidential advice to the President on issues where scientific questions were concerned, and matters of overall review, evaluation and coordination of the very large and growing scientific research programs of the federal government. The implication was that Congress had the right to know the considerations underlying Presidential budgetary and policy recommendations requiring Congressional authorization and appropriation of funds. We still lack detailed knowledge of whether Wiesner was able to maintain this distinction in testifying before Congressional committees, avoiding exposure of the personalities associated with differences of view and final disposition of issues, while satisfying the congressmen of the completeness of his reports and the soundness and accuracy of decisions made by the Executive branch. It is the counterpart of the distinction that Edwin G. Nourse, first Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, insisted upon, in refusing to testify before the congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report in support of the President's program.[18] Congressional agitation has not disappeared for additional machinery to oversee and administer federal science policy —witness the 1963 Report of the Senate Government Operations Committee, *Establishment of a Commission on Science and Technology*,[19] on S. 816 (McClellan), and Senator Bartlett's bill (S. 2038) to establish a Joint Congressional Committee and Office of Science and Technology.

To sum up this discussion of scientific representation at the highest levels of government, one may ask whether the term "scientific establishment" is appropriate to describe the formal-informal, inter-agency, composite structure of policy advice and consultation, the contract-and-subsidy-supported, decentralized administration of scientific research and development that unites universities, private foundations, industry contractors and government bureaus in the nation's scientific effort. But regardless of the label, one must agree with President Lee DuBridge of the California Institute of Technology that the crucial questions involved in the science-government relation are *not whether but how* the government is to enlist the help of the most competent, available members of the scientific community in meeting its problems in the revolutionary age of science and technology; and *how* the government organizes and applies the diverse institutional components of this community to the science-related issues affecting the public interest and the fostering of scientific progress. We must also agree with him that the criteria of evaluation are whether the scientists' contribution has been characterized by the highest levels of competence, breadth of vision and foresight, personal objectivity and conscientiousness, in the most inclusive sense of the nation's interests.[20]

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[18] See his memoir, *Economics in the Public Service* (New York, 1953), esp. pp. 203, 221, 270; and Corinne Silverman, *The President's Economic Advisers*, Inter-University Case Program, No. 48 (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill), reprinted in E. A. Bock and A. K. Campbell, eds., *Case Studies in American Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp. 301–24. Unlike Wiesner, Nourse wanted to dissociate himself from the advice the President took, while maintaining the scientific integrity of the Council's *Economic Report;* he soon found his position untenable.

[19] 88th Cong., 1st sess,. S. Rep. No. 16. The hearings and report reveal that the idea of a federal department of science is by no means defunct, both as a vehicle for congressional control and some scientists' conception of how science policy should be made, notwithstanding the almost unanimous opposition of the scientific establishment and informed political scientists.

The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress has lately formed a Science Policy Research Division, headed by Edward C. Welsh, Jr., formerly Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. *New York Times*, August 30, 1964.

III. THE ROLES OF SCIENCE IN POLICY

Science and scientists are represented in the political and governmental order because of their utility (one might say *indispensability*) not because of their omniscience or correctness of judgment.[21] The problem of scientific representation, then, is not a case of an omnipotent, ruling clique, but a significant case in the general problem of the relation of the expert in the policy-shaping process. In the first section of this paper, the concept of that process as conforming or analogous to the model of the scientific worker in the laboratory was rejected. Several different functional roles in public service were distinguished which scientists have successfully demonstrated their competence to fill. These roles may be briefly recapitulated:

1. Scientific laboratory research in cooperation with government agencies,
   (a) in government laboratories (basic or applied)
   (b) in industrial laboratories (applied, development and testing)
   (c) in universities (basic and applied).
2. Direct support of basic research: review and evaluation of proposals for research support (*e.g.*, panels of NSF and NIH).
3. Authorization and review of research programs (in-house, contracted, or subsidized), communication into policy channels, and translation into policy alternatives for decision:
   (a) technical consultation or service
   (b) administrative: continuing supervision, evaluation.
4. Research on the politics of choice (prediction and evaluation of alternative strategies of decision).
5. Formulation of specific or broad, coherent programs of research support through government funding:
   (a) mission-related, within agencies
   (b) inter-agency programs
   (c) science education; recruitment and training of scientific manpower.
6. Evaluation, coordination, allocation of all scientific programs:
   (a) among fields of basic scientific research
   (b) between basic, applied R&D, and agency missions
   (c) general policies for modes of research support (contracts vs. grants; project vs. institutional; indirect costs; government-industry-university relationships).

Generally speaking, the kinds of services listed proceed from the more technical to the more policy-oriented, from the operating levels of agency research programs to the staff and higher policy levels of departmental and government-wide management and coordination. The recruitment and upward mobility of scientists into administrative work and government policy committees proceeds to some extent along the line of progression from function 1 to 6. But the distinction between the technical aspects of knowledge tested and testable by research, and the applications of knowledge in policy is but a matter of degree.[22] As the character of problems departs from those which can be stated and answered with almost complete precision and certainty, to those about which information on the several variables is uncertain and the inferences debatable, to those about which the variables, the respective weights and conclusions are all speculative, the problem is not simply a matter of substituting the judgment of the policy-maker for the expert's but one of eliciting the contribution of each and finding an appropriate balance between the several expertnesses involved. It is most interesting to observe the parallels between the recent thought about the contributions of the military to policy and that of the scientists.[23] The contemporary emphasis in both fields seems to be upon *professional objectivity* and *balance* in the presentation of the technical, *i.e.*, the military or the scientific, factors and viewpoints, along with the political, economic or moral aspects of the particular policy problem. If then, to adapt Huntington's terminology to another context, *high professional objectivity* is associated with *low political* (electoral) *involvement* and *high popular prestige*, the contemporary relations between science and government would appear to be consistent with a long-standing American tradition.

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[20] "Policy and the Scientists," *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1963), pp. 571–88.

[21] The essays by Albert Wohlstetter and Bernard Brodie in the Gilpin and Wright volume provide ample evidence for the fallibility and limitations of scientific judgment in policy situations.

[22] H. D. Smyth, "Science and National Policy," Walter J. Shepard Lecture, Ohio State University, February 8, 1961.

[23] See testimony of Col. G. A. Lincoln and appendices, *Hearing Before* (Jackson) *Subcommittee of Committee on Government Operations,* U. S. Senate, 88th Cong., 2d sess., "Administration of National Security," Part 9 (June 25, 1964), esp. pp. 560–1.

DEMOCRACY, ORGANIZATION, MICHELS

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This article marks an attempt to clarify the teachings of Robert Michels. It suggests that in *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (1915), Michels presented a favorable account of the compatibility of organization and democracy.

Other treatments attribute to Michels a thesis of the following kind: (1) Large, organizationally complex associations, compared with small, simple associations, are likely to be governed by cliques whose powers (disposable resources, freedom of action, security of tenure) are abundant and whose policies (use of official status and resources) deviate from the policy-preferences of their constituents. (2) Increments of Organization (of scale, or members, and of complexity, or procedural formality, functional differentiation, stratification, specialization, hierarchy, and bureaucracy) augment the powers and the policy-deviating propensities of leaders *vis-à-vis* followers.[1]

It probably is true that in Michels's terms, a system where leaders possess the means and the disposition to ignore their followers' will (or wills) is an undemocratic system.[2] It is not true that on Michels's showing, organization is relatively inhospitable to democratic leader-follower relations. It is not true that Michels portrays increments of Organization as breeders, persistently and proportionally, of counter-democratic changes. Instead, he argues (in a complex but not inconsistent manner) that Organization is incompatible with the attainment or maintenance of absolute democracy and yet can be a source, in many cases and in many ways, of democratization.

It is true that Michels deplored Organization. It is true that Michels voiced a profound pessimism about the fate of mankind, a pessimism rooted in conceptions of the indispensability and the consequences of Organization. It is not true that Michels's pessimism was the pessimism of a democrat.

Far from being a democrat, Michels was a

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[1] See S. M. Lipset's introduction to the Collier Books edition (1962) of *Political Parties*, and the commentaries cited by Lipset. For additional statements or approximations of this version of Michels's thesis, and some challenges, see the following: P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations* (Chandler, 1962), pp. 48, 228; R. C. Brooks, *Political Parties and Electoral Problems* (Harper, 1933), p. 30; F. W. Coker, *Recent Political Thought* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1934), p. 328; R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (Harper, 1953), pp. 279–85; A. W. Gouldner, ed., *Studies in Leadership*, pp. 418–35 (T. W. Adorno) and 477–504 (B. Barber); H. S. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (Vintage, 1951), ch. 7; Suzanne Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class* (Random House, 1963), pp. 72–3, 80, 263, 273–74; Arthur Kornhauser and others, eds., *Industrial Conflict* (McGraw-Hill, 1954), ch. 9 (L. H. Fisher and G. McConnell); H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society* (Yale, 1950); R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (Macmillan, 1959), pp. 122, 140, 434; R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (Praeger, 1964 ed.), pp. 15–17, ch. 11; C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes, eds., *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times* (Macmillan, 1924), pp. 56–67, 383; Max Nomad, *Aspects of Revolt* (Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1959), ch. 1; Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (Knopf, 1962), pp. 4, 41–52; J. M. Pfiffner and F. P. Sherwood, *Administrative Organization* (Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 338; Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 42, 82, 100, 120–28, 134; David Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (Macmillan, 1949), esp. p. 27 and the treatment in Part II of James Burnham's *The Machiavellians;* D. B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (Knopf, 1955), pp. 137–55; and Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (March 1952), pp. 100–01.

[2] Michels does not use the terms "democracy," "oligarchy," and "organization" in a consistent or coherent manner. The terminological difficulties have been probed by C. W. Cassinelli, in "The Law of Oligarchy," this REVIEW, Vol. 47 (Sept. 1953), p. 3 ff. However, Michels persistently associates democracy with equality, with conditions suggesting the notion of popular sovereignty, and with the "system in which delegates represent the mass and carry out its will." On the other hand, he speaks of "The notion of the representation of popular interests, a notion to which the great majority of democrats . . . cleave. . . . " *Political Parties*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Dover Publications, 1959), esp. pp. 1–2, 27, 401. References hereafter will be to this edition unless designated otherwise.

Romantic Revolutionist. He deplored the "conservative" effects of Organization—its general tendency to facilitate the maintenance of a society which is not and cannot be perfectly democratic, and its particular tendency to dissipate "revolutionary currents" in society. But by his account, Organization is counter-revolutionary precisely because it facilitates the amelioration of discontents and injustices; it facilitates democratization.

Far from being a democrat, moreover, Michels was a Scientific Paternalist. He portrayed, and lamented, Organization as the nemesis of authority-systems wherein leaders possess the means and the disposition to voice the scientifically ascertained Interests of the "mass." But by his account, Organization facilitates the advent and the maintenance of leaders who are able and willing to express the manifest wills of their clients or constituents.

Such, at any rate, is the interpretation which seems consistent with the following analysis of (I) Michels's account of general historical trends, (II) his basic reasoning, and (III) his treatment of the Socialist experience.

I

According to Michels's account of general trends, *democratization has persistently accompanied Organization.*

The modern era, in which "political and economic life" acquires increasingly "complex forms," and in which massive bureaucratization occurs in the state and industry and labor, is "what we know as the era of democracy."[3] Only the "blind and fanatical" fail to perceive that "the democratic current daily makes undeniable advance."[4]

Modern "state institutions" exhibit "increasing democratization." Human "freedoms and privileges" have broadened. The workers are enjoying "better conditions of labor;" their burgeoning aptitude for "criticism and control" is bound to increase further "in proportion as the economic status of the masses undergoes improvement and becomes more stable, and as the masses are admitted more effectively to the advantages of civilization."[5]

Michels stipulates that in "the sphere of party" as contrasted with "the sphere of the state," democracy is in a "descending phase." Yet he testifies that a "democratic external form" prevails among modern parties. The aristocratic parties have come to espouse "democratic" policies, and some liberal and conservative parties have worked "essentially" for "socialist ideas and for the victory of the proletariat." The Socialist International has changed from an "individual dictatorship" into "a federal republic consisting of several independent oligarchies." Nearly every Socialist and labor group has manifested "tendencies toward decentralization," tendencies which create pluralistic rather than monistic oligarchies. In the German Socialist and labor parties, an "enormous increase" in membership and in organizational development has been accompanied by changes from "dictatorship" to "oligarchy" and to "theoretical and applied democracy."[6]

The foregoing citations are not arbitrarily selective. Michels does not specifically name any associations in which democracy has been attenuated by Organization.

His contradictory testimony concerning party evolution may be ascribed to at least two sources. On the one hand, it may be ascribed to inconsistent, ambiguous use of the term "party." Sometimes "party" denotes an existential aggregate; sometimes if refers to a hypothetical aggregate. Thus, the so-called, existential 'parties' have not manifested counter-democratic changes, but hypothetical, authentic 'parties' must undergo such changes.

On the other hand, his contradictory testimony may be ascribed to inconsistent, ambiguous use of the term "democracy." Sometimes "democracy" signifies close control by followers over leaders; sometimes it signifies a distinctive associational character (an ideological, sociological, operational uniqueness) and a moral commitment to the cause of social-democratic revolution.

Only in the latter unconventional sense, and only with respect to hypothetical aggregates, does he sustain the argument that 'parties' necessarily undergo a counter-'democratic' transformation.

II

According to Michels's basic reasoning, *Organization precludes democracy, and can destroy democracy, and can facilitate democratization.*

These three propositions are not contradictory. The first pertains to what is ultimately attainable. The others pertain to what can happen in various situations.

Organization precludes democracy. Michels argues persuasively that the presence of Organization is incompatible with the presence of democracy:

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[3] Pp. 33, 40.

[4] P. 402.

[5] Pp. 329, 406.

[6] Pp. 3, 5, 5n, 11, 63, 190, 194, 201.

> Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. . . . Immanent oligarchical tendencies [exist] in every kind of human organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends. . . . Oligarchy is . . . a preordained form of the common life of great social aggregates. . . . The majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are predestined . . . to submit to the dominion of a small minority, and must . . . constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy. . . . Leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life [and] every system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy. . . . All order and civilization must exhibit aristocratic features.[7]

This reiterated proposition seems logically unassailable, so long as two considerations are kept in mind: (a) the proposition pertains only to the attainability of 'pure' democracy, or absolute equality; and (b) "oligarchy" signifies not the antithesis of democracy, but a condition occupying the ground between pure democracy and pure autocracy.

With these considerations noted, the basis of his proposition can readily be appreciated.[8] The presence of Organization signifies the presence of an association whose members are so numerous that it is technically difficult for all to participate equally in all decisions. This condition also is technically incompatible with the exercise by one member of direct control over the formulation and implementation of policies.

Similarly, the presence of Organization signifies the presence of a "system" of leadership, or of subordinate-superordinate relations, together with an established pattern of differentiated tasks, responsibilities, privileges and resources. These conditions are incompatible with equality—and with autocracy. There must be inequalities, and the inequalities must be multiple. Various tasks and resources are vested in various members of the association, each being endowed with a particular expertise and a particular decisional jurisdiction.[9]

In short, Organization necessitates "oligarchy"—that is, arrangements which are neither absolutely democratic nor absolutely autocratic.

Between the poles of pure democracy and pure autocracy lies an enormous range of variations. Although no "system of leadership" can be democratic, some can be less undemocratic than others. Variations can arise from differences in the rules, in the social composition, and in other traits of associations.

Michels does not say, nor does he imply, that the extent of deviation from pure democracy must be directly related to the size or complexity of organization. He does not exclude the possibility that increments of democratization can accompany increments of scale and complexity. Thus his proposition that Organization precludes (absolute) democracy is logically compatible with his reports that democratization has persistently accompanied Organization.

Organization can destroy democracy. Michels devotes most of his attention not to the proposition that Organization is a condition which precludes (absolute) democracy, but to the proposition that Organization is an agent which destroys (absolute) democracy:

> Democracy leads to oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchical nucleus. . . . When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely. . . . Oligarchy . . . issues from democracy. . . . Organization is . . . the source from which the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy. . . . The formation of oligarchies within the various forms of democracy is the outcome of organic necessity.[10]

The proposition contained in these passages has been persistently misunderstood. It is not that Organization breeds Oligarchy; it is that Democracy leads (through Organization) to Oligarchy. The difference is momentous.

Michels's proposition—his Iron Law of Oligarchy—is a statement about what must happen in groups which initially are democracies. Only when democracy is present initially can it be slain by Organization. Democracy is not self-evidently present in all groups which lack Organization. Some small, primitive groups may be run by bullies; others may be isocracies, or associations of equals. Only in the latter instances can the onset of Organization be blamed for the demise of Democracy.

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[7] Pp. 11, 32, 390, 400, 402.

[8] We are excluding here Michels's arguments for the indispensability of Organization and his suggestions that the process of Organization tends to be self-accelerating. Attention is confined to the question of what arrangements can be compatible with the presence of Organization.

[9] For a sophisticated discussion of these processes and of some implications, see Langer, above, note 1, esp. ch. 3.

[10] Pp. viii, 22, 168, 402, 408.

Scholars have persistently inferred that Michels's Law applies, or can apply, to a much broader range of cases—perhaps to the generality of voluntary associations, or of social movements, or of human groups.[11] Michels has been credited with the broad proposition that increments of Organization invariably yield increments of Oligarchy. This misunderstanding may be due to a misapprehension concerning his use of key words. The key words are emphasized in the following passages:

> In every organization, whether it be a *political party*, a *professional union*, or any other *association of the kind*, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly. The mechanism of the organization, while conferring a solidity of structure, induces serious changes in the organized mass, completely inverting the respective position of the leaders and the led. As a result of organization, every *party* or *professional union* becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of directed.[12]
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> * * *
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> Reduced to its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological *law of political parties* (the term "political" being used in its most comprehensive significance) may be formulated in the following terms: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy."[13]

The crucial point here is that by "political parties" and "professional unions" Michels does not mean the generality of so-called, historical parties and unions. Instead, he uses these terms to designate the "kind" of association which is emphasized in Marxian thought: *association by social class*. This qualification is of vital importance.

According to the Marxian formulation, the members of a social class are equal to one another and are endowed with identical needs. If they actively associate, the initial relationship among them must be democratic. The leaders initially will be equal in resources to the followers and will exemplify the policy-preferences of their followers. In Michels's terms, then, *who says "party" says initial democracy*. Thus,

> The term "party" presupposes that among the individual components of the party there *should* exist a harmonious direction of wills toward identical objective and practical aims. Where this is lacking, the party *becomes* a mere "organization."[14]

Similarly, in a "party,"

> Originally the chief is merely the servant of the mass. The organization is based upon the absolute equality of its members. Equality is here understood in its most general sense, as an equality of like men. . . . The democratic principle aims at guaranteeing to all an equal influence and an equal participation in the regulation of the common interests. All are electors, and all are eligible for office. . . . All offices are filled by election. The officials, executive organs of the general will, play a merely subordinate part, are always dependent upon the collectivity, and can be deprived of their office at any moment. The mass of the party is omnipotent.[15]

From this romantic premise of "pure democracy," Michels unfolds his tragic tale of degeneration wrought by Organization. In "the sphere of party," with "the advance of organization, democracy tends to decline." As far as party life is concerned,

> It may be enunciated as a general rule that the increase in the power of the leaders is directly proportional with the extension of the organization. In the various parties and labor organizations of different countries the influence of the leaders is mainly determined . . . by the varying development of organization. Where organization is stronger, we find that there is a lesser degree of applied democracy.[16]

Given this premise of initial democracy, Michels is logically free to argue that only at a

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[11] For example, David Easton, *The Political System* (Knopf, 1959), pp. 56–7.

[12] P. 32.

[13] P. 401.

[14] P. 376; emphasis added. He also says, "A party is neither a social unity nor an economic unity." (p. 387) His characterization of *change* in parties, however, presupposes initial unity. See section III below, under *Social Pluralism*.

[15] Pp. 27–8. Omitted from this quotation is a contradictory remark, illuminating Michels's chronic confusion about the difference between hypothesis and history. He remarks that the "equality of like men" is "manifested" in some cases (*i.e.*, Socialist labor groups) "by the mutual use of the familiar 'thou,' which is employed by the most poorly paid wage-laborer in addressing the most distinguished intellectuals." (p. 27) If poor laborers and intellectuals are associated, then "equality of like men" is absent. The group is not a social democracy, although it may employ equalitarian rituals and it may be pledged to the attainment of social democracy.

[16] P. 33.

"second stage" of organizational development (the stage of full-time, salaried, specialized officialdom) do leaders become "stable and irremovable."[17] Similarly, the assumption that the first leaders were indistinguishable from the followers enables him to say that the "first appearance of professional leadership" marks "the beginning of the end" for "democracy," since such leaders are said to be stronger than their followers and to be animated by deviant interests.[18]

This line of reasoning depends for its elemental plausibility on the validity of the premise of initial democracy. Michels's argument applies only to cases where "at first" the leaders are "no more than executive organs of the general wills," where the leaders first arise "spontaneously" to perform only "accessory and gratuitous" functions, where the leaders initially are "simple workmates" or "single molecule(s) of the mass."[19]

Such reasoning is conspicuous for the contingencies it does not cover. It does not cover associations initially run by bullies. It does not cover groups initially led by men who, instead of being "simple workmates," descend from upper social strata. Since it does not cover cases of this sort, it is neither sustained nor refuted by evidence that in many cases, including cases of so-called political parties, Organization has been accompanied by democratization.

Organization can facilitate democratization. The propositions that Organization precludes absolute democracy and can destroy absolute democracy do not exclude the possibility that Organization can facilitate democratization. Two broad possibilities, within appropriate circumstances, are discernible from Michels's analysis.

(1) *Organization can facilitate 'external' democratization.* Michels teaches that Organization is the "weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong"—an instrument which facilitates "economy of effort" and the political utilization of numerical strength.[20] He acknowledges that "Within certain narrow limits, the democratic party, even when subjected to oligarchical control, can doubtless act upon the state in a democratic sense."[21] (In the context, the phrase "democratic party" evidently denotes a kind of aim or interest, rather than an internal structure.) The chances for democratizing the state are relatively favorable "where there exists universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and where the working class is strongly organized and is awake to its own interests."[22]

In this argument Michels covers a contingency which he has been accused of overlooking. He acknowledges that the democratization of the state and of society can be promoted by, and can occur in the midst of, associations which are non-democratic.[23] Strong organization among society's lower strata impels the ruling caste, for the sake of self-preservation, to make concessions in the form of policies and positions.[24]

> The old political caste of society, and above all the "state" itself, are forced to undertake the revaluation of a considerable number of values—a revaluation both ideal and practical. The importance attributed to the masses increases, even when the leaders are demagogues. The legislature and the executive become accustomed to yield, not only to claims proceeding from above, but also to those proceeding from below.[25]

(2) *Organization can facilitate 'internal' democratization.*

Michels does not deal explicitly with the possibility that Organization can facilitate the democratization of groups within society—that is, the equalization of resources among members and the conformity of leaders' policies to followers' wishes. Such a possibility may be inferred, however, from his testimony that counter-autocratic changes accompanied Socialist Organization. The same possibility may be inferred from the basis of his reasoning. Increments of Organization necessitate delegation and dispersal of authority. In the case of an association where all the members have exercised all authority on an equal basis, the effect of Organization will be counter-democratic. In the case of an association where one or just a few members have exercised all authority, the effect of Organization will be counter-autocratic. An appraisal of these possibilities may be gained from a review of Michels's treatment of Socialist history.

III

According to Michels's account of Socialist experience in Western Europe before 1914,

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[17] P. 401.

[18] P. 36.

[19] Pp. 31–2, 36, 206, 400.

[20] Pp. 21–2.

[21] P. 365.

[22] P. 365n.

[23] For example, see Sartori, above, note 1, pp. 121–26.

[24] See pp. 176, 185–87, 272, 392.

[25] P. 365.

Organization facilitates democratization. He depicts Organization as the efficient cause of multitudinous changes in the 'character' of Socialism, changes that are alleged to be unavoidable and horrible. He spins a fable of innocence lost.

> In the days of the so-called "socialism of the emigres," the socialists devoted themselves to an elevated policy of principles, inspired by the classic criteria of internationalism. Almost every one of them was . . . a specialist in this more general and comprehensive domain. The whole course of their lives, the brisk exchange of ideas on unoccupied evenings, the continued rubbing of shoulders between men of the most different tongues, the enforced isolation from the bourgeois world of their respective countries, and the utter impossibility of any "practical" action, all contributed to this result. But in proportion as, in their own country, paths of activity were opened for the socialists . . . the more did a recognition of the demands of the everyday life of the party divert their attention from immortal principles.[26]

With the advent of practical activities and professional activists, Socialism's "wider and more ideal cultural aims" were smothered by the "petty, narrow, rigid, and illiberal" bureaucratic spirit. The "logical audacities" and "revolutionary currents" suppressed, the once-bold champions displaced by routinizers whose "personal inclination towards quietism" could not be "neutralized" by "the preponderant energy of a comprehensive theory." Socialism's youthful promise to represent the "popular interests" was violated; the "democratic principle" of "THAT WHICH OUGHT TO BE" was suffocated by "that which IS." Bureaucratization and vote-chasing ravished Socialism's "essential character"; having contracted "promiscuous relationships with the most heterogeneous elements," Socialism lost "political virginity."[27]

Now let us dry our tears. Let us attempt to break the spell of the "metaphysical pathos" of organization.[28] Before agreeing with Michels that Socialism underwent a moral *and* a counter-democratic degeneration because of the imperatives of Organization, let us attempt a more systematic canvass.

Below are listed ten changes which by Michels's account took place as the Socialist parties developed. Each will be discussed briefly for its broader theoretical implications.

(1) *Mitigation of formal dictatorship.* Genuine Socialist parties allegedly are, and some of the young Socialist parties allegedly were, corps of para-military combatants. Small, frail, ostentatiously seditious groups cannot afford the luxury of democratic procedures.[29] Socialist growth and development produced a new orientation, emphasizing legalism and electioneering. This marked a deviation from principle; it also facilitated and necessitated a measure of formal democratization.

In broader terms, Michels's analysis suggests that patterns of internal authority vary systematically according to associational aims and situations (or strategies) and sizes. Internal dictatorship is most likely to accompany revolutionary aims, extra-legal tactics, and smallness. Bigness necessitates allegiance, legalism, and a modicum of internal democracy. Each factor helps to explain and engender the others.

(2) *Mitigation of informal dictatorship.* "Every great class movement in history has arisen upon the instigation, with the co-operation, and under the leadership of men sprung from the very class against which the movement was directed."[30] The Socialist movement allegedly consisted initially of two social strata: wage workers, or incipient proletarians, who in terms of "culture and of economic, physical and physiological conditions" are society's "weakest element"; and ex-bourgeois intellectuals, veritable "supermen," the "best instructed, most capable, and most adroit" products of society's most powerful class.[31] Such a compo-

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[26] Pp. 187–8.

[27] Pp. 187, 189, 371, 307, 401 (his capitals), 376. Some writers have suggested that Michels's Law of Oligarchy deals with the general subject of goal-reorientation as determined by internal group processes, rather than with the particular subject of democracy. For example, see Samuel Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups," in *Interest Groups on Four Continents,* ed. H. W. Ehrmann (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 184. Philip Selznick relies heavily on Michels's contributions to understanding the "unanticipated consequences" of Organization and of circumstantial adaptation. See esp. Selznick's "An Approach to the Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 8 (1943), p. 1.

[28] See A. W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (1955), p. 3. Gouldner argues that Michels, Selznick (in *TVA and the Grass Roots*), and other modern theorists of group organization quite arbitrarily assume that the "unanticipated consequences" wrought by Organization will be deplorable.

[29] Part I, ch. 3, esp. pp. 41–3.

[30] P. 238.

[31] Pp. 22, 237, 281.

sition is required because the workers, without help, are ignorant of their interests and their practical needs. It was "only when science placed itself at the service of the working class" that "the *proletarian* movement" became "a *socialist* movement." The men of "science" served at the head of the new movement. The early Socialist program was not a compromise between insight and ignorance; it was "a synthesis of the work of numerous learned men."[32]

Michels never claims the Socialist groups were democracies at *in*ception. He claims rather, that they were democratic in *con*ception —in the goals they espoused (rather than the procedures employed), and in the Interests they 'objectively' represented (as contrasted with the cause they actually promoted). Thus,

> the socialist and revolutionary parties, . . . in respect of *origin* and of *program*, represent the negation of any such tendency [as oligarchy], and have actually come into existence out of opposition thereto. . . . *In theory*, the *principle* of the social and democratic parties is the struggle against oligarchy in all its forms.[33]

More generally, Michels suggests that history's great political movements must initially be internally oligarchic, even if their goals and results are democratic. Leaders of the great leveling movements descend from the upper echelons of society; followers are recruited from the most deprived strata. As the resources of leaders and followers become more equal, the drive for societal equalization loses momentum.

(3) *Social pluralism.* Whereas the Socialist groups initially consisted of a bourgeois and a proletarian stratum, they rapidly became heterogeneous. Many processes contributed to this differentiation:

(a) General social change. The social composition of the Socialist groups was differentiated in consequence of the general process which characterizes modern life—a process not of class polarization, *à la* Marx, but of "increasing differentiation."[34]

(b) Secular social change. Worker-Socialists became additionally differentiated among themselves, and within the working class, in consequence of their various political activities. These contributed to "an even greater accentuation of the differentiation which the proletarian groupings already present. . . . "[35]

(c) Proletarian enterprise. Some worker-Socialists were transformed into petty-bourgeois in consequence of Socialist Organization. Of these, some were forced into small business in consequence of industrial blacklisting, while others exploited commercial opportunities (such as tavern-keeping) which developed in consequence of Socialist activities.[36]

(d) Bureaucratization. The advent of Socialist Organization enabled some worker-Socialists to become salaried officials. Organization served to "deproletarianize" workers, according to how "extensive" and "complicated" the "bureaucratic mechanism" of the Socialist movement became. [7]

(e) Immigration. Additional differentiation was produced by the influx of recruits drawn from various social strata. Such differentiation was facilitated by a number of factors and processes: formal accessibility of membership; the absence of repugnant slogans and policies; the increased availability of salaried posts and other vocational opportunities.[38]

In view of these changes, Michels suggests that bureaucratized associations in general, and politically sensitive associations in particular, cannot be (or long remain) socially homogeneous. Bureaucrats characteristically solicit new recruits, paying little attention to "quality." The "modern party, like the modern state, endeavors to give to its own organization the widest possible base," and to fortify the support attained by multiplying salaried posts.[39] Consequently, each mature Socialist party became, "from the social point of view," a "mixture of classes," being composed of elements fulfilling "diverse functions in the economic process."[40]

Such a social transformation might be deemed counter-democratic, from the standpoint of intra-group relations, *if* the transformation occurred in a once-homogeneous setting. In the Socialist case, as Michels portrays it, the change was from polarized dualism to horizontal and vertical pluralism.

(4) *Petty-embourgeoisement.* Whereas the authentic or early Socialist groups were dualistic and polarized, social change involved chiefly an enlargement of middle-ranking strata. This occurred through the attraction of petty-bourgeois recruits and the "deproletarianiza-

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[32] P. 238; emphasis his.

[33] P. 11; emphasis added. Elsewhere (esp. ch. 2) Michels voices doubt that such a commitment has ever truly animated a particular social group.

[34] P. 40; also pp. 289–90.

[35] P. 295.

[36] Pp. 283–8.

[37] Pp. 271–82.

[38] Pp. 265–70.

[39] Pp. 185–87.

[40] P. 387.

tion" of some worker-Socialists.

Michels summarizes this transformation as "the *embourgeoisement* of the working-class parties."[41] However, his label is not accurate, unless it is meant as a psycho-moral judgment rather than a sociological description. A bourgeois element was present at the beginning, and this element persisted. Socio-economic distance was not created or increased by Socialist Organization; it was 'filled in.'

The Socialist case cannot be cited to show that Organization invariably 'de-polarizes' groups. The 'de-polarization' was conspicuous in the Socialist case because of a distinctive social origin. However, Michels does suggest unmistakably that *Organization facilitates the maintenance and enlargement of society's middle strata.*

Bureaucratic posts are middle-class in social status. These posts allegedly multiply faster than total populations. The proliferation of bureaucratic posts serves to counteract the effects of capital-concentration, effects which otherwise would drive bankrupt small businessmen into the ranks of the proletariat.[42]

Various bureaucracies cater to various social strata. The modern state's bureaucracy caters particularly to the sons of "small manufacturers and traders, independent artisans, farmers, etc."—the sons of people who are particularly discontented and articulate, because they feel the squeeze of "expropriative capitalism" and organized labor.[43] The Catholic Church enables talented sons of petty-bourgeois and peasant families to attain middle-class professional status, whereas this status normally is unattainable because it requires long formal education at private expense.[44] Similarly,

> For the German workers, the labor movement has an importance analogous to that of the Catholic Church for certain fractions of the petty bourgeoisie and of the rural population. In both cases we have an organization which furnishes opportunities for the most intelligent members of certain classes to secure a rise in the social scale.[45]

In no instance does Michels argue that Organization polarizes society. He depicts Organization, rather, as a built-in antidote to the worst consequences of capitalism. The processes of production and exchange under capitalism supposedly spur the creation of two radically distant classes, each increasingly homogeneous. But these processes also spur Organization. The processes generated by Organization facilitate (a) a general, but uneven, improvement in the socio-economic status of the lower strata ('deproletarianization'); (b) the maintenance and enlargement of the middle strata; and (c) a kind of "social exchange" whereby some people move upward socio-economically while others move (in a non-socio-economic sense) downward.[46] Michels laments this process, because it is counter-revolutionary.

(5) *Careers opened to talent.* Throughout his book, Michels emphasizes that the individuals most directly and substantially benefited by Organization (in terms of socio-economic elevation), are society's most talented, most intelligent individuals. Organization provides "facility for ascent in the social scale" by such individuals.[47] The peasants who attain middle-class status through the Church, the bourgeois who penetrate the Prussian nobility through the military corps, the workers who become petty-bourgeois through Socialist organizations, are not hacks. At one point, indeed, Michels declares that "democracy" (his fictional starting-point of Socialist development) "ends by undergoing transformation into a form of government by the best, into an aristocracy.[48]

Such a characterization of the men who attain bureaucratic eminence seems particularly remarkable in view of one of the meanings he assigned to democracy. Although he frequently identifies democracy with absolute equality, Michels also says that democracy "gives to each [citizen] the possibility of ascending to the top of the social scale . . . annulling . . . all privileges of birth, and desiring that in human society the struggle for pre-eminence should be decided in accordance with individual capacity."[49]

On the other hand, Michels maintains that "the bureaucratic spirit corrupts character and engenders moral poverty."[50] This accusation is closely identified with his major accusation: that in elevating talented workers (along with other workers), Organization forestalls revolution.

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[41] P. 268.

[42] P. 275f.

[43] Pp. 185–7.

[44] P. 278.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Part IV, chs. 2, 3, 4. The downward movement involved in the "social exchange" is ideological and affiliational rather than socio-economic. Idealistic or opportunistic bourgeois join Socialist groups, usually as leaders.

[47] P. 279.

[48] P. 89.

[49] P. 1.

[50] P. 189.

(6) *Advent of diverse interests.* Whereas the early Socialists allegedly were endowed with a singular Interest (social-democratic revolution), social differentiation allegedly produced a conflict of Interests. Especially debilitating was the emergence of full-time, professional leaders endowed with a singular "conservative" Interest which diverges from the Interest of the "mass."

> The party is created as a means to secure an end. Having, however, become an end in itself, endowed with aims and interests of its own, it undergoes detachment, from the teleological point of view, from the class which its represents. In a party, it is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes personified. . . . By a universally applicable social law, *every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the need for the division of labor, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself.* The existence of these special interests involves a necessary conflict with the interests of the collectivity. Nay, more, social strata fulfilling peculiar functions tend to become isolated, to produce organs fitted for the defense of their own peculiar interests. In the long run they tend to undergo transformation into distinct classes.[51]

Michels rests his case for the oligarchical impact of Organization chiefly on the argument that the specialists' Interests clash with those of the "mass" and the specialists' powers are stronger. Thus the advent of "professional leadership" marks the beginning of democracy's end. This argument seems inapplicable to the generality of cases, including the Socialist cases, for these reasons:

In the first place, with regard to Socialism it is necessary to accept uncritically the assumption that initial class differences did not involve a conflict of Interests. Michels seemingly covers this eventuality by depicting the pioneer Socialist intellectuals as "ideologues" who transcended the Interest peculiar to their class status.[52]

In the second place, the notion of a conflict of Interest between leaders and "mass" spuriously presupposes a homogeneous "mass." According to Michels's analysis, the advent of professional leadership coincides with the advent of a heterogeneous rank-and-file.

In the third place, the notion that a "conservative" Interest clashes with the Interest of the "mass" arbitrarily presupposes an innovatively oriented, revolutionary "mass." Only the proletariat, according to Michels's Marxian analysis, is objectively endowed with an unconscious Interest in revolution. But worker-Socialists are not fully proletarianised. And any other membership would be endowed with an 'objective' Interest which is not diametrically different from a "conservative" Interest.

In the fourth place, while a given caste of leaders might be endowed with an identical Interest, what is *in* the interest of one leader may contradict what is *in* the interest of another. Michels devotes a chapter on "The Struggle Among the Leaders Themselves," to this chronic situation. He indicates that the policies championed by various leaders will differ *because* each leader is striving competitively to solidify his own position.

Finally, identity between the Interests of leaders and electors is not self-evidently a requisite of democratic representation. If there is a need which can be expressed in the language of Interest, it is the need that the Interest of the leader be one which impels him to conform to the *will(s)* of his electors. As it happens, the "conservative" Interest ascribed by Michels to professional leaders seems to meet this requirement. The professional leader is "conservative" in the sense that he craves to maintain his status. To that end he is likely to conform to the wishes (rather than to the 'objective' Interests) of his electors, insofar as such behavior is the most efficacious or economical means of staying in office.

(7) *Emasculation of unpopular doctrines.* While the early Socialist program allegedly voiced the true "interests of the workers,"[53] many elements of this program proved to be inexpedient politically. They were inexpedient for the game of "modern" party politics, the game of "electoral agitation" to secure votes and "direct agitation" to secure recruits.[54] In short, they were unpopular.

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[51] P. 389. A very similar argument (omitting the "teleology" of "class" fidelity), is advanced by E. H. Carr in *The New Society* (1951) and is dissected by Langer, above, note 1, p. 263.

[52] P. 280.

[53] The early Socialist platform was "the best one from which to advocate the interests of the workers . . . so that the renunciation of this platform almost always involves the loss of opportunity for defending working-class interests" (p. 116).

[54] P. 367.

Socialist and aristocratic party experience mutually demonstrated that "principles" are "often a stumbling block to a party whose main desire is to increase its membership; and to disregard principles may bring electoral advantage, if at the cost of honor."[55] To "avoid alarming" potential "adherents" and "sympathizers" who are "still outside the ideal world of socialism or democracy, the pursuit of a policy based on strict principle is shunned. . . ."[56] Similarly, since the aristocrat "recognizes" that in this "democratic epoch" he "stands alone" with his unpopular "principle," he "dissembles his true thoughts, and howls with the democratic wolves in order to secure the coveted majority."[57]

The efficient cause of this doctrinal emasculation, as of all the other changes besetting the Socialist movement, is alleged to be Organization. With increments of scale and complexity, "every struggle on behalf of ideas within the limits of the organization is necessarily regarded as an obstacle to the realization of its ends"—the ends, that is, of the bureaucrats, who yearn for recruits and safety.[58]

(8) *Renunciation of unpopular policies.* Let us examine two examples.

(a) Legalism. The old Socialist determination "to demolish the existing state" was supplanted "by the new aim, to permeate the state with the men and ideas of the party."[59] This change allegedly was realistic, in the sense that it marked a response to the fact that "the forces of the party, however well-developed, are altogether inferior and subordinate to the forces of the government."[60] The realism was prompted, however, by Organization, which created thousands of livelihoods which would be jeopardized by governmental suppression. Socialist experience demonstrates the general and ironic fact that "the party becomes increasingly inert as the strength of its organization grows."[61] Numerical and financial affluence does not breed audacity. It produces a "need for tranquillity."[62] Thus "the last link in the long chain of phenomena which confer a profoundly conservative character upon the intimate essence of the political party" is the problem of gaining governmental indulgence.[63] However, Michels acknowledges that the advent of Socialist legalism was consistent with widespread popular sentiments. He also acknowledges that the laws which the Socialists came to obey were the laws of formally democratic states.

(b) Patriotism. In response to World War I, most of the Socialist leaders in Western Europe renounced policies which seemed consistent with their avowed principle of "proletarian internationalism." This change allegedly proved conclusively that the "oligarchical tendencies" infesting "modern political parties" impose a "regressive evolution": the "external form of the party, its bureaucratic organization, definitely gains the upper hand over its soul, its doctrinal and theoretical content." Be that as it may, Michels readily acknowledges that the leaders who opted for patriotism were conforming to prevailing rank-and-file sentiment. "Throughout the proletarian mass there has not been reported a single instance of moral rebellion" against the patriotic stance.[64]

(9) *Emergence of 'representative' leaders.* Whereas the ex-bourgeois intellectuals allegedly expressed the Interests of the proletarian "mass" without belonging to that stratum, the second-generation Socialist leaders allegedly conformed more closely to the values and attitudes of their electors. The new leaders came up from the ranks. Michels emphasizes the psychological transformation which must accompany a change in status. But his conception of a psychological transformation pertains to Interests, or underlying motivations, rather than to attitudes and values. As to the latter, he portrays a close correspondence between those of workers and those of ex-worker-bureaucrats.

> The leaders who have themselves been manual workers . . . are more closely allied with the masses in their mode of thought, understand the workers better, experience the same needs as these, and are animated by the same desires. . . .

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[55] Pp. 398–9.

[56] P. 367.

[57] P. 6.

[58] P. 367.

[59] P. 374.

[60] P. 394; also pp. 367–74. Michels amended this assumption in the light of the Bolshevik and Fascist triumphs. He acknowledged the prowess of elitist-insurrectionary (non-"mass") parties during crisis periods. He also suggested that these parties alone can maintain a moral and social integrity, since they do not need to emasculate their doctrines for the sake of pluralistic electoral support. R. Michels, "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties," this REVIEW, Vol. 21 (Nov. 1927), p. 3.

[61] P. 371.

[62] P. 374.

[63] P. 367.

[64] P. 393–5.

[They commonly possess] a more precise understanding of the psychology of the masses. . . . [65]

The ex-proletarian Socialist leaders deviated from official or sacred Socialist principles, not from rank-and-file attitudes and values. The typical workman's "ideal" is "to become a petty bourgeois"; his attitudes are "optimistic," accommodative toward other classes, and "conservative."[66] If the professional leader "continues to express 'reasonable opinions,' he may be sure of securing the praise of his opponents *and* (in most cases) the admiring gratitude of the crowd."[67]

(10) *Advent of 'responsive' leaders.* Whereas the early Socialist leaders allegedly responded to the Interests of a Collectivity, the second-generation leaders responded to the manifest will(s) of constituents. Michels castigates such behavior. The new leaders' "mania for promotion" found expression in "obsequiousness" toward employers, in "a semblance of obedience to the masses," and in "demagogy." Demagogues are "courtesans of the popular will. Instead of raising the masses to their own level, they debase themselves to the level of the masses."[68] Such deplorable responsiveness exemplified the characteristic Interest of professional leaders (a yearning for status-maintenance) and the characteristic situation of professional leaders, a situation in which deviations from constituents' wishes entail relatively great risks. The situational imperatives include the following:

(a) Financial dependence. "When the leaders . . . are attached to the party organism as employees, their economic interest coincides as a rule with the interests of the party"; the "practice of paying for . . . services rendered . . . creates a bond"—a control which is not available in the case of non-salaried volunteers.[69]

(b) Meager 'personal' resources. The professional leaders were relatively deficient in those non-technical resources which allegedly facilitate domination in the absence of tangible service. The principal "factors which secure the dominion of minorities over majorities" are "money and its equivalents (economic superiority), tradition and hereditary transmission (historical superiority)," and "formal instruction . . . (so-called intellectual superiority)."[70] Also formidable are "prestige of celebrity," hypnotic eloquence, catonian self-righteousness, psycho-economic self-sufficiency, and "force of will which reduces to obedience less powerful wills."[71] Compared with their predecessors, the second-generation Socialist leaders were meagerly endowed with these resources. They were not suited to become "temporal divinities" in the eyes of idolatrous masses.[72] Such idolatry, with all the authority it confers, is not likely to devolve upon "strict and prosaic" bureaucrats.[73]

(c) Alert constituents. Michels cites the "general immobility and passivity of the masses" as a major source of "oligarchy in the democratic parties." In such groups, drawn chiefly from the lower social strata, turnover among members is high and turnout for meetings is low. The "leaders, when compared with the masses, whose composition varies from moment to moment, constitute a more stable and constant element." The "gregarious idleness" of the rank-and-file facilitates "the influence of the leader over the masses" and the leaders' "independence" from the masses.[74] This condition varies among groups not according to organizational scale or complexity, but according to social composition and concern with the affairs of a group. The advent of professional Socialist leadership coincided with, and facilitated, an influx of petty-bourgeois members, an elevation of the socio-economic status of worker-Socialists, and an enlargement of the personal, tangible significance of Socialist affiliations.

(d) Non-available 'official' resources. The advent of professional leadership coincided with the establishment of regular, 'official' treasuries, organs of communication, files, agendas, meeting dates, mailing lists, and patronage. Michels discusses with keen insight the way such resources may be used by leaders to disarm challengers. But he does not indicate that these resources become more formidable, more available, in proportion to the scale or complexity of organization. He does testify that "decentralization" of authority occurred, and this presumably involved a dispersal of control over the official resources. He also testifies that Organization entails procedural formalization; this presumably involves specification of legitimate uses of official resources.

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[65] P. 297. The second-generation Socialist leaders, in addition to being psychologically and sociologically more representative than their predecessors, also were 'ethnically' more representative. The early leaders (and many followers) were bourgeois, militant, and Jewish. (pp. 258–63, 28, 324, 342)

[66] Pp. 289, 319, 171.

[67] P. 306; emphasis added.

[68] Pp. 89, 165.

[69] Pp. 389, 114.

[70] P. 80.

[71] Pp. 71–2.

[72] P. 67.

[73] P. 301.

[74] Pp. 400, 50–2, 79, 98.

(e) Individual technical expendability. Michels argues that the "technical indispensability of leadership" proved to be "the principal cause of oligarchy in the democratic parties."[75] This seemingly acknowledges that the leaders ultimately proved durable on account of their authentic utility to their followers, rather than their superiority in wealth, celebrity, oratory and other factors which promote obedience without necessarily rendering service. However, Michels's concept of "technical indispensability" is elusive; it merits an extended analysis.

In one sense, the "technical indispensability of leadership" signifies merely that a particular function, leader*ship*, cannot be forsaken.[76] Since those who perform this function are likely to enjoy some advantage in one-to-one contests with challengers (the advantage, for example, of incumbency), there must be an element of Oligarchy in Organization. But this tells nothing about the relative advantages of leaders in various organizational and sociological contexts.

In another sense, Michels seemingly is suggesting that an individual's power (his freedom of action and security of station) depend ultimately upon the 'objective' utility of the skills at his disposal. One who is richly endowed with a skill which is rare and prized approaches technical indispensability. Such an endowment raises the problem of discretionary action. Gratitude for past service and diffidence toward current complexities may impel clients to grant their agents a broad range of discretion. Agents thought to possess rare skills may be retained even if they defy their clients' policy directives, on the expectation that in future the officials will prove to be technically adept *and* responsive.

On this subject Michels testifies that

> This special competence, this expert knowledge, which the leader acquires in matters inaccessible, or almost inaccessible, to the mass, gives him a security of tenure which conflicts with the essential principles of democracy.
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> * * *
>
> The democratic masses are . . . compelled to submit to a restriction of their own wills when they are forced to give to their leaders an authority which is in the long run destructive to the very principle of democracy. . . . The history of the working-class parties continually furnishes instances in which the leader has been in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental principles of the movement, but in which the rank and file have not [drawn] the logical consequences of this conflict, because they feel that they cannot get along without the leader, and cannot dispense with the qualities he has acquired in virtue of the very position to which they have themselves elevated him, and because they do not see their way to find an adequate substitute. Numerous are the . . . leaders who are in opposition to the rank and file at once theoretically and practically . . . [The rank and file] seldom dare to give [the] leaders their dismissal.[77]

If indeed the second-generation Socialist leaders could survive "practical" conflicts more readily than their predecessors, then one could not conclude that the new leaders were relatively responsive to the will(s) of their electors. But Michels does not systematically develop, or sustain, the charge that the new leaders could readily retain office in the face of "practical" conflicts (deviations from the policy-directives of their constituents). He confines himself almost exclusively to the charge that the new leaders persistently, and securely, retained office in spite of "theoretical" conflicts (deviations from the policies 'demanded' by Socialist doctrine).

That "practical" conflicts actually dwindled in the course of Socialist development seems evidenced by the nature of the changes in Socialist policies and by the growth of Socialist membership. The new leaders did the popular, rather than the theoretically 'correct,' thing.

That "practical" conflicts *necessarily* dwindled in the course of Socialist development—dwindled *in consequence of Organization*—

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[75] P. 400.

[76] "The mass *per se* is amorphous, and therefore needs division of labor, specialization, and guidance." This "incompetence" is "incurable." (p. 404). Sartori observes that what is rendered as "leadership" in the English translation of *Political Parties* appears as *Führerstum* and as *sisterma di capi* in the German and Italian editions. The latter terms allegedly connote "rulership," or "headship" or some sort of arrangement more sinister than what is conveyed by "leadership." Sartori, above, note 1, p. 110.

[77] Pp. 83–83, 86.

seems likely in view of all the considerations advanced earlier in this article and in view of two more considerations.

First, Socialist Organization facilitated, and was accompanied by, material affluence. To that extent, the Socialist partisans acquired more resources with which they could search for agents who were technically qualified and psychologically disposed to be responsive.

Second, Socialist Organization involved task-specialization, and task-specialization often involves task-simplification. "It must not be supposed that the technical competence of the leaders is necessarily profound. . . . "[78] Moreover, the "epoch" of Organization also is a time when "science puts at every one's disposal" such "efficient means of instruction" that "even the youngest may speedily become thoroughly well-instructed." Thus there is "less need for accumulated personal experience of life. . . . Today everything is quickly acquired, even that experience in which formerly consisted the sole and genuine superiority of the old over the young."[79] To that extent, the supply of qualified technicians grows more abundant as organization develops. Consequently, the risks involved in defying an employer's policy-directives become more substantial.

On this showing—on Michels's showing—political survival in large-scale, complex organizations would seem to require that officials gratify the wishes of those they are hired to serve, regardless of the Interests of the latter. The result may be denounced as "obsequiousness" and as infidelity to popular interests, or it may be described as democratization.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Contrary to prevailing belief, then, Robert Michels actually provided a favorable account of the compatibility of Organization and democracy. While maintaining that Organization is incompatible with pure democracy, and that increments of Organization produce counter-democratic changes in associations which initially are pure democracies, he also suggested (in the case of European Socialism and in broader theoretical terms), that Organization can and frequently does accompany and facilitate a multitude of changes which constitute or facilitate democratization.

Among the conditions he linked to Organization are augmented formal rights and privileges, a general increase in social wealth, more prosperity and security and leisure and education and sophistication among the lower social strata, increased horizontal but not vertical social differentiation, enhanced opportunities for talented individuals to ascend socially, and the advent within public and private associations of leaders who are conspicuously qualified technically, disposed socio-psychologically, and obliged circumstantially to conform to the policy-preferences of their electors.

Far from being a pessimistic democrat, Michels was a pessimistic Romantic Revolutionist and a pessimistic Scientific Paternalist. He denounced Organization for promoting the amelioration instead of the radical purification of society. He detested Organization for promoting the manifest wishes rather than the 'objective' Interests of the "masses."

Michels's solicitude for the welfare of the "masses" evidently was linked with a profound disdain for the judgment of the "masses." In the light of his values and his beliefs, it seems understandable that Michels accommodated himself to Fascism.

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[78] P. 83n.

[79] P. 76.

CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS: ENLIGHTENMENT AND BUREAUCRACY[1]

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The Thirty Years War, though essentially religious in origin, assumed towards its end a distinctly political complexion. It became a trial of strength between the major powers of Europe, resulting in the unquestioned supremacy of France and Austria, the establishment of Switzerland as a fully fledged sovereign state, and the extension of the dominion of Sweden and Denmark. Most, if not all, of these changes occurred at the expense of the territorial unity of the German Empire. At the same time the disruption of German Imperial unity brought in its wake the effective assertion of sovereignty on the part of some 360 German principalities. The political unity of 'Germany' became a legal fiction.

Under these changed circumstances the generally prevalent Roman Law, based as it was on the idea of strong central administration, was no longer in accordance with the political realities of Germany. Faced with the strains and stresses caused by particularist tendencies it increasingly had to come to terms with a mode of legal and political thinking that was preoccupied with specific local circumstances and contemporary needs rather than with the universal applicability of general laws. Henceforth the religious autonomy of the diverse German principalities came to entail also the right of the ruler to determine the scope and nature of legislation pertinent to the requirements—as he saw them—of his own domain. Henceforth, too, the search began for a German theory of law and politics. Indeed, it would not be wrong to say that political science as a distinct academic discipline took shape at the very time that Germany disintegrated as a political unit.[2]

Apart from the emergence of a school of positive law, however, this period is also marked by a renewed interest in Natural Law. Hugo Grotius's *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625) was the first systematic attempt to translate the hitherto individualistic and theological interpretation of Natural Law into a secular theory of international or inter-state relations. His work became the basis of a new appraisal of Natural Law in the law faculties of European universities. In Germany, however, Grotius's ideas encountered a distinctly hostile reception in view of the persisting domination of theology over all fields of learning, and over jurisprudence in particular. Samuel Pufendorf's *De jure naturae et gentium* (1672), in which he further developed Grotius's conception of Natural Law met with the same fate. Protestant, no less than Catholic orthodoxy was in arms, determined to protect the ecclesiastical authority over Natural Law against any inroads of secular thinking.

I

Within this theologically oriented atmosphere young Thomasius received his first legal and philosophical training in Leipzig.[3] It is not surprising, therefore, that his first reactions to the writings of Grotius and Pufendorf were not favourable. Only after his departure from Leipzig for Frankfurt-on-the-Oder—where he came under the influence of one of the most famous jurists of the period, Samuel Stryk (1640–1710)—did Thomasius's thinking undergo a drastic change. And by the time he took his doctorate (1678) he had become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Pufendorf's legal and political philosophy. Thomasius's subsequent friendship with Pufendorf was to prove the most abiding feature in his rather turbulent and changing personal relationships. Pufendorf, in turn, thought no less highly of his new disciple. "You have the courage," he wrote to him, "to put into print views which I wholly share, but which I did not have the nerve to express publicly."[4]

[1] I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the German Academic Exchange Service for two research fellowships which enabled me to spend extended periods of study in Germany in preparation of this article. I would also like to record my debt to Professor Isaiah Berlin (Oxford) for encouraging me to undertake this research as a follow-up to my studies on Herder's political thought, and to Professors Kurt Berger (Marburg) and Max Horkheimer (Frankfurt) for their help in making source material accessible to me.

[2] Benedict Carpzov (1595–1666) and Hermann Conring (1606–81) are two outstanding names among political jurists of this period anxious to formulate a theory of positive law in Germany.

[3] Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) was born in Leipzig, the son of a university professor. His father first introduced him to the writings of Grotius.

[4] The letter is dated Berlin, February 25, 1688. See Emil Gigas, *Briefe Samuel Pufendorfs an Christian Thomasius, 1687–1693* (München and Leipzig, 1897), p. 14.

After a brief sojourn in Holland Thomasius settled down in his native Leipzig to embark on a law career. But in spite of his success as an attorney he soon tired of the protracted mode of litigation characteristic of contemporary legal procedures. By 1686 he decided to follow in his father's footsteps and devote his life to university teaching. His fiery temperament coupled with his 'heretical' approach to law and philosophy, however, soon brought him into conflict with the orthodox theologians and his conservative colleagues. Estrangement was followed by hostility and open persecution. It soon became evident that to remain true to his convictions Thomasius had to leave Leipzig. With the help of Pufendorf and the Prussian Court Thomasius was invited to come in 1690 to Halle, which was then in the process of becoming a university. Although here again he could not entirely avoid conflict with his theological colleagues (including the Pietists in his later years), he nonetheless remained in Halle until his death.

The nature and extent of Thomasius's impact upon eighteenth-century thought in Germany may be gauged by the reputation his works enjoyed some time after his death. A. L. Schlözer, the great eighteenth-century publicist and historian, attributed to him an influence more widespread and beneficial than that of the Greek philosophers.[5] Herder spoke of him as "a man such as his Age longed for."[6] Gottsched, Lessing, Schiller and Goethe expressed similar sentiments.[7] However more profoundly Leibniz's philosophy was to determine the intellectual orientation of the German Enlightenment on the one hand, and Pufendorf's legal doctrines the speculations of German political theorists on the other, it was to Thomasius that the emergence of a new critical temper of thought and of a new conception of the nature and functions of political rule owed its very existence. Whereas Leibniz addressed his ideas to the politically mighty and influential with whom he enjoyed considerable favour and respect, Thomasius appealed to all who were able and willing to read his writings or attend his lectures. Leibniz chose the methods of high-level diplomacy and the channels of scientific journals and learned societies, disregarding the as yet virtually inarticulate and politically ineffectual sphere of public opinion. Thomasius employed the weapons of wit and satire in his bold and occasionally aggressive attempts to arouse a critical public awareness through his popular monthlies. Yet, contrary to what one might expect, it was Thomasius who achieved the more tangible and socio-politically more significant results. The dissemination of culture, the dispersal of the fog of ignorance and superstition that was still enveloping the major part of contemporary mankind, the awakening of a more humane, open-minded and public-spirited attitude among all sections of the population: they were the fruit of his pioneering work.[8]

II

Free enquiry was his first demand. The search for truth must not be impeded by reverence for authority or by established beliefs and prejudices.

> Challenge prejudice as the prime source of all errors and mistakes. Never rely in the discovery of truth upon the authority of any one person whosoever he may be, if you yourself lack the inner conviction that what has hitherto been generally believed is founded upon principles of undoubted validity.[9]

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[5] Cited in H. Luden, *Christian Thomasius, nach seinen Schicksalen und Schriften* (Berlin, 1805), p. 300.

[6] *Werke*, ed. Suphan (33 vols., Berlin, 1877–1913), VIII, 234; see also V, 413; IX, 425; XIV, 323; XVI, 594; XVII, 205 and 274; XVIII, 128; and XXIII, 70, 466 and 493.

[7] See Th. W. Danzel, *Gottsched und seine Zeit* (Leipzig, 1848), p. 330; Lessing, *Werke*, ed. Lachmann (Leipzig, 1900), vol. XV, pp. 292 and 382 and vol. XXII, p. 278; Gräf and Leitzmann, ed., *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe* (Leipzig, 1912), vol. II, p. 215.

[8] For an interesting study of the points of contact and divergence between Leibniz and Thomasius, see Karl Biedermann, "Zwei berühmte Leipziger," *Westermann's Monatshefte,* Vol. 56 (1884), pp. 363–70.

[9] Christian Thomasius, *Ausübung der Vernunfft-Lehre* (Halle, 1705), p. 16. (The translation of cited passages is mine.) In his own lectures Thomasius urged his students to think independently and not to accept anything blindly. "I ask you to give me a fair hearing, but I do not mean by this blind trust. I do not want you to believe everything I am telling you; . . . you will not displease me in the slightest by disagreeing with me. On the contrary, the stronger your doubts, the sharper your opposition, the more I shall like it. No one need to fear that he will thus cause me to become impatient." He also encouraged them to attend other lectures to hear diverse views. "Thus you will learn to doubt, and I shall feel indebted to you if as a result you will find errors in what I teach and thus help me to correct them." *Summarischer Entwurff derer Grundlehren* (Halle, 1699), paras. 34 and 48–56.

The individual mind must be free to accept or reject ideas irrespective of their source or sanction; it must be free to follow its own light, its own reason. Even theology must accept the challenge of free enquiry in the light of human reason: "The mysteries of God do indeed surpass the human understanding, but they are not incompatible with it."[10]

Thomasius's second main aspiration as an *Aufklärer* was to break down the barriers that separated the world of learning from practical every-day life. Learning, he maintained, must serve the needs of society. It must cease to be regarded as the exclusive property of the few, for it is in the interest of civil society that anyone who can profit from education should have access to it, even women. But education must be oriented toward practical goals, and no one should deem himself educated if he does not succeed in putting his education to some practical use.[11] The universities, therefore, Thomasius demanded, must turn out men who will make their mark *"in vita civili,"* and for this reason show greater concern for the actual challenges of this world rather than for the more hypothetical cares of the next.[12] To this end Thomasius put forward some radical proposals for the reform of university education. In particular he urged the teaching of Economics and Political Science as academic disciplines in their own right.[13] He also decided, against accepted academic custom, to use German instead of Latin in most of his writings and lectures, thus removing the last vestige of medieval scholasticism. He justified his choice in these words:

> Everybody uses his mother-tongue. After all, the Greek philosophers did not write in Hebrew, nor did the Roman philosophers write in Greek.[14]

Undoubtedly Thomasius's decision to use German, coupled with his determination to write in a manner intelligible to the layman, accounted for the popularity which his writings enjoyed. His works were republished in several editions and Thomasius was constantly urged by his publishers to write new books. Not since the days of Luther were the works of a German scholar so much in demand by people of all walks of life.[15] What is more, his deliberate cultivation of the German language helped to restore some sense of self-confidence and self-respect among the bourgeoisie *vis à vis* the "Frenchified courtiers and nobles" composing high society.[16] Thomasius accurately diagnosed the tendency to copy everything French (even French sins and diseases, as he mockingly remarks) as the most pathetic result of the Thirty Years War which, all the fearful material destruction apart, had fatally damaged the moral fibre of the German middle classes.

> There can be no doubt . . . that if our ancestors, the old Germans were to rise and return to Germany, they would have not the slightest notion that they are back in their fatherland among their own countrymen . . . French clothes, French food, French furniture, French language, French customs, French sins, yes even French diseases are everywhere the fashion.[17]

At the same time he did not deny that there was much that the Germans could learn from their French neighbors. What they had to guard against was blind imitation. The first thing they ought to learn from the French was self-respect and pride in their own language and socio-cultural traditions. A foreign, and particularly a dead language, might well be suited for the analysis of well established notions and concepts, but scientific and literary *development* no less than its wider *assimilation* required the use of a living mother-tongue.[18]

As a further means to help circulate his ideas Thomasius published in 1688 the first monthly journal in the German language. It was intended to be scholarly and entertaining at the same time. Above all, his *Monatsgespräche* aimed to forge a link between the academic world and the world of every-day affairs. With complete disregard for his personal prestige and safety Thomasius attacked everything that he considered obsolete, pedantic, inhuman or intolerant. His chief campaign was directed against witch trials, religious persecution, and the use of torture to extract confessions. He even defended Jews (though he always felt he had better add that he had no friends among the Jews) and atheists against prevalent superstitions and libellous accusations.[19]

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[10] Thomasius, *Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre* (Halle, 1691), p. 82.

[11] Ibid., pp. 84–8.

[12] Ibid., p. 2.

[13] Thomasius, *Historie der Weiszheit und Thorheit* (Halle, 1693), pp. 1–59.

[14] Thomasius, *Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[15] See Walther Bienert, *Der Anbruch der christlichen deutschen Neuzeit dargestellt an Wissenschaft und Glauben des Christian Thomasius* (Halle, 1934), p. 353; and the bibliography in Rolf Lieberwirth, *Christian Thomasius, sein wissenschaftliches Lebenswerk* (Weimar 1955).

[16] Max v. Boehn, *Modes and Manners* (The Eighteenth Century), transl. Joan Joshua (London, 1935), vol. IV, p. 38.

[17] Thomasius, *Kleine Teutsche Schriften* (Halle, 1701), "Christian Thomasius eröffnet der studierenden Jugend zu Leipzig in einem Discours, welcher Gestalt man denen Frantzosen in gemeinem Leben und Wandel nachahmen solle," p. 3.

[18] Thomasius, *Kleine Teutsche Schriften, op. cit.*, pp. 19–35.

Thomasius's decision to use German in university lecturing has been hailed by an American scholar as an epoch-making event, of equal if not greater importance than the "revolution in England" that occurred in the same year. "The year 1688 is memorable for two revolutions—one in England, the other in Germany. In England a conspiracy—partly patriotic, partly rascally—dethroned the last Stuarts; in Germany a young Leipzig professor began giving lectures not in Latin but in German . . . A plausible argument might be made to show that of these two revolutions the act of the German professor was really the more important."[20]

Be that as it may (though we must correct a factual error—Thomasius was not yet a *professor* at Leipzig), the year 1688 is significant also for quite another Thomasian event. Before 1688 Thomasius, following closely the Natural Law teachings of Grotius and Pufendorf, was an ethical rationalist, imbued with unlimited optimism regarding the rational powers of man. After 1688, chiefly as the result of such strangely contrasting influences as those of Pietism on the one hand, and those of Bayle and Locke on the other, Thomasius reveals a much more ambivalent attitude toward 'reason' and a far less optimistic faith in its efficacy to achieve by itself man's secular redemption. He no longer held 'reason' to be equivalent to the traditional Cartesian 'ratio,' to be valued for its own sake as the supreme and infallible arbiter of truth. He now qualifies it by the adjective 'sound' (*gesund*) and makes its objective validity contingent upon conformity to empirical observation by sense perception.[21] Without the latter, reason ceases to be "of use." Sense perception must not, therefore, be opposed to reason but considered as its essential complement.

> Neither sense perception without reason, nor reason without sense perception, can be of use to man. He is therefore in need of both if he is to arrive at truth. Indeed, sense perception is the very basis for the functioning of reason for it forms, so to speak, the foundation upon which reason can construct its edifice. . . . It follows that none of the propositions derived from the operation of reason alone can be accepted as true if they conflict with knowledge gained from sense experience.[22]

It would not be wrong to say that 'reason,' in Thomasius's use, approximates very closely to Locke's concept of 'reflexion,' except that Thomasius, in an attempt to reconcile Locke's Empiricism with Rationalist elements, stresses its partly *a priori* origins. Man, he says, would never be capable of forming ideas of numbers, of extension and time (*ideae quantitatis*), were it not for his *a priori* capacity for entering into pure processes of thought (*actus purus der Gedanken*). Indeed, man would not be man if he were able to reflect in response to sense perceptions alone but never independently of them.[23] It is of historical interest that Thomasius was one of the first major thinkers to depart from the prevalent Cartesian mode of Rationalism and to introduce Locke's ideas into Germany.[24]

However, Thomasius's main concern was not with epistemology. His chief attention was focused on ethics or 'practical philosophy,' as he called it. Epistemology, logic and metaphysics had value for him only in so far as they assisted man in his practical life. Their function was the removal of "prejudices" and their sphere of application those problem areas which are within the grasp of the human understanding.[25] In view of this preoccupation with the world of action, it is not surprising that ethics plays such a pivotal part in Thomasius's thought. What *is* surprising is that, whilst ethics is sharply distinguished from religion and theology, moral *action* is made contingent on man's faith in divine grace. The clue to this apparent paradox lies in Thomasius's doctrine of the human will.

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[19] Thomasius, *Freymüthige Lustige und Ernsthaffte jedoch Vernunfft- und Gesetz-Mäßige Gedancken oder Monatsgespräche* (Halle, 1690). See also Thomasius, *Ernsthaffte, aber doch Muntere und Vernünfftige Thomasische Gedancken und Erinnerungen über allerhand auserlesene Juristische Händel* (where many of the monthly articles are reprinted), (4 vols., Halle, 1720–21); see esp. I, 105–118 (on superstition and libel), 125 ff. (on torture), 223–5 (on suspecting Jews of ritual murder), and 197–206, as also II, 300–39, and III, 221–33 (on witch trials). See further *Chr. Thomasius Erinnerung wegen seiner künfftigen Winter Lectionen* (Halle, 1702), pp. 14–18 (on superstition, witch-trials and torture).

[20] Andrew Dickson White, *Seven Great Statesmen in the Warfare of Humanity with Unreason* (London, 1910), p. 113. This is the only work that so far has appeared in English which devotes more than a passing mention to Thomasius.

[21] It should be noted, however, that Thomasius, even before he became familiar with Locke's philosophy, evidences empiricist tendencies: see his *Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae* (Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1688), lib. I, cap. 1, para. 51, and cap. 2, para. 39.)

[22] Thomasius, *Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes* (Halle, 1699), pp. 7–8; see also *Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre, op. cit.*, pp. 139, 155 and 225f.

[23] *Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre, op. cit.*, pp. 168–72.

[24] Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*, which also transmitted Locke's ideas to Germany, were not published until 1765.

Not 'understanding'—by which Thomasius means the operation of both reason and sense-perception—but 'will' is held to be the driving power in human actions. It is quite wrong, Thomasius insists, to attribute to the understanding any initiating power, for only the will is capable of engendering actions or thoughts that aim at actions.[26] Admittedly, it is the understanding which recognizes the distinction between good and evil, yet by itself it is quite powerless to determine the will in either direction.[27] The will, on the other hand, Thomasius maintains, is by itself wholly oriented towards evil. It causes man to be the most wretched of all living creatures.[28] Thomasius does not deny that man also has propensities toward kindness and benevolence, but these sentiments are in "daily combat" with the far superior power of the will and their only chance of success lies in divine intervention. Man by himself is incapable of conquering this "most evil principle of the world."[29] The recognition of this inability leaves him no option but to seek aid from a higher power. Whilst he can have no certainty about enlisting God's aid, he cannot but entertain the belief in its possibility if he is not to despair.[30] Faith in divine grace, therefore, is postulated by Thomasius as a psychological need. He does not specify any particular faith, nor does he base faith on revelation. But he is adamant in treating secular happiness as a matter of divine ordinance:

> God has not willed his creatures to lead a life of sadness or unhappiness, but one of happiness and joy. For happiness in this world, if it is different from that of the next, is so only in degree but not in kind.[31]

Two circumstances, then, combine to necessitate the postulate of religious belief: man's evil will and his helplessness to overcome it solely by his own efforts, on the one hand, and the conviction that it is his right and duty to promote his happiness on earth, on the other.

'Happiness' is equated by Thomasius to 'reasonable love.' He defines it formally as "that unique state of serenity or 'inner peace' in which man is imbued with the conviction that he can bring his will into harmony with what the understanding [*i.e.*, his reason and his senses] recognizes as morally compelling."[32] Thomasius stipulates further that man's attainment of this state must be a matter for each individual to pursue in his own fashion, free from any external compulsion.[33] No theological dogma, no moral theory can teach man how to attain happiness, let alone any external secular or ecclesiastical 'authority.' Even reason can do no more than act as a practical guide.[34] What is involved, according to Thomasius, is a somewhat tenuous and uneasy combination of faith (in a divinely ordained state of human felicity) and the realization that happiness is something that has to be struggled for since it is not 'given' by nature. If it were, all people would naturally be happy people and the state of nature would be in effect the morally most perfect form of human and social existence. But, patently enough, this is not so:

> If we view our fellow human beings, indeed the rest of mankind—in so far as it is known to us—with a dispassionate eye, we have to admit that most men are the unhappiest of creatures, even if many of them would not care to admit it.[35]

The existence of man's 'inner peace,' then, though a highly desirable condition for social life, can hardly be relied upon as its sufficient condition, if society is to attain any degree of permanence, or transcend the narrow confines of family relations. Thomasius does not wholly deny the existence of a social propensity in man —indeed he considers it as a corollary of 'reasonable love,'[36] but he regards it as too frail, too precarious and uncertain to guarantee man's 'outer peace' which he deems essential for man's life in civil society.

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[25] *Einleitung. . .*, pp. 84–93, and 294.

[26] Thomasius, *Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes, op. cit.*, p. 183.

[27] See his *Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium* (Halle, 1705), lib. I, cap. 1, para. 37: "Voluntas semper movet intellectum." See also *Versuch, op. cit.*, p. 184.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 187–8.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[30] Thomasius, *Einleitung der Sitten-Lehre* (Halle, 1692; edition here used, 1720), I, p. 8; see also his *Ausübung der Sitten-Lehre* (Halle, 1696), p. 95.

[31] Thomasius, *Summarischer Entwurff derer Grundlehren, op. cit.*, para. 61.

[32] Thomasius, *Einleitung der Sitten-Lehre, op. cit.*, IV, p. 187.

[33] *Ibid.*, IX, p. 369.

[34] Thomasius, *Ausübung der Sitten-Lehre, op. cit.*, p. 516.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

Before we proceed to inquire what political inferences Thomasius draws from his conception of the psychological and moral nature of man, it would seem opportune at this point to reflect for a moment how it was possible to reconcile, let alone identify so pessimistic a view of human reason with a way of thought in which reason was held to be the key to all human progress and perfection. In posing this question we are at once brought face to face with what distinguished the German Enlightenment from its French and, to a lesser extent, its English counterparts. For whereas the former shared with the latter two the affirmation of the individual's right to question established truths and their sanction by external authority, this affirmation found manifold and diverse expression, and the belief in the supremacy of reason was by no means consistently maintained.[37] With most of the *Aufklärer* —even Christian Wolff—the challenge was primarily directed against religious orthodoxy, and it sprang, not from religious hostility or sceptical disbelief, but rather from a deeply felt concern for religious values in an age of religious disenchantment. Some of the most passionately religious thinkers of the era were engaged in the quest for such a religious re-orientation. And since to many of these the aim of this re-orientation was almost identical with a return to what they considered to be the essence of the Lutheran creed, it can hardly be surprising that Thomasius's pessimistic, and in this respect essentially Lutheran, outlook seemed to them both revolutionary and traditionally congenial at one and the same time. Finally, it must be remembered that Thomasius was the first since the Reformation to challenge the religious and intellectual *status quo* in Germany in so bold a manner. To the young men of the German Enlightenment, Thomasius was above all the intrepid man of action, the professor who scorned academic pedantry, the prophet of a new dawn. His pessimistic doctrines did little to cloud the 'progressivist' image he had created in their minds.

III

Thomasius's political views, no less than his ethics, embody the fusion of traditionally held and challengingly novel ideas. Whilst his ethics deals with man's inner contentment and with activities the nature and value of which would be annihilated were they made subject to compulsion, his political works are concerned with those areas of human existence where external compulsion is the very hallmark. Whereas the 'inner peace' of the individual is legitimately his own personal affair, in which he may or may not wish to seek the guidance of the church, his 'outer peace'—concerning his material welfare and security—is the responsibility, and the sole responsibility, of a body specifically instituted for that purpose and subject to no other law than that which it has itself created.[38] Following Hobbes, Thomasius demanded the supremacy of secular law over ecclesiastical law in all matters affecting the external relations of citizens within a state. Only the law of the state is law proper. The so-called divine law and the Natural Law are only pseudo-laws, for they are devoid of physical sanction and hence not enforceable. Might is the sole effective source of right.[39] Natural Law, therefore, has no binding or compelling force other than that of a moral precept.[40] It is entirely for the individual to decide which, if any, natural laws he regards as morally binding in the light of his 'sound reason.'[41] Unlike his immediate precursors Grotius and Pufendorf, Thomasius sharply distinguished Natural Law from divine law. Neither depends upon the other. Divine laws are those which the individual voluntarily accepts as guidance for his religious life. They too are of entirely subjective relevance and of purely individual concern.[42] Thus we find Thomasius in support of individualism in the moral and religious sphere and of absolutism in the politico-legal sphere. In the final analysis, however, individual rights can only claim a conditional autonomy for they can only be exercised if backed by positive law. To be sure, Thomasius recognizes the existence of certain innate and inalienable rights—the *iura connata* —as distinct from those which have emerged in the course of positive legislation—the *iura acquisita*.[43] But, again unlike Grotius and Pufendorf, he is not prepared to treat them as divinely ordained rights in the Christian tradition, by virtue of which the individual would be justified in certain circumstances to resist the command of the ruler. Such resistance is as categorically ruled out in Thomasius's political theory as it is in that of Hobbes.[44]

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[36] Thomasius, *Einleitung der Sitten-Lehre, op. cit.*, II, pp. 89–91.

[37] See Hans M. Wolff, *Die Weltanschauung der deutschen Aufklärung* (2d ed., Bern and München, 1963).

[38] Thomasius, *Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae, op. cit.*, lib. II, cap. 2, para. 7; see also his *Der Politische Philosophus* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1724), particularly the preface (*Vorrede*).

[39] *Institutiones, op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 1, para. 30.

[40] *Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium, op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 6, para. 21.

[41] *Institutiones, op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 1, para. 3.

[42] *Ibid.*, lib. II, cap. I, para. 35. For a fuller treatment of Thomasius's legal theories, see Erik Wolf, *Große Rechtsdenker* (4th ed., Tübingen, 1963), pp. 379–414 to which I am in debt.

Yet in his account of man in the state of nature, Thomasius is almost as much at variance with Hobbes's image of a '*bellum omnium contra omnes*' as with Grotius's hypothesis of an instinctive '*appetitus socialis*.' There is no ground, Thomasius feels, for postulating either. Man in the state of nature is neither a social animal, nor a furious *lupus*. He is a weak, isolated, lonely creature, in constant fear of disasters, inclined by his evil will to appropriate more than his due share of such of the scarce things in life as he can come by. In so doing he is forever courting the danger of coming into conflict with his fellows. Whilst he is aware of an inner 'law' which bids him to respect the 'rights' of others, he is at the same time conscious of its insufficient authority and compelling power. The victim of conflicting impulses, he is a danger to himself and to others. Mutual fear and distrust are the inevitable result, making social intercourse precarious if not impossible.[45]

In effect, it is true, Thomasius arrives at the same position as Hobbes, but he arrives there by a slightly different route. His man of nature is a man of conflicts, inherently capable of social cooperation no less than of acts of inconsiderate selfishness. He is not necessarily 'at war' with his fellows. He is simply incapable of forming any lasting social links whatsoever, for he can see no common basis on which to maintain them. For Thomasius, therefore, human 'society' in any form or shape is inconceivable prior to the institution of civil society. Grotius's notion of a natural, biological 'community' has as little meaning for him as Pufendorf's idea of a natural society bound by common traditions and customs. Civil society does not *evolve*, it is the result of a conscious and deliberate *political act*. The social contract brings together *individuals* who prior to its existence were isolated atomistic units. But although Thomasius explains *why* the social contract comes into being and also describes the manner in which it is formed (here he follows traditional lines), he fails to give a plausible explanation of *how* it can come about in the first place under the conditions which he depicts. In this respect Thomasius is no more successful than other social contract theorists before and after him.

According to Thomasius the *reason* for the social contract is man's growing realization that the state of nature is an insufferable situation in that it miserably fails to safeguard, let alone promote, his individual interests.[46] He therefore, as a primary step, concludes with other like-minded individuals (presumably in a flash of rationality or 'reasonable love') an agreement to form a permanent union.[47] The contracting individuals or at least a majority of them, then issue a proclamation which embodies the constitution of their union and a decree which lays down the form that government is to assume.[48] A second agreement thereupon empowers one man, or a number of men, to take on the functions of government. By virtue of this second compact each man not only gives up his natural freedom but also submits his will and his energies to the will and government of the ruler or rulers.[49] The purpose of the government thus formed is the exercise of supreme and sovereign authority with a view to safeguarding the civil happiness of the state—which Thomasius, following Hobbes, calls a 'commonwealth.' By 'civil happiness' Thomasius means the citizens' 'external peace,' that is, their welfare and safety and their protection from offences against, or attacks upon their property.[50] 'Welfare' is conceived, however, in a collective or public rather than a purely private sense, for the commonwealth is to enjoy complete economic autarchy in addition to, or rather, in support of, its political sovereignty. To ensure this, the individual citizen is expected to subordinate his private interests to the interests of the state (as interpreted by the government), irrespective of whether he believes these to conflict with his own or not.[51]

Thomasius is quite explicit regarding the form of government which he prefers. He distinguishes between healthy and sick types of governments. Whilst he admits that any type of government may undergo crises owing to changing and frequently unforeseeable exigencies (including the varying quality of administrators), he insists that there are some types where political diseases are particularly endemic. Among these latter he includes all forms of mixed governments in which not only functions but even decision-making powers are shared between different, though coordinate, bodies.[52] Healthy government, on the other hand, in Thomasius's view, requires the concentration of power in the hands of those whose responsibility it is to rule. Thomasius recognizes the need for persuasive power in addition to physical power. Indeed he considers the former—in the hands of educators in the widest sense—to be vitally important to the smooth running of the state. Nonetheless, the 'advisors' must be clearly distinguished from the 'rulers,' and the supreme authority of the latter must never be called in question. For the basis of sound government is effective government. And effective government is disturbed or made impossible if those who are not willing to heed advice are left in any doubt or ambiguity about the source of the law and the enforceable sanctions at the disposal of the law-giver.[53] Whereas in the state of nature each individual is in a position to enforce his will by having recourse to physical force and thus wage 'war' upon his fellow, in civil society it is only the ruler who can use force in order to punish the legal offender. The citizen is merely entitled to bring an action before the courts (*actio*), not to mete out punishment (*poena*). There can, therefore, never be a 'right' (in the legal and hence, for Thomasius, in the only proper sense) which the subject can invoke to justify the use of force in place of an *actio*, or even in support of one, if the aggrieved citizen feels that the *poena* fails to meet the crime committed against him. And this applies equally to actions brought against other citizens as well as to those directed against the State.[54]

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[43] Thomasius, *Institutiones, op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 1, para. 109, and his *Fundamenta, op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 5, para. 11.

[44] *Institutiones, op. cit.*, lib. III, cap. 6, para. 63.

[45] *Ibid.*, lib. III, cap. 6, para. 12.

[46] *Ibid.*, lib. III, cap. 6, paras. 22–24.

[47] *Ibid.*, para. 29.

[48] *Ibid.*, para. 35.

[49] *Ibid.*, para. 31.

[50] *Ibid.*, para. 56.

[51] *Ibid.*, para. 23.

But having made the legal and theoretical position clear, Thomasius then goes on to warn the ruler or rulers that 'politics' does not mean the same thing as 'legalistics.' There is, he says, almost as little connection between the lawyer and the politician as between the politician and the medical man.[55] The ruler will be no less foolish to claim a divine right to rule arbitrarily than to ignore the citizen's innate right to own property or to hold beliefs of his own choosing, even if such innate 'rights' are not strictly enforceable. Whilst as a ruler he is legally not subject to Natural Law, he is *morally* bound by it in the same manner as his subjects. And the latter's consent and support is *politically* as vital to him as are his protection and tolerance to them.[56] Thomasius does not reveal, however, how, in practice—the original Contract apart—popular consent (let alone support) is to be elicited. Yet even Locke, who *does* maintain the citizen's right to revolt and on that account is commonly regarded as a radical or democrat, is not very informative on this point.[57]

Historically speaking, Thomasius was primarily concerned with the secularization of politics and with establishing it as an autonomous activity in clearly specified fields. He was as adamant in maintaining the absolute and supreme power of positive law, in theory, as he was in circumscribing its political application in practice. He had no wish to eliminate '*honestum*' and '*decorum*' in favour of the enforceable '*justum*,' but he aimed to discourage false hopes in their potency as a political basis for maintaining law and order both within states and in the relations between states. Above all he sought to impress his countrymen that politics is not something that can be left to the jurist or to the well-meaning, though politically inept theologian or philosopher.[58] He believed that the modern state required a professional class of *politically* trained administrators. He had as little use for the myth of divinely ordained kings as he had for the no less traditionally held Platonic belief in the wisdom of philosopher-kings. The task of the modern administrator was different from that of Cicero; it also had little to do with the Laws of Moses.[59]

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[52] *Ibid.*, para. 39.

[53] *Fundamenta*, *op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 4, para. 77, and *Institutiones*, *op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 1, para. 104.

[54] *Institutiones*, *op. cit.*, lib. I, cap. 1, para. 104.

[55] *Der Politische Philosophus*, *op. cit.*, preface.

[56] Thomasius, *Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten* (Halle, 1696, 4th ed., 1699), p. 12.

[57] Locke certainly nowhere suggests that he subscribes to a theory of universal suffrage. For discussion of this question, see Martin Seliger, "Locke's Theory of Revolutionary Action," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1963), pp. 548–68.

[58] Thomasius, *Erinnerung wegen zweyer Collegiorum über den anderen Theil seiner Grund-Lehren* (Halle, 1702), p. 32. Thomasius considers it "one of the oldest errors in Christendom . . . that the zealots of good morals attempt to talk the Christian princes into enforcing Christianity by legislation." (*ibid.*)

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–5.

IV

Thomasius's conception of government as a device for achieving limited and clearly defined ends became the accepted political philosophy of the leading political writers in Germany—the Cameralists, as they came to be called—during the first half of the eighteenth century. Some of them were university professors, such as Gasser (1676–1745) and Dithmar (1678–1737); others were professional administrators, such as Hornigke (1638–1712) and F. K. Moser (1723–98); a few were both, such as Justi (1720–71) for example. They favoured highly centralized absolutism, not principally, as Gierke has suggested, to provide a rationale for the political *status quo*,[60] but because it afforded in their view the best chance of carrying out effective and efficient government without the risk of interference by the non-professional outsider. Their ethos may have been paternalistic and, by modern democratic standards, arrogant, but they were sincere in their belief that a well constructed bureaucratic organization, operating within a framework of fixed rules, could not but further the well-being of the subjects. A number of them also believed that by perfecting the administrative machine as a system of strictly specialized functions they were minimizing the risk of arbitrariness due to personal forces, and thus ensuring fair and impersonal government.[61]

Whilst it would plainly be an overstatement of the case to say that these writers and followers of Thomasius were thinking of the administrative apparatus as a device for restraining the absolute power of the ruler—for he was commonly envisaged as a power outside and above the governmental 'machine'—they were certainly more interested in strengthening the power of the bureaucracy than in buttressing the position of the monarch. Their monolithic and mechanistic conception of government was undoubtedly inadequate as a political theory in that it failed to take account of the complexity and many-sidedness of socio-political life. But in their emphasis upon administrative organization, public finance and political expertness, the Cameralists correctly anticipated, as Thomasius did before them, the growing role which bureaucracy was to play in the modern state.

It was no accident that the Prussia of Frederick II was by far the most enlightened of the absolutist states in eighteenth-century Europe. For it was during the decisive years of the transition from semi-feudal government to absolutist regimes that the Prussian administration drew its recruits from a university (Halle) which was the first in Germany to institute chairs of Politics and Economics and which, within a decade of Thomasius's teaching, rose to become one of the leading and most forward-looking universities of the time.[62]

No less impressive was Thomasius's achievement as a legal reformer. In 1728, the year of his death, Prussia witnessed the last witch trial, and just over a decade later (1740) Frederick II, publicly acknowledging Thomasius's services to the European Enlightenment,[63] decreed the abolition of the practice of torture.

If we take as the basic criteria of liberalism the ideas that the liberty of the individual must be safeguarded by the limitation of governmental power and that, in order to be limited, political power must be shared, then Thomasius can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. But if other, less formal, standards are applied, Thomasius surely qualifies in the history of ideas as a thinker in the liberal tradition. He was undoubtedly perspicacious in suggesting that a politically trained bureaucracy, far from endangering individual liberties, could in fact constitute one of the safeguards against their infringement by arbitrary rulers.

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[60] O. Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, transl. E. Barker (Cambridge, 1934), vol. I, p. 144.

[61] For a detailed account of these administrative theories, see Albion W. Small, *The Cameralists* (Chicago, 1909); see also Geraint Parry, "Enlightened Government and its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 6 (1963), pp. 178–192.

[62] See Dernburg, *Thomasius und die Stiftung der Universität Halle* (Halle, 1865), p. 4, and Schmoller, "Preußischer Beamtenstand unter Friedrich Wilhelm I.", *Preußische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 26 (1870), p. 148 f.

[63] Frederic II, *Oeuvres* (Berlin, 1789), vol. I, p. 376.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON CONSTITUTIONALISM

To the Editor:

There is a great deal in Professor Sartori's article, "Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion" (this Review, December 1962), with which I find myself in enthusiastic accord. I would suggest, however, that in two respects his case may be overstated.

1. The fifth thesis of the summary (p. 863) states that "either the term [constitution] is used in its specific *garantiste* meaning, or it is a meaningless (and deceiving) duplicate of terms such as organization, structure, form, pattern, political system and the like." The difficulty here is that the sharpness of distinction he calls for seems more than the substance of the matter will bear. The *garantiste* meaning is not sufficiently specific in itself; nor is it so easily separable from at least some of the other terms mentioned.

In the first place, let us take the "unambiguous" meaning offered at p. 855: "a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure 'limited government'." How "unambiguous" is this? "Fundamental" is a matter of degree and "limited government" has more than one meaning. The footnote 10 at this point already admits some difficulty: "Of course the query, 'What do the guarantees include?' (*e.g.*, a certain technique of allocation of power, a bill of rights, the rule of law, judicial review, etc.) receives different, complex and changing answers." Just so; there are several routes to the restriction of arbitrary power, and one of these lies along the way of rules as to who is to do what, *i.e.*, "allocation of power." In other words, *garantisme* need not necessarily be secured by a "bill of rights" technique; it can be reached through certain kinds of "frame of government."

In the second place, "rules" too are a matter of degree and kind. (Admitting that differences are of degree does not entail saying that they do not matter.) " 'Rules' applies to any kind of rule—including the rule of leadership" (p. 854); by this we are invited to believe that when the British say "we have rules" they are saying nothing. The Wheare and Jennings definitions are described as "formal" and it is said that they "can be filled with any content whatever" (p. 856). But, to begin with, these definitions are not exhaustive; they are introductory to examination of what the rules in Britain are. Again, insofar as they do indeed speak of "rules which govern the government" (Wheare) or "rules determining the creation and operation of governmental institutions" (Jennings), their purely "formal" nature cannot safely be stressed; it would scarcely be true that "they can be filled with any content whatever," since such definitions would hardly apply to a regime where the government itself simply decides the rules. "Even games have 'rules' " (p. 856), but we would think it strange if we learnt of a game where one side made the rules as it went along. In other words, the regularity which the term "rules" implies is itself hostile to arbitrariness.

Third, and closely related to the above, there is the problem of Aristotle's meaning. In order to support the sharpness of the distinction between the *garantiste* use and all meaningless use of 'constitution,' Sartori suggests (p. 860) that Aristotle cannot be called as a witness to the contrary and that the view that he might be rests on a mistranslation or misunderstanding of *politeía*. "To speak of a Greek 'constitutionalism' " is found "quite absurd," while it is said that "nothing resembling this concept [*i.e.*, that of "a frame of political society, *organised through and by the law*, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power"] was in the mind of Aristotle." Now the difficulty in translating *politeía* must be admitted. But much of the difficulty surely comes from the several different ways in which Aristotle uses the term. It appears too sweeping to say that Aristotle gives it one sole meaning: "*politeía* only conveys the idea of the way in which a polity is patterned." While this could conceivably be a way of expressing the element common to the usage in 1274 *b* and 1276 *b*, it overlooks other meanings. These include (as Sartori concedes) that contained in the "passages . . . in which the term *politeía* specifically refers to the way in which the *polis* magistracies are ordained," such as 1278 *b*, 1289 *a*, and 1290 *a*; it is open to debate whether in these cases "this meaning appears in passing" as Sartori alleges. Further, there is, of course, the use of *politeía* to denote a particular form of government—*e.g.*, 1279 *a*. Here Aristotle is saying that since constitution implies order and arrangement, it is appropriate to label that government constitutional in which matters are well ordered. But above all there is the notable passage, 1292 *a*, in which Aristotle firmly connects the idea of constitution to the whole discussion of the rule of law in Book III: speaking of a kind of democracy in which demagogues sway the multitude and the decrees of the assembly override the law, he writes that "it would seem reasonable to object that this kind of democracy is not a constitution at all, on the ground that where laws do not rule there is no constitution" (1292 *a*, R. Robinson, ed., *Aristotle's Politics Books III and IV*, Oxford, 1963).

Of course, there can also be uncertainty about the meaning of "laws," but I have taken it (*e.g.*, in my "The Emergent Countries" in *Political Quarterly*, July, 1963) that Aristotle can be interpreted, with the least forcing of meaning, as saying that while all political societies, so long as they are stable enough to be said to exist at all, are bound to be regarded as having "constitutions" (*i.e.*, arrangements of their parts), the differences between the extremes of the range are great. At one end are states which are so poorly composed, so irregularly conducted, as to be scarcely deserving of the name; they are liable by disintegration to fall, so to speak, off the end of the range altogether. At the other end are others which are firmly composed, secure, well constituted; and their being well constituted is expressed in their being constitutional (*i.e.*, under the rule of law). In other words, the two senses of constitution are present in his mind and he is feeling his way toward a connection between them, that connection being that an adequately patterned political society is one which has developed or established firm rules controlling the use of power.

I conclude that we have here a conceptual continuum. The *garantiste* meaning of constitution is a development of the "rule of law" meaning and that in turn is a development of the "arrangement of parts" meaning. These important relations should not be obscured by forcing excessively sharp distinctions.

2. The second thesis of the summary states that despite "the complexity of the original model (the English constitution)" and "a somewhat polemic isolationism of the British scholars," "the idea of limit is basic to the English prototype just as much as to the American and the French subsequent models." While his annoyance with the isolationism is understandable, it will not do to suggest that the British approach to constitutionalism differs from that of the Americans and French only because its expositors are polemic isolationists displaying "coquetry" and "unhelpfulness." For this would be to ignore an important strand in British political thought. Bentham can best stand as its representative and he can be heard expressing the relevant point in Chapter IV of the *Fragment on Government* and in the 1789 postscript to the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.* He is scornful as regards attempts to formulate the limits of state or governmental action by reference either to "laws of nature" or to fundamental natural rights listed in a constitutional document. He agrees, and indeed insists, that there are important differences between "free" and "despotic" governments, but he holds that these are neither to be expressed in terms of metaphysics (*i.e.*, "consent" *vs.* "coercion," "in accordance with the laws of nature" *vs.* "contrary to the laws of nature") nor to be achieved by the preparation of formal lists of (impracticable) do's and dont's. In a free state as in a despotism, there is sovereignty: "the *field* of the [sovereign's] authority must unavoidably, I think, *unless where limited by express convention*, be allowed to be *indefinite.*" (The qualification here is of course important, and the footnote at this point interesting.) "Wherein is it then that the difference exists?," he asks. In his answer (para 24 of that Chapter) Bentham points to what may be called the realities (or real conditions) of political life. He mentions, for instance, liberty of the press and association and machinery for rendering governments accountable and replaceable. What this all contributes to is a (distinctively British?) *garantisme* of a peculiar kind in which constitutional form matters less than political habits. This is not, of course, to say that Bentham was an anti-constitutionalist; only that in some of his writing he expresses a hostility to *certain* forms of *garantisme,* that this hostility has remained a feature of British writing about the subject, and that it accounts for some of the "isolationism" which is found so unwarranted and distressing.

The ways in which "limits" on arbitrary power are achieved in practice in different countries differ no more than the ways in which the ideas about the nature of these limits are expressed. To say that "the idea of limit is basic" to several traditions is true; it is equally true that the ideas about limits are interestingly and significantly different among these same traditions. British scholars are, very properly, making this clear.

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A REJOINDER

To the Editor:

A "preliminary discussion" is also an invitation to a further discussion. Therefore I am most grateful to Professor Morris-Jones for his penetrating and perceptive critique of my article, in which the other side of the case is brilliantly stated. My first temptation would be to bow to his witty criticism and concede that his arguments are indeed convincing. In fact, if I followed the approach he takes, in most cases I could only reply: I agree. If I nevertheless stop short of such a conclusion, this is mainly because our disagreement presupposes a methodological issue which deserves to be discussed.

The issue boils down to this question: Why do I find other people guilty of "understatement," and why am I now, in my turn, found guilty of "overstatement"? The explanation, I think, was clearly suggested by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* when he made the point that reason follows two methods, or principles: "homogeneity" and "specification" (*Cf.* ch. III, Appendix to Transcendental Dialectics). Consequently "in one thinker it is the interest for *multiplicity* that prevails (following the principle of specification), while in another thinker it is the interest for *unity* that prevails (according to the principle of aggregation)." And Kant made it very clear that neither principle has, in itself, a superior claim. Both are only "regulative maxims" that express a "different interest of reason" which is, in turn, "the cause of the diversity in method." Therefore when Morris-Jones finds my distinctions "too sharp" he is actually uncovering the fact that I follow the method of "specificity." And this is in turn the reason why I find some of his distinctions too soft.

Does this conclusion imply that we are both right and wrong or, better said, that we are neither right nor wrong? Logically this seems to follow, for either method, in principle, is correct. Nonetheless we need not be content merely with taking stock of the fact that we have reached a stalemate. *Logically*, or in the abstract, both methods are correct, but *historically*, *i.e.*, concretely, there are times when one method is more justified or more necessary than the other.

The historical growth of the tree of knowledge is oscillatory and somewhat cyclical. To put it picturesquely, the development of thought follows a pattern that I would call the *cycle of the cupboard*. Some generations labor under the illusion of storing and ordering ideas and information into a system of cupboards. When they have done so, subsequent generations open the cupboards and tear everything apart. The generations that follow inherit chaos and have to start again ordering the world of knowledge into new cupboards—and so on. The timely question, therefore, is: should we now still pursue the destruction of the cupboards, or is it not high time to engage in their reconstruction? I take the latter view, that the balance between flux and stabilization of knowledge should be restored by trying to rebuild a filing system. And this is why I am more unhappy than Morris-Jones with diffuse thinking, with the advice that we should avoid logical polarizations, with the current abuse of the formula that everything is a matter of degree—and the like. In sum, I believe we have gone too far along the path of "homogeneity" and that the time has come to concentrate on "specificity." Perhaps Morris-Jones does not share that feeling. Yet from the point of view of the cupboard theory of knowledge—if I may call it so—we need not conclude that we are faced with a methodological deadlock, and the way has been cleared for a better mutual understanding.

First point: the *garantiste* meaning of the term constitution. Morris-Jones points out that this meaning "is not sufficiently specific in itself; nor is it so easily separable from at least some of the other terms mentioned." Quite so. But is this a reason for declaring inseparable what appears difficult to separate? According to my approach, it is not. And the "substance of the matter" has little, if anything, to do with this issue because there is nothing *in re*, in the nature of things, which can decide a "regulative" matter. To say that the *garantiste* meaning is not sufficiently specific "in itself" is only to say that previous thinkers have blurred it, or that nobody has yet specified it; in either case we are dealing with mental products which abide by man-made decisions.

The general definition of the *garantiste* meaning that I have suggested is "ambiguous" in that it is general; but perhaps it is an advance *vis à vis* current ambiguities and consequently is "unambiguous" in this relative sense (even though, I grant, still inadequately so). I could hardly deny that " 'fundamental' is a matter of degree and [that] 'limited government' has more than one meaning." Here again, however, my question is: Is this a reason for saying that we cannot draw a line between fundamental and secondary, or between limited and limitless government? Morris-Jones rightly asserts that "there are several routes to the restriction of arbitrary power" and that "*garantisme* need not necessarily be secured by a 'bill of rights' technique." I could not agree more, provided that one is not satisfied with leaving the argument there, as it is—unfinished.

Second point: the meaning of "rules." On this I cannot agree with Morris-Jones, and particularly with his concluding statement that "the regularity which the term 'rules' implies is itself hostile to arbitrariness." This view only testifies to what extent we have lost sight of what constitutionalism is for, and fail to appreciate what it provides. Logically, if there is a rule there is a "regularity"—this is a tautology. But constitutionally it is a small consolation. *Princeps legibus solutus est*, and *regis voluntas suprema lex* are rules. But they are not "hostile to arbitrariness." They are precisely rules which allow the power-holder to make decrees, to change them, or to dispense with them, as he goes along. In fact, they are the rules of dictatorships and have been the rules of absolutism. Therefore if "regularity" is all that is required from constitutional rules, we may as well bid farewell to constitutionalism and resign ourselves to the loss of the constitutional State.

Maybe I have been unfair to Wheare and Jennings in taking out of their context definitions which are "introductory to an examination of what the rules in Britain are." Yet the fact remains that the definitions in question are purely "formal"; and I do not quite see why their books should be introduced by missing the point, that is, missing the specificity of those rules which are of a constitutional nature. Description (what the rules in Britain are) and conceptualization (what is the nature of constitutional rules) do not belong in separate watertight compartments. Therefore I submit that if Wheare and Jennings are satisfied—conceptually—with providing a merely formal definition of rules, the most likely explanation is that they are concerned with *constitutions* but hardly with *constitutionalism*. And if this is true, it is a sombre symptom.

Third point: Aristotle. Morris-Jones is quite right in saying that my way of dealing with Aristotle was "too sweeping." His analysis is acute, and I only wish to inject a further caution in the discussion. Granted that "much of the difficulty . . . comes from the several different ways in which Aristotle uses the term," there is an additional difficulty, namely, that generally we do not quote Aristotle but the translators of Aristotle. I have at hand several translations of the *Politics* (both because my Greek is rusty and because the experiment is amusing), and each translation conveys a rather different idea of what Aristotle had in mind. In the Robinson edition cited by Morris-Jones the crucial passage of 1292 *a* reads "where laws do not rule there is no constitution"; but in the classic Italian translation of V. Costanzi (Laterza, Bari, 1925) the same passage reads "where laws do not rule there is no *political regime*" (my italics). Since Costanzi often does translate *politeia* as "constitution," why is it that in this case he uses a more comprehensive and uncommitted term? Possibly because he feels that, in 1291 *a*, Aristotle's focus is not on the notion of *politeia* but rather on the notion of democracy. Actually his subsequent and concluding sentence ("the kind of arrangement in which everything is decided by the decrees of a popular assembly is not even a democracy in the proper sense of the term") lends weight to the interpretation that *politeia* is the *definiens* (the expression used to define), that *demokratia* is the *definiendum* (the expression to be defined), and therefore that the gist of his argument was to say that where the mob rules instead of the laws, all political institutions collapse—this is no polity, no "arrangement of parts" (as Morris-Jones so well puts it) and therefore this is not even a democracy.

We need not, however, open Pandora's box by entering an exegetical discussion. Whatever was in the mind of Aristotle, let it be suggested that gross misinterpretations are inevitable unless we approach him by subtraction, that is, by taking away from the Greek vision of the world all the discoveries of the mind that were added later. And this is why I said that I find it "absurd" to speak of a Greek "constitutionalism" (just as I find it absurd to speak of a Greek "state"). The thesis of my article was, in fact, that "constitution" is both a modern word and a modern concept, and that when the term was conceived at the end of the Eighteenth century it was given a specific, substantive meaning. Therefore to speak of a Greek constitutionalism is, to begin with, a falsification of the past, for in doing so we inevitably project a modern frame of reference into a very distant and different world, flying as it were over the head of more than twenty centuries.[1]

Morris-Jones concludes his discussion on Aristotle by saying that "we have here a conceptual continuum," in the sense that the "*garantiste* meaning of constitution is a development of the 'rule of law' meaning and that in turn is a development of the 'arrangement of parts' meaning." But I cannot follow him along his continuum. It seems to me that Morris-Jones builds his continuum paralogistically, that is, upon two different meanings of "rule of law": one a generic way of saying, and the other a more technical meaning. Technically, rule of law does not simply mean that it is the laws and not men that rule. Therefore Aristotle did not use the proposition "where the laws rule" in the sense which Morris-Jones seems to suggest—perhaps too sweepingly. At least, I have taken it (in my *Democratic Theory*, 1965 ed., Praeger, New York, pp. 288–291) that the Greek approach to the problem of "liberty under the law" was an anticipation of the *legislative* conception of law, rather than of the English *rule of law* conception of law. As Jhering and Bryce long ago pointed out, the rule of law in its technical sense originates with Roman jurisprudence. Hence I find a discontinuity where Morris-Jones sees an ideal continuity. It is very true that the *garantiste* features of the British constitution are founded on, and derived from, the rule of law (this, incidentally, is why the English did not need a bill of rights); but from the English-type rule of law, not from the Greek concept of law, and even less from Aristotle's meanings of *politeia*.

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[1] See Francis D. Wormuth, "Aristotle on Law," in Milton R. Konvitz, and Arthur E. Murphy, eds., *Essays in Political Theory presented to George H. Sabine* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1948), pp. 45–61; and Wormuth's *The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism* (New York, Harper, 1949).

Fourth point: what is peculiar and distinctively British about present-day English constitutionalism. If my article conveyed the impression that my passes at the English passion for "understatements" or at their "polemic isolationism" were meant to be an exhaustive explanation, Morris-Jones fills the gap very well. Where I had detected a style of "saying less," Morris-Jones points to something which is both more important and more serious: a strand of "hostility to *certain* forms of *garantisme*" which becomes, from Bentham onwards, "a feature of British writing about the subject." This clarification is indeed an illuminating addition to the topic. Yet my query remains: is it really true that British scholars are "making clear" whatever there is that needs to be clarified? I wonder.

Why is it, for instance, that the British can afford to have an unwritten constitution? Morris-Jones supports the view that "constitutional form matters less than political habits." I would argue, however, that this statement is unwarranted unless one goes on to show that it is the "habit" that creates the "form"; otherwise why should the latter "matter less"? Moreover, the statement omits to state (understates?) an essential qualification: that it applies to the British people only because they happen to have the *right* political habits (*i.e.*, habits which are both cause and consequence of the constitutionalization of politics). The next question is: how were these habits formed? It will not do, I think, to explain habits with habits and to ground everything on the cake of custom. Most British scholars, however, do leave the argument at this obscure point.

To cite another instance to warrant my complaints, let me return to the crucial question: what do the English mean when they say "rule of law"? The latest definition in my files (by John Strachey in his latest *Encounter* pamphlet) reads that the rule of law is the principle that "a man or a woman is free to do anything which is not specifically forbidden by the laws of his or her community." I submit that Strachey largely missed the target, for if this were all, any despotism—and the more totalitarian the better—could easily manage to abide by the rule of law. Granted that Strachey was not an authority on the subject, what strikes me is that any Englishman would know better if he was taught better—that is, if British scholars did make things clear. Dicey went too far when he said that "in England the law of the constitution is little else than a generalization of the rights which the courts secure to individuals" (*The Law of the Constitution*, 10th ed., Macmillan, London, 1960, p. 200); yet he came close to the mark when he noted that "the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law" (p. 195) in the sense that it "is a judge-made constitution" (p. 196). Granted that this is only one part of the picture, the interesting point is that Dicey's commentators have generally been more concerned with showing where he was wrong than with improving on him where he was almost right.

The fact is, then, that English scholars seldom, if ever, lay the stress on the crux of the matter, namely, that the rule of law is first and foremost a *conception of the law* (apart from its having several particular meanings), and specifically that conception according to which law is *not* State-willed law, is *not* legislated law. (This, incidentally, is why the British tradition could safely afford to stress the omnipotence of parliament). As I have put it in *Democratic Theory*, the "rule of law" is the opposite of the "rule of legislators," and the more the latter replaces the former, the less even the English may ultimately rely on a rule-of-law type of guarantees. Perhaps this development helps to explain why British scholars appear reluctant when they are asked to unveil the "mistery" of their rule of law, when they are asked what the essence of rule of law is. At any rate, my point is that they are not making it clear.

Morris-Jones will forgive me, I hope, if I have taken his remark about the English tradition of "hostility" (toward the non-British forms of *garantisme*) so seriously as to suggest—pushing the argument a step further—that this hostility is becoming outdated, that it may be unsafe to envisage the future *as if* the rule of law foundations of the English constitution were not weakening, and therefore that it may be wiser to realize that Western constitutionalism as a whole is ever more faced with similar problems and with a common challenge. My plea was, and remains, that the British oracle should become more helpful.

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A NOTE ON THE EVALUATION OF ERROR AND TRANSFORMATION IN DATA ANALYSIS

TO THE EDITOR:

Researchers continually have to confront two practical problems—how to allocate limited resources in the implicit bargain between data refinement and analysis, and how to produce serviceable data within a time in which they remain relevant. A recent review in this journal of a volume by me and other members of the Yale Political Data Program[1] raises several fundamental points about these research problems that deserve careful attention. Let me begin with a comment on accuracy, directed to the reviewer's lament over the frequency of transcription errors in Table 9. Certainly there are more errors in that table than we would have hoped for, and their presence is the cause of real chagrin. Yet, even in what at first sight may seem so gross an instance, it is essential to have a fairly precise idea of the magnitude of the error and the magnitude of its effects on analysis.

Aside from noting a couple of particular caveats,[2] the important point to be made is that the total error alluded to amounts to only one per cent of the variance in the table. Thus the corrected table is correlated .993 with the unrevised one. For some purposes this might indeed still have serious effects, but if the object is primarily to see the direction and strength of the relationship between this variable and another, the conclusions should in no important way be affected; because of other problems of reliability, assumptions about "sampling," etc., differences of a single percentage point in squared correlation coefficients are meaningless. Now I can hardly be sure that there are no errors in the other 74 tables of Part A of the *Handbook*, though for a variety of reasons I am confident Table 9 is *not* typical. But for the sake of a simple illustration let us assume the worst—that in every other table there is a magnitude and type of error corresponding to that in Table 9.

The first thing to note is that it is *random* error, not correlated with income, political system, or any other variable. The effect of random error is to lower the correlation between variables. This can be shown, and its magnitude assessed, by an experiment which I performed. I deliberately introduced error, of the same amount and type in Table 9, into the data for eight other variables (Tables 1, 8, 31, 41, 43, 44, 51, 64), computed the correlation of each with every other, and compared them with the correlations produced by the data as given in the *Handbook*. The average difference in the r^2 produced by the two versions of each table was less than .03; in most of the cases the variables with the random error had lower correlations than those without.[3] Thus the effect on substantive conclusions would seldom be great, though in a few instances of rather low correlation it might mistakenly result in acceptance of the null hypothesis that two variables were not related. And this is where error is introduced into *both* variables, not just one.

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[1] Bruce M. Russett and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1964), reviewed by Arthur S. Banks in this REVIEW, Vol. 59 (March, 1965), pp. 144–146.

[2] Two cases asserted to be in error can be shown to be correct, though, as may occur elsewhere, the reasons (comparability adjustments we made in the figures published in our sources) may not be obvious. Furthermore, two kinds of error should be distinguished. One is erroneous data, the other is erroneous footnoting of correct data. For example, two instances of the latter occurred when superscript references to sources were omitted and the reference thus seemed to be to the general source listed for the table. The data, correct, are to be found in others of the works given at the foot of page 53. An erratum sheet is available on request from the Yale Political Data Program, 89 Trumbull Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

[3] Highly skewed distributions should of course be subjected to a logarithmic or other transformation before correlation coefficients are computed. For this computation the data were transformed precisely as were those in the *Handbook* for the analysis given in Part B. The correlations reported here and below will be only those sta-

For the other kind of mistaken conclusion—the unwarranted rejection of the hypothesis of no relationship—non-random or *systematic* error is more often responsible. This type of error is most likely to stem from deliberate or semi-deliberate distortion by the reporting countries themselves, and its effect can be suggested by another example. Into the same eight *Handbook* tables I deliberately introduced systematic error, meaning that particular types of countries regularly had their values changed in the same direction. I raised the values for all East European countries and again computed the matrix of correlations and compared it with the original one. Here the damage was even less serious; the average difference in r^2 was under .02, although most of the new correlations were higher than with the original data. Both types should be considered in the light of the other problems of data reliability and comparability discussed in the text of the *Handbook*. For most variables these are likely to be appreciably greater than transcribing error, and we attempted to indicate, at least in an appropriate way, their likely magnitude.

We can pursue this subject further, to the discussion of the effect on correlations produced by the decision whether to transform a variable before using it in computations, and, if so, what type of transformation to employ. Banks makes the excellent suggestion that in doubtful cases several different transformations be tried, and that the transformation finally used be specified and the Chi-Square value for the distribution be given. He then shows that four of the tables (nos. 8, 9, 51, 64) not transformed in the *Handbook* might have been so treated, and indicates what transformations would improve the approximation to normality.[4]

But again the magnitude of effect is highly relevant. In a procedure analogous to that above, I made the transformations suggested and compared the resulting r^2 with those produced by the transformed variables. The difference was .09. Under some circumstances, where the degree of skewness was greater or where there was more coincidence among the outliers in different tables, the effect would have been greater.[5] But though in the cases suggested less than 10 per cent of the variance was actually affected, the difference is the greatest found so far and should teach care when correlating skewed distributions.

Even this could be contrasted with another common type of transformation, the dichotomization of a variable into high or low, or more or less, where the researcher feels unsure of the accuracy of any finer distinctions in his data. All of us employ this method at one time or another. For comparative purposes I took eight tables and dichotomized the data according to the criteria which had been found useful in another study[6] and matched the results against those obtained from the data as employed in the *Handbook* correlations, either logarithmically transformed or used in their raw form. The difference was greater than that produced by any of the influences discussed above—the

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tistically significant at the .01 level with a one-tailed test. It would be misleading to report all correlations, however trivial, because with very low correlations small changes can produce substantial variation in the r (for example from .20 to .30) without affecting what one may be most interested in, the r^2, by nearly as much (*i.e.*, from .04 to .09). Such low correlations are likely to occur by chance in any case. For a discussion of the relevance of "statistical significance" in this situation, however, see the *Handbook*, p. 263.

[4] The review also emphasizes the inappropriateness of applying a *logarithmic* transformation to a left-skewed distribution and perhaps leaves the impression that we erroneously did so. This is not the case—there are only two left-skewed distributions in the book, and neither was transformed.

[5] One measure of skewness is that suggested in the *Handbook*, where skewness $=3(\overline{X}-Md/\sigma$ and $\overline{X}=$ the mean, $Md=$ the median, and $\sigma=$ the standard deviation. By this measure the degree of skewness in the four distributions ranges from .18 to .79. For those distributions in the *Handbook* that we did transform the mean value for skewness was 1.36.

[6] Except for Tables 9 and 51 the variables employed in the preceding analysis were included in Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1963), as dichotomized variables. I substituted table 40, which has a counter-part in the *Survey*, in the following analysis. In my review of Banks and Textor ["Strategies for Comparing Nations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 9 (June 1964), pp. 166–70] I suggested some regrettable consequences of the decision to dichotomize, but there are also weighty arguments in its support. My own "The Calculus of Deterrence," *ibid.*, Vol. 8 (June 1963), pp. 97–109, looked for association between dichotomized variables.

mean difference in the r^2 was .20.[7] Moreover, in virtually every case the result was a *drop* in r^2. With dichotomized data one would be much more likely to accept the null hypothesis of no association than when the data are used in their original interval form without the loss of information produced by dichotomization.

The examination of the effects of error, and of various kinds of transformations, needs to be pushed much farther than has been possible here. These illustrations do not substitute for an adequate mathematical consideration, though a number of important contributions in fact exist in the literature of statistics and econometrics.[8] But perhaps this discussion has suggested some criteria for dealing with a common kind of research problem.

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[7] Though it is not a common practice to compute r for dichotomized data it is permissible so long as the n for either side of the dichotomy is not seriously disproportionte and so long as one is not concerned with significance tests.

[8] For a useful piece by a political scientist, however, see the forthcoming article by Rudoph Rummel, "Dimensions of Error in Cross-National Data."

ON THEORIZING IN COMPARATIVE STUDIES

TO THE EDITOR:

We cannot allow to pass unchallenged two inaccurate statements by Gabriel Almond in his review of *Political Power: USA/USSR* in your December 1964 issue.

First, Almond argues that when we attack the so-called convergence theory—which holds that the United States and the Soviet Union are becoming more alike—we are attacking a " 'straw man' . . . which few students of politics would advance with any seriousness. . . ." Maybe Almond's students do not advance this theory, but many learned scholars, leading intellectuals, and influential statesmen do. Walt W. Rostow calls communism a "disease of the transition" to a highly industralized society and predicts that "Communism is likely to wither in the age of high mass-consumption" which the Soviet Union is now approaching.[1] George Kennan states that the changes in the Soviet Union since Stalin represent "an essential alteration of the nature of the regime" toward a "new form of parliamentarianism". "In the main," he says, "the goals and trends of Russian communism lie along the same path as those of Western liberal-industrialism. . . . It is probable that the progress already made is in the direction of our own institutions."[2] Walter Lippmann has stated that the leaders of the Kremlin "are finding . . . what Western society found 200 years ago . . . that if you are going to have an industrial society, you have to have liberty. . . ." Khrushchev, Lippmann argued, "wants more liberty," and the Russians, he concluded, are "becoming more like us" and "less like the Chinese."[3] Clark Kerr and his associates predict that the social and political differences among industrial countries will decrease as they all move toward the "uniformity" of "pluralistic industralism".[4] Philip Slater and Warren Bennis argue at length that democracy is the only efficient form of government for an industrial society, that "autocracy is beginning to decay in the Soviet Union," and that there is an "inevitable Soviet drift toward a more democratic structure. . . ."[5] Nor are these views limited to, or even primarily found among, Americans. In five months of travel through the Eastern Hemisphere from Tokyo to London in 1962–1963, we heard similar views expressed by at least seventy-five per cent of the intellectuals and political leaders with whom we talked. Perhaps the most articulate and impressive case for convergence was made by Jawaharlal Nehru, who argued at length that the Soviet Union was becoming "liberal" and "bourgeois". Are all these gentlemen—Lippmann, Kennan, Rostow, Kerr, Nehru, and the rest—straw men? Or is their theory one which, although erroneous, is both intellectually respectable and politically influential?

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[1] *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 133, 162.

[2] In Raymond Aron, ed., *World Technology and Human Destiny* (University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 77, 79, 89–90.

[3] CBS television interview with Charles Collingwood, May 1, 1963, printed in *Washington Post*, May 3, 1963, p. A-12.

[4] Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Men* (Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 10, esp. pp. 288–296.

[5] "Democracy Is Inevitable," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 42 (March–April 1964), pp. 51–59.

Second, Almond claims that, while we correctly reject ideological models, we "offer no analytical models to take their place." "It is surprising," he concludes, "that in a decade marked by a proliferation of political typologies they use none of these and offer none of their own. . . ." In response to this criticism, we can only point out that his review deals chiefly with the introduction, conclusion, and table of contents. His preoccupation with convergence is preoccupation with a subject which is treated explicitly only in the introduction and conclusion. He does not mention, much less discuss, any of our substantive findings. All his principal comments are directed to points made either in the introduction or conclusion. When he does refer to the other nine chapters which constitute ninety per cent of the book he is almost invariably wrong. "The authors," he says, for example, "provide us with four comparative case studies of politics and policy-making in the two countries." In fact, there are six comparative case studies presented in five different chapters. In the other four chapters in the first half of the book we develop a variety of categories and typologies which we utilize in the analysis of the two political systems. Among other things, we explicitly draw distinctions between: ideological and instrumental political systems; political socialization and politization; political ideologies and political beliefs; bureaucratic and electoral recruitment systems; social forces, interest groups, and policy groups; and the phases of initiation, persuasion, decision, and implementation in the policy-making process. With these and other categories we try to develop generalizations about the similarities and differences in political behavior and attitudes in the United States and the Soviet Union. Some of the categories and typologies we use in this analysis we borrowed from other scholars; others we developed ourselves. Our comparative approach may or may not be successful, but to claim that we ignore the work of others and that we offer no framework of our own is simply inaccurate. Perhaps the problem is that we *did* make use of categories and concepts from Dahl, Easton, Etzioni, Hyman, Kornhauser, Lasswell, Lindblom, Lipset, March, and Simon, but that we *did not* find relevant or useful any of the many typologies "proliferated" by others!

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
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TO THE EDITOR:

I would like to reply briefly to the letter of Professors Huntington and Brzezinski which takes issue with some of the criticism which I made in my review of their *Political Power: USA/USSR*.

I want to reaffirm the evaluation in my review, both in its positive and negative aspects. My criticism took the form of an expression of disappointment. I had the feeling then, as I do now, that Huntington and Brzezinski became faint-hearted when confronting the implications of their own imaginative and often brilliant analysis. Instead of going forward to discuss the intersection of characteristics of the Soviet and American political systems (an intersection which is more than implicit in their own formulation), they drew back and set up a "straw man" conception of "convergence" to refute.

I read the book with some care and with great reward. I read the introduction and the conclusion with even greater care, since the formulation of the problem and the drawing of conclusions are very important parts of an analytical effort. I did not intend to depreciate their analytical inventiveness and the categories which they have drawn from other theorists or have developed themselves. I simply felt it was remarkable that they did not try to present their conclusions about the general characteristics of the Soviet and American political systems in the context of *political system* typologies such as the ones presented by Apter, Shils, Tucker, and Coleman. Without such a political system typology, it is very difficult to confront the question of degree of convergence, extent of intersection, or similarity—dissimilarity.

Finally, let me express again my conviction that this is an original and important work, and my apologies for having miscounted the number of case studies presented in the body of the work.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Man's Quest for Political Knowledge—The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times. By William Anderson. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 381. $8.00.)

Not entirely satisfied with the often-told stories of political events and of political ideas, Dr. Anderson concentrates on the neglected question when, where, and why the quest for political knowledge arose and to what extent and through what people it was activated in studying, teaching and writing about politics. He devotes more than half of the book to Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Israelites and, in Greece, to the Delphic Oracles, the pre-Socratic writers and Socrates' contemporaries before turning to the classical giants. Relatively little space is given to the Romans, with the last chapter covering the six hundred years from Augustus to Justinian on only twenty pages. A second volume is to carry the story through the middle ages to our day.

Knowing in what totally different fields Dr. Anderson has conducted research in his busy life one wonders how he could have undertaken the present work, which seems to presuppose a profound knowledge of history in various sections of the ancient world. He frankly disclaims particular competence but, seeing a gap in literature and no one else around to close it, he decided to do it himself. He set a dozen graduate assistants to examining available literature for material pertinent to the project, and then went to work. Far from being merely a second-rate compilation, as I would have expected from these beginnings, the outcome has been a major contribution because Dr. Anderson has applied his mature knowledge of things political, his discerning mind, his great analytical power, and his own considerable reading knowledge of at least the Greek literature to his self-appointed task.

Although ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt developed remarkably successful administrations there are few indications of a study of government in secular or comparative terms. Egypt had no generic terms for "state," "government," or "politics." There certainly was a remarkable in-service training and an elaborate education of scribes ("it is writing that makes people remember" is Egyptian wisdom) and even some good psychological advice on public relations, such as this Egyptian one: "A petitioner likes attention to his words better than the fulfilling of that for which he came . . . a good hearing is soothing to the heart." But critical research on government would not have been tolerated. The king either had the support of the gods (Mesopotamia) or was recognized as a god himself (Egypt)—that was all the people needed to know. Nevertheless some contributions to political studies were forthcoming, such as the application of writing in government and administration, enlargement of political units, in-service training, and eventually a beginning separation of politics from theology. Dr. Anderson holds that especially the Mesopotamian record should be "studied very carefully for evidences of political inventions, discoveries, and thought, before the Greeks."

Turning to Israel, this is one of the rare books in political science that try to do justice to the contributions made by the ancient Jews. Moses' father-in-law, Jethro, pointed out to him the incompetence of his methods of earthly rule, "one of the speediest governmental surveys on record," and taught him the first important lessons in efficient organization. Jethro put emphasis also upon ability and honesty for officials in the public service. Deuteronomy recommended central consultation with the local people on the qualifications of those to be appointed as local administrators and judges. Prophetic warnings were often based on a realistic appraisal of consequences and risks, such as Samuel's discussion of the risks of kingship (1 Samuel 8) and the parable of the contest of the trees (Judges 9:7): if competent men shirk public responsibilities, there will at the end always be some "bramble" to assume power. Princes were frequently given good advice. Anderson rightly complains of the prevailing tendency to emphasize the religious and ethical messages and to ignore the political and administrative passages of the bible. (He does not seem to know Eric Voegelin's three volumes *Order and History*, the first of which is excellent on political Israel). Anyway, he concedes that the Israelites did not "really mark out the field of politics as something distinct from religion," and that this limited their achievements in the study of secular political matters.

The Greeks had three advantages. With their country organized in many independent city states, Greek students had within easy reach a number of states for comparative studies, historical accounts, intensive "case studies," and philosophical-ethical studies of politics. Having an inquiring turn of mind, they were not diverted from research by the belief in one all-powerful God, and their institutions left them more freedom for critical appraisals.

The predictions and counsels of the Delphic oracle must have been based on some serious study of politics. But as an institution clouded in mystery, blending knowledge and religion, the Delphic establishment made no contribution of lasting value to the study of politics. Neither did Homer, who was not much interested in political matters as a subject for description and analysis. More so was Hesiod, who developed the principle of government according to law. But even to him the chief decisions were made by the gods. Solon, however, was a student of politics in a "truly modern sense." He assumed a "basically humanistic and secular point of view," recognizing man's role in the making of political decisions. The gods are there, but they refrain from action, leaving it to human beings to govern themselves. Solon applied the laws of cause and effect to the political field. Injustices set up reactions among the sufferers who then revolt and destroy their oppressors. People were themselves responsible for the good government of their communities. "Religion and politics he definitely distinguished if not separated. This was the great shift in point of view. . . . '

Of other pre-Socratics Anderson deals with Thales, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. As regards Socrates' contemporaries the author has little taste for abstract logical paradoxes. He dismisses Zeno's famous demonstrations that Achilles could not overtake a tortoise with the remark, which does little justice to the intricacy of the logical problem, that a simple experiment of pitting any good runner against a tortoise would have been enough to destroy Zeno's argument. But he looks carefully for contributions to the study of politics in the works of Alcmaeon, the Eleatics, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Archelaus and Leucippus. Democritus, who outlined a system of government based upon democracy, education, freedom of speech, and the election of public officials, harmony of the social classes and the need for justice, seems to Anderson an important enough man to deserve a thorough modern study of his contributions to politics. Archytas (about 380 B.C.) was remarkable for the stress on the importance of reason in politics. "A correct calculation of consequences prevents the commission of crime." His approach was as secular and free from religious slanting as Solon's.

The sophists contributed little to the study of politics, Anderson holds, because their teachings were largely based on opinion rather than research. He acknowledges, however, that Protagoras established the idea—over Socrates' objections—that politics can be taught and learned by teaching. Hippias, too, was a "fairly important student of politics," but in the theoretical rather than descriptive and historical sense.

In general two ideas stood in the way of a direct study of politics—the notion that political virtue could not be taught and that men could not trust their senses. It was the historians, Herodotus and Thucydides, rather than the sophists, who broke through these barriers by comparing various forms of government and by collecting facts. Thucydides deserves credit also for having brought international relations into the field. By his reporting the speeches of various statesmen, he supplied the "first book of readings on political theories." Almost equally important were the dramatists, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, because of their discussions of unwritten human rights, higher laws, relative merits of monarchy and democracy, and (Euripides) equality of rights and of sexes. Aristophanes was, through his plays, in fact a teacher in current politics, a "hard hitting and influential political propagandist." Among the statesmen, Pericles, like Solon not expecting the gods to intervene, taught the Athenians the lesson of individual and collective responsibility. Anderson regrets that over his great funeral speech his two other excellent speeches reported by Thucydides have been neglected.

It should be clear by now that what the author means by research and teaching refers primarily to *scientia transmissibilis*, especially to the empirical approach, as distinct from mere "thought" if ever so deep. This limitation of focus—which he should have explicitly stated and defended at the outset—leads him eventually to a considerable downgrading of Socrates and even more so of Plato. It was not Socrates, but historians like Herodotus, Xenophon and Thucydides who were studying human affairs broadly by the direct observation of men's actions at home and abroad and by interviews with them. Outside of Athens, Socrates made no direct observations. He often remained ambiguous; few of the dialogues presented by Plato seem to Anderson to come to any clear conclusion. Plato himself "sailed off on the wings of his Utopian schemes" instead of applying his outstanding critical intelligence to realistic political analyses. Anderson keeps speaking of Plato's "anti-politics" and challenges modern students to write studies on the empirical material in Plato (of which there is plenty) rather than on his Utopian and semi-Utopian plans. The very remoteness from actual politics of Plato's Academy seems to explain the fact that it was saved from destruction for eight hundred years while Aristotle's Lycee did not reach the first centenary. Students, not in all respects of the first rank, like Isocrates and Demosthenes, made more important contributions to political science than Plato, Anderson says. Isocrates was a typical political science professor in the modern sense. He concentrated on this field more than did Aristotle, who had much broader interests. Demosthenes "failed, but grandly." The proper hero of Anderson's story is Aristotle, of course, whose merits he extols in a beautifully written summary. Aristotle's Lycee was a "well-organized research center with a definite program," four divisions, and library. His *Politics* was the first real text on the subject. The second part of his *Constitution of Athens* is to Anderson the *non plus ultra* of a study on local government, political theory and analysis. But Aristotle, too, had shortcomings. Anderson mentions his failure to understand the trend toward units larger than cities, his doctrine that there was a general purpose moving toward the good, and his undervaluing the role of economic welfare.

The book's account of political science in Rome, although not lacking in pertinent remarks, is silent on the manner in which political experience and wisdom were being passed on within the leading families and hierarchies of offices. I have missed also a reference to the excellent monograph on Polybius and his theory of mixed government by Kurt von Fritz (*The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity, A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas,* New York, 1954).

These are minor objections. Adoring greatness of human thought wherever it has appeared in the course of history, as it did in Socrates and Plato, this reviewer nonetheless agrees with Professor Anderson that to write a separate story of the empirical approach to politics is an enterprise as legitimate as it is necessary. Anderson has blazed a trail.

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Anarchist Thought in India. BY ADI H. DOCTOR. (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. 120.)

This slender volume is by far the most persuasive philosophical critique of the political thought of Gandhi and his supporters I have read. Adi Doctor, a Lecturer in Politics at Marathwada University in India, begins by effectively arguing that Gandhi's rejection of the state is not an outgrowth of classical Indian thought but is essentially a twentieth century Indian view. Unfortunately, the author weakens this argument by appearing to accept the notion that there is a single classical tradition against which Gandhian thought can be tested, when what is essential to the critique is not the philosophical connections between Gandhi's views and the Indian "tradition" but the fact that Gandhians turn to the tradition to provide a justification for what is in any event a contemporary view. Nonetheless, by demonstrating that important strands of Sanskritic thought are contrary to Gandhi's anarchist position, Doctor successfully turns our attention to the question of whether such a philosophical position is tenable for contemporary India.

The relevance of so-called traditional patterns of political behavior, political institutions and political philosophy to modern Asia and Africa is an issue in most of the developing nations. It is often argued that modern "western" political institutions are inappropriate and that one must therefore turn to more "traditional" patterns of government as if there were a single relevant tradition. Such an argument is based upon what Bert Hoselitz aptly called an ideology of "traditionalism," which attempts to justify and sanctify contemporary actions by reference to real or imagined traditions.

Doctor's tightly reasoned volume is a sharp corrective to traditionalist thought for he does what any modern political and social analyst must do—relate normative judgments to the limits imposed by the real world and relate philosophical principles to philosophical ends. After briefly analyzing the political ideas of several ancient texts, especially the Epics, the *Manusamhita,* the *Dharmasastras* and the *Arthasastra,* Doctor turns to the contemporary writings of Gandhi and his most prominent disciples, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. Doctor quite rightly suggests that Gandhi's attack against centralized governments, political parties, coercive legislation and majority rule itself represents an assault upon India's parliamentary system, not only a traditionalist protest against modernization. In practice the Gandhian critique urges Indians to direct their attention not toward the problem of how to make a parliamentary system work more effectively, but toward its replacement by weak central government and self-sufficient villages in which there are neither parties nor elections but government by consensus. It turns Indians away from the central political problems—not how to eliminate conflicts, but how to manage them; not how to eliminate private ambitions, but how to reconcile these with the ambitions and interests of others; not how to eliminate central authority, but how to make it more effective; not how to establish a village "consensus" (often a guise for the tyranny of a village oligarchy), but how to channel village rivalries into constructive channels.

Doctor's critique of the utopian assumptions underlying Gandhian thought, and his demonstration that the Gandhian proposals would not accomplish what they purport to achieve, namely a society without conflict or coercion, are familiar points to students of political philosophy. His contribution lies in intelligently applying them to the foremost utopian ideology in the developing world.

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Nomos VII: Rational Decision. EDITED BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 228. $6.50).

The question common to most of the essays in this volume concerns the degree of relevance of reason or rationality to legal and political decision-making. The volume does not include a representative sample of all the views current concerning this subject, but it presents a considerable range of positions, and considers a number of the important issues.

A surprising feature of the volume is the slim representation of the view, which comes down to us from Hobbes and Hume, that reason is able to function only with respect to "matters of fact" and "relations between ideas" (Hume), that it is powerless in the realm of values or ends. In the latter areas, reason is the "scout" (Hobbes) or the "slave" (Hume) of the a-rational agents called the passions. This position is represented by the brief comment of Felix Oppenheim. Oppenheim contends that "Intrinsic valuations are a matter of subjective commitment, not of objective truth." Hence they are neither rational nor irrational, but "non-rational" (p. 219). On this view, reason is relevant to politics solely as an aid in calculating means-ends relationships. This is perhaps the most widely held position in contemporary political science. It has also been popular in Anglo-American philosophy since Hume, and it dominated that philosophy for a considerable period in our century. More recently, however, serious questions have been raised concerning it, and at present it has few adherents among Anglo-American philosophers. This is reflected in the papers by philosophers in the present volume.

The starting point of much recent criticism of the Humean view is the observation that our language allows us intelligibly to ask for reasons in support of value decisions, and that we regularly do so. That is, we regularly utilize the English word "reason" and its cognates to request presentation of the grounds on which value choices rest, and to describe or categorize responses to such requests. Given this empirical fact, the philosophical assertion that reason is irrelevant to value decisions generates a paradox. Unless it is assumed that use of "reason" and its cognates in discourse concerning value decisions rests upon a misunderstanding of those words, that is unless it is assumed that no communication takes place in such discourse, the philosophical assertion has the force of insisting that men cannot do what they regularly do as a matter of course. Since a glance at the dictionary falsifies the assumption, the philosopher is in the untenable position of dictating to ordinary language.[1] If this line of argument is correct, it is false to say that reason is irrelevant to intrinsic value decisions. It is demonstrated to be false by the fact that the English word "reason" *is* employed in discourse concerning value. For this employment demonstrates that the non-linguistic referent of "reason" is in fact used in making such decisions.

It will properly be objected, however, that philosophical disputes concerning problems of value cannot be adjudicated by the simple device of consulting ordinary language. But if linguistic evidence cannot conclusively resolve philosophical disputes, it directs us to the source of the differences between the philosopher and the common sense views reflected in ordinary usage. These differences trace, to adapt John Ladd's argument slightly, to an "obsession [on the part of the Humean] with science and with scientific models of reasoning . . . and the assumption that there is only one kind of rationality, namely, that represented by formal logic and the scientific method" (p. 127). Or, in Aristotelian language, to "the reduction of practical thinking to some form or other of theoretical thinking" (*ibid.*). Aristotle insisted that the exactness of theoretical science was unattainable in practical discourse. Yet he regarded man as capable of making defensible decisions in that sphere and held that this capacity distinguished man from other animated beings. Conceding, in other words, that moral decisions cannot be entailed or validated in the sense required of conclusions in theoretical discourse, he nevertheless held that some decisions could be shown to be rationally preferable to others. Ordinary language reflects a similar view.[2] The Humean, on the other hand, while admitting that value decisions can be made to turn in part on questions of fact and relations between ideas, and hence that reason has an ancillary role to play in making them, insists that "ultimately" they depend upon commitments to which reasons are irrelevant.

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[1] See the essays in V. C. Chappell, ed., *Ordinary Language* (Prentice-Hall, 1964).

The dispute would appear to be in part terminological. Hume uses "reason" in one way, Aristotle, a number of other philosophers, and most speakers of the English language, use it in another. But matters of substance hinge upon the differences in terminology. The Aristotelian view, to take but one example, prompts investigation of value questions as they arise in various contexts, seeking constantly to maximize practical rationality. "While our present theory is thus necessarily inexact, we must do what we can to help it out."[3] The Humean, by contrast, takes it as settled that nothing of a rational sort can be said concerning intrinsic value decisions. His motto might be said to be "Our present theory is entirely exact and there is nothing we can do to help it out." The Humean view, therefore, underlies the widely accepted position that scientific analysis of moral and political life has no concern with value decisions, while the Aristotelian position sees such decisions as a central concern of moral and political analysis. Hence the dispute is of more than terminological significance.

The view just summarized, drawn primarily from the papers of Frankena, Freund, and Ladd, is also relevant to the very different approaches of other essays in the volume. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. prefaces his closely argued interpretation of Burke's Bristol Speech with a distinction between reason and "true reason." "All men, or at least all normal men, are rational because they speak, giving reasons. But only a few men know true reasons, and only to a limited degree. Yet a reason is in the highest sense not a reason unless it is a true reason" (p. 199). Further, true reasons lead to "correct decisions"—not merely to decisions—and "in the highest sense, only a correct decision is truly a decision." Leaving aside the identification of speech and (inexact) reason, the question is raised as to the differences between reason and "reason in the highest sense" or "true reason."

Mansfield's use of "true," "correct," and "exact" as modifiers for "reason" and "decision" recalls Oppenheim's "objective truth." It suggests not a continuum moving from more to less inexact reasoning within the category of practical reasoning, but a sharp dichotomy between inexact and truly exact reasoning leading, respectively, to a "compromise of opinions" (p. 197) and "truly correct decisions." Mansfield would seem to agree with Oppenheim and his positivistic cohorts that "exact" conclusions or decisions are the only ones that truly deserve to be called rational, but to disagree with their view that such conclusions are unavailable in the realm of value decisions.

If this interpretation of Mansfield's distinction is correct, and it should be admitted that there are some suggestions of another view, there are obvious conflicts, both linguistic and philosophical, between it and the view summarized above. Mansfield appears to be sensitive to the possibility of linguistic difficulties with his argument since he troubles to claim the support of language for his view. He asserts that "The meaning of 'decision' tends in the direction of 'correct decision,' just as the meaning of 'rational' tends in the direction of 'true'." Passing by the question of the evidence on which these assertions rest, the reader is left to discover the force of the verb "tends" for himself. That uses of "rational" range from "arguable" to "true" can be discovered from the dictionary. But if Mansfield's argument is to be supported by linguistic evidence, that evidence must show not merely that "rational" is sometimes used in the sense of "true," but that this is the sense in which it is used (or to which it "tends") in discourse concerning the value-laden decisions of political life. It is on this point, which he ignores, that Mansfield's argument conflicts with a fundamental aspect of the position summarized above.

Mansfield departs less sharply from ordinary usage than does Oppenheim. We do use "true" as a modifier for "reason" and "rationality," and it cannot be said that we never do so in discussion of values. If the foregoing arguments are viable, however, when such usage is challenged ("what precisely do you mean by 'true'?"), it must be withdrawn or equated with "more rational than the alternatives" or a related locution. Escape from these alternatives is possible only if philosophical arguments are offered which define the nature and demonstrate the possibility of "true" or "exact" conclusions in the realm of values. Mansfield neither presents nor cites any such arguments. Hence his formulation is misleading in that it suggests (unintentionally if I understand his comments concerning Hobbes) an equivalence between practical and theoretical discourse, or simply puzzling in that we do not know how to interpret "true."[4] In conceptual analysis, ordinary language is not the be-all or end-all, but it is the begin-all.[5]

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[2] Note the extent to which Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is taken up with analysis of ordinary language.

[3] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 2. (Wheelwright translation.) Several of the essays in the present volume, particularly those by Pennock, Freund, Ladd, and Mavrinac, are solid albeit brief efforts in this direction.

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The Strange Tactics of Extremism. BY HARRY AND BONARO OVERSTREET. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. 315. $4.50.)

Harry and Bonaro Overstreet's *The Strange Tactics of Extremism* is a needed, perceptive, and readable book. It is a needed book because American society is once again under attack—as it has been at various times in our history—by a small, dedicated handful of zealots, in whose breasts flames the most virulent of hatreds, who would advance their own distorted views of public policy and their own thirst for personal power by playing on the fears of, as well as seeking to intimidate, some of their fellow citizens. The Know-Nothings, the Ku Klux Klan, the Communists, and now the multiple front elements of the radical right: all have had, and some continue to have, their moments on the American scene. Public awareness of their real aims, and an aroused recognition of the danger have meant, and hopefully, will always mean, their sure demise.

It is a perceptive book because the Overstreets are not strangers to the strategies and tactics of those whose anachronistic views of the world about them leads them to jeer at almost anyone who seeks progress in this age of science and space. Three books and years of research on Communism and the tactics of Marxism-Leninism provide an excellent background to analyze and explore the tactics of the radical rightist movement.

It is a readable book because the Overstreets are the Overstreets and they seek to communicate their thought and their findings to the many rather than to the select few. They write not merely for the professional students of radical groups but for the laymen in cities and towns across America who, if they are to help preserve our nation, must be provided with the intellectual tools which will expose the fallacies in the thinking of those on both the far left and the far right.

The Overstreets are biased. So am I, for they believe, as I believe, in the concept of a democracy in a republic. They believe, as I believe, in the values of free and decent discussion. They have faith, as I have faith, that an American people, given the "facts," will, in the long run, come to grips with the problem and make the right decision. Most Americans, I think, share this bias. The current problem is: what must we as Americans do to preserve a system of free discussion when it is undermined by radicals on both ends of the political spectrum.

Before one can act with wisdom, one must understand. The Overstreets assist in providing that understanding, as they take you through the labyrinth of ideology and tactics as practiced by Robert Welch and the John Birch Society, Dan Smoot in his Report, Carl McIntire and his 20th Century Reformation Hour, Myers G. Lowman and his Circuit Riders, Edgar C. Bundy and his Church League of America, and Billy James Hargis and his Christian Crusade.

Professor Revilo P. Oliver, associate editor of the John Birch Society magazine, *American Opinion,* believes, according to the Overstreets, that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated because he was falling behind in "delivering the assigned quota of conspiratorial gain" (p. 239). Is this view too far removed from Robert Welch's incredible statement that Dwight D. Eisenhower, the last Republican President, was "a conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy"? Of course not.

The Overstreets note early in the book (p. 17) that both Lenin and Hitler set down their aims and tactics for all the world to see, but few paid attention until acts were committed, and by that time it was almost too late. The Overstreets want us to begin our homework on the radical right now, and note that "the materials we need to read are being published in our midst every day of the week. The problem we have to cope with is that of our own unawareness of the need to learn." (p. 18) They state that while the John Birch Society "is *in* the American scene, it is not *of* it: certainly not in the relationship it defines between leader and led." (p. 26) To its leader, Mr. Welch, democracy is "a perennial fraud." (p. 36) As my colleague, Senator Milton Young (R-North Dakota) noted when he revealed some of the activities of the John Birch Society, a high percentage of those whom Mr. Welch attacks are "middle-of-the-road, and even conservative, Republicans." (p. 42)

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[4] The discussion of Mansfield's paper is relevant to Gottfried Dietze's argument concerning "absolute" rationality and to Heinz Eulau's construction of a "model" of rationality as well.

[5] I have of course ignored the many difficulties with this argument. Some of them are dealt with in the essays summarized above. The reviewer is attempting to deal with aspects of these problems as they relate to politics, in a forthcoming work entitled *The Public Interest, An Essay in the Logic of the Normative Discourse of Politics.*

The Overstreets ask what is the worst that men can say of extremism? Their tentative answer is in accord with the values of Western Man which have slowly been attained over the ages and that is that "extremism . . . pronounces a death sentence upon honest communication." (p. 54) They analyze the nature of the extremist communication and skillfully reveal the illogic of its structure and the misleading innuendo which is drawn from the irrelevant fact. In this regard, perhaps the understatement of the book is that "one key to Welch's success is his remarkable power to use the tools of scholarship without letting them cramp his style." (p. 85)

The tactics of the far right are similar to those of the far left: the reading rooms, the periodicals, the radio and TV programs, speakers' bureau, all serve to indoctrinate the faithful; the letter-writing and petition-passing serve to keep them busy, and the "fronts" to confuse the opposition and attract the willing dupes. The radical right is against, rather than for something. Thus, they oppose the United Nations, NATO, the income tax, civil rights, the Supreme Court, Radio Free Europe, and the Peace Corps, and so on. They deal in stereotypes rather than problems. (p. 123) Perhaps the radical rightist's basic disservice is, as the authors note, that he treats the term *Communism* as a spacious container that can be made to hold all the religious, social, political, and economic attitudes and policies of which he disapproves." (p. 191)

The Overstreets correctly make it clear that conservatism should not be equated with radicalism of the right, any more than liberalism should be equated with Communism. They say "at the risk of being repetitious, we would stress again that not everyone who sees danger in the growth of centralized government or who opposes federal housing and aid to education is thereby proved to be an extremist. What counts is the manner in which these issues are interpreted. . . ." (p. 212)

The radical rightist is against any area of agreement between America's two great political parties, he seeks to "politicalize" every aspect of life as does the totalitarian, he seeks to infect related groups in society and create intolerance to all who oppose his aims, he believes in secrecy, and also in a double-standard of conduct. (pp. 224–225) The Overstreets urge conservatives to learn what the radical right can do as the liberals were educated to what the radical left could do in the 1930's and 1940's. What is the best way to do this? Ask the radical rightists "to substantiate every charge they make and . . . then (give) the fullest possible publicity . . . to their responses." (p. 249) The authors note that the schools, the PTA's, the mental health movement, and the public libraries have long been particular right-wing targets. (pp. 266–267) To protect these institutions from the onslaught of the extremists, and to expose the contradictory nature of extremist beliefs, the Overstreets advocate full and free discussions. They note that labeling the radical right as "fascist" or "anarchic" is not only emotional, but incorrect. If any label can be applied to these extremists it is that of "anarchic totalitarianism." (p. 268) The radical rightist line, conclude the authors, "is not underwritten by any coherent theory. It is a product of anger, not of thought; of anger, and of a will to be on top of *some* heap. It expresses a determination to climb up and to pull down." (p. 268)

While noting that the strength of the nation is in its "liberal-conservative" or "conservative-liberal" center, perhaps the authors place too great a stress here and there on the "liberal" or the "conservative" in American society. Such labels even though we admit their lack of preciseness connote an emphasis on and commitment to ideology which I do not believe exists. I hope also that the authors will some day undertake a further work dealing with extremism in our society and attempt to determine the causes of the frustrations which have provided the material upon which such groups thrive.

Of particular interest to educators, and a sentiment with which this reviewer concurs, is the Overstreets' admonition to those in charge of our schools that perhaps our young people should have more familiarity with "the great words of our tradition so that they will have, all their lives, the supportive companionship of these words when they need them." (p. 296) The authors are thinking of the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address. While such a plea might sound "corny" to some who have devoted their lives to the fine points of analyzing the governmental processes and dealing with the sophisticated methodologies of the behavioral sciences, it is time all of us realized that there is more to government in a free society than the analysis of particular issues or the statistical predictability of particular decision-makers. There is a spirit of freedom which must be conveyed in terms of our past if we are to keep faith with the future. That is the challenge of the Overstreets, not only to their fellow Americans, but to all who seek, through service and through instruction, to set an example for the young men and women of our land.

The radical reactionary right in the United States poses a danger for our country. It is constantly seeking to undermine faith in government and in public servants. Anyone who disagrees with its fanatical beliefs is in danger of false and venomous attack and abuse. The time for all decent, reasonable citizens to stand up against radicals, left and right, is certainly here. The Overstreets have shown how this stand can be intelligently, responsibly and patriotically taken.

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Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society. By Fred W. Riggs. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964. Pp. xvi, 477. $7.95.)

As chairman of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration and as one of the most imaginative and prolific theorists of political development, Fred Riggs has measurably reshaped the thinking of both practitioners and pedants of public administration in the new states. He was in the forefront of those who insisted that the principles of American public administration cannot be directly applied to transitional societies and that new models and concepts must be designed both to explain what goes on in such societies and to facilitate substantive programs of development. The measure of Riggs' influence is not how many people use such terms of his as "prismatic society," "sala," or "clects," but rather the large number of people who are following him in trying to find some patterned order in the otherwise strange behavior of officials and bureaucrats in the new states.

During the last few years it has not been easy to lay one's hands upon much of Riggs' writing, for as an extraordinarily cosmopolitan scholar he has generously published in numerous out-of-the-way journals. Now, however, he has done us the service of bringing together many of his widely scattered articles and organized them as the chapters of this new book. This work is therefore not a systematic exposition of his theory of a "prismatic society," something which we still await. It is instead a fascinating introduction to the restless searchings of an amazingly wide-ranging mind. Riggs is always uninhibited in sharing his readings and his ruminations. As a theorist he is intrigued with words, their definitions and their nuances of meaning. He is constantly breaking the flow of his analysis to elaborate on the need for a new word, on the inadequacies of conventional terminologies, on the need to make more refined distinctions than the mind of man usually feels comfortable with.

But it would be grossly wrong to dismiss Riggs as one who would tell us more about verbal distinctions than we want or need to know. Although at places in this book it is hard to understand why Riggs is so enthusiastic in laboring points which appear hardly to deserve footnote status, in truth the sum effect of his efforts is a substantial advance in both our knowledge of transitional societies and the state of social science theory in general. And this is true for two very specific reasons. First, in spite of his penchant for abstractions, Riggs is in fact above all a realist whose speculative mind is sparked by visions of exactly what happens in particular settings and not by the formulations of other theorists. Second, in seeking his level of description and analysis Riggs has gone further than anyone else in shattering the traditional disciplinary boundaries and finding a new level for integrating, in particular, economic and political behavior and thus suggesting a modern, behavioral version of the old-fashioned field of political economy.

Intellectually Riggs began his theoretical studies of the underdeveloped countries with the dichotomous models of "traditional" and "modern," which were evolved in the writings of Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons; and he once saw the underdeveloped countries as "transitional" or mixed systems in a condition of unstable equilibrium between the two ideal types. Like most other contemporary scholars he was, however, soon dissatisfied with these categories and with all the compromising or euphemistic terms which have been invented for labeling the phenomena. It is true that Riggs has come up with a new terminology, and certainly only a very few scholars will feel that the basic problems of classification have been solved by his invention of calling traditional systems "fused" as is light before striking a prism, modern societies "diffracted" as is a beam of light after passing through a prism, and transitional systems "prismatic" for the state of light within a prism. Tastes differ and analogies that are illuminating to one may seem only gross and clumsy to others. But it is not the terms that are important, as much as Riggs would belabor them; what is important is that Riggs has gone further than any other social theorist in taking the transitional societies as they really are and seeing them as much in a state of equilibrium as any "traditional" or "modern" system. In his theory of the "prismatic society" Riggs singles out patterns of behavior which have an internal logic of their own, and which do not merely represent imperfect incorporation of modern practices in societies in which traditional ways are being disrupted. In noting precisely what goes on in these societies he does not try to rationalize away or dismiss as transitory phenomena practices which might seem deviant in either traditional or modern settings.

Let is be clear that Riggs is not advocating the Pollyanna view that apparently strange behavior in transitional societies "makes sense" if one only "understands their values." Nor is he saying that given time alone changes in behavior can be expected. What he is trying to do is to create a general utility model in which economic wealth, political power and social status considerations can be treated in the same matrix, and with respect to which, given the resource parameters of prismatic societies, the behavior of actors represents the hard-headed and clear-eyed judgments of men who are striving to optimize their total self-interest. The implication of Riggs' analysis is that people do what they commonly do in transitional societies because that is where the payoffs lie for them and not because of any lingering "hold of tradition." Thus, "development" toward "modernization" cannot be expected as long as people, who can do something about it, will be hurt more than helped by such "development."

All this represents a significant advance in the boldness of theory building. Unfortunately it cannot be said that Riggs has been fully successful in expounding this model in the book under review. We must await the time when he will attempt a full exposition of his theories. In the meantime, however, he has given us a rich and provocative harvest of ideas.

Lucian W. Pye

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Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. By Wilbur Schramm. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 333. $7.50.)

For better or for worse, it is now widely assumed that social science can be useful to policy makers, and particularly that careful attention to our storehouse of knowledge can make the processes of bringing about change or "development" less chancy, socially painful and politically unpredictable than was true in the past. Exactly how the contemporary leaders of the West or of the New Nations find their way through the theoretical and conceptual jungle of national economic, political and social development is an intriguing mystery. Whether they can derive any coherent meaning from the babel of hunches, insights, hypotheses, theories, "laws," findings and speculations that social science has produced in this area in recent years is itself a subject that might be rewardingly researched.

One great merit of Wilbur Schramm's volume is that it is in part a self-conscious effort at intellectual stock-taking. His central premise is that the process of economic and social development (the "terrible ascent" from traditionality to modernity) can be greatly facilitated through the intelligent and systematic use of modern communications technology—particularly the mass media of radio and television. In support of this premise, he assembles a striking amount of data on the distribution of information and information-producing facilities around the world; he summarizes much of what we believe we know about the dynamics of change; and he provides a number of summary examples of the role of communications in facilitating change, drawing in some detail on the works of Lerner, Doob, Holmberg and Rao. Few will quarrel with his contention that those who would speed up the industrial response to the "revolution of rising expectations" would do well to understand the importance of communications in this process.

Schramm's data clearly indicate that the task of achieving the goal he desires is formidable. Arresting statistics are produced to show that to be underdeveloped means, among other things, to be radically deprived on every dimension relating to the production and dissemination of information. Foreign news coverage in the world's newspapers, for example, centers overwhelmingly on the affairs of France, Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. A relative trickle of news emanates from the rest of the world, both because the less developed countries do little to transmit local information and because the foreign dispatches of the five world news services (owned by the same four countries noted above) concentrate on the affairs of each other. When these world news services do report on the affairs of Asia or other less developed parts of the world, the emphasis is often on the spectacular or the bizarre. This distortion and lack of balance is a problem worth considerable reflection.

The pattern of severe inequality in the flow of information remains unchanged when one examines such media as mail, telephone and telegraph messages, radio and television. Most of the world remains a considerable distance from achieving the modest level of communications development established by UNESCO as a minimally acceptable standard. For the many reasons Schramm cites, the serious lack of mass media facilities is not significantly counterbalanced by the two-step communications flow whereby information is diffused from urban centers to the countryside and from a few literates to a larger mass of illiterates. Moreover, he also argues quite cogently that economic development—and especially political development—will require the existence of not one but many channels of information diffusion. A rational handling of this problem necessitates not merely more schools and newspapers but, in addition, greatly increased use of radio and television.

Schramm is judicious in differentiating the kinds of things the mass media can accomplish in the complex field of development. As "watchmen," he feels the media acting alone can do much to broaden human horizons, disseminate knowledge of economic alternatives and raise the level of human aspirations. In the area of changing values, attitudes and social customs, he suggests that the mass media must work through other structures by seeking to have an impact on opinion leaders and by imparting such necessary things as status and technical information to those who might in turn influence others. As "teachers" he concludes that the role of the mass media must be essentially auxiliary, reinforcing and perhaps extending the capability of existing human resources. His hope is that the mass media in the vital area of education can grow from the use of first and second generation materials (*e.g.*, charts, maps, chalkboards, books) to the utilization of third and fourth generation devices (*e.g.*, films and film strips, radio, television, programmed instruction and computers). It is these new media which "represent the great hope of the developing countries for supplying education at the rate and of the quality required."

Despite the author's frequent caveats about well known obstacles to change, there is both a strikingly sanguine attitude toward the efficacy of the mass media and a distressing tendency to slide over several perplexing issues. For example, one would surely want to question Schramm's implicit assumption that a relatively high level of economic modernity can be brought in the foreseeable future to that portion of the world he calls the "band of scarcity." Some of his own data depicting the extremely modest improvements growing out of planned economic inputs clearly suggest how staggering this problem is and how little change one can expect in a period of several generations. If this is so, one is led to wonder just how much added information is consistent with keeping the "rising frustration" level at something below the point of serious eruption. The author himself at one point observes that change must be balanced (*e.g.*, literacy and technical skills should not outrun jobs), but he does not go on to specify that this concept—in some places and under certain conditions—may very well imply slowing down rather than accelerating the communications revolution.

The author also raises the ethical question about using information technology to overcome traditional resistances to change. He concludes that "the developing countries have decided to change" (which raises the question of *who* this is) and that, other things being equal, knowledge is better than ignorance, health better than disease, eating better than going hungry, a comfortable living standard better than poverty, and political participation better than isolation from the polity.

As an abstract statement of a democratic ethic, such a roll call of preferences is certainly laudable. But as an implied prediction about what is likely to emerge in the developing world, the rationale seems curiously removed from the conditions and patterns that currently prevail there. The realities of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America indicate that mass communications in part are utilized quite deliberately by indigenous elites to achieve and maintain control of political systems, often at the expense of the very values that are important to the author. In Schramm's scheme of values (illustrated by the criteria for drawing up a national communications statute prepared by Fernand Terrou), information should be free, strongly protected by legal institutions and used as an instrument of human liberation. That, as a matter of empirical practice, it may and often is used as a device for enslaving man receives less treatment than one might expect.

Finally, there is something unrealistic about Schramm's repeated assertion that in the developing countries demands for budgetary outlays for communications development should not be viewed as part of the normal competition for funds that obtains among administrative departments. Because communications are essential to all governmental activities, its claims should be accorded a privileged position. Quite apart from the query whether communications, inherently a part of all functional administrative units or divisions, warrant separate operational status in a cabinet or ministerial structure, it seems of great importance that those who would increase budgetary outlays in this sector should be made to compete with the champions of more roads, better health, public housing, expanded educational facilities, industrialization and other activities associated with modernization. How limited resources are in fact allocated in any system is the essence of politics, and it seems unlikely that a formula can be found that will take the field of communications outside this sphere.

Schramm's treatment is a cogent and often brilliant brief for the thesis that communications are central to—perhaps even the touchstone of—economic, social and political development. As such, it represents an important contribution to the growing published output in the communications field, of which Schramm is a leading figure. Those who read this volume with care will be rewarded by its combination of rich detail and illuminating insights. Many will feel, however, that the case for the kind of attention to mass communications that the author suggests suffers from the great gaps that remain in our knowledge about the dynamics of change. Schramm's lucid analysis will certainly help us to identify the kinds of problems that require further scholarly attention, both on the dimension he treats so competently and on others of equal relevance to the difficult subject treated by this volume.

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American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline. BY ALBERT SOMIT AND JOSEPH TANENHAUS. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 173. $5.75.)

Somit and Tanenhaus accept some rather narrow limits in this book. They are not concerned with what we as political scientists do, nor with how or how well we do it. Rather they ask what attitudes or beliefs we have about a series of matters: behavioralism, the adequacy of our profession, the existence and influence of an Establishment in the APSA, the quality of doctoral programs, the significance of the work being done in various fields, the composition of our "hall of fame," the factors making for professional success, the prestige-value of publication in various journals, and career satisfaction. They get at our beliefs through a questionnaire sent to a representative sample of the members of the APSA and through computer-assisted multivariate analyses of the responses (N = 431).

One of the main parts of the questionnaire, Part B, consists of 26 statements, respondents being invited to check "agree strongly," "agree," "disagree," "disagree strongly," or "can't say." The statements are taken from the literature and are of the kind that we all repeatedly hear. Yet they are vague and ambiguous, most of them in more than one respect. For example, "A substantial part of the intellectual conflict in American political science is rooted in issues that are methodological in character." What is the meaning of *substantial?* Suppose that I think that a "substantial" part *is* so rooted, and that another "substantial" part *is not.* How should I respond? Whatever my response, am I reacting to a factual statement or to a criticism? If it is a factual statement, what is the point in responding "strongly?" Should I agree "strongly" that it is three o'clock? Another of the 26 statements illustrates similar difficulties: "The really significant problems of political life cannot be successfully attacked by the behavioral approach." How should I respond if I think (as I do) that some can be and that others can't be, and further that even when it is possible to adopt a behavioral approach it may or may not be sensible to do so? (I will not ask the tired question—though I might, for it is relevant—whether we all agree on the definition of "behavioral approach.")

One of the conclusions that Somit and Tanenhaus reach is that "political scientists consider behavioralism the single most important issue facing the discipline." But obviously the finding is limited by the fact that they checked only on some selected issues of an intra-disciplinary sort, not on issues relating directly to government and international affairs.

A colleague skilled in factor analysis, Samuel C. Patterson, is from a technical point of view quite respectful of the methods that Somit and Tanenhaus employ. On the negative side he points to the claim that factors concerning "behavioralism" and the "adequacy of the profession" are independent of each other and says that the alleged finding was in fact postulated in the method employed—that the orthogonal rotation of the factors precluded any finding that they were related. On the positive side he points particularly to the sophisticated and ingenious analyses relating to the "have-nots" and to "career satisfaction."

The most striking of the findings emerge from Part C of the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to name the political scientists who have made the most significant contributions to the discipline. As Somit and Tanenhaus note, the item revealed a "curious lack of consensus." A mention by 2.9% or more of the respondents sufficed to get a name among the "greats," 18 being included for the pre-1945 period and 19 for the post-1945 period. To add to the curious aspects of the situation, we might note that of the 33 on the combined list (four appear twice), 19 have been elected to the Presidency of the APSA, but only 4 are among the 25 authors whose books have received the Woodrow Wilson prize since it was first awarded in 1947. The most notable fact is that almost all of the "greats" are the Ph.D. products of a very few departments. To put it differently, most departments—even most of the top eleven as determined by Hughes in 1925, Keniston in 1957, and Somit and Tanenhaus in 1963—have failed to produce a single "great." We can wonder what the effect would have been if a slightly different question had been put, *e.g.*, if the respondents had been instructed to name a designated number of persons, or if they had been instructed to render judgment only in their own major field of interest.

In the chapter dealing with the "greats," Somit and Tanenhaus attempt to identify the elements of eminence—the factors that seem to account for the presence of the various names on the list. In the following chapter their concern is with "the road to success." But "success" apparently has nothing to do with eminence. Somit and Tanenhaus choose, for their purposes, to equate it with "the ability to get offers from other schools," and they comment on the "realism" with which respondents rated the contribution of various factors, *e.g.*, the view that the quantity of publications contributes more than their quality. But again the responses raise questions. How would the results have differed if the respondents had been asked about the actual receipt of offers rather than the ability to get them? How would they have differed if a distinction had been made between offers from Harvard University and Harding College? How would they have differed if respondents had confined themselves to explaining offers they themselves had received or extended rather than explaining those received by the other fellow?

In sum, judgments of the book can well be mixed. It is elegantly written, and much of it is interesting. But when people—even professors—are asked vague and ambiguous questions to which they can respond only on an impressionistic or intuitive basis, how much importance should we attach to the findings? If similar but clearer questions were asked not of a subgroup comprising a representative sample of the profession but of a subgroup consisting of persons commanding very special respect, how much would the results differ and in what ways? And with regard to the departments that have produced the "greats," what do they have that the rest lack? Or should we ask what they once had that the rest then lacked?

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✓ *The Crisis of Political Imagination.* BY GLENN TINDER. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Pp. 373. $7.50).

One criterion applicable to a book whose topic is ostensibly political theory is the fruitfulness of the genre in which it is written. Professor Tinder's essay is a study in political metaphysics. Its chief theme is the alleged failure of political theory to do away once and for all with all the world's ills and to rectify the tragedy of the human condition. According to Tinder, modern political thought has managed to create a "bifurcation of spirit and society," and has then refused to recognize this schism as the critical question confronting modern political thought. Consistent with this genre of analysis, the condition of mankind is deduced from principles which are assumed to be axiomatic and, consequently, beyond systematically acquired empirical data.

The axiom in question is the alienation and estrangement of man, "the dread of his personal existence," the separateness of his life, and the decline of the traditional social and community institutions which in the past provided the conditions for a more productive, secure and happier existence. This axiom is, as axioms must be, self-evident. Thus anchored, Tinder proceeds to an analysis of how alienation or estrangement has manifested itself in our culture. The symptoms of mass disintegration are everywhere (indeed, no area of personal or social life escapes): the loss of rural assets (*e.g.*, an open, unpolluted sky, the breezes of the open country); the high divorce rate; the dislocations of industrial society; the decay of fraternalism in trade unions, lodges and neighborhoods; neuroses and psychoses; a loss of warmth in human relations (including an end to the *esprit* of the slums (*sic*); deadening conformity; the private political impotence engendered by mass democracy.

Estrangement and alienation are enforced not only by social and historical circumstances, but are expressed in cultural institutions as well. Religion, science, art, and philosophy, earlier sources of unity and social and psychological integration, have each contributed to this dislocation. In rejecting religion, despite those respects in which skepticism constitutes a victory of rationality and enlightenment (p. 43), the relationship of man to the universe established "through the great myths of Christianity" has been largely lost (p. 44). Science, chiefly physics, in its mechanistic or Newtonian stage, made it possible for man to "master a portion of reality . . . became an obstacle to apprehension of the whole range of being." (p. 44) Modern physics, on the other hand, is incomprehensible to the layman and, therefore, a source of bewilderment, hence estrangement, rather than security. In philosophy, Descartes, Kant (whose philosophy is "in some ways one of the most depressing ever formulated" [p. 46]), Hegel, and the existentialists have made the world unknowable and absurd. Recent art communicates the personal eccentricity rather than, as in the classical past, the universality of the human experience. Above all, politics has failed to offer a philosophy of community or a policy for furthering community. Liberalism, with *laissez faire* capitalism, and mass democracy have issued in a decline of political authority and thus of community.

Where must we look, what must we seek to do, to extricate ourselves from this oppressive and dehumanized condition? Tinder replies:

> . . . the first task of social thought in our time is to regain the posture, if not of religious faith, at least of religious openness and inquiry. During most of Western history, theology and political theory have, despite some exceptional periods and figures, been close allies. What seems to be called for by the present failure of political imagination is above all a restoration of this ancient coalition. (p. 241)

At this point Tinder explicitly formulates the theological premises of his argument, stating that "the demand of our time—which can be ignored only at the ultimate price of the continued decay of Western civilization—is that society be reconstituted on the foundations of revelation, faith, and vision." (p. 272)

Now, the words "alienation" and "estrangement" are *exceptives* which serve, like the concept "neurosis" or the concept "selfish" to denote systems of behavior which are characteristically different from other kinds of behavior. It would be senseless to say that everyone, everywhere and always, is neurotic or selfish. The logic of the concept "neurosis" requires, if the word is to be meaningfully used, that non-neurotic behavior is possible. "Alienation" is a concept of the same sort. Its utility as a descriptive concept depends upon the possibility of nonalienated existence. Anyone may, of course, use the concept in whatever fashion he wishes, but if it is employed in a general and undiscriminating way, we are simply left without a word to denote the phenomenon in question. Certainly the young Marx recognized this characteristic of the concept alienation and used it to describe a narrow and unique phenomenon—*viz.*, the alienation of the proletariat from the products of their labor. The extension of the theory of alienation to all aspects of life diminishes its fruitfulness and renders it innocuous and banal. The etiology of this error appears to go something like this: despite his increased control over nature, chiefly since the industrial revolution, man is nonetheless lonely and unfulfilled in a universe which he does not comprehend and which appears to offer neither solace nor encouragement. This condition is thought to stem from a breakdown in traditional norms of community. (Cause and symptom are systematically confused by Tinder). Men, it is thought, could not always have lived this way. And, like Jeremiah and the prophets, Tinder urges us to look to the past and consider the conditions of life lived by those who were less anxiety ridden, less neurotic, less existentially lonely and estranged. Who then? The Athenian in the *agora?* The village smith under the spreading chestnut tree? The medieval vassal? The Jew of the ghetto? It is not clear—but somewhere in the past, before political and religious institutions were torn asunder, life allegedly was better: stable, orderly, happy—a veritable Golden Age of Fulfillment.

The Crisis of Political Imagination is not a crisis in political imagination at all. It is a catalogue of *clichés* (with a *cliché* for a solution) which does not add up to an argument. There may well be a painful, tormented and lonely dimension of life which has nothing whatever to do with politics. Private feelings of estrangement may, as well, be a luxury for those who at this point in industrial civilization need no longer expend their time, energy and effort in acquiring the basic necessities of life.

Finally, there is, as Tinder himself observes, a kind of pretentiousness in supposing that our times and our problems are greater or that they are uniquely different from those of the past. But it is sheer folly to suppose that a possible solution to these problems lies in the resurrection of ancient and well interred religious institutions. Political theorists ought to be among those most keenly aware of the torment and effort expended by mankind in getting politics clear of the religious rubric. Whatever price is paid in the "disintegration of community" (if indeed this infelicitous expression has any meaning at all) it is a small one if the conditions of political community require the reemergence of religion in political life.

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The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. BY VICTOR T. LEVINE. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. 329, $7.50.)

It has become commonplace to stress at the beginning of a political study devoted to a particular African country that the area under consideration is culturally heterogeneous. In the case of the Cameroun Federal Republic, such an assertion is fully justified not only because the republic's people belong to three major African culture areas (according to the late Melville Herskovits's classification) but also because the country has been a meeting ground for three major European cultures: German, French, and English. What was originally the German protectorate of Kamerun was divided into two mandated areas administered by France and Britain respectively. The French "Cameroun" became independent on January 1, 1960; two regions that constituted the British "Cameroons," administered as part of Nigeria, chose different fates by means of a referendum: the Northern part was integrated with Nigeria, and the Southern part joined its French-speaking neighbor to constitute the present Federal Republic on October 1, 1961. This new state thus shares with the Somali Republic the rare distinction of being a country in which units administered by different colonial powers came together at the time of independence. As the only political history of the area, Mr. LeVine's book is a useful addition to the relatively short list of serious country monographs on Africa.

The focus of this study is on the lesser-known of the two components, French-speaking East Cameroun. More than half of the text is devoted to background factors and pre-World War II institutional and political history but contains several items that are particularly well handled and contribute significantly to an understanding of later political development. The first of these is LeVine's interesting discussion of the German colonial experience in Kamerun which, in spite of its harshness, became an extremely important factor shaping nationalism in the area: "The German experience remains, for many Cameroonians, at once a political touchstone and a potent symbol of a half-mythical golden age when the Cameroons were one." (p. 38) This is more than a footnote to colonial history: it indicates how rapidly the boundaries drawn during the African scramble became symbolic referents for nationalist ideologues. Given the importance of the German factor, however, one wonders why there are no traces of African reactions to the German conquest of Western Europe which are known to have occurred in such disparate areas as Northern Mali, the Congo, Kenya, and Madagascar, where the event was associated with hopes for African liberation and led to political effervescence.

Another item of particular interest is LeVine's treatment of ethnic tensions among the Bassa and Bamileke of the south in the chapter on westernization and social change. This is of the utmost importance for an understanding of recent politics in the area because these groups have provided the nucleus of support for the *Union des Populations du Cameroun*, an organization founded in 1948 and originally affiliated with the French West African *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain;* when the latter adopted a meliorist strategy, the UPC remained militant and eventually became an underground terrorist movement whose persistence throughout the past decade has affected the entire political system. Although it is not completely clear from LeVine's discussion why such social tensions, common to numerous other ethnic groups in similar situations, should have resulted in this particular political outcome, he has provided at least the beginnings of a case study which hopefully will lead others to attempt a comparative examination of a dramatic but hitherto poorly understood aspect of the political process in Africa.

Since the author has already published in compendia edited by others much of his material on recent political parties and groups, as well as on institutional arrangements within the Federal Republic, the chapters he devotes to the post-World War II period constitute primarily a chronicle of groups, personalities, and events, with relatively little stress on political structure and process. This is somewhat unfortunate because it deprives the present book of what might have been a more unified format. It is indeed difficult to find our bearings when the author reaches the end of the line—except that it is 1961 and the ride is over. There is very little conceptual clarity in the terminal discussion of what is, after all, a very interesting problem of integration. Similarly, among his conclusions, LeVine states that "Admittedly, a nation . . . does not need a vigorous party system in order to be a nation. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Yugoslavia are no less nations for having single-party systems." (pp. 220–221) What is the relevance of this remark? He goes on to argue that since both East and West Camerouns have chosen democratically-oriented systems, however, "The stability of the Camerouns' party system becomes, therefore, a crucial element in building a Cameroun nation as Camerounians themselves would like it to be." The author then summarizes "the gradual collapse of multi-partyism" (covered in detail in his other publications), the emergence of a one-party state, and concludes that "The East Cameroun has, for all practical purposes, ceased to have a 'party system'. . . ." He then ends with further remarks on stability and democracy.

The shift in the level of discussion from regime to system, the confusion between modernization and democracy, the lack of clarity in the relation of both of these with some undefined state labeled "stability" is unfortunately characteristic of much current work in comparative politics. While he does not achieve conceptual elegance, however, LeVine has demonstrated soundness of judgment and empirical flair by forging out of disparate materials a useful political study.

Aristide R. Zolberg
The University of Chicago

The New States of West Africa. By Ken Post. Penguin African Library AP14, 1964. 206 pages. $1.25.

In this interesting and able book Mr. Post, a British political scientist who has worked particularly in Nigeria, surveys the new world created since so many West African countries gained their independence in the period 1957–1961. He is interested, he notes, in formulating a "preliminary set of generalizations" about the political systems operating there, but he is not model-building at a high level of abstraction. He suggests that too much attention has been paid to outward forms in looking at modern West Africa; he is more concerned to describe political reality than political forms. To this extent his book does not deal in the terms of political sociology which David Apter and others have previously applied to West Africa, but belongs rather to the British school of narrative and dissection.

Mr. Post deals first with the manner in which the various West African states achieved independence. His account is not elementary, and readers without some familiarity with West African names and parties may find it complicated to follow. He then considers the role of the African elites to whom the colonial powers transferred authority, the political institutions which they attempted to transfer, and the problems of creating national unity and national consensus. This is the real focus of his work, and its most informative and useful section. The differences among the various national elites and their relations with traditional structures of authority are thus described, as well as the heritage of political ideas left by the British and the French. Mr. Post concludes that the difference in political attitude of these two powers is still to be seen in West Africa; indeed, he really uses "French" as a synonym for ideological, and "British" as a synonym for pragmatic. He notes that the political system in Ghana does not fit into either category and that the special conditions of federalism explain many developments in Nigeria. Nevertheless, this single antithesis seems incomplete as an analysis of the differences among West African political systems, and Mr. Post tries to make it explain too much. In his opinion, incidentally, both British and French policies were failures in West Africa, for the French failed to transcend territorial boundaries to build a French West Africa, and the British concept of parliamentary government has not taken root.

In discussing current institutions and problems Mr. Post devotes a chapter to what Mamadou Dia called "the indispensable symbiosis of party and government". Here he considers not so much the structure of a one-party state, as its real impact on policy and development at local levels, in other words how it affects the ordinary citizen. He notes with interest recent trends in Senegal and Guinea which seem to point toward a rebuilding of local administrative cadres and their insulation from direct party influence, although party structures still handle the making of policy. On problems of national unity he discusses the lack of distinction so far made by African leaders among such terms as "state", "nation", and "country", to which Leopold Senghor has added "fatherland". He makes clear the turning inward of the new political units, even to the point of xenophobia, as well as the role (or lack of it, at present) of agencies of dissent: competing parties, trade unions, youth groups, the church. Mr. Post is not sanguine about the dangers which the call for unity and uniformity may create, when an opposition has no method of protest save violence. His conclusion stresses both the frightening fragility of the present political systems, and the enormous burdens of the top rulers, on whose judgment and ability (and with very little institutional assistance) the West African future depends.

Three last chapters, on economic development, education, and foreign relations, are largely descriptive. There is a good bibliography; a listing of French materials will be of special advantage to readers in the United States. There are a few minor errors in figures and dates, but none to affect seriously Mr. Post's general theses. His book can be recommended to the college reader and should be of considerable use for courses on African politics, although it seems to this reviewer to demand of the reader some previous knowledge of Africa.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. EDITED BY L. H. BUTTERFIELD. (New York: Atheneum, 1964. Boxed in four paper volumes. Vol. I, Pp. xcviii, 365. Vol. II, Pp. x, 458. Vol. III, Pp. xiii, 449. Vol. IV, Pp. x, 403. $2.65 each volume.)

When these first four volumes of *The Adams Papers* were originally published in 1961 it marked an event of such historical significance that President John F. Kennedy was called upon to review them for the *American Historical Review.* For these first four volumes are but the beginning of a mammoth publishing undertaking, sponsored by the cooperative endeavors of *Life,* Harvard University Press, the Massachusetts Historical Society and the Adams family, to bring forth an anticipated one hundred volume record of the writings of three generations of the Adams family. This monumental project, which commences in 1755 when John Adams started his *Diary,* will cover some thirteen decades of Adams' writing, up to 1889, which the editors have chosen as the cut-off year because it was the year in which the last survivor of the "third generation," died. Scholars will thus have for the first time an accessible record of the major literary accomplishments, reflections, observtions and comments of what assuredly was the most historically conscious family in the formative years of our history.

In the attractive paper-back edition of the *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams,* the *Diary,* spanning the years 1755 to 1804, runs to two and a half volumes; the *Autobiography,* composed of three large fragments of manuscript which ends in midsentence in 1780, covers approximately a volume and a half. The last one hundred pages of volume four are devoted to an exceptionally copious and informative index to the four volumes.

While these volumes cast little new light upon political history, they are quite revealing of the temperament and personality of their author. What emerges from this remarkable record, in much fuller flavor than found in its previous partial publication in the *Works of John Adams* edited by Charles Francis Adams (1850–1856), is an intensely sensitive, vain, warm, introspective, humorous and occasionally earthy human being. Here is the contrite and Puritanical Adams who could write in his twenty-first year, "Oh! That I could wear out of my mind every mean and base affectation, conquer my natural Pride and Self Conceit, expect no more deference from my fellows than I deserve, acquire that meekness, and humility, which are the sure marks and Characters of a great and generous Soul, and subdue every unworthy Passion and treat all men as I wish to be treated by all." Here is the ambitious and self-pitying youthful Adams: "I long to be a master of Greek and Latin. I long to prosecute the mathematical and philosophical Sciences. I long to know a little of Ethicks and moral Philosophy. But I have no Books, no Time, no Friends. I must therefore be contented to live and die an ignorant, obscure fellow." Yet here also is the omnivorous reader, Adams, devouring every work he can lay his hands upon in law, history and philosophy, in Latin and Greek as well as French and English and dutifully recording each achievement along with his conjectures in his diary. "Would the State of Nature be a State of War or Peace?", he considers upon reading Montesquieu. "Hobbes thinks, that Men like Cattle, if in a state of Nature, would mutually desire and strive for the Mastery, and I think Secondat's Argument from the Complexity of the Idea of Dominion, is not a Refutation of Hobbes's Hypothesis, for Cattle fight for Dominion, and Men in the State of Nature may be supposed to have as clear an Idea of Dominion as the Cattle have." And here also is the maturing "mixed government" theorist, recollecting in his *Autobiography* his opinions of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense.* "The Arguments in favour of Independence I liked very well: but one third of the Book was filled with Arguments from the old Testament . . . and another Third, in planning a form of Government, for the separate States in One Assembly, and for the United States, in a Congress. His Arguments from the old Testament, were ridiculous. . . . The other third part relative to a form of Government I considered as flowing from simple Ignorance, and a mere desire to please the democratic Party in Philadelphia. . . ."

It is interesting if not surprising to find that in composing his *Autobiography* Adams did not bother to consult his *Diary* to refresh his memory. As a result events remembered in the *Autobiography* do not always occur in precisely the same fashion as those recorded in the *Diary.*

L. H. Butterfield, editor of *The Adams Papers,* and Leonard C. Faber and Wendell D. Garrett, assistant editors, deserve especial praise for the manner in which they have joined the miscellany of manuscript into a coherent whole. Their judicious use of informative notes, which reveal a tremendous amount of painstaking research on their part, enlighten the reader to names, places and events which otherwise might remain either confusing or obscure. John Adams once wrote in his *Diary*, " . . . I never shall shine, till some animating Occasion calls forth all my Powers. I find that the Mind must be agitated with some Passion, either Love, Fear, Hope, etc. before she will do her best." These four volumes are the record of a mind passionately active in the making of our history.—ALAN P. GRIMES, *Michigan State University*.

Mill and Liberalism. BY MAURICE COWLING. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 161. $5.00.)

Cowling's essay on John Stuart Mill is of a piece with his *Nature and Limits of Political Science* (reviewed in this REVIEW by Dwight Waldo, LVIII, 403, June, 1964), and it is probably the most severe attack on Mill since James Fitzjames Stephen published his *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* in 1873. In the *Nature and Limits* Cowling argues that political science has become pretentious and sterile, or at least fallen into a state of confusion, through its failure to sever *explanation* on the one hand from *persuasion* and *practice* on the other. Dwight Waldo is probably correct: most of us will find Cowling's general thesis "perverse and precious" and be repelled by his advocacy of "Science for Science's Sake" and "Philosophy for Philosophy's Sake"; yet from the vantage point of this frame of reference Cowling is able in this essay on Mill to highlight some of the confusions in Mill's work and to show he is something less than the liberal he is usually held to be.

Cowling believes it bad enough to move from explanation to prescription, but he finds completely "intolerable" the sin of using the former as a "cover" for justifying or dignifying the latter. And Mill has sinned beyond redemption. He could be forgiven, Cowling says, if he had done what one expects of a politician, if he had offered practical advice and then supported it with "rhetorical gesturing"; but when one finds a philosopher has allowed his practical interests "to dominate, and deflect, the structure of his explanation" and has justified persuasion to moral revolution on the basis of philosophical authority, "then one must say that philosophy has been corrupted." (p. 113)

Nor can it be otherwise: Mill places all hope for the moral and political reconstruction of modern society in the very group that Cowling feels must divorce itself completely from practical matters—Cowling's academia (the scientist and the philosopher) apparently corresponds very closely with Mill's "clerisy" (the literati and the intellectuals). In Cowling's estimate Mill believed Christianity had served its purpose of providing an ordering principle during the Middle Ages, but Christianity was inadequate for the developing age of science, an age that demanded an all-encompassing Truth in place of the partial truth to which the inflexible Christian intolerantly clung. Moreover, Christianity was negative, emphasizing "Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic pursuit of Good." (p. 13) A new fount of moral doctrine was needed, the clergy were to be replaced by the clerisy; and then, freed from the shackles of convention, eventually all men would, through their intellect and under the guidance (and indoctrination) of the clerisy, be able to arrive at a consensus about the way the empirical world functions (Mill's Sociology). Moreover, through the sense-knowledge obtained in the Science of Sociology man would be able to arrive at moral agreement (Mill's Ethology). Apparently this latter consensus will come when man rises to a level of intellectual cultivation where through self-examination he can achieve a "disinterestedness," a state enabling him to see that his own interests are best served by the serving of the best interests of all. (A "natural-harmony-of-interests" postulate makes an easy bridge between *is* and *ought*.)

On the methodological dimension Cowling is asking the impossible or belaboring the obvious: while he would insist on the impossible requirement that the scientist should have no bias from the very beginning of his investigation, his insistence harmlessly serves to remind us that the scientist must take every precaution to eliminate his prejudices when possible or to minimize them when it is not—or at the very least to lay them bare before his audience. Far more interesting to Mill scholars will be the substantive judgments, the firm denials that Mill was the Great Liberal. For Cowling argues most persuasively (if at inordinate length) that Mill finds individuality no more an end than liberty; they are but instruments to permit the clerisy to unburden themselves of convention and lead us into the light, according to Mill.—THEODORE B. FLEMING, JR., *Wayne State University*.

Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. BY R. C. CROSS AND A. D. WOOZLEY. (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1964. Pp. xv, 295. $5.00.)

This work, admirable in many of its aspects, is the result of the collaboration of two professors in the Scottish Universities of Aberdeen and St. Andrews. They have written this commentary for the benefit of British students whose introductory course in philosophy is based upon a reading of the *Republic*. They aim to provide the reader with an appreciation of Plato's views, with an explanation of the structure of his arguments, of the philosophical problems involved and also to provide an introduction to philosophy as the authors understand the term. Their approach to philosophy, however, and Plato's conception of philosophy differ in many respects so that their attempt to conjoin an introduction to modern philosophy to an exegesis of the *Republic* does not have a wholly felicitous result. One part of their enterprise, the introduction to modern philosophy is well realized, and though their exegesis is not equally successful, it is still eminently worthwhile.

The structure of the *Republic* lends itself to an introduction to philosophy, since the dialogue itself is, among other things, a propaedeutics to philosophy. The authors analyze the initial arguments with special care; they show the alternative lines of enquiry that remain unexplored; the occasional errors in argumentation are pointed out and we see that some of Plato's arguments are indeed quite bad. At the same time as we follow the argument we become acquainted with the various kinds of definition (the authors reject Aristotle's real definition as too narrow) and with the dangers of ambiguous terms.

As the argument moves forward we become aware of the complex of ideas enveloped in the term justice; social, moral, epistemological and ontological dimensions appear, and the wide range of topics and materials requires the commentators to become selective. They choose to disregard the educational theories and to restrict themselves to brief observations on politics of which two are of special interest. The authors argue rather convincingly that no social contract theory is to be found in the *Republic* since Glaucon's argument contains no idea of political obligation. The authors also call attention to Plato's shift from economic classes in the first and second city to political classes as the basis of organization in third city. This change of organizational principle occurs without any emphasis, so that there remains a moot question whether Plato was unaware of the shift or decided to accomplish it without awakening the reader's attention.

The main stress of the commentary is laid upon purely philosophical topics. Better than a third of the work is devoted to discussion of *Republic* 474 to 535 (end of V, VI and VII) where problems of epistemology and ontology are treated extensively. Here, as throughout the whole commentary, the discussion is penetrating and lucid, the comments incisive, and the presentation of the various strands of argument is a marvel of clarity. But here also it becomes evident that the authors' aim to furnish simultaneously a philosophical propaedeutics and an exegesis of the *Republic* cannot be wholly realized.

The distinction of *episteme* and *doxa* is analyzed in terms of the difference between knowledge and belief. As Messrs. Cross and Woozley point out neither English term, though customarily used as translation, does quite convey the meaning of the Greek. It is necessary to add, moreover, that in our usage the word belief contains an element of subjectivity, not present in Plato's notion of *doxa*. The authors' procedure to elucidate Plato's doctrine through an analysis of the meaning of belief and knowledge and examination of their linguistic function, though very interesting and informative, rather tends to obscure Plato's teachings. Plato's epistemology, its constitution of differing objects of knowledge coordinated to the different modes of knowing, is open to objection. But the authors' criticism based on their discussion of knowledge and belief miss their mark. The distinction between *doxa* and *episteme* is fundamental to Plato's ontology, but as the authors have been misled by their own interpretation of knowledge and belief they are not compelled to give an exhaustive account of the ontological characteristics of the Forms (ideas). Their attention is focused mainly upon the functions of the Forms as basis of necessary (*a priori*) propositions and as universals. There is a masterly account of the functions of the Forms in Plato's system from which the student will derive a better understanding of the structure of Platonism. The account of Plato's philosophy of mathematics is also very interesting. The suggestion that the mathematicals are the Forms seen in isolation, while the highest level of knowledge is the perception of the Forms in their connection with the Form of the Good is thoughtprovoking.

The commentary concludes with a chapter on Plato's philosophy of art and a very brief discussion of the final myth. The brevity of the last section indicates that Mssrs. Cross and Woozley consider the myth largely irrelevant. No doubt, most modern philosophers would esteem it little. But, since the device of the myth is often used by Plato at decisive points, relegating the myth of Er to unimportance will give the uninformed reader an erroneous impression of the role of myths in Plato.

As an explication of Plato's teaching his work is highly provocative, always thoughtful and full of valuable insights but not in all respects authoritative. Considered as an introduction to philosophy for British students this work is excellent. The parochial nature of the audience for whom this commentary is intended may explain the paucity of American authors cited and the absence of any literature in a foreign language.

Despite the various shortcomings noted, the authors have greatly enriched the Platonic literature and their work should be read by every student of the *Republic.* It would be well, however, if all those readers who wish to grasp Plato's intent would at the same time consult Jaeger's *Paideia,* Wild's *Plato's Theory of Man* and Voegelin's *Plato and Aristotle,* none of which are mentioned in the bibliography.—ULRICH S. ALLERS, *Georgetown University.*

John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951. SELECTED AND EDITED BY SIDNEY RATNER AND JULES ALTMAN WITH JAMES E. WHEELER AS ASSOCIATE EDITOR. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. 737. $12.50.)

This volume is a fascinating record of the intellectual exchanges between the late Professor John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. The record begins with a letter from Bentley, dated November 15, 1932, in which he states that he is sending a copy of his recently published *Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics* to Professor Dewey. He remarks that some of the views expounded in the book owed much to some of Professor Dewey's early lectures. The second letter is Professor Dewey's reply, dated May 22, 1935. He doubts that he acknowledged the receipt of the volume when it was received, and he adds that he has recently read it. "It has given me more enlightenment and intellectual help than any book that I have read for a very long time. . . . "

The next to the last letter in the volume, 595 pages later, begins "Dear A. F.," dated April 9, 1951. The last letter is dated December 6, 1951, and it begins "Dear John." In the intervening pages may be found comments on almost all problems of philosophy and scientific method and also the steps by which the formal salutations of 1932 and 1935 became the informal salutations of 1951. The story is told through the correspondence of the two men. The editors have noted and corrected the mistakes the writers make in their letters and occasionally have added a note to clarify the transaction that is going on between the two men. These editorial insertions are major aids to the reader in following the intellectual controversies. The issues and problems come alive as these two men strive to make clear the notions that they are developing. It is a great pleasure to follow the fully documented account of their agreements and disagreements.

An introductory essay by Sidney Ratner provides a biographical sketch of each man and an excellent summary of the philosophical mileu in which the correspondence occurred. The volume contains two previously unprinted essays by Dewey and two appendices. One of the latter gives a brief but useful bibliography, and the other a brief biography of the persons that are referred to in the letters. Both are very useful features of the book.

The correspondence that is reproduced covers a period long after the publication of *The Process of Government.* There are a few brief references to the *Process* book and some casual remarks about a few political scientists. The major topics in the letters are the notions that are developed in the essays published by Dewey and Bentley under the title *Knowing and the Known* (1949). Both authors published other works in the period covered by the letters.

The book will be most helpful to those who are interested in the problems of scientific method, for there are elaborate commentaries on most of the major contributors to philosophy in this century. The reader will find himself titillated by the vigor and informality of the correspondence and he will be impressed by the seriousness of purpose that pervades the search for firm statements about the human condition. The volume is a substantial contribution to the intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.—CHARLES B. HAGAN, *University of Illinois.*

Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations. BY LEONARD W. DOOB. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. 297. $6.75.)

Professor Doob is a psychologist with a remarkable facility for relating psychological research to problems of political importance. In the past he has performed this task in relation to the problem of the change in beliefs, values, and behavior associated with the process of "becoming more civilized" and the problem of the boundaries of communications systems. This earlier work was based on extensive field work in Africa. The current book, which extends the earlier research, is based on field work in another area where problems of community and nation building are important—the German speaking South Tyrolean section of Italy. And here the main concern is with patriotism and nationalism.

Patriotism, in Doob's useful definition, is "the more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society." Nationalism is the set of demands for action arising from patriotism that incline people to sacrifice on behalf of their government's aims. Patriotism is thus intimately related to the general political problem of nation building. And nationalism—which used to be a political problem in the international sphere as a source of potential conflict among nations—is, as Doob defines it, closely related to problems of economic and political development. The nation-state is the institution that mobilizes resources for development and coordinates developmental activities. Economic development and social change have always been related to appropriate motivation—be it the Protestant ethic or high achievement motivation—but in a context where the state is the focus of development, nationalism becomes a prime motivating set of beliefs. Nationalism becomes a way of motivating people to work for social change and of harnessing their energies into cooperative and coordinated activities.

Patriotism and nationalism are related to commitment on lower or higher levels—to local attachments and to international attachments. Thus economic and social development that depends upon commitment to the nation-state has important implications for both parochial commitments to the family, community, ethnic group, and region and for commitment beyond the nation-state to internationalism. Here Doob returns to the great questions about nationalism that have usually been the focus of concern—its role in generating international tensions and in blocking international cooperation.

Doob has many interesting things to say here upon these subjects from his psychological perspective, largely because his particular psychological perspective is an extremely sensible one. He does not look at nationalism as a way in which personal psychoses play themselves out on the political stage. Though he considers the psychological functions of nationalism, it is not considered a pathological manifestation. He deals with the ways in which political events are interpreted by those involved in them and how these interpretations in turn lead to further action. This provides a useful psychological approach to history—as a set of interpretations of events and reactions to them. In this way, history becomes intimately connected with the contemporary culture of a nation.

One of the most interesting sections of the book deals with the objects of patriotic and nationalistic commitment. One rarely loves one's country in the abstract sense of the term, but rather, some observable manifestation of the country—its land, its people, its culture, its symbols—and the discussion of the variety of possible objects of attachment is particularly enlightening.

The book opens with the important question of what the psychological study of nationalism can add to our understanding of the political problem of nationalism. The question is dealt with from a variety of perspectives in the book—the psychologists' tools are brought to bear on the problem of the sources of patriotism and nationalism, and on the problems of causal inference and of measurement. And many fascinating ideas are suggested. But perhaps because the subject is so intriguing, because Doob has so many interesting ideas to develop, because his skills are so apt for the task, and, perhaps, most of all, because this reviewer had such high expectations based on his experience with Doob's earlier books on Africa, the present volume is somewhat disappointing.

Doob's previous work on Africa has employed data gathered in the most uncongenial circumstances to deal with complex and important problems. The present book in contrast is rather thin in new material. One might have hoped for more material from Doob's new studies in the South Tyrol and more comparisons with the results of his African studies. Much of the book is a speculative essay on nationalism based on a mixed bag of psychological, historical and philosophical works (though good speculation, it is true). And lastly, the book makes clear how important it is that the psychological study of nationalism be merged with studies of nationalism from the organizational point of view. Further information on the organization of South Tyrolean nationalism would have added greatly to our understanding of the role of nationalistic beliefs.

But this is perhaps to ask too much. The present volume remains a stimulating discussion of a vital topic—a discussion that is psychologically wise and politically pertinent.—SIDNEY VERBA, *Stanford University.*

Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model. BY WILLIAM J. GORE. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. viii, 191. $5.00.)

This book is a major contribution to organization theory. Professor Gore subjects the process of decision-making to closer scrutiny than has been done heretofore, and he comes up with some highly original observations, not only concerning decisions, but as to the nature of organization.

He begins by constructing a detailed model of decision-making based on successive empirical studies and then draws theoretical conclusions. The model provides insights into the decision-making process and into the way the problems are perceived, evaluated, weighed in terms of consequences, and support obtained for an agreed course of action. He traces the organizational actions and varied reactions in each of these phases.

Decision-making has become a most popular subject in public administration in recent years. As Gore wryly points out, it has become the latest in "a succession of widely held enthusiasms for some particular dimension as the key to effective administration." (p. 2)

But from Gore's material the decision-making process as usually described does not conform to administrative reality. "Classical theory sets decision-making off as a sequence of independent choices made by executives with formally designated powers. Acting in the name of the organization with the assistance of top staff and through consultation with their subordinates, these men were said to carry out decision-making functions. They do this through the rational process of defining a problem, identifying the alternatives, selecting the most appropriate and acceptable alternatives, translating it into a course of action, and initiating the implementing activities. . . . We do not have one case history that shows an executive making the decision through a formal mechanism. The procedure described by the classical theory is the means used to formalize and proclaim the decision, not to cast it." (pp. 132–133)

Actually, Gore concludes, administrative decision-making cannot be separated from the full stream of organizational behavior "Though some distinctly choice-making behaviors can be separated from the full scope of forming a collective response, it does not seem profitable to attempt to break down organizational behavior in terms of a choice-making, non-choice making dichotomy. Decision-making seems to serve as an orienting device by means of which a response is first given direction and then appropriate content." (p. 133)

More clearly than any theorist before him Gore analyzes the organization as an enormously complicated pattern of inter-acting behaviors in a somewhat precarious equilibrium. The executives (or as he calls them, "power-holders") are not the persons who choose satisficing alternatives most appropriate to achieve agreed ends, nor who perform a specified technical operations; "they are the power-holders in a large, indigenous social system, who have the political skills and the character traits that lead them to strive for and pay the price of maintaining a position in an inherently unstable, often untenable power structure." (p. 134)

In his studies of the organization as an inter-acting system Gore is acutely aware that, even in the simplest organization, the goals pursued by the various participants (including clientele groups) are never unified and often clashing. It is fortunate that his illustrations are drawn from a small town fire department which most people assume to be a single purpose unitary organization. He effectively shows that such is not the case.

I think Professor Gore is unduly modest in his claims for this work. He calls his analysis "a decision theory fragment." It is certainly more than that. It casts new lights on many aspects of organization. Perhaps most significant about Gore's analysis is its implications for total political systems. If his generalizations are true for simple organizations they describe as well the operations of the larger political system. He also makes possible an understanding of the dynamics of change and the way it effects (is incorporated into or rejected by) organizations.

If there is a criticism of this book it is the fact that it is so tightly written that it is likely to frighten away or lose those who most need its message. Much of the material so contradicts the "conventional wisdom" in the field of organization theory that to incorporate these insights would require a basic re-structuring of most of the teaching materials now used in the field.—DONALD SMITHBURG, *Illinois Institute of Technology.*

The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups. By TERENCE K. HOPKINS. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 205. $6.50.)

In this book a sociologist at Columbia University reduces to system a wide range of research and theory building on small groups. He uses the work of psychologists like Kurt Lewin, Muzafer Sherif, Solomon Asch, Herbert Hyman, Robert Bales, and Leon Festinger; of sociologists like Durkheim, Lazarsfeld, Parsons, and Merton; of philosophers like Ernest Nagel; and of comparably distinguished writers who are harder to classify. The work of these researchers and writers is indeed of durable vitality. It is in this book, logically and neatly arranged within a hermetically sealed retort, in which all these rich and yeasty cultures die.

Within its own terms the book is brilliantly successful. It sets out to examine patterns of influence within small groups, which the author defines as those not containing subgroups. It limits itself to influence patterns as they are determined wholly by forces that generate (or—to use a term more appropriate to contained analysis—function) within small groups. Hopkins states that influence, which is not equally shared by all group members, reflects status, which in turn has five properties: rank, centrality, observability, conformity, and influence.

The non-static relationship between these five attributes is not quite clear. The author correlates each with every other one, though the subject of the book, influence, is the property to which the four others presumably bear some special relationship. In describing the book, one hesitates to use such terms as independent and dependent variables, or causes and effects, because they are not consistent with the static style of thought that characterizes the book. Rank, centrality, conformity, and influence all positively correlate. Rank, influence, and centrality tend to cumulate. Aside from what is implicit in cumulation, there is no real consideration of why these attributes tend to interact statistically with each other.

The author states that there is less change in group members as a consequence of inter-personal influence (i.e., by a single individual working on another individual) than of group influence. He offers two explanations for this: that it is easier to change opinion in a group context and that group pressure is visible. The first is not really an explanation but rather a tautology; the second is an intriguing, little discussed enigma.

Why are people more influenced by their fellow group members than they are by a person who has one or another attribute of high group status?

At various points, Hopkins gives clues. He says that the motivation for compliance is outside the interaction system, and he does not look into motivation. He says that those parts of a person that are outside the group are causally relevant to individual behavior in small groups. But again these parts are not part of his analysis of these groups. What the author has done by mentioning these factors is to indicate that the etiology of group interaction is in part external to the system and therefore not a matter of concern. This is as grand a non-sequitur as the chemist who says that the analysis of acids and bases relates to ions of hydrogen and hydroxyl, but since positive and negative charges of electricity are outside the chemical system, they are not to be considered. Chemists do not so exclude physics.

What is curious is that a sociologist so manifestly competent in psychological and sociological literature and in logic itself can so casually eliminate from consideration those forces that would reanimate the cultures sealed in his bottle and produce in vitro an analysis in vivo. The book's systemism concerns rank but has no odor. Indeed, even within the group as system, the author refuses to consider dynamic forces: "The principal mechanism checking the tendency to anomie . . . is the exercise of influence." This is almost another tautology and may be valid only if other (non-group) causes of anomie are excluded. Why some individuals have influence and others accept it is not considered, because these would involve an analysis in depth of group interaction and in breadth of the non-group aspects of the personalities of the group members.

As an attempt to abstract and codify some manifest characteristics of group interaction, the book is a success. But abstraction of principles, a necessary ingredient of all scientific endeavor, is by no means sufficient. It is like reducing all chemistry to the periodic table. Group interaction involves long and complicated equations, with elements compounding and interacting in a manner that such a periodic table as this book helps little to understand.—JAMES C. DAVIES, *University of Oregon.*

The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. BY GEORGE L. MOSSE. (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964. Pp. 373. Cloth $5.95, Paper $2.65.)

After the military defeat of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis in 1945, scholarly interest in Fascism rapidly and sharply declined, while communism (particularly after the start of the cold war in 1947) became the focus of attention among students of totalitarianism. Yet the unexpected phenomenal success of William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* a decade and a half after World War II showed that the interest of the reading public in German Nazism was stronger than the professional historians and political scientists had assumed. The continued relative lack of interest in the Italian and other varieties of Fascism may be based on an inarticulate—and yet very perceptive—realization that German Nazism was not just another variety of Fascism but a phenomenon *sui generis*—totalitarianism in its most nihilistic form so far experienced. As time goes on, therefore, it may be expected that more and more searching analyses of Nazism will be forthcoming, abandoning the shallow interpretations of Nazism as capitalism in depression and decay or as a reaction to the Versailles Treaty or as the product of a few evil men of the Hitler-Himmler-Eichmann type.

Professor Mosse's book is a valuable symptom of, and contribution to, this stirring process of serious and probing study of German Nazism and its background. While many dismissed Nazi ideas for long as mere tools of propaganda that few Germans—including the Nazi leadership—took seriously unless they belonged to the cultural and social riff-raff of German society, the author emphasizes at the outset that it "is important to keep in mind that the Nazis found their greatest support among respectable, educated people" (p. 1). The interpretation of the small Nazi movements in countries like Holland or Norway in terms of the concept of *Lumpen-Bourgeoisie* possesses considerable validity, but is entirely inappropriate in analyzing the ideological forces that culminated in German Nazism. In fact, one of the most striking results of the author's research is to demonstrate the questionable usefulness of the general conception of Fascism to the extent that the differences between German Nazism and other varieties of Fascism may be greater than the similarities. Thoroughly familiar with Fascist movements outside of Germany, the author concludes that "the German variety came to be unique" (p. 315), and that the fundamental difference between Nazism and other types of Fascism "reflects the difference between German thought and that of the other western European nations" (*ibid.*). Professor Mosse singles out the rationalism of the Enlightenment and the social radicalism of the French Revolution as the two most important ideological forces that were repudiated by the German "Volkish" tradition that finally culminated in the triumph of Nazism. The author correctly points out that these ideological forces were, and remained, alive throughout the high tide of Fascism elsewhere in Europe, and consequently Fascism remained a relatively small movement in the western countries outside of Germany. What was a (perhaps *the*) central cultural tradition in Germany over a long period of time, was only a marginal and episodic current of opinion in the rest of Western Europe. In elaborating these basic differences between Germany and other western nations Professor Mosse fails to deal with the all-important phenomenon, both in thought and behavior, of nihilism. In this nihilistic attitude, developed in Germany long before the rise of Nazism, nothing was sacred or permanent. In religion, Germany was the only country in which it was seriously planned to destroy the Jewish-Christian tradition and ethics and to revive the ancient pre-Christian pagan cults of Wotan *et al.* Among primary social institutions, even the family was to be done away with—something which, again, no other Fascist movement intended to do. Finally, in murdering six million Jewish men, women, and children at Auschwitz and other extermination camps, German nihilists revealed how the unthinkable could be turned not only into the thinkable but into real events. It is Professor Mosse's merit to show in his book that this mentality has a long background in German thought and institutional life, and while he does not propose that the tradition that culminated in Nazism encompassed all facets of German thought and action, he shows that it was a trend strong enough to eventually become the dominant force of the German state and society. In particular, he points out the crucial role played by the German conservative classes in actively aiding the rising tide of racialism, irrationalism, and totalitarianism.

The wealth of material in Professor Mosse's book, inaccessible to anyone not intimately familiar with the German language and writings unduly neglected outside of Germany, makes his work a must for any student of modern totalitarianism. The book would have been more valuable still if the author had not confined himself to the period after 1870 in tracing the ideological background of Nazism. The late eighteenth century would perhaps have been a better starting point, since the author could have then shown the impact of Romanticism, for example, in literature as well as in history, politics, economics, and law. Finally, while the author shows in a masterly fashion *how* the ideas and sentiments developed in Germany that found their final and disastrous expression in Nazism, he hardly comes to grips with the basic question of *why* such attitudes were embraced by so many Germans but rejected very largely elsewhere in Western Europe. But perhaps this is a theme for another book.—WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, *University of California (Santa Barbara).*

The Liberal Idea of Freedom. BY DAVID SPITZ. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1964. Pp. 210. $5.50.)

This far-ranging book, by our most persistent and industrious spokesman for the political theory tradition that reaches from Mill to MacIver and Bertrand Russell, includes *inter alia:* a refutation of the "iron law of oligarchy"; a demonstration that the Communists are not, properly speaking, of "the Left"; a new attempt to salvage John Milton as a legitimate forerunner of contemporary "open society" doctrines; an indictment of the American South (it is seceding "not merely from the country but from civilization itself;" it "may well drown the country in [a] . . . torrent of barbarism which is a continuing affront to democracy and to mankind") that some readers, including this one, will have to interpret as a summons for a new Civil War; a defense of "the right of civil disobedience"; a vindication of Hobbes against the classical political philosophers, who "pretentiously" claimed to know the highest good, while Hobbes did not. On all these matters, Professor Spitz' conclusions flow from his premises just as inevitably as ever Euclid's did from his axioms; for those who share those premises, he provides the best of all possible refresher courses in how to use them as weapons with which to rout the forces of reaction, authoritarianism, aristocracy. At the end of the book Professor Spitz stands, like Fortinbras in the last act of *Hamlet,* himself unscathed, among the fallen corpses of those who have, in one fashion or another, stood in his way. Two groups of readers, perhaps, will hesitate to celebrate his victories: First, those who do not share his premises. And second, those whose specifically intellectual history has been, in recent years, a little different from his.

We have all had the experience: the orchestra on the radio begins a tune that we have not heard for a long while, and suddenly we are transported across time and distance to a moment and place we had supposed to have faded completely from our memories; we feel again the feelings, experience again the associations, even re-know bits of knowledge, that make us, for the nonce, 18 or 25 or 32 again. So it is with *The Liberal Idea of Freedom:* it evokes a world in which World War Two has not yet happened (so that it seems only natural, not surprising at all, when, at one point, Professor Spitz refers to Josef Stalin as if he were still alive and running the USSR, and, at numerous points, cites MacIver and Laski as if they were names to conjure with). One searches, as one reads, for the secret of the evocation, which cannot be a matter merely of the unfamiliarity of the names or even of Professor Spitz' very considerable literary skills. Then, suddenly, one understands: the world he conjures up is a world not yet touched by the Strauss-Voegelin revolution in political theory scholarship, the world of Sabine and Catlin, a world, therefore, in which modern political theory has not yet been brought into focus by *Natural Right and History*, and in which the American political tradition continues to look as it can never look again to the man who has moved into the Strauss-Voegelin universe. Those whose recent intellectual history has been different from Professor Spitz' will not, I repeat, celebrate his victories; but there could be, for them, no better bench-mark than his new book from which to measure the eons that separate us from MacIver and Laski. A not-yet-dead Stalin will, for them, be less of an anachronism than a Hobbes (Hobbes the very inventor of those individual "rights" that constitute the essence of Professor Spitz' explicitly "anti-conservative" position) whom the author, without blinking an eye-lash, can describe as a "conservative."

It remains to mention the part of *The Liberal Idea of Freedom* that should most gladden the hearts of Professor Spitz' political co-religionaries, namely, pp. 127–174, in which he takes up "the curious contemporary revival of what may loosely be called conservative thought" and passes in rapid review some of its typical spokesmen: Senator Goldwater, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Walter Berns, Peter Viereck, Russell Kirk, Willmoore Kendall. Here his theses seem to be first, that the writers in question all suppose themselves to be in possession of a higher truth, or set of principles, or orthodoxy, that they are only too eager to impose upon others, that they seem little able to agree among themselves as to what that higher truth, or those principles, are, and that, taken individually, they turn out, upon examination, to be pretty much unintelligible. On the unintelligibility charge, this reviewer finds himself in substantial agreement with Spitz, except perhaps, but only perhaps, in the case of that one of the writers whose work he (the reviewer) knows best. On the lack-of-agreement charge, again no quarrel from this quarter—at most the suggestion that our author pay less attention in future to the Conservative intellectuals he takes time to vivisect—they are indeed, for the most part, a poor lot—and more to the real well-springs of American Conservatism, which is the continuingly-successful though inarticulate resistance, out in American society, to what I have called elsewhere the Liberal Revolution. On the eager-to-impose-an-orthodoxy charge, I content myself with (a) denying it, and (b) observing that it might come with better grace from a theorist less intoxicated than Professor Spitz upon the absolute rightness of his own position.—WILLMOORE KENDALL, *University of Dallas.*

The New Meaning of Treason. BY REBECCA WEST. (New York: The Viking Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 374. $6.95.)

Rebecca West is one of those fortunate people untroubled by serious doubts. Not for her are the agonies of a Gheorghiu or a Hesse or a Kafka striving to understand the pathos, even the absurdity, of the human condition. Not for her are the confusions of a mind torn by a conflict of loyalties, or by the uncertain meaning of loyalty itself—whether this implies devotion to the laws or to the state or to the people or to a moral or political principle by which we may judge those laws or that state or that people. Not for her, again, are the qualified and tentative portrayals and judgments of the skilled biographer or historian; despite the absence of adequate data—and as Herbert L. Packer's *Ex-Communist Witnesses* makes clear, even the most exhaustive legislative investigations, administrative hearings, and court trials are deficient fact-finding instruments—she simply and repeatedly asserts "he must have imagined" and "it can be taken as certain that . . . " Not for her, finally, is there an appreciation of the fact that her book is about The New Traitors, not The New Meaning of Treason; for what really concerns her is not treason or changing concepts of treason—least of all the haunting thought that the ultimate dishonor is treachery to one's self—but the character and motives of some of England's recent and contemporary traitors. In short, Miss West's projected clarity is the clarity of the innocent; and in the absence of sustained and systematic political and philosophical analysis, the innocent are as unlikely to understand the guilty as the rich are to understand the poor.

If we can set all this aside, the encomiums heaped on Miss West's book—a revision and expansion of a work originally published in 1947—are understandable. For Miss West tells an absorbing story in an absorbing way. With uncommon literary grace, she spins the tale of treason in England from William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw) and John Amery to Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs to the defectors Burgess and Maclean. Even the sordid Ward-Profumo-Keeler case falls under the purview of Miss West's acid yet stylistically elegant pen. For one who wishes to while away an otherwise dull afternoon, and who has no Eric Ambler at hand, this is an intriguing volume.

But one must not read or inquire too closely. If he does, if for example he asks: who or what is the new as distinct from the old traitor? he will find it difficult to apply with consistency the three chief labels Miss West provides: the New Traitor is the extrovert rather than the introvert, the professional rather than the amateur, the Communist rather than the Fascist. If he takes seriously her oft-repeated contention, reminiscent of Socrates in the *Crito*, that "if a state gives a citizen protection it has a claim to his allegiance" (p. 361), he will have to ask, what Crito with his intellectual limitations did not ask, why then was Socrates in prison in the first place? Clearly a claim is not always equivalent to an obligation or a right; and it is not the least of Miss West's shortcomings that in all her many pages she has room for but a single paragraph that barely touches this side of the coin. And if the reader enjoys such quips as, "The French Revolution has given pleasure to all subsequent generations, because it was an outstanding event which afterwards proved never to have happened" (p. 80), and "communism . . . is fascism with a glandular and geographical difference" (p. 141), he will also have to ask himself, what is their relevance to her argument? and more importantly, are the statements true?

That Miss West's book is a superior example of sophisticated journalism, that it abounds with sprightly aperçus, and that it raises questions of major significance, make it all the more regrettable that the book warranting this title is not the volume Miss West has written.—DAVID SPITZ *The Ohio State University.*

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5. University of Minnesota
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7. University of Washington
8. Rutgers University
9. Indiana University
10. University of California Medical Center, San Francisco
11. University of Oxford
12. Tokyo Metropolitan University
13. University of Chicago
14. University of Southern California
15. University of Delaware
16. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
17. University of Kentucky
18. University College of Rhodesia, Nyasaland
19. University of Kansas
20. University of Michigan
21. Yale University
23. Ohio State University
24. The University of Essex
25. University of Hawaii
26. Hunter College
27. University of Missouri at Kansas City
28. University of Wisconsin
29. Northwestern University
30. Technical Operations Inc., Burlington, Massachusetts
31. Ethyl Corporation
32. Kansas State University
33. York University, Toronto
34. Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta
35. North Dakota State University
36. Michigan State University
37. University of Houston
38. University of Goteborg, Sweden
39. Wayne State University
40. National Institute of Mental Health

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962. By MARTIN ANDERSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 272. $5.95.)

This is an unfortunate book. It is unfortunate in that the author presents it as a work of objective scholarship, and it fails lamentably to meet minimum scholarly standards. It is unfortunate in that a university press has seemed through this publication to give the *imprimatur* of academic respectability to a book which would not otherwise have acquired such credentials. It is unfortunate in that the book has debased the currency of the academy among knowledgeable men of affairs. It is unfortunate in that this inadequate polemic has already come to play a major role in the political debates over urban policy. The issues involved in urban affairs are complicated and difficult enough without the distortions and obfuscations Anderson introduces with his array of non-evidence.

Anderson's general conclusion is that the federal urban renewal program should be repealed. He argues that renewal projects involve major social costs, primarily by destroying large amounts of low-cost housing (slums), relocating the low-income residents, and building a smaller volume of higher priced housing. The effect is to shift slums rather than eliminate them, and efforts to inhibit further blight through rehabilitation programs are, says Anderson, inherently doomed to failure. As against these costs, the benefits of renewal are alleged to be far smaller than commonly supposed. Actual rebuilding is slow and not very profitable, only privileged economic and intellectual elites benefit, tax resources are lost to the city, and so on.

These are important arguments, in much need of careful inquiry and constructive dialogue. Renewal did generate a halo effect for itself and has subsequently generated opposition from such strange bedfellows as urban liberals and ideological conservatives. Thus the political issues have both curiosity and social importance. Their elucidation cannot be served by incompetence.

Anderson makes a strong case against reliance on summary statistical reports and occasional secondary sources for analysis of complex problems. He makes the case through his exclusive reliance on this sort of material. There is no evidence that he has conducted any field inquiries at all, and he makes no effort to determine whether there are significant variations among cities and, if so, why. His data are not only inadequate but quite out-of-date. Generally he stops in early 1961 which was about the time that many large projects began to move into construction phases. At one point (p. 106) Anderson concedes that more recent data may undercut his position, but he decided that it was "not feasible to attempt to redo the entire study in order to update the data." A perfectly reasonable position, *provided* the argument is altered to take account of the new prospects.

In his preface Anderson acknowledges that readers thought his book was unbalanced. In reply, he asked, "But what haven't I considered? What have I left out that is important?" (p. *x*) The answer is that he left out a great deal. For example, he stresses the fact that urban renewal projects had destroyed, as of March, 1961, some 126,000 dwelling units, mostly low cost slums, and built only about 4000 low cost units to take care of the erstwhile slum dwellers. He neglects to mention the 268,000 units of public housing completed during this same period in other parts of these cities.

There is a chapter questioning the constitutionality of renewal programs. The author sustains his argument by quoting at length from a district court opinion which the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently overruled and by omitting mention of later reaffirmations of this position. Anderson's conception of constitutionality hinges on his notion of virtue, not on the law, which on this question is not at all uncertain. Another curious use of material involves a quotation from the president of Alcoa respecting that firm's experience in renewal work. "We have seen enough to know that we have had it" (p. 122). The same man is quoted in *The Journal of Housing* as follows:

> "We have the conviction that urban renewal is essential if our cities are to survive and that Alcoa can play a constructive role in that battle and bring home to its shareholders a reasonable return on their investment." (October, 1964, p. 472)

If Anderson wants to establish the disenchantment of investors with renewal, he needs systematic evidence, not an isolated instance.

In his concluding chapter Anderson cites twenty "quite persistent" beliefs about the urban renewal program. No clues are given as to whose beliefs these are, but they constitute a summary version of the straw men against whom Anderson is arguing. He then arrays twenty "facts and estimates" which purport to demonstrate the invalidity of the beliefs. In one such pairing Anderson asserts that it is *believed* that, "Urban renewal is definitely in the public interest, that is, its net result is 'good' when looked at from the national viewpoint." The "fact and estimate" reads, "It has never been clearly established that urban renewal is in the public interest. In fact, a strong argument can be made that it is not in the public interest." (p. 223)

An unfortunate book.—ROBERT H. SALISBURY, *Washington University (St. Louis).*

Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies. BY WILLIAM W. BOYER. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. ix, 184, $1.95.)

"This book," William Boyer writes in his preface, "not only attempts a general description and analysis of policy making in administrative agencies but is also concerned with administrative policy making in terms of its relation to democratic government and 'due process'." By policies, he refers to "agency statements, essentially legislative in substance, that affect private rights and interests" (page 1). If a teacher is looking for a brief and relatively simple introduction to administrative procedure for use by students, this book should do quite well. The diversity of formal procedures and the arguments for and against various standard practices are outlined throughout the book. But the reader who takes the title seriously and expects discussion of how administrative agencies make decisions on substantive policy matters is bound to be disappointed. The only policy decisions treated here are those concerning the kinds of procedures to be followed in making administrative rules.

In his concluding chapter, the author begins by observing that typical policy making does not exist in the context of governmental pluralism, at least not in details, but that

> Nevertheless, in an idealized form the policy-making cycle is tantamount to the structure of a model. From this model, certain conceptual propositions emerge that have important implications for administrative theory:
>
> 1. *Policy making in public administration is not devoid of an identifiable process capable of descriptive analysis.*
> 2. *This process consists of a cycle of five sequential stages—initiation, preliminary drafting, public participation, final drafting, and reviewing.*
> 3. *The most important stages substantively, and the most complex procedurally (those that involve the most participants) are the initiation and public participation stages.*
> 4. *The initiation and public participation stages involve the vital interaction of public administration with its external environment.*
> 5. *This vital interaction is organized and purposeful, rather than individual and accidental.* (pages 166–167)

Apparently, the author wishes to convey his belief that there is some definable pattern in administrative rule making and that the world outside the agency has some impact upon it. It would be interesting to speculate on why he saw fit to draw up these elementary notions in the form of "conceptual propositions" or even "the structure of a model." What might otherwise be reasonable statements turn into vacuous grand conceptions only because the author abandons his material in favor of genuflections to the worst aspects of contemporary fashion in the social sciences. His real contributions risk getting buried amidst the rubble of pseudo-propositions.

Taking material not only from the usual sources on national administrative law but also from a variety of state sources, Boyer adds to our knowledge of administrative procedure. He shows us the great variety of procedures and the many problems connected with them. We see how contact with the application of rules sometimes makes administrators reluctant to codify or even publish them. The problems which this creates for the affected citizens and for those concerned with due process are brought out so that students can appreciate the difficulties. The author's special knowledge of Wisconsin adds a valuable dimension to his discussion.—AARON WILDAVSKY, *University of California (Berkeley)*.

Who Speaks for the South? BY JAMES MCBRIDE DABBS. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, Inc. Pp. 398. $5.95.)

James McBride Dabbs speaks for the South in the voice of his prototype, the Southerner. Mr. Dabbs believes that there is a predominant southern type and a characteristic southern attitude. The reviewer is inclined to doubt that the South is singular or that there is *a* typical Southerner. But Mr. Dabbs, who was born and reared and continues to live on a South Carolina plantation, speaks with more authority than the reviewer who was born and reared in the North and has lived in the South only a little over thirty years. Moreover, Mr. Dabbs is past President and a member of the Executive Committee of the Southern Regional Council, "champion of the best in the South," "the most solidly based interracial organization in the South."

This is not a book in political science, or social science, though it offers many discerning views on southern politics and southern society. The analysis is highly subjective and introspective. The author himself concedes that his interpretation of southern culture is probably influenced by the fact that he was born in a seaboard state of the Old South and not in one of the later southern states such as Alabama or Mississippi. Quite obviously, the Southerner is a White Southerner though the author treats White Southerners and Negro Southerners with equal courtesy and concern. This, indeed, is the crux of his thesis, that the Southerner has been created largely by the relationship between the two races, a relationship which he traces back to the early settlers whose "basic error" was to accept the institution of slavery for plantation life.

The South about which Mr. Dabbs writes "was, and is, in part legendary, in part real." One gains the impression that the author admires and loves the legendary part, regrets and deplores much of that which is real. A truly religious person, his perception of the South and the Southerner reflects his own values and convictions. The Southerner is "the product of history, still existing, though daily being modified toward the American norm." Because the region perpetuated the "basic error" of its first settlers, it still suffers from a sense of guilt that sets it apart from the rest of the nation. As Mr. Dabbs points out, the South has always been a great land for politicians. Politics perforce has substituted for religion, for the roots of religion are necessarily shallow in a society that accepts slavery. Protestantism with its emphasis on individual morality was never able to encompass the whole culture of the region. And, even after the Civil War, the treatment of the freed Negroes remained on the conscience of the Southerner who tried to keep ethics out of politics and to talk more about State's Rights than civil rights.

If the author lingers too long upon the tragic as well as the heroic past, it is not because he has no vision of the future. He notes briefly, and almost incidentally, that industrialization and urbanization in the past twenty years have been producing revolutionary changes in the region. He notes also that the South has been increasingly drawn into national circles by the Democratic Party (obviously written before the 1964 election!) and that it has felt the unifying impact of federal appropriations for military installations. More impressively he suggests that "The South has been God's project"—a kind of pilot project—"learning how to do within a limited area what now has to be done in the world if civilization is to survive." As he views it, "southern history was God's way of leading two opposed peoples into a richer life than either could have found alone." Thus, tomorrow the South, "By God's Grace."

What can a political scientist learn from this?—what one thoughtful and sensitive Southerner thinks and believes about his own land and people. But the South is a complex subject and no one person speaks for its entirety. Other southerners are no less southern who speak quite differently about the same land and people—Strom Thurmond, Martin Luther King, Ralph McGill, George Wallace, James Prothro, Emmette Redford, *et al*,. southerners all!—MARIAN D. IRISH, *Florida State University*.

Essays on the American Constitution. GOTTFRIED DIETZE, ED. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. x, 245. $6.50.)

All who labor in the field of constitutional law know the impact of Alpheus Mason's efforts. This *Festschrift* makes it clear that a famous scholar may also be a great teacher. Plainly Alpheus is not one of those professors who—after a short burst of youthful enthusiasm—come to look upon their work as the casting of false pearls before true swine. For he has kept his enthusiasm in the only way an intelligent man can keep it—by passing it on to others. This of course is high art, and obviously Alpheus has it. Year after year Princeton undergraduates have cited him as their "most inspiring teacher." Now in this volume a group of his former graduate students pay similar tribute in the special coinage of scholars—the commemorative essay.

Even so, I think, Alpheus has been a bit short-changed. For these essays are confined almost exclusively to problems of the American Constitution. That leaves largely untouched the history of American political thought in which—as I see it—A.T.M. is second to none.

The first selection, entitled "The Chasm that Separated Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall," was written by Julian P. Boyd, who studied under Mason in the 1920's at Trinity College, now Duke University. He is now Professor of History at Princeton and editor of the papers of Thomas Jefferson.

The other contributors—Gordon Baker, Harold Chase, Andrew Hacker, John Hopkirk, Woodford Howard, Samuel Krislov, Richard Leach, Donald Mathews, Jack Peltason, and James Prothro—are post-World War II graduates whose work already suggests that at least two or three of them may ultimately match their teacher's accomplishments.—WALLACE MENDELSON, *The University of Texas*.

At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958. BY THEODORE J. LOWI. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xvi, 272. n.p.)

This study of the appointments of New York mayors since 1898 is tinctured with arsenic and decorated with old lace. The first takes the form of an occasional patronizing attitude toward predecessors in the community politics field, extending even to Robert A. Dahl, and of an annoying and unjustified tone of arrogance. ("The novelty of my own approach is that it combines the historical methods of earlier scholars with the quantitative, empirical methods of today." But the approach is not novel. It is today routine.) The old lace is found in a Victorian style of writing. ("If the recruitment role of interest groups has grown it is because. . . ." It is the task of the author to tell us if it has grown. And if it has, why not say so declaratively?) The book as a whole suffers from an inferior writing style that could and should have been corrected by the author or the editors of the publishing house. The book is also cluttered with value judgments that could better have been left out. They destroy the disinterested analysis we have been led to expect from the opening statements.

Lowi spends part of the book in whipping a horse that died about a decade ago: "It is a great mistake to treat a political system from the beginning as though there were only a single power structure or a single influence process; it is extremely misleading to refer glibly [or even thoughtfully?] to '*the* power structure'. . . ." He urges us to search for *conditions* rather than "universal" generalizations, by which he means, apparently, that we should seek to identify dependent variables. Most researchers will surely not disagree.

The book is an extension of the Sayre and Kaufman study, *Governing New York City*, and uses its analytical framework. It makes an important contribution to the study of local politics, but that contribution is not in the "more sophisticated approach" to community politics that the author promises, rather it is in the excellent historical analysis of the office of mayor as it has been buffeted in the political gales of the great city. A prodigious amount of work went into the data collection and into the analysis of interest group behavior in relation to the mayor's office. The description of the class-oriented group conflicts involved in the politics of distribution as distinguished from the non-class-oriented politics of regulation is first rate. The two best chapters in the book, I thought, were those dealing with "arenas of power": Personal Continuity, and Attribute Continuity. Lowi finds the tenure pattern in distribution agencies to be significantly different from that in regulatory agencies. The critical decision-making positions where the policy concerns of the mayor are great also have a different pattern from the highly structured offices where policy is shaped largely by public expectations and a professional bureaucracy. In these, administrative values dominate.

The chapters on patterns of pressures for appointments are important and impressive. The conclusions reached in them are more convincing than what the author calls his "major conclusions" which "revolve around the thesis that it is the minority, or majority-in-the-making party that is the source of innovation." He cites as evidence the reform administrations of Seth Low and John P. Mitchel, and especially of Fiorello H. LaGuardia and the supporting political parties of each. The idea is not new. Reform parties are expected to be innovative and during the Great Depression innovation was rampant throughout the land, everywhere encouraged by desperate protest. "Without history," Lowi asks, "how is one to know what phase of community trend he has captured?" Even with a fifty-year time span, can one generalize about the relationship between parties and innovation? Can one, in such a span and in only one city, generalize about innovation and patterned variables? The generalization he makes is not false, of course. He shows that political innovation has come through the minority party and has been much less characteristic of the majority party. He does not and cannot show that it could not also have come through the majority party.

This is an important book which makes contributions to both our collections of data and to theory building. With a bit more modesty on the author's part, it could have been a much better book. "The proper question for political scientists," the author tells Robert Dahl and the rest of us in his conclusion, "is not 'Who rules?' but 'What are the conditions for rule?'" It is perhaps, more accurately, "Who rules under what conditions?"

The book has many helpful charts and graphs and a good index. It received the J. Kimbrough Owen Award of the American Political Science Association in 1962.—CHARLES R. ADRIAN, *Michigan State University*.

Mr. Crump of Memphis. BY WILLIAM D. MILLER. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 372. $6.75.)

Edward H. Crump preferred to be known as "Mr. Crump, leader of the Shelby County delegation," but author Miller adopts the popular view that Crump was the "last of the old-fashioned bosses." Crump was in the tradition of the "boss and the machine" but he cannot be considered typical. In fact, there is some difficulty determining what is typical because, as the late Harold Zink discovered, it is risky to make generalizations for all bosses. Crump would have been happy to be considered by himself alone and not in other bosses' company. He particularly refused to be bracketed with such men as Curley, Hague and Pendergast.

Crump entered politics early in the century espousing the Progressive philosophy of that period, at least as much of it as is associated with civic reform and the castigation of the alliance between city government and corporate interests. If this background is distinctive among bosses, much of the operation of the Crump organization is Memphis was predictable. All of the standard practices of ward politics were followed. To a degree that few other bosses achieved, it was one-man rule and his rules were clear. In cases of infraction, the person was "excommunicated" and Crump was implacably opposed to him thereafter. One of Crump's signal achievements was to bring generally high calibre men into public office and compel them to operate within the broad lines he set. He both gave and expected loyalty.

As an individual, Crump had a passion for order in all things and was strongly puritanical. Simple and direct, he ordered his own life on the maxims he frequently repeated to others. "He was an absolutist in everything he did from the way he kept order in his dresser drawer to the way he organized the Memphis political machine." (p. 189) Crump was wedded to politics, at least Memphis politics. He had the virus in his political bloodstream, not to be a candidate and hold public office, but to dominate because he knew what was best for his people.

Although he was rich, it is difficult to prove that he enriched himself improperly from political activity. The connection was probably much more subtle—the realization of Memphians that it was wise to insure with the E. H. Crump Company, for example, although this biography does not hint of such connections. The Crump organization was noted for its honesty even among its detractors. He did not rise to the heights or stay there by dependence upon rackets or a privileged group. He worked much of his life in politics without financial compensation and did not resort to the usual demagogic devices and issues to keep his control. Author Miller concludes that the motivation was a romanticism in Crump's makeup but that Crump "determined to actualize his romantic fancy." (p. 222) All he asked in return for his organization's substantial contributions was that he run the City. Memphians got "good government" at the price of self government or, as some insisted, by selling their souls.

The sources of the Crump strength are found in the group basis of politics. Crump took care of the vital interests of Memphis groups and, by the use of various techniques, kept down the normal factionalism which arises from clashes of interests. He held himself aloof, was not identified with any group or intimate with anyone. Even within his organization, he was "Mr. Crump," never "Ed." Most groups considered him a friend who had a special understanding of their problems. He maintained a channel to each group through one of their representatives and held together Baptists, Jews, Catholics, Irish, Italian, Negroes, business and the AFL but not the CIO. His relations with business perhaps were most publicized. To the business community, Crump was their man. He provided an efficient and honest administration of city services; kept insurance, transportation, electric, and tax rates low; provided a climate for growth in political stability. Thus, large industries as well as small business were enthusiastic supporters and pressured their employees to vote.

The Negroes were a special case, for the organization "voted" them regularly, and there were no nice distinctions about residence inasmuch as Arkansas and Mississippi Negroes were as acceptable as those living in Memphis. Crump was a racist in the traditional Southern school, believing that Negroes had their own place. However, he gave them consideration in appointments, in health, and in housing and was committed to improving their conditions.

Restiveness after World War II supplemented the backlog of opposition from the dissidents. Whites were more responsive to the intellectual's attacks upon the lack of self government and Negroes were more interested in equal rights and less in *noblesse oblige*. The culmination was Crump's famous state-wide defeat in 1948. Crump's style of campaigning had become out of date and, in many respects, so had he. It was a new world, one he would never have made. Despite his reverses, he was never overthrown in his own bailiwick; but, the organization being his, died with him. No one else could possibly have carried it on.

Miller apparently was the first to have access to the Crump papers and while they proved illuminating in some respects, the student of Tennessee politics may have the feeling that not all of the Crump story was found there. Extensive interviews with many participants in the events of the Crump years yielded no noteworthy revelations. The author is a former Memphis resident and has previously written on Memphis politics. On at least one occasion he was a poll-watcher for Crump's opposition, but he indulged no grudges in this book. There is an obvious attempt to be fair and objective, admitting quietly what was unquestioned and resisting charges for which he concludes there is no proof. Crump's operations and relations with some Tennessee political figures are sometimes blurred. For instance, the late Senator McKellar suddenly comes into the picture but from where the reader is not told.

The author has summed up the issue by admitting that Crump authoritarianism restricted freedom. "But the extent of freedom is bound by the ordering factor of its intrinsic worth. Had there been no Crump there doubtless would have been more freedom for independent political action, but would the people of Memphis have been as free in those areas that represent the basis for any humanized society—order and material well being? Considering the character of Memphis as Crump found it, it is doubtful that they would have been." (pp. 222–23)

This may not be the last word on Mr. Crump but it can well be the last word in his behalf.—WILLIAM GOODMAN, *Southern Illinois University (Edwardsville)*.

The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths. BY FREDERICK C. MOSHER AND ORVILLE F. POLAND. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1964. Pp. xvi, 180. n.p.)

Anyone concerned with public policy, whether scholar or citizen, will find this book useful. It presents many facts and discredits many myths regarding public fiscal affairs. It deserves wide reading.

In this reviewer's experience most undergraduate and many graduate political scientists are illiterate with respect to the facts of fiscal policy. Sharing a general bias with their instructors in favor of fiscal policies espoused by Democratic Administrations, most political science students express only a superficial understanding of fiscal policy issues or of the facts relevant to them. Yet if politics is defined as "who gets what, when where and how," fiscal decisions are of crucial significance.

Among the reasons for the neglect of fiscal policy issues by political science students has been the absence of brief and definitive treatments. A big step in remedying this lack has now been taken by the Mosher-Poland volume.

In nine chapters crammed with data, much of which is in chart or table form the authors consider: Perspective and Public Finances; Trends in Public Spending; Expenditures and the Federal System; Public Revenues; Balancing the Budget; The Public Debt; The Purposes of Public Spending; Public Employment; and The Ecology of Public Finances.

Their presentation is clear and there are many wise insights scattered among the 152 pages of fact-filled text. The discussion of the limited savings likely from improvement in administrative efficiency (p. 147) represents both wisdom and realism. The well-documented statement that ". . . by every yardstick, the national debt has gone down [since the end of World War II]" is an example of authors' success in dispelling many fiscal myths. Many more examples might be cited to suggest the value of this book. Each chapter, incidentally, concludes with an excellent summary, testifying to the orderliness of presentation.

Criticisms of a book as fine as this one by Mosher and Poland may seem gratuitous, yet the book might have been even better it there had been more than passing references to the politics of fiscal decision-making. In the discussion of "Defense Spending and the Economy" (p. 109) the reader is left to infer the political consequences of the fact that "An unusually large number of the companies that have experienced rapid growth since World War II have been concerned with products for the defense effort." It might similarly have been useful to discuss the political implications of the so-called "trust funds," and the myths associated with them. The politics of Social Security taxation may become a burning issue in the not too distant future when expenditures from the "trust funds" exceed revenues.

With respect to the presentation of state and local data, it might have been useful if distribution ranges and regional differences had been pointed out, in addition to aggregates and averages. Students might have found the charts and tables more interesting, if some "Madison Avenue" touches had been used—perhaps in the style of recent Twentieth Century Fund reports on the American and European economies.

But despite these possible deficiencies, this book is a first rate piece of work. It should find many uses in and out of the classrooms.—NORMAN WENGERT, *Wayne State University.*

The Miami Metropolitan Experiment. BY EDWARD SOFEN. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963. Pp. vii, 330. $6.95.)

Among contemporary domestic problems, few are more challenging than planning for metropolitan areas. The difficulties that beset our great cities and their mushrooming suburbs cannot be solved by local communities alone, for governmental functions now cut across boundary lines. They can be resolved only by planning on a metropolitan scale. Most efforts to plan regional services have been pragmatic, taking the form of cooperative arrangements, understandings, or agreements. Sometimes special districts, created to perform a single function, have been superimposed on existing governmental structures.

Such devices have created crazy-quilt patterns of responsibility and authority. In some regions local jurisdictions have proliferated into jungles of local governmental authorities. What is needed, many political scientists believe, is a more sweeping approach, which will assemble the hodgepodge of units in a metropolitan area and fit them together into a new political framework, with adequate power for regional planning.

One of the very few regions that has created a metropolitan-wide unit for coordinating governmental service is Florida's Dade County (the Miami area). That is why Sofen's scholarly and perceptive account of this unique area offers a valuable contribution to our understanding of metropolitan politics and government. Sofen wanted to know how Dade County succeeded in adopting far-reaching structural changes in government, while similar proposals, as well as less drastic plans, had failed in most other areas where they had been introduced. He also wanted to find out how the county officials managed to defeat repeated efforts to dismantle "Metro," as the metropolitan government of Dade County was called, and what problems it had to resolve before it could survive. In providing answers to these important questions, the author includes the political and social background of Dade County, a history of the development and early years of "Metro" in this area, an account of its internecine squabbles and the attempts to emasculate it, and a description of its titanic problems and initial achievements.

Sofen was unusually well qualified to write this volume, the second "Metropolitan Action Study." (This series, sponsored by the University of Indiana, analyzes efforts to change metropolitan governmental institutions.) A member of the University of Miami's Committee on Municipal Research, he has closely followed Metro's development and published analyses of its political, legal, and financial problems in professional journals and research reports. This background enabled him to probe the subject in depth, applying the techniques of political science. For example, Sofen not only describes Metro's evolving mechanism of government, but also presents a detailed analysis of its charter, a summary of court decisions on the subject, and an extended interpretation of the federal system of relationships it established between the county and its twenty-six constituent municipalities. Again, when he describes the stakes of the region's interest groups in metropolitan consolidation, he draws on detailed political behavior surveys conducted by his colleagues in the Government Department of the University of Miami. Many of the sources in this thoroughly documented work required considerable effort to ferret out.

One of the outstanding characteristics of this volume is that it does not confine its analysis to a single area. The typical study of a single region offers the advantages and limitation of a case study. It makes implicit comparisons with other areas, but the reader has to puzzle them out for himself. Relatively few studies of the government and politics of metropolitan areas, however, are available. This underscores the importance of explicit comparisons. Before attempting to explain why Dade County succeeded in creating a viable metropolitan government, Sofen made an intensive study of the literature relating to comparable areas. This gave him a sound apperceptive base for drawing conclusions about the Miami area.

The Miami Metropolitan Experiment presents a massive set of relationships, based on an enormously detailed body of source material its author has collected over the years. To read it readily and fluently, however, requires not only a background of political science, but also a thorough familiarity with the politics of Dade County, a combination probably only a handful of students of the Florida scene possess. Fortunately Sofen offers a few guides to this labyrinth of detail, such as chronologies, chapter summaries, and a summing up in his final chapter.

Several decades usually elapse before the initial adoption of a constructive political or social idea; often it requires a full century before it is universally accepted. Political scientists' proposals for drastic governmental reorganization of metropolitan areas, however meritorious, are not likely to obtain immediate widespread acceptance. But when other metropolitan areas seek systems of comprehensive regional planning that are superior to their present patchwork arrangements, they will find valuable lessons in *The Miami Metropolitan Experiment.*—FREDERICK SHAW, *City University of New York.*

The Rationing of Justice. BY ARNOLD S. TREBACH. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 350. $10.00.)

This is an important book, both substantively and methodologically. It draws attention to a significant subject to which political scientists have in recent years drawn more and more attention, the problems facing a man who is accused of a crime. At the same time, Dr. Trebach adds to a considerable body of knowledge about the law on this subject, as laid down by legislative bodies and appellate courts, a substantial amount of empirical information.

In the effort to study not merely the law in the books, but also the law in action, Dr. Trebach interviewed many judges, prosecutors, lawyers, prison-keepers and other officials concerned with the administration of criminal justice. But most important of all, he also interviewed a considerable number of prisoners—359 to be precise—from whom he sought information as to their treatment during the various stages of their difficulties, from arrest to sentence and appeal. Of these prisoners, 245 were in New Jersey institutions, 39 were in a jail in Philadelphia, and 75 were in the federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. While Dr. Trebach draws heavily upon federal rules of criminal procedure, and is quite aware of general tendencies in the criminal law at the state level, he relies largely upon New Jersey law for his local illustrations.

While Dr. Trebach has broken new ground, from the point of view of political science methodology, and while he is to be commended for the imaginative diligence he displayed in pursuing his research, it is difficult to avoid the observation that the author's sample is very small indeed, as he himself repeatedly warns the reader. I suspect that a one-man crime survey is simply a physical impossibility. What this book teaches us—among many other things—is that the time has long since arrived when a truly national crime survey, adequately supported and staffed, is urgently needed if the country is to secure any significant body of reliable information as to what is going on in the field of criminal law administration, as a basis for enlarged public understanding and for reforms in both institutions and procedures. There has been no such national inquest since the old Wickersham Commission, which was created by President Hoover, who was so strongly devoted to the utilization of social science research as a useful tool of government. While Dr. Trebach does not come to this conclusion, though he does come to other useful and interesting conclusions, it seems to me that in many ways this is the basic teaching of this book.

Several propositions stand out crystal clear in this fine study. One is that most of the people who get involved in the toils of the criminal law are poor. As the author puts it, "those most affected by injustice or inefficiency in the criminal process are almost always socially powerless if not insignificant. They stand at the bottom of the social heap." Another is that we still have many unresolved problems in this area which clamor for attention, such as illegal arrest, police violence, eavesdropping, delay, coerced confessions, denial of bail, bad jail conditions and "bargain justice." But the preeminent problem is lack of counsel, and Dr. Trebach makes the significant point that the right to counsel involves many things, including compensation for counsel, the availability of investigative services, assistance during the critically important pre-trial stages, the use of expert witnesses, more adequate discovery procedures, and counsel at the sentencing, appeal and post-conviction stages. While the author spells out the inadequacies of the public defender system, which is now used in 184 American counties, he concludes that on the whole it is to be preferred to the assigned counsel system. He also advocates improved professionalization of the police, independent advisory boards to deal with complaints against the police, and some device for over-all supervision, such as the Scandinavian Ombudsman.

In many ways this is, in the political science field, though not in the academic law field, something of a pioneering work. One may hope that other political scientists will continue the work in respect to which Dr. Trebach has made such a good start.—DAVID FELLMAN, *University of Wisconsin.*

First Tuesday. BY DAVID WALLACE. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii, 328. $6.00.)

This book reports a survey based on 829 mailed questionnaires representing a 54 per cent response from a sample of registered voters in Westport, Connecticut. Addresses were drawn equally from the official lists of Republican, Democratic, and unaffiliated registrants; the mailing was made in the Spring of 1960. After the election of November, 1960, a short follow-up form was returned by three out of every five of the original 54 per cent.

Westport is an upper income "liberal Republican" town on the perimeter of the New York City commuting circle. According to Wallace, in the 1940's it experienced over a 40 per cent population increase and in the 1950's a 60 per cent increase. In the 1930's and 1940's its normal majority for the Republican presidential candidate was approximately two-thirds. It gave Eisenhower a larger majority than this in both his elections, but in 1958, Abraham Ribicoff, as Democratic candidate for governor, also received more than 50 per cent of the two-party vote in Westport.

Unfortunately, this work is ambiguous as to purpose. Sometimes findings are discussed seemingly to confirm propositions from earlier research by the Michigan or Columbia groups. Sometimes findings are used as a basis for marvelling at the perceptiveness of men like Simmel (p. 254) or Tocqueville (p. 257). The literary style is journalistic, and suggests a lay audience as the target—perhaps the avid library patrons of Westport itself. Mr. Wallace feels it necessary to explain the "socialization" should not be confused with "socialism," "socialized medicine," or other leftish political usages (p. 229). On the other hand, the work is replete with complicated tables presenting the Westport data, with the clear inference that something new has been found there. It is necessary to evaluate the book as a separate social inquiry—not simply as a popular exposition of Westport politics.

One of Wallace's theses seems to be that in this Connecticut town at least, suburban life does not transform Democrats into Republicans. Westport Democrats comprise two principal elements: first, the (old) working-class descendants of Italian Catholics, the lowest income and education groupings in the town (and underrepresented in *First Tuesday* samples) and, second, the new "Madison Avenue" group of in-migrants, drawing membership heavily from high SES strata and including most of the suburb's relatively large proportion of Jews (overrepresented by their heavy response to the mailed questionnaires). Insofar as Wallace's data bear on the question of partisan conversion in Westport, he reports that a between-generations shift toward the Republican party did occur among the "old style Catholic, second generation Democrats," and that this is barely offset by the post-1930 Democratic trend among the Jewish migrants to Westport.

Wallace's argument against the Republicanizing tendencies of suburban life is apparently based on his finding that the net shift toward Republican partisanship among Westport respondents has been just about zero—using intergenerational change as the acid test. (No comparison is made with the secular Democratic trend elsewhere and hence there is no rigorous basis for his claim to have refuted the "doctrine of predestined suburban Republicanism.") It is not clear whether his contention is against the view that the suburbs are more Republican in percentage than they were in the 1920's—a view held by few familiar with available voting statistics—or whether he is maintaining that the suburban social climate exerts no decisively Republicanizing effect on newcomers. Chapter III discusses some related questions posed in the relevant literature (especially the political significance of migration to and from urban centers) but without formulating hypotheses to be tested with the Westport data.

The book's subtitle, "Rationality in Voting," suggests a major theme for analysis. But here again the specific contentions of the author are hard to identify. Chapter V seems to propose a nonrational basis for partisan identification. Becoming partisan, like accepting the religion of one's parent, is seen as an "inevitable" part of early socialization. The acquisition of political and religious loyalties is treated by Wallace as strictly analogous, though little beyond statistical parallels can be adduced for such a view. In his summary, after observing that in Westport the "modal Republican" is Protestant and the "modal Democrat" Jewish, Mr. Wallace remarks that "The act of voting is guided by essentially nonrational political partisanship that is culturally transmitted . . . the same as is 'character,' 'breeding,' or any other of the abstruse terms used to describe a cultural heritage." In other words, the effort to *explain* rationality in voting has been abortive. This is a pleasant book that highlights suburban politics in mid-century without crystallizing any insights into the underlying configurations.—DWAINE MARVICK, *University of California (Los Angeles).*

Tales Out of Congress. By Senator Stephen M. Young. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964. Pp. 254. $4.50.)

Senator Young's book is both entertaining and enlightening. He tells of his long and useful public life with disarming and engaging pride. He has fought what he regards as "the good fight" and relishes telling of his victories and "occasional" defeats. But most importantly he offers insights into why he dedicated his life to "the good fight" against poverty and injustice and why his efforts were rewarded with a goodly measure of electoral success in conservative Ohio.

The book was written and published before his victory over Robert A. Taft, Jr. on November 3, 1964. The book, though, helps unravel the mystery of the biggest election upset of that election day. Election analysts who adopt a mode of thinking which they mistakenly associate with the processes of the automatic computers explained his victory in terms of the Lyndon Johnson landslide and Taft's endorsement of an unpopular Republican presidential candidate.

Such analyses overlook the hearts and minds of both the voters and the candidates, and in this case the character of Stephen M. Young. Interestingly, the electronic computers which forecast the results of the election never make such an error. They simply take the vote of a representative part of the state's voters and project the returns on this basis. No black magic is included in the electronic calculations of the vote results and there is no dehumanization of the electorate. The votes placed in the machine are the product of flesh and blood reactions to the candidates, and all the machines could say election night was that the division in Ohio was too close to be predicted. The dehumanizers of the electorate are the commentators who attempt to squeeze out of the final electoral decision every element of rational and irrational calculation of the relative merits of the candidates and reduce it to a kind of "mass mind" reaction to the Johnson-Goldwater race.

Without doubt, the principal element in Young's personality that appeals to Ohioans is his independence. Senator Frank Lausche is also "independent" of political bosses and special interests. However, Young's independence as it emerges from the pages of *Tales Out of Congress* takes a radically different form from Lausche's. Young's political independence seems due to the fact that he is a "gut" liberal. Throughout *Tales Out of Congress* he refers to his concern with poverty and injustice. According to Young, his awareness of and concern with injustice was a product of his father's liberal attitudes, and acts of injustice he witnessed as a child, e.g., senseless police brutality directed at helpless people, such as a hobo who was beaten by a town police officer.

The most important manifestation of Young's liberalism is his voting record in Congress. However, for Ohioans and the world his fame as a maverick is founded in the letters he writes bad-tempered constituents. Young takes pride in the letters and devotes a good deal of space in the book to them. Perhaps his most widely known letter is the one in which he helpfully informed a constituent: "I am sending you a letter received this morning, evidently from some crackpot who used your name." Again, when Young was told by a voter that he was the sort of fellow who would enjoy desecrating the graves in Arlington Cemetery, the Senator succinctly replied:

> "Sir:
> "You are a liar."

Young was equally blunt in his correspondence with the officers of pressure groups. For example, when he received a letter from the Americanism Chairman, Hamilton County Council of the American Legion of Ohio "Disapproving and censoring" one of his actions, the senator's reply was as follows:

> "Sir
>
> "So—you self-appointed censors and self-proclaimed super-duper 100 percent America Firsters censure me. You professional veterans who proclaim your vainglorious chauvinism have the effrontery to issue a press release gratuitously offering an expression of censure and making urgent demand that I cancel a speaking engagement previously made.
>
> "I repudiate your resolution, Buster, and your pompous, self-righteous, holier-than-thou title of Americanism Chairman! Why don't you read and try to understand that cornerstone of our liberties, the Constitution of the United States?
>
> "If, in your press release, you asserted, or implied that I am likely to become a tool of the Communist apparatus, you are a liar.
>
> "Another thing—why don't you puffed up patriots write my American Legion Post demanding my expulsion? Or, do you self-appointed vigilantes demand that I submit a list of speaking engagements for clearance by your outfit before I, as, a Senator of the United States, open my mouth in public?"

Ohioans laughed when they read Young's letters in the papers—and the laughter was generally with Young and against his enemies. A frequently heard comment was, "Whatever else you say about Young—he sure has guts." By virtue of his letters Young became a personality in Ohio, and his liberalism was given concrete meaningful expression. Senator Young, then, defeated Robert Taft, Jr., in 1964 because many voters respected him as a personality and felt an affinity for his political philosophy as expressed in his letters. Johnson's landslide victory helped Young, but the history of Ohio politics demonstrates that the Ohio voters never hesitate to split their tickets, if they prefer the candidate of the other party, e.g., witness Lausche's landslide victories in the face of Eisenhower's overwhelming electoral triumphs in 1952 and 1956.

In 1958, Lou Harris noted in an analysis of Ohio's voting behavior that it was a source of amazement to him that no Democrat had ever forcefully attacked John Bricker's "reactionary" voting record in Congress. Steve Young proceeded to fill that vacuum and subsequently defeated the "unbeatable" John Bricker. Similarly, in 1964 Stephen Young accomplished the "impossible" by defeating Bob Taft, Jr.

In reality, neither victory was as unpredictable as observers alleged. Bricker was not popular in Ohio. Similarly, the Taft name was never as great a political asset in Ohio as myth would have led us to believe. Bob Taft, Sr., won only one "big" electoral victory in Ohio, and that was against Joe Ferguson, a candidate of somewhat limited attainments. And in 1962, Bob Taft, Jr. won an impressive victory against a Democratic opponent who was repudiated by both the Ohio Democratic party and his Democratic running mates because of his racist position.

Senator Stephen Young exploded the myths concerning the "political invulnerability" of Taft and Bricker. And these victories symbolize a lifetime devoted to exploding myths and attacking windmills. But when Steve Young attacks a windmill it had best look to its moorings.—JOHN H. FENTON, *University of Massachusetts.*

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Africa's Quest for Order. By Fred G. Burke. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. 177. $4.50.)

If the title of this book emphasizes order (and the search for it) the material is largely devoted to the analysis of change. Mr. Burke, describing the various ways in which change is occurring, emphasizes the transition from a rural to an urban environment, subsistence to commercial enterprise, local to central government, and, more generally, particularism of traditional social life to a more complex all-embracing pattern of overlapping association.

Indeed, *dis*association of individuals from one set of institutions and their *re*association in new corporate groups is a central theme of the book. The "order" to which he refers arises out of this process. To emphasize this he chooses Simmel's term, sociation, as the critical variable. The result will be useful for beginning courses on Africa.

For the specialist the book is not very helpful. The sweep is broad but lacking in insight. It does not compare well with Wallerstein's *Africa, The Politics of Independence*, or Hunter in *The New Societies of Tropical Africa*. Bohannan and Lucy Mair have covered similar ground with greater knowledge and shrewder judgments. One cannot help wondering why Burke fails to employ the aspects of Simmel's theory dealing with conflict, without which the concept of sociation has little significance. In effect, Burke realizes this. After introducing the idea of sociation, little use is made of it in the substance of the book.

There are a number of irritating small errors such as, reference to Lumumba's tribe (the Otetela or Batetela not Valetla, p. 30). The proofreading is careless. (For example, the word American is used where African is clearly meant, p. 81). The late Soviet Africanist, Ivan Potekhin is spelled Potemkin. (p. 73)

There are surprising omissions. A discussion of the role of women leaves out any reference to Denise Paulme's *Women of Tropical Africa*. In the discussion of the city, one of the most interesting and significant, Dakar, is scarcely mentioned. The example of urban redevelopment in Lagos, so carefully analyzed by Peter Marris in *Family and Social Change in an African City* is not even mentioned. Such books would have been helpful, the sketchiness of an over-view notwithstanding. They contain mature judgments on topics with which the book deals.

The last half of the book suffers considerably when, departing from the earlier effort at analysis, we are treated to a survey of events. The survey should have been more carefully done. For example, it is misleading to say that Mali was not displeased at the breakup of the Mali Federation. Not only were Malien's displeased but they were furious at what appeared to be Senegalese acquiescence to French imperialism.

Sometimes the sequence is confusing. A discussion of the Casablanca group and the association of Guinea, Ghana and Mali (p. 122), fails to make clear the fact that the association had been dissolved at the time of the Addis Ababa Conference. The latter point is made only on p. 138 and in a different context.

In general, however, and despite these criticisms, the book is a useful addition to the growing literature on Africa. Its style is felicitous despite an unfortunate tendency towards misplaced cliches; with Africans "flexing their newly acquired racial and political muscles" (p. 111), and changes in relationships described "heady wine" (p. 112), to choose some examples at random. By far the best material is on East Africa, which Mr. Burke knows best, and that, of course, is to be expected.—David E. Apter, *University of California (Berkeley)*.

Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. By Coleman, James S., and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, xiii, 730 pp. $10.00.)

Rarely has a book in the field of African politics been awaited with such anticipation and for so long as *Political Parties and National Integration*, edited by James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. In the light of the time it took to edit and bring out this massive collective work, it is perhaps not ungracious to have expected that the concepts defined in the introduction and conclusion would have been used more obviously in the individual sections, and that there would have been comparisons within and thus more cumulative impact by the sections themselves. Nonetheless, the volume is an impressive one, and includes a wide range of useful factual material written clearly and very succinctly.

The framework within which the sections of the book are presented is suggestive in itself. Two-thirds of the work are devoted to what is called "The One-Party Tendency"—surely a considerable understatement—which is divided in turn into "The Pragmatic-Pluralistic Pattern" (Senegal, Ivory Coast—an outstanding piece—Sierra Leone and Cameroun); "The Revolutionary-Centralizing Trend" (Guinea, Mali and Ghana); and "The Control of Nonparty Groups" (Voluntary Associations, Trade Unions, Traditional Rulers, and Students).

The other third carries virtually the same title as the book as a whole, "Parties and National Integration." It has a number of subsections whose titles are more suggestive; under "The Transformation of Historic Oligarchies" are Liberia and Zanzibar, of which the latter's transformation, considered briefly in a postscript, has gone a great deal farther then Mr. Lofchie could have guessed at the time of writing and "The Expansion in Political Scale" deals with Somali—where more could have been done with the fact that there is a genuine cultural nationalism, closer to that of the European or Arab-Middle Eastern pattern than is found elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa with Congo (Leopoldville)—where events have far outstripped and unhappily overlaid the description provided—and with Nigeria. Several, though not all of these countries have been treated along somewhat the same lines in other recent collections, or as with the Ivory Coast, Cameroun, and Nigeria, in far greater detail by the authors who handle them in this volume. The justification for their appearance here is in part the fact that this volume was planned so much earlier, but possibly more so because the experience of particular countries illustrates specific types of regimes and development.

Since Professor Coleman and Professor Rosberg are both well known for their pioneering efforts at system making with the somewhat intractable material of African politics, the introduction and conclusion attract particular attention. Both are stimulating though it may be questioned whether the sophisticated terms that are used do not sometimes confuse more than they illuminate. This is the more so since the descriptions, as for example of the four patterns of oligarchic situations, are so spare and refined that they do not transmit the full meaning which lies behind them. Indeed, there is enough in these last thirty-five pages of conclusion to expand into a useful and stimulating "Government and Politics in Africa" that might fill one of the more noticeable gaps in the literature of this area.

The American scholarly study of Africa coincided to considerable degree with the rise of the behavioral sciences in this country. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the newer tools of scientific and theoretical analysis have been tried out in conjunction with African studies. What is still needed—and what, perhaps too optimistically, had been hoped for from this work—is a pervading quality of theoretical analysis that goes beyond the efforts made to date. Instead *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* joins the other solid, competent studies with which we have been favored in the past few years, to some degree distinguished by the analysis of its editors, and occasional original summations by its authors, but destined like the others to become outdated by passing events. Is it too much to hope that the insights of classical theory and the solid accomplishments of political history may be joined one of these days to the imaginative conceptualization of behavioralism to produce a new framework of analysis and understanding that encompasses those elements of African life that are relatively untouched by contemporary politics as well as those fragile aspects that can alter so sharply and noticeably with changing events?—GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, *Northwestern University.*

The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey. BY LAWRENCE A. MARINELLI. (New York: Praeger, 1964. Pp. 228. $5.95.)

This laudatory and largely uncritical account of the regime of President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia is published under the auspices of the Africa Service Institute of New York. Mr Marinelli dismisses the central problem of Liberian society, the relationship between the 90 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture and the fractional ruling elite of Monrovia, in terms of personal impressions gained during his visit to the country. "Has the Unification Policy really been effective? Has it really improved the lot of the tribal people? Has it really brought a change in the attitudes of the Americo-Liberians toward their tribal country men? Based upon several months of research and first hand observation, this writer must reply in the affirmative." Regrettably, Marinelli does not present sufficient evidence on which judgment could be made as to whether the ambitious health, education and economic projects of the Tubman regime have substantially improved the living conditions of the tribal majority. Some years ago infant mortality figures in "bush" villages were reported as touching on 80 per cent. Current vital statistics are missing from this work though account is given of the number of hospitals constructed and the measure of success reached in the control of yaws, leprosy and small pox through campaigns undertaken by the World Health Organization. Also missing are Labor and Income statistics that might assist in elucidating specific ways in which the majority of the people benefit from the exploitation of Liberian resources. However non statistical appendices, containing Tubman's speeches and correspondence together with the text of the Liberian Constitution, amount to 82 pages as against 146 pages of text. Marinelli may prove correct in his major contention that the Tubman Open Door Policy—basically a foreign concession policy—"is an important model for the continent wide progress of emerging Africa." Certainly the private sector of United States power and influence has committed itself fully to this viewpoint in Liberia. The French observers, Pierre and Renée Gosset in their book, *L'Afrique, les Africains,* describe Liberia as *"esclave et enclave du dollar."* Witticisms and visitors' impressions aside, a requirement exists for an objective review of the consequences of the flow of external capital into the Liberian economy. If a resulting breakthrough in social development for the bulk of the population is indicated, then the system will stand justified despite accusations of neo-colonialism. On the other hand if an oligarchy is being entrenched and enriched contrary to the interests of the common people, United States policies, both private and governmental, may founder in another Zanzibar-type revolt. Raymond Leslie Buell's pioneer work in *Liberia, a century of survival,* deserves updating in line with its scholarly standards from the abundance of statistical and sociological material now available. Marinelli writes as an advocate for President Tubman, unquestionably a key figure of singular attainments in the existing Liberian situation. A useful chapter is devoted to Tubman's skilful diplomacy in the interplay of African states. In a brief Introduction, Leopold Senghor expresses his esteem. Liberia, under Tubman, enjoys a respected place amid the turmoil of African affairs, providing American interests and influence with a favorable base on the Continent. It would be regrettable if our investment in capital and prestige were squandered through lack of objective analysis of underlying social and political conditions.—THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University.*

The Crisis of British Government in the 1960s. BY BERNARD CRICK. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964. Pp. 274. 36/-.)

This is an excellent book which, within its self-chosen limitations, can scarcely be praised too highly. Dr. Crick has a natural and rare aptitude for combining theory with its application to practical affairs of state. Supplemented by seven factual appendices, on, e.g., 'The Work of the House of Lords,' the book concludes with a chapter, 'What is to be Done?', itself carrying ten recommendations. That "British government and politics is British government and politics" (recommendation 10) may seem somewhat Gertrude Steinish but, after the recent Conservative Party Blackpool Conference, many a British politician (including Mr. Reginald Maudling) has cause to reflect on the wisdom of the remark here that "much of politics is the art"—and the luck also—"of being present at the right time." That "Parliament serves to inform the electorate, not to overthrow Governments" (No. 1) is provocative and controversial. That "technical and expert advice is more and more necessary to modern government but is more and more open to opinion and interpretation" is close to the core of Dr. Crick's theme.

The privileges of Parliament are archaic, arbitrary and excessive. The British Constitution is 700 years old and not good. This is not only because, under the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, "there are no overriding legal restraints whatever upon a British Government's actions" set by the people—admittedly interference with the judiciary is regarded with disfavour, even when it keeps for sizable lengths of time probable thugs in prison without trial. It is indeed, as Blackstone says, "an extraordinary tribunal." The issue is not even whether the power of the Prime Minister has increased, is increasing and should be reconsidered. At present, as in the last days of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, he can remain in office, not because he has a popular mandate, but because he knows that he hasn't, and bides his time. (In one respect indeed the power of Members against Ministers has recently increased: they debate decisions in Foreign Affairs. As late as Asquith this was considered a 'mystery of State,' not for their eyes, but to be agreed secretly by a few of 'the King's Ministers.' The Union of Democratic Control did something to end that.) The system is bad because it is a mix-up between the principle of local representatives coming to Westminster to agree to taxes, in return for redress of local grievances, and the need in a highly technical age for an Executive competent to rule its Civil Service, but which yet appreciates what the expert issues are. The requirements can be sharply different. The answer is the usual British one: "The muddle works." Does it? That is one of Dr. Crick's questions. Another real issue is the relations of Premier and Party (a far more formidable, nationally organized body than in the States).

Dr. Crick argues that, as a fact, "governing has now become a prolonged election campaign." Much of this indeed will be carried on outside Parliament, through media where the little unelected Popes of Broadcasting can quiz senior Ministers in a fashion no back-bencher would dare to attempt. "The public must know all." An appendix to this book discusses TV in Parliament and "powdered Parliamentary faces."

Is, then, the government of a great nation to be conducted like a perpetual political rag-market? "Corruption," writes Dr. Crick, "exists wherever the function of a government is held to be reduced to one overwhelming consideration: political survival." Many people today would so far agree with Dr. Crick about this inflated importance of party victory in the brawl of political football as to hold: (a) that we are democrats, and alone pure democrats, in judging that polls, plebiscite and direct TV appeal are indeed "the chief procedural invention of the democratic era," and that the graph of these political consumer polls must be watched, but not servilely followed; (b) that of respect for these polls an elected Parliament is the watchdog, moving in decent fear of constituents; (c) that, as in Switzerland, Cabinets should be enduring coalitions of elected professionals, conducting the nation's business on the basis of a sought consensus, proportional to the Parliamentary representation; (d) that rival Party shops, stocked with salesmen and even 'fans' (or fanatics) may be well enough, but that this should not obscure the prior importance of the sober and efficient transaction of the nation's business. This book is a sprightly plea, scholarly but light-hearted, for the Reform of the Mother of Parliaments. The question is whether this very elderly lady has the least desire to be reformed.—GEORGE E. G. CATLIN, *London.*

Australian Party Politics. BY JAMES JUPP. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 235. $7.50.)

The ten chapters of this study fall logically into three parts: brief general surveys of party history and party background; discussions of each party; the two final chapters analyzing "The Party Machine" and "Australian Politics."

Australian politics has been characterized by dissension and confusion. Only the Australian Labor Party has a continuous history of more than fifty years. The author gives coherence to what might otherwise appear chaotic by stressing three points: the trend from loose, personal alliances battling over narrow issues in the colonial period to "national politics organized by mass parties on domestic and international issues"; the importance of the tradition of "colonial radicalism" which, although waning, is inherited to some extent by all present-day parties; and lastly, the influence of events outside Australia upon the crises which have precipitated periodic realignments. The discussion of the environmental factors affecting Australian politics is illuminating. What appears to be a homogeneous society is torn by sectional, sectarian and separatist tendencies. These, coupled with the federal structure and tensions between "town and country capital" generate conflicts *within* the parties which are often more significant than those between them.

It is impossible here to do justice to the discussion of the machinery, inner conflicts and policies of each of the parties which makes up the central half of the volume. The material is rich, the treatment is well-balanced and perceptive, the theses developed in the earlier chapters are fully illustrated, and the author builds up a strong case for the conclusions which follow.

The final chapters are an acute analysis of the party machines and their effect on democratic processes. The similarities in party machinery and the influence of the A.L.P. upon its rivals are stressed. Labor is still the most extreme advocate of parliamentary subservience to the party machine, but the gap between it and the other parties has narrowed in the last fifty years. The Country Party has adopted many of its methods as well as much of its machinery. And even the Liberal Party has adopted some of the relationship between parliamentarians and party which its predecessors attacked so violently. The author concludes that all parties have become machines for providing access to power rather than "movements striving after ideals." For the last forty years the power base of each party has been stabilized in certain geographical areas and occupational groups. Mr. Jupp is at his best in analyzing the groups supporting each party, and in pointing out features of the electoral system and social structure which have encouraged this stability. Preoccupied with power, the parties are barren of new ideas and it is difficult to discuss them in terms of "progress" and "reaction," "left" and "right." Within them bitter conflicts take place among "power" and "interest" groups with little ideological significance. Because of this the parties are not attracting new members and gradually their mass-base is being eroded.

In his critique of Australian parties the author concedes that they have gone a long way toward channeling regional and social differences into two coherent parliamentary followings. But insofar as they are "transmission belts" it is between organized interests and the government rather than between the party's mass support and the government. Lacking interest in policy-making, the parties have failed to provide the machinery and the climate which encourage discussion of ideas and generally favor "practical" men rather than "intellectuals." Only in the federal secretariat of the Liberal Party is there any serious attempt at coherent formulation of policy. As the parties fail to attract mass support and translate it into influence on the government, initiative in policy-making comes from organized interests and the contest between parties becomes a struggle of interests to allocate the nation's resources. What troubles the writer about this is not its "pragmatism" but that it is "irrational, aimless and conservative," and that it leaves the parties so ill-prepared to cope with pressing issues of foreign policy being forced upon them from outside Australia. Parties do not remain static and Mr. Jupp suggests several interesting marginal realignments as possible. But whatever direction these take, two changes seem certain: the development of "centralist" tendencies, and the greater dependence on professional staffs by central party executives. The author even suggests that reliance on technicians may reach the point where the parties will become "public relations agencies for the parliamentarians," thus completely reversing the tradition that the politician is the servant of the party.

Mr. Jupp has given us an excellent interpretative study based upon recent research which helps fill in many gaps in our knowledge of Australian parties. One may not agree with him throughout, but one cannot quarrel with the consistency of his interpretation or the scholarship with which he supports his points. It is a study which demonstrates the rapid progress made in the field of political science in Australia since World War II, and which suggests trends well worth exploring in studies of parties in other democracies. A critical bibliography would have been a welcome addition, especially to overseas scholars.—LOUISE OVERACKER, *Professor Emeritus, Wellesley College.*

The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962. BY WILLIAM P. SNYDER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 284. $6.25.)

In the dust-jacket's claim of "a definitive study of a complex and neglected subject," there is only the usual publisher's exaggeration. It would be surprising to have a definitive work on the politics of any nation's recent defense policy. The subject is new and by no means entirely open to scholarly scrutiny. Even more often than in other policy-making areas, defense decisions of a democratic government—not to mention those of a nondemocratic government—are made for reasons concealed from public view. It is even difficult to know whether the reasons derive from domestic pressures, economic or political, or from strategic responses to external circumstances.

It says much, therefore, for Snyder that he has written a good and useful book on a subject about which we would like to know much more. Trained both as a West Point officer and as a political scientist, Snyder writes knowledgeably on defense policy itself as well as on British politics. While well-balanced in every respect, the work conveys a tone of general approval of the British policy-making process. Certainly Snyder criticizes that process less than many recently fashionable commentators on British institutions, but this is not because of any ignorance of the pressures now widely believed to influence British governmental decisions no less than American. Snyder simply recognizes conflicting pressures as part, indeed as a useful part, of the decision-making process. Neither the pressure nor any other part of the process is held responsible for deficiencies in British defense. If there are such deficiencies (and Snyder appears to think that there is a gap between British commitments and the conventional forces to fulfill those commitments), he attributes the deficiencies to a conflict between military policy and other national goals. In other words, Britain has not been spending enough on defense, or enough on conventional as opposed to nuclear deterrent defense. Yet Snyder does not argue that Britain should spend more. Instead he presents data indicating the relatively large British program. Even in 1960 defense expenditures were seven per cent of the gross national product, and they were as high as twelve per cent during the Korean war.

The British defense policy of 1945–1962 is fairly labelled an "alliance-deterrence strategy," replacing the nation's older "maritime-intervention strategy." The new policy is clearly described and evaluated, but this aspect of the book is less original than the effort to show how the policy has been made. Snyder discusses the influence of parliament, the articulate public, pressure groups (notably industrial groups), policy elites, and service departments. He also takes into account the limits fixed by Britain's balance-of-payments problem and related economic difficulties. His main observations under each of these headings are within the now standard view of the British governmental process, and what Snyder has to say is an important contribution to our knowledge of that process. Thus he shows that parliament, while possessed of limited information and at any rate excluded from direct policy-making participation, remains an influence if only because of ministerial responsiveness to back-bench pressure. Similarly, while emphasizing the extent to which decisions are actually made by the executive authority, Snyder makes it clear that there is a great deal of bargaining within this executive authority before the decision is made. He is at his most interesting when he tells us even a little about this bargaining and especially about the role of the service departments, often backed by their respective industrial suppliers, in making the bargains. There is the important suggestion that the navy and air force, with stronger links to private manufacturers, fare better than the army, which receives much of its equipment from royal ordnance factories.—Leon D. Epstein, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. By Peter G. J. Pulzer. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. 364. n.p.)

How hard it must be to lay aside one's feelings on a subject as emotion-laden as anti-Semitism and write a book with restraint and clinical objectivity. But Peter Pulzer, lecturer in politics at Oxford University, has achieved this objective. Not that he withholds his views entirely and provides the reader only with sets of facts; on the contrary, his sophisticated analyses and interpretations lend substance to the distressing and depressing subject.

The author traces the roots and the development of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, with primary emphasis on the period from 1867 to 1914. His chief contribution lies in unearthing and tapping private archive papers and documents hitherto not used, and then weaving these into a fabric of the history of the movement. He demonstrates the remarkable parallels between German and Austrian anti-Semitism, and devotes much space to the latter since it has been less fully discussed in other writings.

The pre-World War I epoch was selected because despite few significant successes on the part of the anti-Semites, their ideology "penetrated the general stock of political thinking and undermined the acceptance of the liberal values of the nineteenth century." Pulzer's thesis is that anti-Semitism represented a reaction to Western rationalism and liberalism, to capitalism and urban civilization: "It is a revolt, not of the sentimental idealist or the hardheaded reformer, but of the dionysiac element in man, a hunger for pre-civilized standards of conduct."

In this "cult of the grass roots" the movement's political foundations were laid in the 1870's, followed by an era of uncertainty in the 1880's, and some successes in the 1890's. The author deals at length with such men as Adolf Stöcker and Otto Böckel in Germany and Karl Lueger in Austria who attempted to gain mass followings by writing tracts, and organizing meetings and political parties. What is remarkable is the failure of many respectable elements of society to resist their exhortations and their irrational arguments. It was the support of members of the clergy and the middle and lower middle classes which propelled Lueger into the mayoralty of Vienna in 1897 and which kept him in power until his death in 1910. While Lueger's victory can be attributed partially to the resentment of many people against the economic position of the Jews, his maintenance in power can also be attributed to his skill in politics and his dabbling in municipal socialism. Other leaders had less political success than Lueger, and around the turn of the century the movement became dormant as the old generation of leaders disappeared.

If the anti-Semitic movements had been only the product of a few obscure fanatics during the nineteenth century, they might be relegated to the pages of history, but unfortunately the ideology on which they were based permeated other sectors of society: the nationalist and pan-German movements, the university community (including dueling fraternities, student organizations and academicians, e.g. Heinrich von Treitschke), and in the early period even European socialist parties. Later when the German Social Democrats became staunch foes of anti-Semitism, their Marxist ideology blinded them in their forecasts: "The solution of the Jewish question, like that of all other problems, would be provided by the coming of Socialism, which would not only remove the economic basis of anti-Semitism but do away with the separate identity of the Jews." August Bebel even commented that anti-Semitism would never decisively influence German politics.

Pulzer argues in the epilogue, dealing with the period 1914–1938, that such forecasts proved wrong and that anti-Semitism made relatively more headway in Germany and Austria than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, because in the latter liberal ideas and institutions had become an integral part of the open and relatively mobile society. In the former, members of the professional and small and middle business community did not accept liberalism, and vented their frustrations and difficulties on members of the financial-capitalist elite, many of whom were Jews. Religious and "racial" biases compounded the hate.

The schisms in Germany and Austria and the "ravings of obscure sects," however, would not have led to the final catastrophe if it had not been for the political and economic crisis, accentuated by "sins of commission and omission," and finally by the Nazis who, unlike earlier anti-Semites, actually engated in mass violence and sadism.

If any criticism is to be made of the book it lies in the scope of its narrative. The reader could have judged the movement in a wider context if some space had been devoted to the relative power of anti-Semitic movements in other countries during the same era, and more space to the power of forces opposed to anti-Semitism in the two countries under review.

To interested political scientists and historians this book is recommended as an important social documentary. To the racists wherever they may be this book should be required reading to make them aware of the consequences of their preachments of hate.—GERARD BRAUNTHAL, *University of Massachusetts.*

Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republic. Vol. 1 *Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919–1930.* By Gerhard Schulz. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1963. Pp. 678, n.p.)

The profusion of subtitles of this book indicates that Schulz had difficulties in determining exactly its subject matter. Did the author want to write the political or the administrative history of the Weimar Republic? Or was he mainly concerned with one particular aspect of both: the practice of German federalism under the Weimar Republic? At any rate, using very profitably the mass of hitherto unknown official documents and autobiographical material, Schulz begins by presenting various plans and projects for the future constitutional and administrative organization of the Weimar Republic, as seen from the vantage point of the closing days of 1918 and the first half of 1919. In this period the bureaucracy, which had remained intact from before the war, and its new social democratic rulers found an easy meeting ground in their common desire to uphold and defend continuity and order against all suspicious attempts to experiment with new forms of organization. It was not only Kurt Eisner who—to quote a famous dictum of Meinecke—slipped into the temporarily empty mansion of the Bavarian state. In his later chapters the author demonstrates convincingly how Eisner's more skillful Prussian colleague, Otto Braun, without the burden of any intellectual baggage, and more favored by circumstances of time and place, performed successfully a similar feat.

Once the framework of the Reich-Laender organization had been re-established, even without Bismarck's effective linkage of the Reich and Prussian political and administrative machinery at the command level, the question of its adequacy for the political life of the new state arose. To answer this question the author is compelled to describe in some detail much of the history of the political conflicts of the early twenties. His survey includes the occupation of Saxony and Thuringia by the Reichswehr, the effective ejection of their deviant governments, and the tortuous methods by which the military, political, and bureaucratic leaderships of the Reich and of Bavaria were able to reach an accommodation. His description frequently corrects previous more partisan and partial accounts.

To this part belongs the story of the divisive and unitary tendencies present in both the Rhein and the Ruhr, and described for the first time, as having occurred in East Prussia as well. The author's presentation continues to emphasize both thrust and counterthrust tendencies affecting the rights of various bureaucratic apparatuses, and making their influence felt through constitutional formulae, ministers' and civil servants' memos, conferences and committees.

In evaluating Schulz's first volume, it is important to differentiate between the early period and the period of consolidation from 1924 to 1928. During the earlier years the history of federalism is so closely interwoven with substantive problems of the period that constitutional theorems and bureaucratic strategems appear simply as byproducts of major political and social struggles. But with the beginnings of consolidation in 1924, those in power in the territorial governmental units became actors in their own right. Therefore, if one considers the staying power of the administrative structure, the later period is the more revealing. For despite the impetus received from the financial plight of the Laender, reform of the Federal structure was frustrated by the resistance of the Prussian S.P.D. leadership. The author shows convincingly how at that late stage Prussian political leaders lost interest in a Prussian-Reich merger which could not guarantee them a permanent share of political power.

Whatever one might think of the author's organization of his material, his book will long remain indispensable for the analysis of two problems: 1) the relative weakness of federal structures in dealing with major problems of a socially heterogeneous society; 2) the conditions and chances of successful collaboration between higher bureaucracy and the conservative leadership of various mass parties and protest movements.—OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University*.

Il clero di riserva. BY GIANFRANCO POGGI. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1963.)

Il clero di riserva (*The Auxiliary Clergy*), *subtitled Studio sociologico sull'Azione Cattolica Italiana durante la presidenza Gedda* (*A Sociological Study of Italian Catholic Action During the Gedda Presidency*), is an analysis of how the structure and functioning of Italian Catholic Action in the years preceding 1958 prevented it from achieving the goals set by the Church. It is a very good analysis of the particular Italian situation and a contribution to our understanding of the relationship between structure and goals in a church-related association.

The author, formerly at the University of Florence and now teaching at a university in the U.K., is well qualified by background and training to undertake this study; it originated as a doctoral dissertation in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Poggi worked with Professor Joseph La Palombara in his study of Italian interest groups and had access to his materials and interviews dealing with Catholic Action. *Il clero di riserva,* however, does not focus on Catholic Action in politics. Nor is the author primarily interested in Catholic Action as an organization.

His concern is rather with the interaction among the organization, the Church, and the larger society. It is his principal thesis that the use of Catholic Action by the Church as a defense mechanism, an auxiliary clergy shielded from the main stream of Italian life by an emphasis on rigid individual morality and complete subordination to the hierarchy, prevents it from performing its historical mission of serving as the church's vital link with a rapidly changing and increasingly secular society. Instead of being an extension of the church in the secular world it is a means of selecting out the more pious elements and detaching them from the main stream of developments. As a result, the teachings of Catholic Action and the church are largely irrelevant to contemporary Italian problems.

In presenting his argument the author shows how the internal structure of Catholic Action serves to detach the member from many important contacts and experiences of his age group. The principal organizations of Catholic Action divide members by age and sex on the basis of the parish or diocese. Diocesan organization groups all social classes together; the author believes that separate organizations for young workers, as in France and Belgium, would be more effective. Apart from the four large organizations for men, women, young men, and young women, there are specialized organizations for university students, university graduates, and school teachers (associations for workers, farmers and other specific categories are outside Catholic Action proper).

At all levels in these organizations the real power rests with priests and, ultimately, the Vatican. Although laymen occupy important positions, they are closely controlled by the clergy. The absence of lay initiative leads to sterility in ideas and a lack of dynamism. The more creative and able, even among practicing Catholics, tend to leave Catholic Action or never to join. As a result it is a recruiting ground for religious orders and the Christian Democratic party; but it does not achieve its goal of penetrating society as the example of Catholic adaptation to the modern world, for it "does not take seriously the things of this world." Its too close ties with the church, its limited adaptability, and the authoritarian proclivities of Gedda were primarily responsible for this lack of success.

This study does not attempt to evaluate the changes which have taken place since 1958. Under Pope John XXIII Italian Catholic Action took on a new image and Gedda was replaced as president. As Dr. Poggi points out, the Gedda line had met important opposition even within Catholic Action and the church hierarchy. The situation is now considerably altered from that analyzed in *Il clero di riserva*.

The basic questions asked by Dr. Poggi remain. How can one organization sponsor another without dominating it? How can a highly hierarchical church adapt to an age of political democracy and lay participation? How can a traditional organization such as the church engage in adaptive and dynamic action in an increasingly secular world? Certainly the church has done a better job of adapting in numerous countries than in Italy. The closeness of the Vatican, its interest in Italian affairs, the fear of communism in Italy, and the close ties between the church and dominant Italian elites have caused Italian Catholicism to lag far behind in coming to grips with the modern world. Perhaps the era described by Dr. Poggi was the last of its kind and the fresh views of Pope John XXIII will come to dominate in Italy. Certainly the Gedda leadership of Catholic Action, however, fitted neatly into the spirit of Italian Catholicism. A new approach will have to overcome not only the opposition of much of the Italian hierarchy but also the restraining influence of the ingrained habits and attitudes of Italian society itself.—SAMUEL H. BARNES, *University of Michigan.*

Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg. BY JENS JEPPESEN AND POUL MEYER. (Aarhus: Aarhus University Institute of Political Science, 1964. Pp. 105.)

This distinguished study of electoral turnout in Denmark uses both official voting statistics since 1909 and survey data from the parliamentary elections of 1957 and 1960. Since Danish voting statistics, like those throughout Northern Europe, are comprehensive as well as of long standing, the raw material is almost overwhelming. Jeppesen and Meyer have, however, with considerable conceptual sophistication, made intellectually interesting a study which of necessity consists mostly of statistical tables.

These tables demonstrate that a remarkably high proportion of the Danish electorate votes regularly. Since the 1939 election the turnout for parliamentary elections (Jeppesen and Meyer make valuable comparisons with turnout in Danish local elections, as well as in parliamentary elections in West Germany and Sweden, and in local and parliamentary elections in Norway) has remained above—generally well above—80%. In 1957, for instance, the turnout was 83.7% and in 1960, 85.8%. Significantly, the highest turnout (89.5%) was in 1943, when Denmark was occupied by German troops, and voting became even more meaningful as an act of national commitment. The number of Danes who never vote in parliamentary elections is very small; the number who vote in some but not all parliamentary elections is substantial. Participation in elections increases with age until a relatively late age—for men, until sixty or seventy years of age, and for women somewhat earlier. Those who would be more likely to vote only irregularly, or not at all, include women, the youngest and oldest voting ages, and rural residents. The greatest differences between voters and non-voters, however, are in marital status. Married men vote more often than married women, who vote more often than single men, who vote more often than single women. Least likely to vote of all Danes are single women, either very young or very old, living in rural areas isolated from Copenhagen, the center of political life. Supporting recent Norwegian and Swedish findings, Jeppesen and Meyer conclude that separated and divorced persons have the lowest electoral turnout. Unmarried men vote much less often than widowed men, but unmarried women vote a little more often than widows. In Denmark, as elsewhere, the self-employed vote more often than wage-earners, higher employees more often than lower employees, and skilled workers more often than unskilled workers. High-status members of Danish communities, especially in rural areas, apparently obey a social norm according to which they are expected to vote regularly.

Regional differences in electoral turnout in Denmark are relatively small. Among the few exceptions to this geographical uniformity were the 1935 and 1939 elections in Southern Jutland, where the threat presented by National Socialist Germany was especially evident. To explain that degree of geographical variation in turnout which does exist, Jeppesen and Meyer argue that electoral turnout is inversely correlated with the distance of the electoral district from Copenhagen. This hypothesis proves valid for rural areas, but not for larger cities. The authors suggest that in these cities a special urban electoral milieu is created, which is completely independent of the adjoining rural milieu. With continuing urbanization of Denmark, there will be presumably even further reduction in geographical differences in electoral turnout. Social location is clearly more important than spatial location, and social distance is more important than spatial distance. Neither of these distances, of course, is very great in Denmark. The dominant impression one receives from this study is the national uniformity of electoral turnout. In this important respect, as in so many others, the Danes have come as close to achieving a true political community as is perhaps possible in this imperfect world.—Marvin Rintala, *Boston College.*

History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. By Ivan Avakumovic. (Aberdeen: The Aberdeen University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 207, Vol. One, 60s.)

The first volume of this projected series on the history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia launches a truly monumental project, even if the first installment is only slender in size and restricted in scope. The author, a native of Yugoslavia, who left his country and was subsequently educated in Scotland and at Canadian universities, is currently a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. He is uniquely qualified to write the definitive history of Tito's Communist movement since he is completely conversant with, and seems to have excellent access to, the original documentary materials dealing with the Party and its rapidly changing leadership.

Volume One focuses on the 1914–1941 period, beginning with the years of World War I and stretching to the spring of 1941 when the German invasion of Yugoslavia heralded not only the advent of an inevitable World War II, but also the emergence of a Communist nucleus in the forefront of the country's resistance struggle. Despite the voluminous documentation of the earlier period, this reviewer found the story more interesting (and more relevant to the current Eastern European scene) as the late nineteen-thirties are being discussed in terms of the rise of Tito and the factional inner-strife of the Comintern hierarchy. This impression also suggests that subsequent volumes will be increasingly important contributions to scholarly work on Balkan politics, and possibly of more appeal to the general public and college students alike. The first volume is clearly a specialist's book written for fellow-specialists.

The study is lucidly organized into four central parts; although each section is a chronological slice of Yugoslav Communist history, it also has a definite main theme running through that particular period. Thus we witness the "years of legality" (1919–1920, in which the Socialist movement crystallized between the Social Democrats and a small Communist group); the "years of semi-legality" (1921–1928, marked by bitter infighting on the Communist "home-front" and bewilderingly contradictory instructions from Stalin through various Balkan Comintern specialists); the "years of illegality" (1929–1936, when King Alexander's royal dictatorship and efficient secret police succeeded in breaking apart the burgeoning Communist Party while imprisoning its leaders), and finally the years of "Popular Front Tactics" (1937–1939, when Tito gradually assumed the center of the small CP stage to the exclusion of everyone else). Finally, an all-too brief chapter deals with the onrush of the "Second Imperialist War" which engulfs both protagonists and bystanders, both Royalists and Stalinists alike.

In specific terms, the book's highlights include a discussion of an interesting Yugoslav Communist call for a general strike as early as December 1920, to be carried out by the Communist trade unions (p. 49 *et seq.*); an ideologically significant argument with the Comintern as to whether the Yugoslav Communists were ready and able (in the 1920's) to profit from the Bolshevik experience and organize a "successful revolution in Yugoslavia" (p. 57), and the first membership purge carried out by Tito in the 1937–1938 period when he proceeded to shake up the Croatian and Serbian CP members with the full blessing and support of Moscow's Comintern leadership (p. 137). Indeed, the Comintern authorization was so broad, giving Tito "the task of pursuing the purge of all alien, vacillating elements from the Party," that one could date the origins of this man's monolithic rule over the CPY from this 1938 order.

The volume ends with a social and economic analysis of the crucial 1939–1941 transition years which saw the CPY assume a defeatist, anti-Western attitude in foreign policy, while accelerating at home the drive to recruit members in Belgrade University, in the secondary schools of the major cities and in the various literary societies. This period is characterized even more interestingly, and certainly with more eloquence, in Milovan Djilas' *Land Without Justice* which reported on his own "capture" by Communism as a young high school and college student. Everyone concerned with Communism and with Central-Eastern European politics will look forward to subsequent volumes by Dr. Avakumovic.—Andrew Gyorgy, *Boston University.*

√*World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith.* By Richard Lowenthal. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xxii, 296. $6.00.)

Richard Lowenthal has put together in this volume a number of essays which have previously appeared in *Problems of Communism*, *Encounter*, *The China Quarterly*, and various German magazines and journals. When most of these articles were first published, there was less agreement among specialists on World Communism that this movement was in such a highly fissionable state. Commencing his discussion with the unsuccessful Soviet attempt to return Tito to the Communist fold and ending with an epilogue on the events in the summer of 1963 on the Sino-Soviet split, Lowenthal takes the reader through a fascinating chain of events plaguing the Communist bloc. The author analyzes the significant XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of February 1956, which might be regarded as the beginning of the split in the bloc under Khrushchev. By admitting separate roads to "Socialism," the Soviet leader took the lid off to Pandora's box. Since then, the Soviet bloc has not been the monolith which it once was, Khrushchev had hoped that this new freer discussion would usher in an ideological rebirth of Soviet and international communism. It did the opposite. Chaos, insubordination, and ideological warfare have followed. The book is especially good on the 1959, 1960, and 1961 periods of the breakup of world communism.

Khrushchev's advocacy of peaceful coexistence was one of the divisive forces separating Moscow and Peking. Enunciated at the XX Party Congress in February 1956, this disputed doctrine has been ever present in the ideological tug of war between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Khrushchev's trip to the United States in September 1959 and his efforts in behalf of a summit conference without China contributed to the furthering of the rift which became increasingly more acute with each new month. Khrushchev's policies of the reduction of Soviet armed forces in early 1960 and his expressed willingness for discussion of controls for a nuclear test ban contributed to the feeling on the part of the Chinese that Khrushchev was letting them down. The U-2 incident made the attempt at a summit conference abortive but the Russians did not lessen their ideological pronouncements of peaceful coexistence. At the December 1960 meeting of the eighty-one Communist parties, Khrushchev said, "Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not mean reconciliation between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies an intensification of the struggle of the working class, and of all Communist parties for the triumph of socialist ideas . . . Peace is the true ally of socialism, for time is working for socialism and against capitalism." The Khrushchev formula of avoiding international wars but justifying wars of national liberation was a Soviet-proffered ideological compromise with the Chinese—a compromise which Mao could not accept.

On the leadership question of the international Communist movement, the 1960 declaration indicated the failure to have a single Communist center. The 1957 Moscow declaration implied that there was such a center, the USSR. By December of 1960, there was admitted the existence of two actual centers of Communist authority, Moscow and Peking, because Khrushchev had asked "for the omission of the flattering formula placing the Soviet Union 'at the head of the Socialist camp' and the CPSU 'at the head of the Communist world movement'." But by the XXII Congress of the CPSU in 1961, Khrushchev was openly defied by the Chinese Communists. This forced him in Lowenthal's opinion to wipe out the last symbolic remnants of Stalinism, including the removal of his body from the sacred position of repose in the mausoleum in Red Square. The Chinese had persisted in backing the defeated Stalinist remnants in the USSR and in the Soviet bloc. The Chinese refused to accept the expulsion of Albania from the Communist camp and flouted Khrushchev by laying a wreath on Stalin's tomb.

Lowenthal discusses some of the various repercussions of this schism. He predicts that some individual Communist parties will become less dependent on Moscow while remaining as national Communist totalitarian states. Rumania's recent independence from the USSR by going its own way economically and ideologically, has borne out this prediction. Lowenthal believes that the most marked new results of the schism will come within the USSR itself, in the Soviet Communist Party. Khrushchev's dethronement has transpired since Lowenthal wrote these essays. But what Lowenthal prophetically wrote has been revealed in fact. The ideological implications of the schism have been realized in the CPSU. In Lowenthal's words written in 1963, the schism "has also sown the seeds, then, of a future 'de-Khrushchevization'; in the next crisis of succession, reassertion of the primacy of an ideological party may no longer be the safest road to victory."

In an Epilogue: On the Stages of International Communism, written in 1963, Lowenthal traces how the centralist World Party stage of Lenin and Stalin, which followed the loosely organized Russian Revolutionary stage had been transformed into the Khrushchev international leadership stage. The Khrushchev stage reached its apotheosis in 1957 and proved unworkable by 1960. Lowenthal believes that the present stage of attempting to maintain Party unity by compromise, which the reviewer might add has been continued with some modifications by Khrushchev's successors, can never work at all. It remains to be seen whether this is true. This test will come in to course of events in Vietnam. The future development of Communist Parties dependent on the USSR will, according to Lowenthal, show a withering away of power as the Soviet Union declines in authority in the world Communist movement. Lowenthal argues that those parties with the greatest potential for independence are those "concentrated in underdeveloped regions, where today, Chinese ideological influence is greatest." This is a far cry from the predictions of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, or even Khrushchev.—WILLIAM B. BALLIS, *The University of Michigan.*

The Arabs: Their History & Future. BY JACQUES BERQUE, TRANS. BY JEAN STEWART. (New York: Praeger, 1964. Pp. 290. $7.50.)

Professor Berque brings a rare combination of qualities to his studies of the Arab world. His anthropological work, *Structures Sociales du Haut-Atlas* (1955) is a classic, and he has lived and worked in both North Africa and the Middle East. His book, originally published as *Les Arabes d'Hier à Démain* (1960), reflects his acute awareness of disciplinary demands tempered by an intimate knowledge of the Arabs, their mentality and their aspirations. His book borders on the poetic, but it is poetry with full recognition of the real dilemmas and frustrations of the people of whom he writes. Moreover, Professor Berque's anthropological and sociological interests give the study a forceful action orientation, something which many scholarly works on the contemporary Muslim world lack.

The focus of the study is the contemporary Arab in relation to his environment and his intellectual history. Perhaps there is nothing equivalent to spending months in an isolated village to develop the extraordinary sensitivity Berque displays: the saint's tomb in the midst of the junkyard, the Arab League office overshadowed by a Coca Cola sign, the Arab intellectual destroying his copies of Racine in tearful rage during the Suez crisis. Examples of this kind are scattered throughout the book, and might lead the superficial reader to regard it as an unintelligible *mélange* of impressions. In a sense, it is, because the Arab's view of the world is such a *mélange*, but in a more important way it is not because Berque sees these dramatic situations as revealing the Arab conflict with a realism that permits orderly differentiation and analysis.

Despite the symbolism essential to ordering such a work, Professor Berque deals with very real problems. Indeed, seven of the fourteen chapters deal with specific economic questions: finance, technical innovation, entrepreneurial qualities, working conditions, etc. These chapters might be considered the most useful because they shed a completely new meaning on the barren figures economic analysts are prone to project on the human problems of the Arab world. His curiosity takes him to psychological fundamentals in the emergence of a more complex society, e.g., what are the connotations of "things" and "number" in Arabic. The Islamic injunctions about saving and investment are not sterile theological speculations, but brilliant insights into how the Arab relates the objects of his environment to his feelings, frustrations and intellectual history. Every student of emergent nations will sympathize with the "need to build new pyramids" (p. 141), and every diplomat should appreciate Berque's notation that the Aswan Dam represents Nasser's reply to the Suez disaster.

The later chapters of the book may seem less clear, in part because the juxtaposition of object and perception is much less well defined in discussing art, music, language, the role of women and politics. No more succinct statement of the meaning of marriage in the Arab world exists than his observation that marital relations are "an affirmation rather than an exchange." (p. 175) Seldom have the problems of the Arabic language been more acutely summarized than in his note that Arabic "scarcely belongs to the world of men; rather it has been lent to them." (p. 190) As a student of North African politics, this reviewer could not agree more with his observation that "emancipation took place when total independence had become a euphemism." (p. 260) These insights, however, would be in the category of wisely written memoirs were it not that Berque constantly returns to the symbolic meaning of each conflict in the total experience of the contemporary Arab.

Berque's method is unclear because he indeed does not insist that his conceptual tools provide concrete limits to variations in human experience. Much that he writes would receive corroboration in learning theory and in Gestalt psychology, e.g. "radical reconsideration of the past involves paradoxically the deliberate choice of swift progress." (p. 147) His optimism about the future of the Arabs, then, is not derived from how their social relationships might conform to ours, but from the creativity that might take place in the process of their struggle to adapt the past to the future. His reliance on symbolism is dictated by his insistence that the layers of meaning be recognized, often using old logical patterns and meanings in completely new situations. This is not an easy book to read, but the careful reader may learn to free his imagination and perception from many of the unproductive ground rules of more commonly used concepts and conventional studies. He will surely come to appreciate the Arab world in its total complexity in a way that few other books have approached.—DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD, *Cornell University.*

The Formation of Malaysia; New Factor in World Politics. BY WILLARD A. HANNA. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1964. Pp. 247. $6.50.)

The formation of Malaysia seemed to provide a quiet and graceful disentaglement of British authority from its last colonial remnants in Southeast Asia. In actual fact, it created a new storm center lashed by the winds of President Sukarno's "newly emergent forces." The twenty-four chapters of Willard Hanna's book (excluding the newly-written Introduction and Postscript) represent his original American Universities Field Staff reports submitted between February 1962 and mid-September 1963. They present a lucid account of how a tentative proposal for federating the State of Malaya with the former British colonies of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak led to the creation of Malaysia through the rational adjustment and manipulation of conflicting interests. Recorded before and while international pressures began to exert themselves upon Malayan policymakers, these chapters contain a freshness which might well have been lost if they had been written at a later date. At the same time they reflect the insight of a competent on-the-spot observer into the internal politics of the merger proposal both in Singapore and the relatively little-known Borneo territories.

Hanna's discussion of the gradual (1957–62) economic merger of the former Crown Colony (and free port) of Penang into the newly formed Federation of Malaya led him to predict that the economic merger of Singapore with Malaya could well be mutually profitable and prevent fewer serious immediate problems than anticipated at the time of his writing. Nor can Hanna be accused of hindsight when he mentions the possibility (in his Febr. 28, 1962 report on "Politics in Borneo") that, in spite of official pronouncements, Indonesia was likely to turn its attention to the "liberation" of the Borneo territories after the successful completion of its West Irian liberation campaign.

The tiny (2,000 square miles, 90,000 people) colony of Brunei is an oil-rich paradise with an annual state income of $40,000,000, ruled by a Sultan who was willing to reform. Guided by British technical know-how, the ordinary family was able to afford most of the world's modern amenities. Yet it was this highly favoured Brunei welfare laboratory which fomented a widely-supported local rebellion. This incident causes Hanna to ask whether peace, progress, and prosperity by themselves are sufficient to ensure stability or whether the mystical appeal of the "newly emerging forces" is irresistable. If the latter is true, chances for stability in the remainder of Southeast Asia are dim indeed (p. 151). Hanna admits that the Malaysia experiment itself stands in sharp contrast to the whole idea of "violent revolution" and he believes that the very gravity of Singapore's dilemma "becomes the best insurance of its sanity" (p. 205). He leaves some doubt in the minds of his readers, however, whether this victory of rationalism will be able to withstand the onslaught of ultranationalism and the stigma of being part of a "neocolonial conspiracy." Hanna notes that contrary to original expectations the orderly and successful development of the Malaysia experiment seems to depend mainly upon the wiles of Indonesian policymakers.

Interesting though each of the 24 AUFS reports are, their presentation in one volume has some disadvantages. Several of the chapters provide the reader with interesting insights and sidelights of life in Malaya and Singapore, but in combination with those which focus on political matters do not make for easy reading in book-form. The elimination of these chapters might have deprived readers of precious vignettes but the central theme of the book—the formation of Malaysia—would have stood out in better perspective. With the consequent reduction in length, more space could have been devoted to the causes of the Philippine and Indonesian reactions. With regard to the latter, for example, this reviewer was surprised to find no mention of the Indonesian fear that Malaysia would become a state dominated by Chinese. It is also to be regretted that there is no discussion of the British position which would have required a Hannan analysis of the Cobbold Commission report. The latter comments, however, are mainly criticisms of organization and expression of regret that there were not more AUFS reports by Hanna. His compilation is evidence not only of his ability as a shrewd observer but also of the value of the AUFS to the American student body in providing timely analyses of foreign affairs.—Paul W. van der Veur, *Australian National University (Canberra)*.

✓*Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation*. By Wendell Bell. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 229. $6.00.)

The postwar period has seen the birth of new nations in greater profusion than at any other time in history. Almost all of them have inevitably had to be phoenixes (though not always birds of great beauty) rising from the ashes, or at least the embers, of worn out colonial empires. Inevitably, too, most of them have been in Africa, where colonialism most recently flourished.

Opportunities for the establishment of new sovereignties in the Western Hemisphere are relatively few. It is the more useful, consequently, to have available a good study of Jamaica, one of the most recent of the new nations. Wendell Bell, a Yale sociologist, has carried on extensive research in the West Indies, especially in Jamaica, and this study is the fruit of that long investigation. As becomes a devotion to its author's discipline, the approach and content are primarily sociological but there is much of interest and value to the political scientist.

In an introductory chapter the author sets the stage historically, politically, and economically. The overwhelming conditioning fact of Jamaican life is of course its enormous percentage of Negroes. For more than a hundred years that percentage has varied only slightly between 75 and 80. The presence of this segment of the population, both under Spanish and, after 1655, English control, determined Jamaica's economy, its social structure, and in recent years its politics.

In this chapter, too, we are introduced to the two dominant figures in contemporary Jamaican political life, Sir Alexander Bustamante, founder of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and later of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), and Norman Washington Manley, chief figure in the formation of the People's National Party (PNP), Jamaican affiliate of the British Labour Party.

Later chapters move more directly into an analysis of Jamaican leadership. They are based chiefly on a thorough and skillfully devised questionnaire submitted to some 800 Jamaican "elites" selected from *Who's Who, Jamaica* and other sources. Of those queried, 238 responded, and the scientific analysis of these comprehensive answers gives the basis for much of the fascinating information included in the study. The questionnaires were supplemented by widescale interviewing. Numerous statistical tables give the gist of the analysis; the text admirably supplements and explains such findings.

In one chapter title Bell asks whether Jamaica should have a democratic political system. He concludes that political cynicism is fairly widespread in Jamaica, that the politically cynical leaders (nondemocrats) tended to oppose independence for the island and the politically idealistic leaders to favor it, and that the real danger to the continuation of fledgling democratic forms comes chiefly from those leaders who wanted both political independence and at the same time social and economic progress.

In examining the attitudes of his elitist respondents toward the question of whether Jamaica should be independent Bell finds that about two-thirds were nationalist, that nationalist attitudes did not generally reflect great bitterness toward the mother country nor hold that independence would be a panacea for all Jamaica's problems, and that most of his respondents believe that independence will bring economic benefits but that close economic relations with the United Kingdom should be maintained.

An independent Jamaica faced a theoretical choice between East and West and the problem was made somewhat more difficult by the pseudo-glamour of nearby Communist Cuba. It was decided by 1963, however, that Jamaica would align itself with the Western democracies, a decision which, the author holds, must necessarily affect the island's future in significant ways. That future is precarious, though, inasmuch as the economic base is small and so much remains to be done in the fields of education, housing, economic diversification, removal of the sense of political alienation and cynicism.

Jamaica's leaders, Bell maintains, seem to have avoided corruption and opportunism but it is not yet determined whether they can avoid a drift toward increasing cynicism about political democracy and whether they can lead the way to a more equalitarian society.

In appendices the author gives an analysis of Jamaican occupational ratings, a discussion of his methodological procedures and problems, and a reproduction of his 54-point questionnaire. A number of excellent photographs add to the interest of the book.

Bell has skillfully wedded sociological and political analysis. His techniques might well be borrowed by others interested in making similar basic studies of new nations and underdeveloped countries.—RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, *University of California (Santa Barbara).*

Colombia Today—And Tomorrow. BY PAT M. HOLT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. viii, 209. $5.50.)

This is an interesting book which is mistitled, for it is not an analysis of *Colombia Today—And Tomorrow,* but rather a collection of miscellaneous information which probably should have been entitled "Observations on Colombia." The author, a former newspaperman and a staff member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, writes in a preface that "this book is based largely on a series of newsletters that I wrote to the Institute of Current World Affairs when I was a fellow in the Institute in residence in Bogotá in 1961–62. It is based also on independent research and on information gathered and impressions received during five other visits to Colombia between 1953 and 1963." The book contains a brief geographical description of the country, something on the social classes, an outline of its history, and a great deal of descriptive material about the government, the agricultural system, the role coffee plays in the country's economy, the steps being taken to introduce agrarian reform, and to industrialize the country. One chapter deals with the experiences of the United States Peace Corps volunteers in Colombia, another analyzes the elections of 1962 and 1964, and one deals with the Catholic church. The material is not knit together by any systematic analysis, nor is the author sure what the future holds for he writes, "Colombia faces a future heavily charged with 'ifs.'" (p. 195) "The question remains whether the bursting, shifting population of Colombia, now awakening after centuries of slumber, can continue on this slow and difficult road—or whether new violence lies in ambush around the next bend." (p. 197)

Colombia is one of the most difficult of all the Latin American countries to understand. For many decades, as Lewis Hanke has written, there was a "widely held idea that Colombia represented Latin American democracy at its best." This misconception died quickly when the most violent and destructive riot ever to take place in Latin America left part of Bogotá in ruins in 1948 and almost broke up the 9th Conference of the American Republics. At least 200,000 men, women, and children were murdered during the next ten years as chaotic violence swept the country. Conditions became so bad that, to try to stop the senseless slaughter, the leaders of the two most important political parties quit opposing each other and won support for the novel idea that all governmental power should be shared equally by the two large political parties and some stability returned. Thus, from 1958 to 1964 all positions on all levels and in all branches of the government are equally divided and the presidency rotates between the parties every four years. It is hoped that by 1974 the country will have been pacified enough so that democratic government based on competition between political parties can be reintroduced.

This book will be useful to those unfamiliar with what has been happening in Colombia since there is no other good book available in English. Mr. Holt describes a country undergoing rapid change in which urbanization, industralization, and a rapid rise in population have disrupted the old traditional society. Yet at the same time, he points out, "Colombia's social structure and cultural habits are still basically those brought there by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century." (p. 7) This is best seen in his description of the country's agricultural system. Mr. Holt writes: "In the country as a whole, roughly four per cent of the land is owned by sixty per cent of the farmers in lots of less than three Hectares (about seven acres). The farms of more than one hundred Hectares are owned by less than three per cent of the farmers and account for more than half of the land." (pp. 85–86)

"The way in which land is used in Colombia seems to be somewhat more uniform than the way in which it is distributed. With some exceptions, the general pattern is that the best lands are used extensively for cattle (frequently with unimproved pastures) and the poorest lands are used intensively for crops." (p. 86) As a result of the land tenure system and other aspects of the organization of society, the economy does not as yet supply a decent standard of living to most of the population. Thus, the country has been living through a serious crisis for decades and a race goes on between the "National Front" government trying to induce ordered change and the chaotic social forces no one seems able to control.—Harry Kantor, *University of Florida.*

Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America. By Edwin Lieuwen. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 160. $4.50.)

This little book is an updating of Professor Lieuwen's earlier and well-known *Aims and Politics in Latin America.* There are brief descriptions of the seven military coups occurring in Latin America between March, 1962 and April, 1964; there is a general discussion of military politics in Latin America and suggestions for U. S. policy-makers.

An attempt to compress factual analysis and policy critique in a slender volume covering such a vast and complex area is fraught with conceptual difficulties. The tendency is to hover somewhere between reporting and polemics and to confuse assumptions with conclusions. This book epitomizes these problems. Crucial words and phrases go undefined. An example here—as in many books on Latin America—is the term "oligarchies." They are variously referred to as "landed," "commercial," and/or "business oligarchies." They are treated throughout as if in all countries they share monolithic interests and have similar simbiotic relations with the military.

The very term "military" offers similar difficulties. To arrive ultimately at some general policy declarations the author treats the "military" as a transcontinental institution of common aims and interests. Thus, "there is little question that the armed forces are a conservative, antirevolutionary institution standing in the way of the achievement of evolutionary social revolutions by democratic means" (p. 130); and on the same page, "ten of Latin America's twenty republics are gripped in military vises *designed* to hold back the pressures of social revolution." (My italics.) But from the evidence which Lieuwen adduces in his seven case studies, plus those of Venezuela and El Salvador—cases of the military "acquiescing" in social reforms—it is clear that generalizations about the "Latin American military" become misleading. He himself underscores the importance of discussing the military in terms of its varying reactions to the "acute social crisis through which Latin America is passing" (p. 8). He is careful to discuss the important divisions within the Argentine military in 1962, not all of which can be dismissed as merely personal or opportunistic power plays undivorced from ideological or policy positions. Throughout the descriptive parts of the book a distinction is made between military interventions which obstruct social reform; those where the military announces an interest in the idea of reform but may intervene to keep the "labor-left" out of power; and those where the military acquiesces in social reform. A biref section is devoted to "Nasserism"—a vaguely defined term referring to the leadership of social revolution by the military. Lieuwen does not give much hope to this kind of development in Latin America, but on the other hand he speaks of an awakening social consciousness in the military, increasing recruitment into the armed services from the lower middle class, the development of more responsible middle-rank officers. Though he does not want to make the picture look too gloomy, he concludes that even where armies justify their intervention in politics as arbiters of conflicting civilian forces, to save the Constitution from "Communists" or to lead reforms, they *really* intervene to save their own institutional interests and are, therefore, the "chief impediments to democratic social revolution." (pp. 86, 107)

Unrigorous conceptualization leads to contradictory policy recommendations. Lieuwen is quite correctly conscious of the conflicting goals of the U. S. regarding Latin America. He is frank to admit that "despite its noble efforts and intentions, the Kennedy Administration accomplished little in furthering the cause of democracy in Latin America." (p. 129) Nevertheless, after criticizing the Johnson Administration's apparent move away from the policy of non-recognition of military governments, he urges its reassertion. He suggests the argument that the failures of the Kennedy Administration in Latin America were due to the inability of Washington to exercise control over the actions of Latin American military organizations. (p. 128) But if it is true, as he has explained earlier, that the Latin American military are political actors, not apolitical professionals and intervene politically to defend their own institutional interests—then it is quite apparent that Washington simply can not exercise control over them, whether or not it should.

Although Lieuwen states that "the attempt to use reason, to lecture the military on its responsibilities toward the law and the constitution does no good whatsoever," as President Bosch of the Dominican Republic discovered (p. 111), he insists, in the closing sentences of the book, that the most fruitful policy for the U. S. is to continue to try to convince the Latin American military to "eschew politics completely . . . to become the tools rather than the masters of the state . . ." (p. 149). The desire to compress the analysis of such diverse and complex events as those that form the descriptive base of this book into immediate policy exhortations seems to lead us into ever-narrowing circles.—ROBERT W. ANDERSON, *University of Puerto Rico.*

British Guiana. Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society. BY PETER NEWMAN. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 104. Map. Tables. $1.95. Paper.)

This timely volume, issued under the auspices of the British Institute of Race Relations, provides the general reader with a very good introduction to the emerging nation of British Guiana, whose violent political life has several times appeared in newspaper headlines in recent years. Chapter titles—Geography and Natural Resources, Historical Background, Demographic and Social Pressures, The Performance of the Economy since 1953, Political Developments, and Conclusions—well indicate the scope of the author's treatment. It should be added that the treatment of these various themes tends to focus upon the political problem.

The author traces historically the development of the British colony (Chapter II) as a basis for his demographic and social analysis in Chapter III, possibly the most informative part of the book. His analysis of the economy (Chapter IV), an economy based on sugar, rice, bauxite, and timber, concludes with a plea to remedy the lack of planning which has resulted in an unemployment rate (1961) of 18 per cent. In the discussion of political developments (Chapter V) the author points out how various factors in the situation contributed to moving both of the popular political parties toward a generally socialist position, while blaming the British suspension of the constitution in 1953 for much of the subsequent violence and political anarchy:

> The net effect of the 1953 intervention was to postpone for a long time the development of responsible thought about the real economic and social problems of the country, and therefore to move the locus of discussion back to constitutional problems of independence and eventually to problems of racial division. . . . (p. 81)

Both Burnham and Jagan are criticised for their demagogic political leadership, particularly the latter. The author believes that Dr. Jagan merely pretends to be a marxist and is greatly at fault for not presenting a clear cut description of his economic program. Yet much of the blame for present conditions, the author insists, lies with Britain for her "thoughtless colonial assembly of planatation labour from so many disparate sources," and for neglect of the kind of "active and generous participation" without which the economic and social future of British Guiana will be bleak. (p. 102)

A Postscript (pp. 103–104) written after the political and racial violence of 1964, which grew out of a strike of the sugar workers union, supported by the Peoples Progressive Party costing 160 lives, adopts an even less optimistic view of the future than that set forth in the main text. The author writes that "it is clear that the present situation is not stable at all in the long run." He is skeptical of the suggestion of Eric Williams, Premier of Trinidad, made in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference of July 1964, for a limited UN trusteeship, believing that somehow a solution should be found within the Commonwealth.

The book is well written, objective in tone, and cogent in arguing its central thesis of British historical responsibility for an anarchic political situation. Some readers may feel the author is too imbued with the concept of class struggle. (See page 78.) None will suspect him to race prejudice.—Harold Eugene Davis, *The American University*.

Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic. By Selden Rodman. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Pp. x, 202. $5.95.)

This is an outstanding book on the Dominican Republic and its pre-Columbian predecessor, part of which was known to the Tainos as Quisqueya. But "outstanding" is a lefthanded compliment, a phrase with no political coloration.

It is lefthanded, for *Quisqueya* is the only work on the nation nearest Puerto Rico worthy of being rated in a fairly-good-to-very-good range since Sumner Welles' *Naboth's Vineyard* (1928). Briefly, this reader knows of no outstanding book in any language by a social scientist on Columbus' first permanent settlement, a tragic colony, an international pawn of big power politics, a Marine-ruled Wall Street debtor, intermittent nation, corporate-type private fief of a voraciously efficient thief, and short-lived Alliance for Progress showcase that today is the Dominican Republic.

With emphasis on political stress and strain, especially on domestic ineptitude and greed, nonetheless there is a vast amount of condensed, valuable, and dramatic information in 172 of the pages. Of the thirty left, twenty consist of a physical description appendix. A blue pencil should have cut out the appendix. It is partly a useless appendage, partly a painful one, and partly a gangrenous one. By that is meant it is repetitious of what has been said earlier; or it should have been included in the first chapter; or it is incongruous. Numerous tourist guide interjections about the palatability of the fare in hotels throughout the country, highway mileages, beach bathing facilities, and historic monuments make up the appendix's incongruity. Few tourists go any place except to Santo Domingo; virtually none brings a car with him or visits the interior. These intrusions are unduly subjective. For example, Rodman refers to the "hopelessly 'restored'" palace of Diego Columbus. In view of the poverty and cultural level of the Republic, there is nothing hopeless about the edifice, and found at it is infinitely less commercialism than at Williamsburg.

A selected bibliography indicates about as much of a dearth of politico-historical literature on the Dominican Republic up to 1910 as on Puerto Rico. On a comparative population appraisal not much more has been produced on the Republic since 1910 than on the French Antilles, in which to date have occurred no notable outbursts for independence.

Rodman's subjectivism in the appendix and elsewhere may be accounted for by his background. An occasional contributor to the long defunct *New Masses*, he is the author of six books of verse, has compiled five anthologies of poetry, and has written seven books on the visual arts, including three on Haitian art. *Quisqueya* is the only book of his he identifies as being a history. Those who would quarrel with his scarcity of footnotes, infrequent dramatic flourishes, failure to treat adequately of the impact of exterior economic events, might dilute their acerbity by recalling they have not written a book on the Dominican Republic. Rodman did. He has thus measurably filled up with a largely dispassionate recital a historical time gap existing since 1928.

The work would be more useful had Rodman devoted another hundred pages to the Trujillo era and its aftermath, probably most of them to the aftermath, particularly to Juan Bosch and the aborted Alliance for Progress program. But books on the Dominican Republic, even those on Trujillo, have not been best sellers. Within the limitations of his market potential and subject, Rodman has done well.

Quisqueya is not comparable in quality, coverage, scholarship, and documentation to Eric Williams' *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago* (1962), a 294-page paperback which sells in Port-of-Spain for less than U.S. $2.00. This contrast cannot be explained simply by some glib over-simplification about British thoroughness and Spanish haphazardness. After all, Cubans have produced excellent histories of their island.

At present (May 1965) 30,000 American troops occupy Santo Domingo, in the aftermath of the Dominican Revolution. That our marines are back in Santo Domingo is evidence of a new Johnson Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Having been a professor at Santiago de Cuba in 1956, just prior to the Castro Revolt, and also at Santiago de los Caballeros early in 1965, I feel qualified to make a prediction, even though I am now jobless. In the next ten years five other Cuban-Dominican-type revolts will occur in hungry, desperate, hopeless Latin American countries. In 1964 there was a dearth of unbiased, well-rounded, in depth books, monographs, and other studies on the Dominican Republic. I expect the same can be said in 1967 by which time a dozen new ones will have been published. Byron White, *Universidad Cátolica Madre y Maestra, Santiago de los Caballeros, Dominican Republic.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Richard L. Merritt, with Ellen B. Pirro
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NIMROD RAPHAELI
The University of Michigan

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Democratic Civilization. By Leslie Lipson. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 614. $7.50 and $10.00.)

Leslie Lipson has written a grand book in the grand manner. Bringing to bear a wide knowledge and understanding of political theory and comparative government he ranges across not only the United States and Great Britain but also such countries as Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, and New Zealand in his attempt to generalize about the character of modern democracy.

Some will of course be tempted to add that the book is written in the "old" style as well. There are no mentions of Talcott Parsons or David Easton; there are no four-cell tables or diagrams filled with boxes and arrows; there is no effort to adapt recent behavioral phrasings to his subject of study. While *The Democratic Civilization* is heavily comparative in its emphasis, in no sense at all does it try to do for the developed areas of the world what Almond and Coleman did for the developing.

What does emerge is a skilled synthesis of philosophy and institutions. The great ideas, from Plato and Pericles to Marx and Mill, are considered in tandem with parties, legislatures, and related agencies of government. References to Dickens, Shaw, Shakespeare, and Swift also catch the eye and are used to good purpose. There is, in short, a breadth and sweep of learning here that is bound to command respect. The author's imperviousness to recent methods and approaches is, in the final analysis, an asset. Each of us should do what he can do best. Those scholars reared in the earlier tradition who have tried to switch intellectual horses—or to straddle both at once—have more often than not ended up floundering in the stream. The point is that this book, by not seeking to be all things to all readers, comes forth as a study from which students of varied persuasions can profit.

This is a study of what might be called the traditions and institutions of civility. While much of the focus is on the modes and mechanisms of majority rule, the abiding concern is with social and political patterns which elevate the quality of human life. The assumption is that the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as some smaller countries, are not only democracies but are on their way to solving most of the problems that persist in their midst. The tone is optimistic, at times even to a fault, and there are occasions when one begins to wonder if there is much of anything left to worry about. At all events, there exists the premise that the philosophy of such writers as Aristotle, Locke, and Jefferson has been transmuted into prevailing democratic ideology. This philosophy, however, was as much aristocratic as it was democratic. While the principle of majority-rule was approved it was assumed that the populous would refrain from getting big ideas about itself. Thus the values of civility would prevail despite the growth in suffrage and the rise of leaders sprung from the people. These values call for the defense and encouragement of civil liberties and civil rights, of constitutionalism and liberal learning. They require an atmosphere of moderation, maturity, and self-imposed restraint. These social and intellectual underpinnings of democratic civility are examined in various national settings, and particularly impressive are the chapters showing how potentially explosive issues like language and religion have been resolved in diverse settings.

The conclusion is that on the whole the people have not overstepped their proper bounds. To the query whether democratic majorities have been prone to acts of tyranny, the answer is that fears of such excesses have seldom been realized. Yet it would have been interesting to have some reflections on a few of the current debates like the one over the quality of democratic culture: in art and literature, education, even entertainment. The consumers with the highest bidding power have been accused of driving serious matter from the air-waves and the classrooms. This is, in a sense that is both real and political, an act of a majority's tyranny over a minority. Alternatively advanced democratic societies are increasingly characterized by large corporate institutions which seem to be able to make plans and exercise power without having to ask for public permission. Neither Aristotle nor Rousseau knew of such institutions, and it may well be that the principles embodied in the traditional corpus of theory has less relevance today than might at first be thought. At all events the tendencies of a mass society and a corporate society are both inimical to the tradition of civility. Whether the public has too much or too little power, or even just about the right amount, there is reason for suspecting that forces making for civilized life have been weakening and are failing to be renewed.

One final query: Is *The Democratic Civilization* a textbook or isn't it? The publisher quotes two prices, for text and non-text use. Clearly the textbook appurtenances are there: frequent subheads, minimal footnotes, an all-too-brief bibliography. There has been a tendency for serious thematic studies (in the field of political theory the recent works by Sheldon Wolin, Carl Friedrich, Roland Pennock and David Smith come to mind) to try to appeal to two markets at once: not only to one's professional colleagues but to bid for wide classroom adoptions as well. Whether such attempts can be successful is problematical. The books must be longer, more step-by-step, if they are to be used in undergraduate courses. This tends to put off the advanced reader, who is disinclined to sit down with a textbook-looking book of a leisurely evening. At the same time such volumes can only really be effective for a semester of teaching if the instructor is willing to recast his course outline to accord with the theme and content of the book. And this is unlikely to happen in many places. But just because this book is not likely to be successful as a text does not mean that its appearance should frighten away the serious student. Leslie Lipson has brought a fresh mind and wide learning to bear on a vital subject. Any political scientist can consider this book as part of his education.—ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University.*

Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy. BY HEINRICH VON BRENTANO, translated by Edward Fitzgerald. (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 224. $5.95.)

This volume is an abbreviated version of a book published 1962 in West Germany under the title *Deutschland, Europa, und die Welt: Raden zur deutschen Aussenpolitik.* It contains a collection of speeches given by the late Heinrich von Brentano during the formidable years of the Bonn Republic. The author commenced his political career after World War II as *Landtag* representative in Hesse, was elected to the *Bundestag* in 1949, became Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Christian Democratic Union in the federal legislature, and served as Foreign Minister from 1955 to 1961.

The speeches in this book cover a much broader field than the sub-title suggests, and extend, in terms of substance and time, from the economic and political consolidation of the three Western zones of occupied Germany to the problems of the Atlantic Community in the 1960's. The volume can be divided into four sections: the first collection of essays deals with issues and problems related to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. Here the author discusses the political tasks of the *Länder*, the problem of de-nazification, and the Bonn Statute. The second part concerns European unification. It includes speeches on Franco-German understanding, the Schuman Plan, European political unification, and the future of the Atlantic Community. The third section features speeches on the German problem and West German foreign policy. The author speaks out on the issue of all-German elections and self-determination, discusses the German problem in connection with Western foreign policy, explains West German policy toward Eastern Europe, and elucidates cultural and economic considerations in foreign policy. The final part of the book contains some miscellaneous speeches and statements, among them an obituary for John Foster Dulles, a memorial address in honor of Gustav Stresemann, and Mr. von Brentano's resignation statement.

Some criticism might be made about the selection of the articles. The German original includes some speeches that might have been of interest to the student of German politics, but, unfortunately, have not been put into the publication under review. For example, Mr. von Brenatano's speeches endorsing West German accession to the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Economic Community should have been included. Also missing in the Praeger publication are the author's 1958 speech on the ardently debated topic of disengagement in Central Europe and some informative talks on West German foreign policy considerations in 1959 and 1960.

In general, the translation is quite satisfactory. Moreover, the English in this volume is less stilted than one encounters in a number of other translations. On the negative side, however, it should be said that the reviewer found the constant use of "Federal Landtag" (instead of *Bundestag*) slightly irritating. There are also some minor substantive errors in this volume which are not found in the German original. But despite these and a few other criticisms that might be made, the volume constitutes a desirable addition to the English-language sources on contemporary German politics. For, with the exception of Weymar's dated *Konrad Adenauer: His Authorized Biography* little is yet available in the English language that renders a primary account of the West German government's position on the issues that were widely argued between the spokesmen of the government and the Social Democratic leaders in the 1950's.—Herbert R. Winter, *Rhode Island College.*

The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. By Bernard B. Fall. (New York: Praeger, 1963. Pp. xii, 493. $7.95.)

South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. By Robert Scigliano. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963. Pp. ix. 227, Plus unbound insertion "Epilogue: The Coup d'Etat," 9 p. $3.50; $1.95 paper.)

Written by two scholars of different backgrounds, and appearing almost simultaneously, these two works achieve an amazing degree of analytical and evaluative convergence as to the events and personalities making up the story of Viet-Nam in the 1954–1963 decade. Scigliano's work is compact with well-organized and accurate information (except for the error on the beginnings of the Vietnamese press, p. 177). The main body of the analysis, consisting of Chapters 4 to 8, gives much emphasis to administrative behavior. His study of political personalities and party system in South Viet-Nam is perhaps the best short treatment available, even though the casual reader may find it quite hard to keep track of the numerous unfamiliar names mentioned. A good case-study of recent U.S. foreign relations can be found in the last chapter. Unequal to the main analysis are Chapters 2 and 3, as well as the hastily put together epilogue on the November 1, 1963 coup which toppled the Diem regime. Other factors favoring his book are its relative brevity and a stylistic restraint which takes the sting out of his critical comments.

Unlike Scigliano's book, Fall's *The Two Viet-Nams* is not his first major work on this topic in which he has specialized for about a dozen years. Even to this day he seems to be better known for his *The Viet-Minh Regime* and *Street without Joy* than for this impressive compendium in which the common background as well as the separate ways taken by North and South Viet-Nam since partition are treated. Despite some technical shortcomings, this work might well be the most important study of contemporary Viet-Nam since Philippe Devillers' *Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952* and Jean Lacouture-Philippe Devillers' *La fin d'une guerre* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952 and 1960 respectively). The best part of Fall's book is found in Chapters 8 and 9 dealing with political organization and social changes in North Viet-Nam, and Chapters 15 and 16 dealing with the revolutionary insurgency in South Viet-Nam. In these two chapters, Fall speaks his mind on the political and military miscalculations of both Saigon and Washington. His asperity on the subject has undoubtedly provoked negative reactions from Foggy Bottom and Pentagon men. This otherwise good book is also marred by the apparent haste in editing. For example, the complex events of 1945–1954 are fragmented by artificially dividing them between Chapters 6–7 and Chapters 10–11. Source indications are missing in several instances, notably in quotes of Dean Acheson (p. 61), François Mitterand (p. 221), and Ngo Dinh Diem (p. 237). Also scattered misspellings, and especially the randomized and partial use of some Vietnamese diacritical marks give the impression that the book was not proofread carefully. (In my opinion, diacritical marks are better left out completely in a publication of this kind, as is done in Scigliano's book.) These editing defects should not, however, detract the reader from the generally sound substance of both of these works.

Addressing themselves mainly to Americans, Fall and Scigliano devote a great part of their works to the past American involvement in Viet-Nam and to its future course. They remind the reader that the United States has in various ways been involved in Viet-Nam since 1940, and especially since the Dulles-Eisenhower's commitments first to help the all-but-defeated French before 1954 and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime thereafter. Yet U.S. dealings withthe Vietnamese and the French have been so confused and improvised that a network of mutual distrust now envelop all three governments. For both the U.S. and South Viet-Nam, the lack of a concerted overall policy except for a sterile anti-communist negativism has had the effect of a self-fulfilling delusion. Thus for example, the 1956–1962 "sink-or-swim-with-Diem" line had resulted in preventing the consolidation of any serious alternative to the Diem regime besides the Communist-led National Liberation Front which directed the anti-Saigon guerilla war. Fall emphasizes the fact that for too long the U.S. has engaged in "wildly wishful thinking" and indulged in "illusion[s] of victory" which were reinforced at dependable intervals by high-ranking executive, military, and Congressional spokesmen. For both authors, the U.S. has also for too long refused to recognized the nationalistic-revolutionary character of the anti-Saigon insurgents. At any rate, these were fast capturing peasant support, beginning at least as early as 1958, while the U.S.-backed Diem regime was shrinking steadily from contacts—except propped-up ones—with the people. Both Washington and Saigon were above all preoccupied with "security," unfortunately defined in almost exclusively negative, static, and military terms. Fall's description of the routinized outmaneuverings of Washington by Saigon (p. 270) is amusingly—or rather pathetically—apt. For both authors, South Viet-Nam appears to be the classic case of "a puppet who pulls the strings" (Scigliano, p. 216), a situation most frustrating to a superpower.

Much more solid substance is contained in these books than could possibly be reviewed in an article of this length. These works are to be recommended for those who seriously desire *some* in-depth understanding of the Vietnamese problem. It is also recommended that they be read with self-restraint, for not only the reality they relate is often unpleasant, but also because Viet-Nam has been and continues to be a puzzle of bewildering complexity. And while there appeas to be no easy solution offered in these honestly written books, their contribution has been indeed substantial toward a better comprehension of the current situation.—PHAN THIEN CHAU, *University of Denver.*

The Court of European Communities: New Dimensions in International Adjudication. BY WERNER FELD. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. viii, 127. Guilders 13.50. $3.75.)

The Court of European Communities, replacing the Court of the Coal and Steel Community, is an institution novel in its scope and setting. Although the Court has been in existence for a relatively short period of time, it has achieved a stature and status in its work for the Common Market to cause the writer of this book to say, "If the United States of Europe should become a reality in the future, it is highly probable that the Court of Justice of the European Communities, now sitting in Luxembourg, will be transformed into the supreme court of the new federation" (p. vii). He thinks the Court has achieved this status because it handles conflicts both in the economic and in the political fields, and it has "developed a body of 'European' case law which, in time, is likely to have favorable implications for the eventual unification of Europe" (p. vii). The impact of the decisions of the Court has been felt and has been reflected in the public policy of the members of the Community.

The author makes no claim that his treatise is a legal study, in the narrow sense, but he does examine the legal problems which the Court of necessity must decide. He says, "These problems are not analyzed and evaluated in depth; rather emphasis is placed on the economic and political implications which some of these problems have within the context of the struggle for a new Europe" (p. 3). He does describe, however, at some length and in depth the professional background and qualifications of the judges, the organization, procedure, and jurisdiction of the Court, and the factors and forces which affect the decisions of the Court.

The Court is one unit of the over-all governmental structure. There is an executive composed of four bodies: the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the EEC, the Commission of

Euratom, and the Council of Ministers. The legislature is the European Parliament composed of 142 delegates appointed by the legislatures of the six Members. "The Parliament is not authorized to legislate nor does it have full budgetary control" (p. 9). The structure of the Court is defined in the provisions of the treaty between its members (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). It is composed of seven judges chosen by the six Member States for a period of six years, with election on a staggered basis. Only nationals of the Members are eligible to serve on the Court. One special feature of the Court is that its judges may be removed by the other judges if "in the unanimous opinion of the other members of the Court, they no longer fulfill the required conditions or meet the obligations of office" (p. 15). Access to the Court may be had by the Member States (the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such cases and the treaty provides a Member State may not use the International Court of Justice in disputes under the treaty), by the major organs of the Community, by private persons and by private enterprises, and by the Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank. A unique feature of jurisdiction is that the Court itself may be sued in civil service matters. The Court finds its sources of law from: the Treaties between the Members, the acts and regulations of the institutions of the Community, municipal laws, and the Court's own jurisprudence. International law has played a minor role as a source of law before the Court.

In numerous instances the author compares and contrasts the work and function of this Court with that of the Supreme Court of the United States. A more important and apt comparison, however, is made with the success and effectiveness of this Court and the Central American Court of Justice. Although the latter Court had compulsory jurisdiction over cases between private persons and between states, it handled only 10 cases during the ten years of its existence, 1908 to 1918. "In contrast to the performance of the Central American Court, the Court of European Communities rendered during the first eleven years of its existence—specifically up to February 18, 1964—113 decisions and opinions and over 90 cases were pending on that date" (p. 106). The major litigations came from private persons, although a number of cases came from Member States, and a few came from organs of the Communities.

This book deserves careful reading and study by laymen and by students interested in the field of jurisprudence. It shows careful and intensive research on the part of the author. He not only describes what the Court is now, but he shows, from a realistic viewpoint, what the court *might* become. It is a work tinged with a high degree of imagination.—JAMES A. GATHINGS, *Bucknell University*.

The Changing Structure of International Law. BY WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xvi, 410. $8.75.)

Many books in this century dealt with change in international law. The present volume, from the learned and prolific pen of Columbia's professorial Director of International Legal Research, belongs to those which primarily describe rather than urge the development which the law has taken or ought to undergo. Using the sociological approach made popular in this country's legal writings by Roscoe Pound, the author first analyzes the profound horizontal and vertical changes which the last generation has seen in the structure and scope of international relations, their effect upon helpless individuals and sovereign states, and the conflicts of power, of interests, and of values or the co-operation generated by common or diverse objectives. Conflict and co-operation, he argues, demand and gave rise to two types of international law: the traditional "diplomatic" international law of co-ordination confirming sovereignty and aiming at the preservation of the status quo and the peaceful coexistence of states, and a new, modern, or progressive international law of co-operation, welfare, or reciprocity hostile to sovereignty and concerned with economic, social and cultural matters. Both of these laws move on a regional or universal, a transnational, supranational, or international level of structure, scope, and intensity. The author next inquires into the reality and validity, the sanctions and consensual basis, of international law, the principles and processes of procuring change in it, and the new fields—tentatively described as international constitutional, administrative, labor, criminal, commercial (including economic development), corporation, anti-trust and tax law—added by these methods to international welfare or co-operation law. Change, while leaving the state as the main, the only full, the only law-making subject of international law and the basic unit of international society, has also brought the recognition of international organizations, private corporations, and individuals as more or less limited, even only ad hoc, subjects of this law. Further, the forces behind change have created a complex pattern of international status quo or security and progressive or welfare organizations. These too move on a regional or universal level and have more or less intensive functions, powers, organization, and success depending on the conflict or harmony of the institutionalized human purposes. Change also poses the problem of the actual or potential universality of international law in the face of the political, economic, and ideological diversity of the world. On this we read that diversity leaves unaffected the conditions of coexistence of differing sovereign states, thus permitting a universal international law of coexistence, but that divergence restricts the international law of co-operation to homogeneous value groups. A summary and conclusions close the volume. There is a list of writings cited and an index.

The great merit of this book lies not so much in its originality as in its thorough, systematic, and readable survey of the more recent literature on the new trends in international law and organization and in its attempt to analyze these changes in their importance and interdependence. While primarily descriptive and analytical, the book, however, also provides intellectual stimulation. It bristles with suggestions for improvement or solutions of the problems encountered. Throughout discussion is objective and balanced even if sympathies on the side of law and order vs. conflict and anachronistic sovereignty orientate, as they always do, judgment regarding improvement and solution and construction regarding trends. The volume also tenders food to critics. Sometimes, breadth seems achieved at the expense of depth and historical accuracy. The division of international law and organization into coexistence and co-operation institutions, the claim regarding new fields of this law, and the arguments concerning its theoretical foundations, its sanction, sources, and subjects will not remain unquestioned. Some might criticize a few repetitious statements, a few errors of fact, a few logical contradictions, a few printer's misspellings and botched sentences, a reader's deficiencies in compiling the list of writings and the index, the author's English way of spelling. Few will, however, deny on any of these grounds the merits and usefulness of the book. It still makes very meaty, very interesting, very fluent, often eloquent, and always learned essential reading for the political scientist interested in or teaching international relations, organization and law.—GEORGE MANNER, *University of Illinois.*

In Pursuit of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations. BY RICHARD N. GARDNER. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 263. $4.95.)

The basic theme permeating this analysis was expressed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who wrote the Introduction: "... the most powerful nation in the world is less able to employ its power alone, in pursuit of national ends, than at any previous point in history." Building upon and elaborating this theme, Richard N. Gardner—who has been intimately involved in American foreign policy in the United Nations since 1961—discusses the evolution and future of the UN, as it relates to the fulfillment of the diplomatic goals of the United States.

Although the author does not say so, it seems clear that his appraisal is designed for the general public, rather than for the informed student. It appears to be aimed specifically at those groups who are apprehensive, dubious or otherwise uncertain about the United Nations. And this group in turn is composed of two antithetical schools of thought: those who regard the United Nations as an instrument inimical to, and potentially destructive of, America's global interests; and those who feel that the United Nations (owing largely to the failure of American leadership) has not reached the standards set in 1945 or measured up to its true potential.

It should occasion no surprise that Mr. Gardner belongs to neither school. If he freely admits the UN's limitations, he also is impressed with its accomplishments; and if he believes the organization has considerable potential for future growth, he is no less aware that Utopian expectations may impair its future as certainly as undisguised opposition. The author seems to be telling the reader something like this: "Many valid criticisms can be, and have been, made about the United Nations. Throughout the entire range of its activities—from involvement in the Congo, to disarmament proceedings, to the operation of UNESCO—there is room for much improvement. No one understands this fact better than American officials. Yet they are also aware—more aware than most members of the public—of the UN's achievements, of its expanding influence on the global scene, and of its capacity for continued growth. In the vast preponderance of cases, it is in the interest of the United States both to support the United Nations and to lend its influence to efforts directed at enhancing its powers."

In short, the author is endeavoring to dispel two conflicting myths: the idea that the UN is infringing upon national sovereignty—or the myth of UN usurpation; and the idea that it has no future—or the myth of UN impotency.

Mr. Gardner's qualifications for this assignment are impeccable. On the basis of first-hand experience at the UN, he obviously has command of his subject, familiarity with relevant documentary and secondary materials, and a perceptive grasp of the intricacies of the issues with which the UN is concerned. Most of the time, he is able to communicate his ideas smoothly, lucidly, and readably.

Yet occasionally his volume is also tedious; written like a guidebook describing the scope of UN activities; and content to reiterate official policy statements. In terms of space devoted to various aspects of his subject, the author suggests that the function of the United Nations as a peace-keeping agency is of equal importance with the achievement of international agreements on outer space; both topics receive approximately the same coverage. By the same standard, the UN "decade of development" is on a par with the Soviet Union's role in the organization. Put differently, out of a total of 263 pages, well over half is devoted to the non-political aspects of the UN's work.

Intrinsically, of course, there is nothing wrong with this division. In practice, however, it means that sometimes the author's discussion of bedrock political problems confronting the UN—and causing deep anxiety among some groups in American society—boils down to little more than assurances that all is well for American interests; the description of the operations of the International Monetary Fund, on the other hand, reaches a complexity of treatment fully understandable by, and of interest to, only expert economists.

In most respects, however, Mr. Gardner has written an informative, helpful, and provocative book which ought to contribute significantly to raising the level of American enlightenment about the United Nations.—CECIL V. CRABB, JR., *Vassar College.*

Law and Politics of the Danube. BY STEPHEN GOROVE. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xiv, 171. $5.80.)

In his introduction to Gorove's book Hans Kohn regrets that more attention has not been paid to the role of the Danube in international relations and law in recent years. Unfortunately this study does not fill the need.

More than half of the study is devoted to Soviet-American relations. While those relations have greatly influenced the status of the Danube after World War II they have also been covered in many books. Mr. Gorove adds very little that has not been known before and has consulted few original sources. The Danube is occasionally out of focus. When its problems reemerge clearly one looks in vain for an analysis in depth. The subtitle of the book is "An Interdisciplinary Study." One wonders what approach the author believes he has employed other than a somewhat traditional historical one?

The author does provide an adequate, though extremely brief (pp. 22–36), historical survey of the status of the Danube up to World War II. The main part (pp. 67–132) covers the 3 post-World War II years which culminated in the 1948 Belgrade Convention. It is in this section that the author rehashes alleged American policy failures in not preventing the consolidation by the Soviet Union of its control over Eastern Europe. While the author occasionally admits that power relationships were at the root of Soviet diplomatic successes, he cannot refrain from suggesting that the United States was bested in Eastern Europe because of our inability to recognize the nature of the Soviet challenge. The author does not support his allegations with any new documentary evidence.

While the last chapter (pp. 133–156) purports to bring the account up to 1962 it does this only in the most superficial manner by relating the announced accomplishments of the periodic meetings of the New Danube Commission. The relevant activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) are referred to briefly in a footnote. The exciting history of the stresses and strains of the Eastern European satellites (aside from Tito's defection) is not even mentioned.

It would have been useful if some of the treaties and agreements regulating the Danube had been reproduced in an appendix. The bibliography is extremely brief, however the footnotes are useful guides for further research.—CURT F. BECK, *University of Connecticut.*

The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions. BY KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 300. $7.50.)

This volume is a chronology of the formal bodies which have been created in Eastern Europe primarily during the last decade in the hope of giving the so-called socialist commonwealth an institutional and legal basis. The author has reviewed the charters, agreements and communiques of the various bodies and given them a legal interpretation. The difficulty in using official Communist commentaries without weighing and interpreting them in the light of the overall political picture and other evidence available is that it is impossible to separate fact from fiction. Furthermore, the official works do not permit a penetrating analysis of even the legal questions to which the communists seem to want to give maximum publicity. For example, the author points out that Eastern European states consider the pattern of their trade relations to be unique because of its planned and unexploitive character and because governments are the sole trading partner under socialism. But except for a few superficial points of difference as shown in the basic agreements the author is unable to show how this special relationship has worked in practice, developed over the years, and how disputes in fact are resolved under the system.

From this survey of the formal relations among the members of the Soviet bloc the reader is struck by how undeveloped the institutions are compared to the West and how the bloc has borrowed extensively from its neighbors. Apparently this was done not only to retaliate against Western integration and defense moves as in the case of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, but in the hope of copying the success of Western integration and economic development. Another incongruity of these formal institutions is that they have developed only as the solidarity of the Soviet bloc manifested so absolutely during the Stalin era is falling apart. Apparently the various forms of economic cooperation were conceived to replace the political and military coercion of the earlier period but it is questionable whether they can reverse the disentegration. Unfortunately the author does not deal with these questions. The volume, however, is a useful tabulation of the multilateral economic and military agreements within the Soviet bloc as they have developed thus far.—David T. Cattell, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Scientific Revolution and World Politics. By Caryl P. Haskins. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 115. $3.50.)

The President of the Carnegie Institution is a research biologist of wide-angled perspective, at home in both science affairs and foreign affairs. In *The Scientific Revolution and World Politics* he discusses issues in which the two kinds of affairs intersect. It is not the dramatic scientific developments of the atomic age to which Caryl Haskins addresses himself in this slender volume of essays; *the* scientific revolution is for him the revolution in the search for truth which has flourished in Europe and the Europeanized world since the time of Isaac Newton. The world politics of which he writes is, on the other hand, defined narrowly; he is concerned with contemporary issues of American foreign policy as they affect or are affected by the uneven and unevenly growing acceptance of scientific ways of thinking in various parts of the world. One finds in this book no clarion call for the mobilization of American and "free World" science to "win" the cold war or to defeat the Soviet opponent in actual hostilities. Success in the Apollo Project will do little, he suggests, to solve problems which are his most immediate concern, those connected with the spread to the non-Western world of the West's scientific revolution.

Mr. Haskins is not insensitive to the Soviet threat and quotes approvingly a reference to the Soviet state as "the scavenger of transition." If the adoption of new scientific ways of thinking loosens some of the ties that hold traditional societies together, it offers at the same time a new basis for binding them back together; it is for this "extremely vulnerable" transition period that the United States choices must be most carefully made.

Mr. Haskins differentiates the truly new nations in which, as one West African educator put it, the need is not for "prestige projects but the answers to our own witch doctors" from the intermediate nations whose educated élites already have some experience of the scientific revolution but have as yet no autonomous scientific tradition. In the new nations the problem is the absolute scarcity of men attuned to the modern world's scientific "style"; in such "intermediate" nations as Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey available scientific talent is not yet organized and deployed to serve such nations effectively.

So far as Western Europe is concerned, Caryl Haskins is content to preach the gospel of Jean Monnet. The United States followed Europe's lead in basic science down to the Second World War; and it has since forged ahead, he thinks, largely because of the absence of intra-continental barriers to the free flow of ideas and men. As for the Soviet Union his estimate is guardedly optimistic; the scientists and technologists may be a liberalizing element, and the Soviet monolith may not be able to sustain scientific advance as evenly and on as broad a front as the pluralistic American system. The Soviet Union, however, in contrast with China, has been able to mount its scientific effort on the basis of a Western scientific tradition that antedates the Soviet regime.

It is no criticism of *The Scientific Revolution and World Politics* that it provides no answers to questions which its author does not ask, e.g.: How is the spread of the scientific revolution likely to affect the relative position of the powers in the coming decades? What are the political consequences of unequal rates of scientific change among various states and groups of states? Is the gap in scientific and technological achievement between the leading states and the others likely to widen or narrow? What may be the consequences for world politics of varying degrees of mobilization of science in the interest of national security? With arms control agreements to what extent would scientists be liberated to work on non-military problems and with what consequences? How is state behavior affected by the incorporation of scientists into the highest levels of national decision-making? Etc., etc.

What Caryl Haskins does do is to argue in a reasoned and humane way for a number of policy-relevant propositions such as the following. Zones of free inquiry need to be wider than the territory of most existing states, and especially some of the new states. The new states especially need 'cross-national co-operative training centers." The most relevant technologies for the new nations are not necessarily nuclear. The intermediate nations can be shown how to use the scientists they now have with much greater effectiveness. Scientists of North America and Western Europe need to organize advisory groups to offer policy counsel to the scientists of less advanced nations. Above all, the gains in winning races to the moon and in being first in other prestige projects are ephemeral as compared with the gains to be derived from ministering to the needs of nations on the threshold of the scientific revolution.—William T. R. Fox, *Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.*

International Stability. Edited by Dale J. Hekhuis, Charles G. McClintock and Arthur L. Burns. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii, 296. $6.00.)

This anthology grew out of a study project originally undertaken by the author-editors for General Electric's Technical Military Planning Operation (TEMPO), "exploring the military, economic, and political nature of the future international environment and identifying possible alternative strategies for coping with various contingencies." Identifying it as a pragmatic approach, the small volume draws together a number of items that have been published elsewhere, woven around the central theme "International Stability" (or rather, the lack of it) and arranged according to the unsolved problems in underdeveloped areas, mutual deterrence, disarmament-arms control and international organization.

Robert C. Tucker joins the primary authors in a collegial introduction which asserts that the two overriding realities of our day are the "thermonuclear balance of terror" and the "social revolutions in the underdeveloped areas of the world." *Stability* is defined to assume constant change within and among the constituent elements of world society, but within a *system* that has the propensity to preserve its members "against destruction or elimination, not merely by resisting or precluding change, but by adjusting to it through rearrangement." The succeeding essays strive to identify threats to stability in the system and to suggest strategies and specific measures for promoting international order.

Lucian Pye's piece on underdeveloped areas (Ch. 3) is a good analysis of the slowly evolving realization in the United States public that the end of colonialism, even with technical and financial aid, was not an unmixed blessing. Indeed, it has added new challenges to our national security wholly unrelated to the Communist threat. The dimensions examined are (1) strain on the existing nation-state system, (2) strain between advanced and developing states, (3) rivalries among developing states and (4) uncertain controls within themselves. Pye forecasts growing tension through 1975.

Paul Rosenstein-Rodan joined Hekhuis in canvassing the most promising programs for alleviating instability in underdeveloped areas. Six suggestions in the technical assistance field seem to be the brightest prospects, but here it is noted the U.S. is particularly weak. Among 26 "Free World Nations" offering on-the-job training exchange programs the United States ranks 18th. Beyond this distinctly pragmatic method, the authors displayed a pronounced confidence in the efficacy of research itself.

Those familiar with the writing of Robert Osgood and Tom Schelling will already have seen their worthwhile contributions on nuclear deterrence and arms control. Arthur Burns' look at the Nth Country problem, however, is novel. He assumes a 4-power world in 1970—the USA, USSR, Europe and Communist China; or, alternatively, a bi-polar world with other blocs forced into dependence on the now-familiar East-West goliaths. While exploring rather thoroughly numerous alternatives, the assumptions and variables become so profuse as to produce a model containing too many "ifs" to be even mildly reassuring that stability is more than an accidental possibility. Sample reservation: "The Russians . . . might not share (in its entirety) the West's conception of rational behavior" (p. 129).

A common pattern throughout the book, both useful and disjunctive at times, is the opening of chapters with a set of hypotheses. This technique, so essential to scientific precision, often leads the student of politics into the employment of unstated assumptions or, a worse fault, the construction of a model that may have little recognizable similarity to reality. In Chapter 7, McClintock and Hekhuis excellently evaluate the merits of an independent European deterrent based on the assumptions that (1) current NATO deterrent strategy based on U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability is inadequate and inappropriate for strategic defense of Europe, and (2) formation of a European Community organization with independent strategic force is both desirable and feasible. However, one senses that the solution is dependent on the unstated assumption that historic nationalistic drives and rivalries that appear to defy logic will somehow succumb to this superior logical analysis.

Burns is somewhat more candid in this regard when in his chapter on "Problems of Disarmament" he opens by citing the argument that "the fortunate accident of a stable deterrent system or 'balance of terror' makes disarmament undesirable," and even if desirable currently impossible; but amid the evaluation of evidence observes, "It may turn out there is no way of arriving at stable disarmament. But if so, neither is there a substitute for it." As much as anything in the book, this is an admission that the facts with which we work are as unstable as they are alarmingly real.

Taken as a whole, the collection of writing that makes up this book would be most useful to the people least likely to read it—those who are inclined to oversimplify issues and plunge into easy solutions. The concluding chapter (U.N. as Peace-

Preserving Force) is characteristic. In analyzing problems and contingencies the work is excellent. In providing solutions, or even fruitful methods for identifying solutions, there is apt to be more frustration than illumination. Although alluded to, none of the co-authors of this book ever comes to grip with the common element of destabilizing force that permeates most of their actual and assumed situations—the heterogeneity of value systems and inability to communicate among ideologies and cultures. For me, at least, there is something very incomplete about discussions of international stability in terms of "thermonuclear deterrence" in an age in which the greater number of world troublespots are inhabited by people who could not care less—even if they understood its significance.—James A. Riedel, *State University of New York, Graduate School of Public Affairs.*

The European Community and Its Role in the World. By Max Kohnstamm. (Columbia, Mo.: The University of Missouri Press, 1964. Pp. 82. $2.50.)

This slender book by Max Kohnstamm (former member of the Dutch Foreign Service, High Authority of E.C.S.C., and now Vice President of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe) constituted the John Findley Green Foundation lectures at Westminster College in March 1963, in which the author examined the philosophy behind the European Community, its relationship with Britain and the United States, and its prospects for the future. Because of events in 1963—especially the test ban treaty and the death of President Kennedy—Kohnstamm added an epilogue in January 1964, but the story is still anticlimactic, though he believes that the British entry has been only delayed.

Kohnstamm's basic assumption is that Europe can become a force for peace only if it is federalized. War had been a traditional necessity, to right the balance when disturbed, but when both economics and politics became aspects of nationalism, the law of the jungle applied to both. Only after World War II was it evident that economic nationalism and war were so catastrophic that the old system was unable to provide civilization with a framework in which it could continue. A common interest had to be created between peoples whose interests had heretofore been divided by national boundaries. "A common interest leads to a common view." The Coal and Steel Community was an appropriate beginning, and its institutions permit Community decisions, the essence of the new system.

In 1945 Britain reverted to its traditional role of being both in and out of Europe at the same time. Standing at the center of a group of interconnecting circles and not belonging completely to any one of them, Britain refused to join the Coal and Steel Community, EDC, and at first the Common Market. Although the United States had also withdrawn from Europe after World War I, it understood in 1945 that this could happen again only by accepting Soviet domination of Europe. The United States could escape from Europe only by helping Europe to unite, which she did, until Europe is now no longer a protege but a partner of America. Given this new situation, Britain moved to join the European Community.

Kohnstamm says that most of the British-Community problems were soluble, and were largely solved during the negotiations. The fundamental difficulty resulted from a French failure to recognize that the Community is a process and not a new bloc or a new Power. While trying to mold the Community into a 19th century coalition, France acted contrary to the spirit of the Community, which is that of common action collectively decided upon. The free nations will unite only if they can establish the necessary collective mechanisms. It is a clear choice: states are condemned to remain in the jungle or they must build the institutions which permit collective action. They must choose between the 19th century and the 20th century.

Many Council decisions now requiring unanimity can be taken, after 1965, by majority decision. But the parliamentary influence within the Community's institutions must be strengthened. The procedure for nominating the Commission must be revised to give citizens a direct influence. A delegation of foreign policy and defense powers must be made, though unity here can be reached only gradually. The Community and America must be interdependent.

Little in this book is new. The student of contemporary affairs will not need to tarry long. The book provides, rather, a general knowledge of the European Community, told in a clear fashion that can be understood by the general public which, after all, is the type of audience for which it was intended.—Donald G. Bishop, *Syracuse University.*

The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Forces. By John C. Ries. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. Pp. xviii, 228. $6.50.)

This provocative book by a member of the Department of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy is an account of the continuing problems of armed services unification and defense organization. Essentially it is a thoughtful and spirited attack upon the "myth" that control can be established through centralization.

By analyzing the response to the lessons of the second World War, the debates leading to the National Security Act of 1947 and to amendments to the Act of 1949, and to the defense reorganizations of 1953 and 1958, Ries contends that "the folklore of organizational efficiency and control" have largely been unsuccessful. According to this folklore, efficiency and control are achieved by "the all powerful executive who sits at the apex of a tightly organized, tightly run organizational pyramid—the man who makes all decisions, the man who runs things from the top down." As a matter of fact, however, the efforts of defense reformers to create such a structure have brought about a vast, centralized bureaucracy that is beyond control.

The concept of control through centralization of authority is derived from the principle of hierarchical organization inherited from the United States Army. This principle, however, is based upon assumptions that are disproved by contemporary studies in organizational behavior. As the structure becomes larger, the executive at the top becomes increasingly removed from the operations he seeks to control. He is reduced to endorsing proposals from his subordinates, and he retains little real influence other than indicating general approval.

The prototype of Ries' ideal organizational model is found in the Operations Division of the World War II War Department. In this central command post, no attempt was made to separate policy and administrative functions. The flow of information and decisions was both upward and downward. By avoiding all operational and support responsibilities, OPD maintained control by dealing only with the broadest policy guidelines and by providing a link between goals and the instrumentalities to achieve these goals. It served as an agency by which the operators were brought into the policy process as a part of a two way continuum.

It is Ries' conviction that means and ends cannot be separated. The statesman's task does not end with a declaration of goals and the soldier's task is more than providing the means in terms of men, ships and planes. Each task shades off into the other. Thus both the statesman and the soldier must participate in policy-making. This being the case, control of defense organization is more a matter of political leadership than of administrative authority. Successive secretaries of defense have lost control when they have failed to recognize that the authority of the office depends not upon the degree of uniformity imposed upon the defense organization, but upon the agreement that can be developed among the various parties who, because of expertise, knowledge and responsibility, participate in the ends-means adjustment of policy-making. Ultimately the authority of the secretary depends upon skill in negotiation and ability to persuade others to accept a course of action by convincing them that it is in their interest to do so.

Although Ries retraces much of the ground covered by Hammong, Kintner, Schilling, Stanley and other students of defense organization, he brings to this material a fresh analysis derived from his critical use of recent contributions to the theory of organizational behavior. He is successful in this effort. Yet apart from conclusions developed in his analysis of experience between 1942 and 1958, he does not attempt to set forth recommendations for action. While recognizing that control of defense policy and organization depends more upon executive behavior than upon organizational structure, he does offer some general observations on administrative decentralization. Ries suggests only in bare outline how such decentralization might be achieved. He concludes with an almost wistful hope that Congress is the most likely source of initiative in this direction. Although not within the scope of this book, one wishes that Ries had applied his insights to the development of recommendations in the context of the administration of the Department of Defense by Secretary McNamara.—JOHN W. MASLAND, *Dartmouth College.*

Problems of the Trusteeship System. Travaux de Droit, D'Economie de Sociologie et de Sciences Politiques, No. 24. BY GEORGE THULLEN. (Geneva, Librairie Droz, 1964.)

There are at least two good reasons why a scholar might rework a well plowed field. He may, on the one hand, uncover new data leading to a more complete or different description of a subject. Or, he might approach the same data with a new perspective, reorganizing the subject around different concepts. Professor Morgenthau's treatment of international politics, organized around the concept of power, comes to mind as an example of the latter.

The subtitle of George Thullen's, *Problems of the Trusteeship System*, "A Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations," offers the promise to treat in a new way a—by now—old subject. And, indeed, in his Introduction, while nodding politely in the direction of other works on trusteeship, he laments their failure to deal with "the political climate shaping the decisions taken during the different post-war phases" (p. 13). Unfortunately, the introductory promise is largely unfulfilled in the body of the work.

The book is divided into three distinct parts. Part I amounts to an unexceptional description of the formation of the trusteeship system, which adds nothing to the prior literature on the subject. Part II examines some of the procedural and substantive issues encountered by the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly, while Part

III is a case study of the Togoland issue, which is a well documented repetition and extension of James Coleman's work on the subject.[1]

The most interesting chapter (V) in the book is to be found in Part II. Here the author attempts to relate developments in the trusteeship system to the changing international environment, as well as noting the contributions of members of the Secretariat to the working of the system. He indicates the connection, for example, between the shift in Soviet tactics after Stalin's death and the "package deal" of 1955, which expanded United Nations membership considerably, with the growing acceleration of anti-colonial sentiment in the General Assembly. These relationships are rather sketchily traced, however, and what might have been the basis of an interesting work on the politics of trusteeship is but a ten page essay of intriguing speculation.

The basic difficulty of the book, given its stated purpose, is that the author seems to be unclear about just what he means by politics. If one attempts a study of "political behavior," surely it ought to be clear to the reader just what is meant by that term. This is not to argue that the writer is obligated to survey completely the ever increasing mass of literature concerning concept and method in political science. But it is to assert that it is incumbent on him to make clear just what *he* means by "politics." The difficulties arising from a failure to do this are apparent throughout the book, especially in those parts which attempt to describe political behavior in the trusteeship system.

Consider the following paragraph concerning the question of the Trusteeship Council's Annual Report to the General Assembly:

> In essence, this long-winded dispute over the layout of the Council's report merely underlined a tendency to politicize issues brought before the Trusteeship Council, resulting from balanced membership of increasingly hostile groups and government [sic] rather than expert representation. Continuing insistence by nonadministering members that equal prominence be given majority and minority, administering and non-administering views grew out of this basic mistrust. If information supplied by administering powers were assumed to be a misrepresentation of facts, then naturally the only protection would lie in structuring the report to the advantage of the opposing group by giving equal weight to factual corrections—or counterpropaganda. Although all members claimed they were interested primarily in protecting the interests of trust territory inhabitants, this jockeying for position reflected the importance of Council members' own prestige considerations rather than of the search for a mutually acceptable objectivity. (p. 70.)

If this means anything it means: (1) politics involves conflict (a proposition to which we may all readily subscribe); but (2) something called "mutually acceptable objectivity" is a possible, indeed desireable, substitute for politics. This, to make a wild understatement, is not a widely held view among contemporary students of political behavior, whatever differences they may have.

In emphasizing the negative attributes of the book, I do not mean to imply that there is not considerable merit in it, especially in terms of thoroughness of description. But in any work purporting to contain political analysis, it is critical—particularly in the field of international organization—that the author go somewhat further than writing in terms of "politicizing" issues through conflict of policy, and "depoliticizing" them through "mutually acceptable objectivity." The point is too important for the study of international organization to pass unremarked.

—James N. Murray, *University of Iowa.*

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[1] James S. Coleman, "Togoland," *International Conciliation*, No. 509 (September, 1956), pp. 1–91.

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NEWS AND NOTES

1965 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1965–66

The 1965 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8–11 at the Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D. C. Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Brookings Institution, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina, Chairman; Bernard C. Cohen, University of Wisconsin; Alfred Diamant, Haverford College; Robert Horn, Stanford University; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; and Ruth Weintraub, Hunter College) will propose the following officers for 1965–66:

President Elect: Robert A. Dahl, Yale University
Vice Presidents: Manning J. Dauer, University of Florida
William T. R. Fox, Columbia University
Rupert Emerson, Harvard University
Secretary: John H. Kautsky, Washington University, St. Louis
Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D. C.

Members of the Council for two years:

James C. Davies, University of Oregon
Alex N. Dragnich, Vanderbilt University
Heinz Eulau, Stanford University
Samuel Hendel, City College of New York
Wallace Mendelson, University of Texas
Laurence I. Radway, Dartmouth College
William H. Riker, University of Rochester
Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1966 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1966 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in New York City at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, September 6–10. Early appointment of the Program Committee for the meeting makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as convenient, and prior to October, 1965, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Members of the Committee are:

Chairman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
American Government—Donald Matthews, University of North Carolina
Civil Order and Violence—Guy Pauker, Rand Corporation
Comparative Politics: Developed Systems—Lewis Edinger, Washington University, St. Louis
Comparative Politics: Developing Systems—Myron Weiner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Comparative Politics: Communist Systems—A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University
Data Bases for Political Science—Hayward Alker, Yale University
International Relations—James Rosenau, Douglass College, Rutgers University
Judicial Processes—Yosele Rogat, Stanford University
Operations Analysis in Government—James March, University of California, Irvine
Political Modernization in the U. S.—Norton Long, Brandeis University
Political Processes—Dwaine Marvick, University of California, Los Angeles
Political Psychology—Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley
Political Theory—David Spitz, Ohio State University
Public Administration—Herbert Kaufman, Yale University
State and Local Government—James Wilson, Harvard University
Strategic Studies—Albert Wohlstetter, University of Chicago

The Program Committee invites younger members of the Association to submit papers for consideration to the appropriate section chairman listed above. This procedure replaces separately organized selected-paper or volunteer-paper panels but is designed to afford the same opportunity. To be considered, papers should be submitted no later than December 1, 1965.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

Congressional Study Project.—In a statement appearing in the *Congressional Record* of May 21, Sen. Carl Hayden of Arizona described progress of the Association's Study of Congress project. The text of his comments follows:

> Mr. President, a good many Members of Congress participated in the discussions that led to establishment by the American Political Science Association of its comprehensive Study of Congress. Supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, this project today is focusing the attention of more than 16 persons on various aspects of congressional organization and operations. The purpose of the study is to contribute to informed public discussion of the problems of Congressional reorganization—a timely thing, considering the current hearings by the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, established under S. Con. Res. 2.
>
> As the report to the Senate said, "During the past several years there has developed an ever-increasing conviction among Members of Congress, reinforced by many expressions of opinion from the public at large, that a study and review of the present congressional machinery is a real necessity if Congress is to continue to be an effective co-equal partner in our tripartite system of government."
>
> In coming to this conclusion, it was necessary that those within Congress communicate in a meaningful way with their constituents who share many viewpoints. And in turn, those in the outside community who wish to contribute to any changes must help to develop a better understanding of the unique qualities of this institution in order to successfully interpret it. As an outstanding journalist and student of Congress in a recent speech put it,
>
>> "The members of Congress have valid cause for reacting with suspicion to much of the intellectual community for a latent hostility toward Congress permeates the thinking of many leaders of public opinion outside Congress. It is evident in the books of political scientists, in newspaper editorials, and even in the witticisms of our humorists. It is most evident of all in many of the reforms of Congress that are suggested. Too often, proposed reforms smack of an obvious intent to reduce Congress from its status as a separate and independent branch of the federal government."
>
> This does not seem to be the case with the Study of Congress. Its initiation and organization was the product of a cooperative effort between Members of both Houses on both sides of the aisle working with the Association's executive director, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, and his associate, Donald G. Tacheron.
>
> In announcing the Study, which is being carried out under the direction of Ralph K. Huitt of the University of Wisconsin, Kirkpatrick said:
>
>> "The vitality of legislative bodies is essential to the preservation of individual freedom, to democracy and to the maintenance of social and economic viability. Before considering drastic changes in Congress—an institution which has served this nation very well—we must first clarify various assumptions regarding the role of Congress in our system, identifying and analyzing major problems of Congressional operation and explaining the character and probable consequences of realistic alternatives for structural or procedural change."
>
> Mr. President, I feel that these are words of wise counsel in our present deliberations, and I want to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of my colleagues the names and academic affiliations of the scholars who are engaged in this important undertaking, so that Members who are interested will find it convenient to contact them for their views and assistance:
>
> Milton C. Cummings, The Brookings Institution
> Richard F. Fenno, University of Rochester
> Lewis A. Froman, Jr., University of California at Irvine
> Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona
> John F. Manley, Syracuse University
> Roy E. Moor, George Washington University
> Kenneth G. Olson, formerly at Smith College, and now a consultant
> David M. Olson, University of Texas
> Samuel C. Patterson, State University of Iowa
> Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University
> Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University
> Randall B. Ripley, The Bookings Institution
> Leroy N. Rieselbach, State University of Iowa
> James A. Robinson, Ohio State University
> John S. Saloma, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
> Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University

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Committee Staff Assignment.—A political scientist, Nicholas A. Masters, of Pennsylvania State University, is participating directly in the activities of the Joint Committee on Organization of Congress. Masters' appointment as staff research consultant was announced April 14 by Sen. A. S. Mike Monroney (D., Okla.) and Rep. Ray J. Madden (D., Ind), co-chairmen of the committee. A former research fellow in Sen. Philip A. Hart's office, Masters has been granted temporary leave by the university for the duration of the Congressional assignment.

Congressional Staff Fellowship Program.—The Association on May 6 announced approval of grants totaling $99,000 for study and research projects planned by nine Congressional Staff members. The awards were made under the Association's Congressional Staff Fellowship Program, designed to encourage the further development of a permanent and highly professional staff system in Congress. Winners were selected by a bi-partisan Advisory Committee, composed of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Senators Thomas Kuchel and Russell

Long; Representatives Leslie Arends and Hale Boggs; and Donald Herzberg, director, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.

Competition for the awards, made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation, was open to all professional House and Senate office and committee staff employees. Winners undertake study and research projects related to their professional responsibilities and goals at the college or university of their choice. The awards carry a stipend of up to $14,000 for a full year and up to $8,000 for six months of study. The 1965–66 Congressional Staff Fellows are:

Samuel J. Archibald, staff director, House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee
Richard L. Bowen, Legislative Assistant, Senator Karl E. Mundt
Harold F. Eberle, Jr., Administrative Assistant, Representative Robert J. Corbett
Richard W. C. Falknor, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
Hugh Gregory Gallagher, Legislative Assistant, Senator E. L. Bartlett
William T. Kendall, Administrative Assistant, Representative Peter Frelinghuysen
Will Ernest Leonard, Jr., Legislative Assistant, Senator Russell B. Long
Stanley L. Newman, Legislative Assistant, Representative William F. Ryan
Kent Watkins, Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Standing Rules

Seminar in Legislative Operations.—The fifth in the series of Legislative Operations Roundtables, jointly sponsored by the Association and the Office of Career Development of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, was held May 10–14 for 20 Federal executives. The sessions were conducted at Georgetown University and at the Capitol. The program is part of a continuing effort to improve the federal career executive's knowledge and understanding of executive-legislative relations through an examination in depth of Congressional functions and processes. Discussion leaders and their subjects were as follows:

Max Kampelman, A.P.S.A. Treasurer and Counsel, "Congress and the American System"
Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University, and Robert L. Peabody, The Johns Hopkins University, "Congressional Organization: Leadership and Rules Changes in the 89th Congress"
Richard M. Scammon, Director of Elections Research Center, Governmental Affairs Institute, "The Congressman and His Constituency"
Stanley J. McFarland, Assistant Director, Federal Relations Division, National Education Association and Mary C. Gereau, Legislative Consultant, N.E.A., "External Pressures on Congress"
Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System"
Senator George D. Aiken, Vermont, "Representing and Informing the People: The Senate"
D. B. Hardeman, Administrative Assistant to Majority Whip Hale Boggs, and Eugene Eidenberg, Congressional Fellow of the American Political Science Association, "The Legislative Process"
Wilfred Rommel, Deputy Director, Office of Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget, "Central Legislative Clearance and Legislative Liaison"
Robert Clark, Clerk, Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate, "Financial Policy Determination and the Appropriations Process"
Francis J. Keenan, Administrative Assistant to Rep. Florence P. Dwyer and Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University, "Work behind the Scenes—The Congressional Staff"
Carl B. Swisher, The Johns Hopkins University, "Congress and the Courts"
Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin, "Legislative-Executive Branch Relations"

Social Studies Teachers' Seminars.—A group of Arlington County, Virginia, high school teachers explored the current state of political science and government during an eight-week series of seminars, which started March 29. Entitled "Political Science and the Social Studies," the seminars were co-sponsored by the Association and the Division of Instruction, Arlington County Public Schools. The sessions were conducted by leading members of the legislative and executive branches of the government, political scientists and other experts in the field of public affairs. About 50 of the Arlington Public School system's social studies teachers participated. Carried out as part of the Association's Social Studies Project, the seminar leaders and their subjects were as follows:

Richard M. Scammon, Director of Elections Research Center, Governmental Affairs Institute, "The Electoral Process"
Rep. Ken Hechler, Fourth District, West Virginia, "The Congress and the Presidency"
William B. Prendergast, Director of Research, House Republican Conference, "Political Parties"
Max Kampelman, A.P.S.A. treasurer and counsel, "The Judicial Process"

Norman Beckman, Assistant Director, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Local Government"
Field Haviland, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, "Foreign Policy and International Relations"
Harold Seidman, Director, Office of Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget, "Organization and Management"
Evron M. Kirkpatrick, A.P.S.A. Executive Director, "Political Science and the Social Studies"

Internship Evaluation Conference.—The Association sponsored a conference April 15–19 to consider implications of various forms of political internship for the educational process. Included among those attending the sessions, supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation and held near San Juan, Puerto Rico, were directors of all such programs involving more than a single campus. Seven of the participants presented papers on the potential—and problems—of political internship. They were:

Everett Cataldo, Ohio State University, "Evaluation of the Congressional Fellowship Program"
Bernard C. Hennessy, National Center for Education in Politics, "The Nature and Scope of College Political Internship Programs: Survey and Commentary"
Donald G. Herzberg, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, "The Care and Feeding of Interns"
Harold D. Lasswell, Yale Law School, "The Professional and Public Service Potential of Internship Programs"
James A. Robinson, Ohio State University, "Internships, Participant Observation, and Research"
John G. Stewart, Office of the Vice President, "The Intern Crisis: Some Thoughts on the Overextension of a Good Thing"
Sidney Wise, Franklin and Marshall College, "The Administration of an Internship Program"

Also attending the conference were the following:

Donald Bacon, Newhouse National News Service
Rep. John Brademas, of Indiana
Donald Balmer, Lewis and Clark College
Preston Edsall, North Carolina State College
D. B. Hardeman, Office of Democratic Whip, House of Representatives
Stephen Horn, Legislative Assistant to Sen. Thomas Kuchel
Victor Jones, University of California, Berkeley
Max Kampelman, A.P.S.A. treasurer and counsel
Evron M. Kirkpatrick, A.P.S.A. Executive Director
Malcolm Moos, The Ford Foundation
Richard Neustadt, Harvard University
J. W. Peltason, University of California at Irvine
Donald G. Tacheron, A.P.S.A. Associate Director
Paul N. Ylvisaker, Public Affairs Division, The Ford Foundation

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Eighth Annual Conference of the District of Columbia Political Science Association was held on December 5, 1964, at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D. C. Panel I was chaired by Pio Uliassi of the State Department who presented four discussants on the "International Implications of the Sino-Soviet Dispute." They were Franz Michael, George Washington University; Cary Fisher, editorial staff of USIA's *Problems of Communism;* Eric Willenz, Department of State; and Samuel L. Sharp, American University. Panel II chaired by Edna Fluegel of Trinity College presented a discussion formally titled "Consensus and the Two-Party System." Discussants were Robert J. Corber, chairman of the Virginia Republican Party; Franklin L. Burdette, University of Maryland; and Wesley McCune, president of Group Research, Inc. Panel III chaired by Nathaniel Preston, American University, probed "Political Science, Public Administration and the Technological Revolution." Paul W. Howerton and Terence G. Jackson, Jr., of American University and Stanford Research Institute respectively, presented papers on "The New Technology and Its Application" and "Points of Impact between Technology and Political Science: Some Researchable Propositions." Outgoing president Richard M. Scammon presided over the business meeting which elected the following Association officers: president, Charles L. Clapp, Legislative Assistant to Senator Saltonstall; 1st vice president, Valerie Earle, Georgetown University; 2d vice president, Richard T. Greer, executive director of Operations & Policy Research, Inc.; council member (2 years), Hugh LeBlanc, George Washington University; and council member (2 years), Walter Kravits, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

The Midwest Political Science Association met at Indiana University April 22 and 23 and commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Department of Government there. John E. Stoner, Indiana University, president of the association, presided. The program arranged by John E. Turner, University of Minnesota, consisted of considerations of the following topics with the leader of each: political theory, Thomas L. Thorson, University of Wisconsin; national government, Philip Wilder, Wabash College; comparative government, J. B. Christoph, Ohio State University; state and local government, David Minar, Northwestern University; public law and judicial process, Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky; international relations and foreign policy, David Farnsworth, University of Wichita; political parties, Paul Smith, Grinnell College; political behavior, Kenneth Prewett, Washington University (St. Louis); and developing nations, J. Gus Liebenow, Indiana University.

Two special features were an applied demonstration of simulation arranged by Raymond Tanter, Northwestern University, and a panel arranged by graduate students.

The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy held its annual meeting April 24–25, 1965 in Washington, D. C. Richard B. Brandt, chairman of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, was named president-elect. J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College, was appointed editor and John W. Chapman, University of Pittsburgh, associate editor of *Nomos*, the annual publication of the Society. Forthcoming volumes of *Nomos* will stress "Equality," the topic of the Washington meeting, and "Representation," the topic of the joint meeting with the American Political Science Association in September, 1965. The editors invite suggestions on potential contributors.

In the future, depending upon the topic selected for consideration at the Annual Meeting, the Society will meet in conjunction with the annual meetings of other social science disciplines.

Indiana and Purdue Universities served as hosts to the University-Federal Agency Conference held at Bloomington, Indiana, April 25 to April 28. The conference was sponsored by the U. S. Civil Service Commission and was attended by educators and government agency officials interested in the problems of career development and continuing education.

The Department of Government and the Division of University Extension of Indiana University, in cooperation with the Atlantic Council of the United States and the WFBM stations of Indianapolis, sponsored a conference on the United States and the Atlantic Community in February.

Rutgers—The State University sponsored a conference on International and Comparative Urban Studies and American Higher Education on June 6–8 in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

A conference on Liberty and Loyalty in a Free Society, sponsored by the Institute of Governmental Affairs and the Department of Political Science, was held March 27, 1965, at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Speakers included Supreme Court Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Thomas Fairchild, David Fellman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Dean Reynolds Seitz of the Marquette Law School, Harry Kalven, Jr. of the University of Chicago Law School, Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University, and Allan Dionisopoulos of Northern Illinois University.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, in collaboration with the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, will hold sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in Berkeley, California, December 26–31, 1965.

Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions should forward titles and abstracts of some 300 words not later than September 1 to Donald P. Ray, Director, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D. C. 20044.

Papers should be based on research current or recently completed by the author. Subjects may concern any field of political science, and especially science and public administration, political sociology of semi-developed countries, and international relations and the political science of national security.

Selected materials of the sessions will be published by the National Institute. The annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. is the largest professional meeting in the world.

Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., have announced the establishment of the John Fitzgerald

Kennedy Memorial Award of $10,000 for a "book of general interest which illumines the influence of an individual or individuals on his or their times and which fosters an understanding of this country or its role in the world." The publishers expect to make the first award to a manuscript received prior to December 31, 1965, and to make similar awards regularly in ensuing years. Judges for this year's manuscript will be Senator Robert F. Kennedy; McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President; and Allan Nevins, professor emeritus of American History at Columbia University. Interested persons should contact the publishers at 49 E. 33rd Street, New York, New York 10016 for further details.

The Weil Institute for Studies in Religion and the Humanities is offering eight 1966 summer fellowships, each yielding $1,200. Those eligible are faculty members working on publishable papers in the humanities (literature, art, history, philosophy, etc.) dealing with religion. The purpose of the grant is to enable the recipient to forego summer teaching in order to further his research or writing in connection with his paper, at a location of his choice. Preference in the past has been accorded to younger candidates in the lower academic ranks. While the project may ultimately be incorporated in a book, the essay should be an end in itself, and not a segment of a proposed book. Applications must be submitted by September 1, 1965, to the Weil Institute, 3101 Clifton Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45220.

A seminar on State Politics in India was held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology on December 21–23, 1964. The seminar was sponsored by the South Asia Committee of the Association for Asian Studies and was organized and chaired by Myron Weiner of M.I.T. Papers were read by Wayne Wilcox of Columbia, Baldev Raj Nayar of McGill University, Hugh Gray of L.S.E., Lawrence Shrader of Mills College, Marcus Franda of the University of Chicago and Paul Brass of Bryn Mawr. These papers, along with several others, will be published in a volume on the comparative study of the Indian states.

The University of Pennsylvania has received a total of $545,000 in grants to initiate a five-year cross-cultural study of the social values which influence the community leaders of countries in the process of political development to make decisions whose effect is to pull the society together. The main focus of the study will be on the identification, comparison and measurement of those values held by community leaders which influence their policy decisions.

In order to secure cross-cultural comparisons, the study will be conducted along parallel lines in several countries and regions within countries. During the first year, it will concentrate on India, Yugoslavia and Poland as well as the United States, and on the basis of this experience extend it to other areas.

Philip E. Jacob, professor of political science at Pennsylvania and director of the University's Program of International Cooperative Research on Social Values and Political Behavior, will direct the international study. Operationally based at Pennsylvania, it will be conducted with the collaboration of political and social scientists from various American and foreign universities.

Indiana University has been chosen by the National Institute of Public Affairs to conduct special mid-career training for government officials in the field of Science, Technology and Public Policy. Universities now cooperating with NIPA in various program facets of government mid-career training are Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Chicago, Virginia and Indiana.

The ninth annual Institute on United States Foreign Policy was held in the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Union on March 6, 1965. Speakers on the topic, "Break-up of the Bipolar World?" included Oliver E. Clubb, Jr. of Syracuse University; Alexander Dallin of Columbia University; James F. Leonard, Department of State; and Theodore C. Achilles, Atlantic Council, Washington, D. C.

BETTY BRAND BURCH, Tufts University, chaired the New England Regional Conference for the Association of Asian Studies held at Tufts last November.

ARDATH W. BURKS, Rutgers University, did field work in Japan during the first semester of 1965–66 on a grant from the Rutgers Research Council.

JAMES L. BUSEY, University of Colorado, served as Fulbright professor of political science at the School of Sociology and Politics, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, during the spring semester of 1964.

GEORGE CAREY, Georgetown University, was on leave of absence during 1964–65 to do research with Charles Hyneman at Indiana University.

THOMAS H. CLANCY, S. J., Loyola University, New Orleans, has been awarded a cross-disciplinary postdoctoral fellowship by the Society for Religion in Higher Education of New Haven, Connecticut. He will study at Oxford University during the 1965–66 academic year.

Gordon B. Cleveland, University of North Carolina, will spend the summer and fall in Italy conducting research.

George A. Codding, Jr., University of Colorado, has been granted a one-year faculty fellowship for 1965–66. He will take up research residence in Geneva.

Patrick J. Conklin, University of Missouri, was on leave of absence during most of 1964, serving as a staff member of the State Reorganization Commission of Missouri.

Robert T. Daland, University of North Carolina, will spend the summer in Brazil at the request of the School of Administration of the University of Bahia. He will serve as a consultant on the research program of the School and assist in the program of the Institute of Public Service.

Raymond H. Dawson, will return to his position in the department of political science at the University of North Carolina after one year on leave at King's College, University of London.

John C. Donovan has returned to teaching (Bowdoin) after an absence of six years which he spent in Washington. During that time he served in several capacities: as Administrative Assistant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie; as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Labor and during the past year as Manpower Administrator in the Department of Labor.

Arthur Dowell, Indiana State University, was on sabbatical leave during the spring semester.

Marion Doro has returned to Connecticut College as a regular member of the staff. During 1963–64 she was a visiting professor at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, on a University of Chicago Exchange Program supported by the Department of State.

Leo M. Egand, formerly of the New York City Planning Department, has been appointed Senior Management Consultant in the office of the Mayor of New York City.

Henry W. Ehrmann has been named Joel Parker professor of law and political science at Dartmouth.

Amitai Etzioni, Columbia University has been appointed to the editorial board of the *Administrative Science Quarterly*.

Richard R. Fagen will be on leave from Stanford University for the academic years 1965–67 on a Ford Retraining Fellowship in Latin American politics.

Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Rutgers University, will be on research leave during 1965–66 on a grant from the Rutgers Research Council.

Lawrence H. Fuchs, Brandeis University, will be on leave during 1965–66 as a senior scholar at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii.

Federico G. Gil returned in February to his position as chairman of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina.

Henry F. Goodnow will spend 18 months at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, to aid the university's public administration program.

George Grassmuck is serving as acting director of the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Michigan during the academic year 1964–65.

Richard I. Hofferbert, Williams College, has been awarded an NCEP fellowship and will serve from July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, as special assistant to Governor Lane of Colorado.

Dan N. Jacobs, Miami University (Ohio), has been awarded a university grant for summer research in the Soviet Union.

C. Herschel Jones, Bucknell University, directed a week-long Institute of Public Personnel Administration for New York State, February 15–19. The Institute is part of New York's Public Administration Internship and Trainee program.

Josef Kalvoda, University of San Diego, College for Women, has been awarded a research grant by the Hoover Institution on Revolution, Peace, and War, Stanford University.

Stephen D. Kertesz, Notre Dame, has received a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

William Kinter, University of Pennsylvania, received the annual award of the Assembly of Captive European Nations in February. Medals are awarded to journalists and political writers who have directed their concern toward Eastern Europe and the cause of freedom there.

Norman Kogan, University of Connecticut, spent his 1964–65 sabbatical leave in Rome, Italy.

David Kurtzman, University of Pennsylvania, is serving as a member of the Pennsylvania State Planning Board and of the Governor's Committee on Tax Administration by appointment of Governor Scranton.

Hugh L. LeBlanc, George Washington University, was on sabbatical leave during the spring semester of 1965.

KURT L. LONDON, George Washington University, has been invited to lecture on American foreign policy and the Sino-Soviet conflict at Keio University, the Imperial Japanese Defense Academy and the University of Kyoto in the fall of 1965.

H. MALCOLM MACDONALD, University of Texas, has been granted a research leave for the summer of 1965.

DANIEL S. MCHARGUE, formerly of the University of Michigan, has completed a two-year assignment as visiting professor of public administration with the University of South California's Public Administration project in Pakistan. He will now act in the same capacity for the University's Indonesian Public Administration project.

WARREN L. MASON, Miami University (Ohio), has returned from a month's study in India, sponsored by the Indian government.

CURTIS W. MARTIN has returned from a year's stay in Australia as Fulbright professor. In Australia he divided his time between the University of Sydney and the University of Tasmania at Hobart.

DONALD R. MATTHEWS has returned to the University of North Carolina after being on leave of absence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, California.

L. VINCENT PADGETT, San Diego State College, was on leave during the spring quarter. He will spend the academic year 1965–66 in Colombia under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

CHARLES J. PARRISH, University of Texas, has resumed his post there following a year in Chile on research leave.

HOWARD PENNIMAN, Georgetown University, combined a Fulbright research grant with sabbatical leave in southern France, during 1964–65.

EMMETTE S. REDFORD, University of Texas, will serve part time during the fall semester in the Graduate School of Business Administration.

DONALD R. REICH, Oberlin College, will spend the 1965–66 year as a fellow in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science at Palo Alto.

JOHN P. ROCHE, Brandeis University, will be on sabbatical leave in 1965–66. He has received a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

GEORGE K. ROMOSER, Connecticut College, received grants from the American Philosophical Society and the American Council of Learned Societies. He spent the 1964 summer in Berlin conducting research and lecturing at the Free University.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, University of Bridgeport, has been elected an honorary member of the *Instituto de Ciencias Sociales* of Spain.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW, Columbia University, is on sabbatical leave during the spring and fall terms of 1965. During the spring term he was NATO visiting professor in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

ROBERT SELTZER, Indiana State University has been on sabbatical leave.

JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, Rutgers University, will teach at Cornell during the summer of 1965 and while there will counsel a group of secondary school teachers in a special Cornell program.

KARL N. SNOW, Brigham Young University, is currently on leave to complete his doctorate at the University of California.

JOHN E. STONER, Indiana University, has received a research grant from the National Safety Council.

MORTON J. TENZER has resigned his position as associate director of the U. S. Civil Service Commission's Executive Seminar Center to become a staff member of the Institute of Public Administration in New York.

EARL WALLACE, University of North Carolina, served on the Evaluation Panel for the Selection of Fellowships for the National Science Foundation in Washington in February, 1965. He also served as a member of a committee to study the feasibility of expanding the coverage of the advanced test of the Graduate Record Examination.

ARTHUR M. WILSON has been named Daniel Webster professor at Dartmouth College.

DAVID O. D. WURFEL, University of Missouri, is spending the current academic year in the Far East. Much of his time has been devoted to a Fulbright lectureship at the University of Singapore.

STAFF CHANGES

New Appointments

David B. Abernathy, assistant professor, Stanford University, September, 1965.

John Batchelder, instructor, University of Iowa.

George D. Beam, assistant professor, Chicago Circle Branch, University of Illinois, September, 1965.

Edward M. Bershtein, associate professor and chairman of the department, University of Hartford, Connecticut.

Lewis Bowman, assistant professor, University of Virginia, September, 1965.

Peter K. Breit, instructor, University of Hartford, Connecticut.

William Brill, assistant professor, Georgetown University.

Milton C. Cummins, associate professor, Johns Hopkins University.

John C. Donovan, professor, Bowdoin College.

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, associate professor, University of Virginia.

Marion Doro, assistant professor, Connecticut College.

David V. Edwards, assistant professor, University of Texas.

Morton Gordon, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Donald Hancock, assistant professor, University of Texas.

Harold C. Hinton, associate professor, George Washington University.

James R. Jensen, professor and coordinator of Instructional Television, University of Alabama, beginning February 1, 1965; formerly of the University of Houston.

Harold S. Johnson, assistant professor, Michigan State University, September, 1965.

Jack T. Johnson, professor and director of the Bureau of Government Research, Indiana State University.

Willard R. Johnson, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Melvin A. Kahn, associate professor, Indiana State University.

Bradley Karan, instructor, Michigan State University.

William Keech, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

Robert O. Keohane, instructor, Swarthmore College, September, 1965.

David C. Leege, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

William Matthews, Indiana State University; formerly of the University of Vermont.

William Maxam, Indiana State University; formerly research analyst, Committee on Intergovernmental Relations.

Franz Michael, professor and director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, Georgetown University; formerly of University of Washington.

Stanley Millet, professor and chairman of the department, Adelphi University, September, 1965.

Robert A. Packenham, assistant professor, Stanford University, September, 1965.

Rene Peritz, Indiana State University.

John M. Phelps, assistant professor, University of Southwestern Louisiana.

Theodore L. Putterman, instructor, University of Arizona.

Bernard Reich, assistant professor, Georgetown University.

William H. Roberts, professor and director of the Institute of International Law and Relations, the Catholic University of America.

Edward T. Rowe, instructor, University of Denver.

Robert S. Shartlet, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

Robert H. Solver (Col. U. S. Army, retired), associate professor, Brigham Young University.

Herbert J. Spiro, professor, University of Pennsylvania.

Newell M. Stultz, assistant professor, Brown University, July, 1965.

Joseph Tanenhaus, professor, University of Iowa; formerly of New York University.

Paul Wallace, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

William O. Winter, professor and chairman of the department, University of Colorado.

John C. Withey, lecturer, Whittier College.

Peter Wall, associate professor, Brandeis University.

Stephen Wood, associate professor, Connecticut College, September, 1964.

Paul de Young Kay, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Jay K. Zawodny, professor, University of Pennsylvania.

Temporary and Visiting Appointments

Bruce Borthwick, Georgetown University (1964–65).

Harold R. Bruce, Dartmouth College: visiting professor, Scripps College.

Ardath W. Burks, Rutgers University: visiting lecturer, University of Hawaii, summer, 1965.

Heinz Eulau, Stanford University: visiting professor, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1964–65.

Robert H. Ferrell, Indiana University: visiting professor, University of Connecticut, 1964–65.

Herman Finer, University of Chicago: visiting professor, Chicago Circle Branch of the University of Illinois, 1965–66.

Lee Green, visiting professor, University of Georgia, spring, 1965.

Reverdy Gliddon, University of Missouri: visiting professor, University of Texas, summer, 1965.

Henry F. Goodnow, University of California: visiting professor, University of California.

Robert F. Karsch, University of Missouri: visiting professor, Jadavpur University, Calcutta, India, 1965–66.

Wolfgang H. Kraus, George Washington University: visiting professor, University of Heidelberg, summer, 1964.

H. Malcolm MacDonald, University of Texas: William A. Johnson visiting professor, Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School.

Eugene J. Meehan, Rutgers University: visiting professor, Brandeis University, 1965–66.

Linda Miller, instructor, Barnard College, 1965–1966.

Randall H. Nelson, Southern Illinois University: visiting professor, University of California, spring and summer, 1964.

Chester Newland, North Texas State University: visiting professor, University of Texas, summer, 1965.

A. F. K. Organski, Brooklyn College: visiting professor, University of Michigan, winter, 1965.

Roland I. Perusse, University of Maryland: visiting associate professor, Texas Western College.

Herman C. Pritchett, University of Chicago: lecturer in American democracy, Stanford University, winter quarter, 1965.

Charles B. Robson, University of North Carolina: guest professor, University of Cologne, summer, 1965.

Robert A. Rupen, University of North Carolina: lecturer, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, July-December, 1965.

Lalita Prosad Singh, Australian National University: visiting assistant professor, University of Missouri, 1965–66.

Byron S. Weng, instructor, Miami University (Ohio), 1964–65.

Philip S. Wilder, Jr., Wabash College: visiting lecturer, University of Illinois, second semester, 1964–65.

Richard B. Wilson, University of Colorado: visiting professor, University of California at Santa Barbara, spring, 1964.

Other Appointments

Charles F. Baldwin, Diplomat in Residence, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, formerly Ambassador to Malaysia.

Demetrios Caraley, Barnard College: chairman of the department.

Lee W. Farnsworth, Brihgam Young University: coordinator of the International Relations Program.

Paul Fowler, Indiana State University: acting chairman of the department.

Louis G. Kahle, University of Missouri: chairman of the department beginning June 1, 1964.

NORTON E. LONG, Brandeis University: chairman of the department, 1965–66.

EDWIN B. MORRELL, Brigham Young University: coordinator of the newly established Russian Studies program.

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT (formerly of Columbia University): associate dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration and director of the new Institute of Politics to be connected with the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

MAURICE K. TOWNSEND, Moorhead State College: academic dean.

JAMES R. WOODWORTH, Miami University (Ohio), chairman of the department, beginning February 1, 1965.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

MICHAEL A. ARMACOST, Pomona College, assistant professor.

WILLIAM ANDREWS, Tufts University, associate professor.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY, Barnard College: associate professor.

GEORGE CAREY, Georgetown University: associate professor.

PATRICK J. CONKLIN, University of Missouri: associate professor.

HARVEY GLICKMAN, Haverford College: associate professor.

JACOB LANDYNSKI, The Graduate Faculty, The New School: associate professor.

HERBERT R. MARSHALL, Stanford University: professor.

DALE A. NEUMAN, University of Rochester: assistant professor.

L. VINCENT PADGETT, San Diego State College: professor.

ROBERT L. PEABODY, Johns Hopkins University: associate professor.

GEORGE K. ROMOSER, Connecticut College: associate professor.

MARTIN SHAPIRO, Stanford University: associate professor.

JAN TRISKA, Stanford University: professor.

LLOYD M. WELLS, University of Missouri: professor.

MARVIN WEINBAUM, Colby College, assistant professor.

DAVID O. D. WURFEL, University of Missouri: associate professor.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

JOSEPH E. BLACK has resigned from the chairmanship at Miami University (Ohio) to be director of Social Sciences and Humanities, Rockefeller Foundation.

GENERAL WILLIAM C. CHASE retired at the end of the spring quarter, 1965, as visiting lecturer at the University of Houston.

DAVID W. KEPPER retired at the end of the spring quarter, 1965, after twenty years as professor at the University of Houston.

LOUIS MEYER resigned from the University of Arizona to become administrative assistant to Governor Sam Goddard.

THOMAS P. PEARDON will retire from Barnard as of July, 1965.

JOHN SCHMIDHAUSER resigned his professorship at the University of Iowa to take over his new duties as U. S. Representative from the first congressional district of Iowa.

JACOB VAN EK, University of Colorado, retired in June, 1965. He had served as dean of the College of Arts and Sciences from 1929 to 1959.

SSRC PROGRAMS, 1966

The Social Science Research Council's programs of Research Training Fellowships and Faculty Research Grants are currently under review, and it is not yet certain what form these may take for the coming year.

The Council will again offer grants to mature scholars, not candidates for degrees, on essentially the same basis as before, for research on American Governmental and Legal Processes, and for research on International Organization.

Under joint sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, several programs of fellowships and grants for training and research on certain foreign areas will be continued; inquiries concerning these should be directed respectively to the offices indicated:

Grants to mature scholars for research on Africa, Contemporary China, Latin America, and the Near and Middle East are administered by the Social Science Research Council; for research in Asian Studies and in Slavic and East European Studies, by the American Council of Learned Societies (345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017);

Fellowships for training in foreign area studies are administered by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program (444 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y 10022).

Inquiries, and requests for a final announcement to be issued in late September, should be addressed to Social Science Research Council Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

To avoid missing deadlines, prospective applicants should correspond with appropriate office by early October.

IN MEMORIAM

William Montgomery McGovern, professor of political science at Northwestern University, died December 12, 1964, at the age of 67. Born in Brooklyn, N. Y., he spent most of his childhood in the Orient. He obtained his Doctor of Philosophy degree from Christ Church College, Oxford, England, in 1922, and joined the faculty of Northwestern University in 1929. In 1937 he left the University to report the developing war in the Far East for the *Chicago Times*, returning in 1940 to lecture at Harvard University. Beginning in 1941 he served in the Navy as a special advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On his discharge from the Navy he held the rank of commander and received the Legion of Merit. He then returned to full time teaching duties at Northwestern and also participated actively in public affairs both in party politics and in various capacities in the national government.

Professor McGovern was the author of eleven books. Their range reflects the spectrum of his life's interest: *Modern Japan, Colloquial Japanese, An Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism, Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, To Lhasa in Disguise, Jungle Paths and Inca Ruins, Growth of Institutions, Early Empires of Central Asia, From Luther to Hitler, Radicals and Conservatives,* and *Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow.*

He is survived by his widow, two daughters and a son.—R. Barry Farrell

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(September 8-11, 1965)

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The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

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Notice

Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

> "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 7, 1965, in the Wilmington Room, Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.

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

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